Fite/ C.F. Personal Milwaukee, Wis., April 3, 1903. My dear Secretary Moody: Is it true that Captain Lamborton has recently delivered a lecture in Boston in which he has stated that a war with Germany cannot be avoided? If so, please call him to account, and if this thing goes on any further a general order will have to be issued warning in the sharpest terms our officers that they must not use language which may be accepted as hostile to any foreign nation. I want every step to be taken to increase the size of our navy, and I should hold the Navy Department to a rigid accountability if it did not steadfastly endeavor to increase the efficiency of the navy so that it would be fit to meet any possible fee; but it is neither wise nor seemly for any officer of the navy, from Admiral Dewey to Captain Lamberton down, to use any language which may tend to embarrass the good feeling between us and any foreign nation. Faithfully yours, Hon. Wm. H. Moody, Secretary of the Navy.2 [ca. 481903] [Shorthand writing] [a secreatary's page of notes in shorthand][attached to Lodge, 4-8-03]Personal. Cinnabar, Montana. April 17, 1903. My dear Sir: Your letter of March 31st was duly received and has been brought to the attention of the President, who request me to thank you cordially for writing. Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Hon. George Turner, Spokane, Washington.TELEGRAM. W4 White House, Washington. Cinnabar, Mont. April 21, 1903. W.A. Patton, Assistant to the President, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Philadelphia, Pa. Personal. The favor would be greatly appreciated if you could send another representative in place of Mr. McCoy for the balance of the President's trip. I make [*this*] the request with great reluctance and hope it will not be interpreted to Mr. McCoy's detriment. He is undoubtedly an exceptionally efficient man in railroad matters, but he does not seem to possess the peculiar qualifications necessary for the conduct of a Presidential tour. My personal relations with him are pleasant, but he has embarrassed me considerably by talking too much and does not get on well with the members of the party nor with the crew. I am therefore constrained, after most careful consideration, to make this request. WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary. (Official)TELEGRAM T WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Cinnabar, Mont., April 22, 1903. Hon. Rudolph Forster, Assistant Secretary to the President, Washington, D.C. Please inquire of Secretary of the Treasury and inform me if appointment of [*Hanbury as?*] New York Shipping Commissioner was announced on the fifteenth in accordance with instructions. William Loeb, Jr., Secretary. (Official.) Sent in [cipher?]Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Grand Island, Neb., April 27, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: I am glad to see that you removed Tyner. The action of Mrs. Tyner shows that our clemency was misplaced, and that he should have been re- moved outright instead of being given the chance to resign. I think that whole bureau should be cleaned out. It does not seem to me that it would be expedient to promote Tyner's assistant, Christiancy, for evidently things have gone on there in bad shape. So far I have had a very successful trip. I earnestly hope your health is all right. I look forward to seeing you when I get back to Washington. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Henry C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C.Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Lincoln, Nebraska, April 27, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Getting hold of the papers, I am rather concerned over the statements that appear about the Post Office Department. There has evidently been some very bad work in the past in the Post Office Department and we cannot afford to take half measures. We need some new men, and very possibly a re- arrangements of positions. Let Bristow go right on with his investigation, and if there is the slightest rottenness put the knife in up to the hilt. Bristow is an entirely fearless and honest man, and I do not believe he has been talking. Let me know how things are coming out. As I wrote you, I feel we should have not only a new man in Tyner's place but a new man for his assistant. Give my warm regards to Mrs. Payne. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Henry C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. St. Louis, Mo., April 29, 1903. Dear Mr. Payne: I have just received your letter and it is first rate. I am very glad you made that statement; and have not a thing to suggest. Don't decide about Machen until I see you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Henry C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. {Handwritten} see Payne 4/27/03 Form No. 168. [*550 6500*] THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY INCORPORATED 23,000 OFFICES IN AMERICA. CABLE SERVICE TO ALL THE WORLD. This Company TRANSMITS and DELIVERS messages only on conditions limiting its liability, which have been assented to by the sender of the following message. Errors can be guarded against only by repeating a message back to the sending station for comparison, and the Company will not hold itself liable for errors or delay. In transmission or delivery of Unrepeated Messages, beyond the amount of tolls paid thereon, nor in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is file with the Company for transmission. This is an UNREPEATED MESSAGE, and is delivered by request of the sender, under the conditions named above. ROBERT C. CLOWRY, President and General Manager. RECEIVED at Wyatt Building, Cor. 14th & F. Streets, Washington, D. C. A287Ny. Mq. Xa. 43 paid govt RUSSELL KAS, May 2, 1903 Hon John Hay, Secy of State, Washington D. C. Personal - What does Loubets telegram of April 30th mean? I thought American squadron was not to touch anywhere on Continent of Europe. Do not let fleet alter arrangements without my sanction. Theodore Roosevelt. 6:08pmRECEIVED A287Ny. Mq. Xa. 43 paid govt RUSSELL KAS, Hay 2,1903 Hon John Hay, Secy of State, Washington D.C. Personal- What does Loubate telegram of April 30th mean? I thought American squadron was not to touch anywhere on Continent of Europe. Do not let fleet alter arrangements without my sanction. Theodore Roosevelt. 6:08amPersonal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Enroute, May 11, 1903. My dear Mr. Postmaster General: I have been very glad to have a long talk with Moody over what you told him, as well as to receive the letter you sent; and I am much pleased that Machen has been relieved. From information already given me I feel that Machen should in no event be kept -- always provided of course that the information given me is not false. I am not worried at all about the newspaper criticism and talk. You and I are not responsible for what has been discovered in the Post Office Department. We are merely responsible for having discovered it. All these men who have done badly were appointed before our time; all the abuses existed before our time. All that we are doing is to cut them out. If we do this resolutely and thoroughly the public will I think sooner or later recognize the fact --and if it does not, why we cannot help it, and we will have done our duty anyhow. In three weeks from now I shall be home and then I can go over the whole situation with you. I am delighted with the confidence you have in Bristow and am sure that he will go to the root of things. I wish very much that we could punish some of the scoundrels. I should like to get the whole Tyner family and connections in jail; but I suppose there is not much chance of it. Give my love to Mrs. Payne. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H.C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. P.S. Of course as regards the outrage on the colored letter carrier in Tennessee, we will simply have no work done on the route unless the colored letter carrier is protected and is allowed to do his work peaceably and properly.Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Seattle, Washington, May 23, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Many thanks for your letter. I shall take up the whole matter of the postal business with you just as soon as I get back. Meanwhile I should advise against your issuing any further statements whatever. I do not think it well to let the answers and statements go out piecemeal. When I get back we will go into the matter and endeavor to close it just as quickly as possible-- that is, as quickly as is compatible with thoroughness of investigation; and then we can make one clear cut definite statement which shall recapitulate the whole matter, showing what has been done. I have regretted Senator Hanna's action in the Ohio Convention, and his last utterance is of course sheer nonsense and insincere nonsense at that. I do not understand his saying that the Ohio Republicans could not with propriety at this time take the action concerning me which at a corresponding period in President McKinley's first administration Mr. Hanna was most anxious I should take, and which I did take. If Mr. Hanna is for me there could be no possible objection to his saying so. Of course he has a perfect right to be against me, but if such is the case his action should be based explicitly on that ground, and not on grounds which are foolish. I have had a great trip, but am feeling anxious to get back and have my hands on the levers once more. Besides, I am of course jaded and tired, - 2. and have delivered all my "messages," so that I do not feel that I have anything else to say. With warm regards to Mrs. Payne. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C .TELEGRAM White House, Washington. Seattle, Wash., May 24, 1903. Hon. M. A. Hanna, Cleveland, Ohio. Telegram received. The President will arrive in Cleveland on special train early on morning of tenth. Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary. (Official)TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. May 25, 1903. Frie/C.F. The following statement has been given out for to-morrow morning's papers: "In speaking of the sudden political developments in Ohio the President this afternoon said: "I have not asked any man for his support. I have had nothing whatever to do with raising the issue as to my endorsement. Sooner or later it was bound to arise; and inasmuch as it has now arisen, of course those who favor my administration and my nomination will endorse both [of them], and those who do not will oppose." The President also said that he was deeply touched by the action of President McKinley's home county, in which Canton is situated, in instructing so heartily in his favor. Nothing could have pleased him more. Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary. (Charge to the President's personal account, White House, Washington, D.C.) The above telegram was sent to Hon. J.B. Foraker, Cincinnati, O., and Hon. F.B. Loomes, Asst. Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. [5-25-03] In speaking of the sudden political developments in Ohio the President this afternoon said: "I have not asked any man for his support, I have [not raised (the issue of ?my nomination of me.) this issue] had nothing whatever to do with raising the issue as to my endorsement. Sooner or later it was bound to arise; and inasmuch as it has now arisen, of course those who favor my administration and my nomination will endorse both, and those who do not will oppose." The President also said that he was deeply touched by the action of President McKinley's home county, in which Canton is situated, in instructing as heartily in his favor. Nothing could have pleased him more.[1903 May 25] In speaking of the sudden political developments in Ohio the President this afternoon said: "I have not asked any man for his support, I have not raised this issues. [????] Sooner or later it was bound to arise; and inasmuch as it has now arisen, of course those who favor my administration [and my nomination] will endorse both, and those who do not will oppose." The President also said that he was deeply touched by the action of President MrKinley's home county, in which Canton is situated, in instructing so heartily in his favor. Nothing could have pleased him more. [shorthand] [shorthand] [shorthand] [shorthand] [shorthand][*Hanna*] TELEGRAM. [*50*] White House, [*NA File C.F.*] Washington. May 25, 1903 . Hon. M. A. Hanna, Cleveland, Ohio. Your telegram received. I have not asked any man for his support . I have had nothing whatever to do with raising this issue. Inasmuch as it has been raised of course those who favor my administration and my nomination will favor endorsing both and those who do not will oppose. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[5-25-03] Hon. M. H. Hanna Cleveland Ohio. Your telegram received. I have not asked [and never shall ask] any man for his support. I have [done] had nothing whatever to dowith raising this issue. In as much as it has been raised of course those who favor my administration and my nomination will favor endorsing both [me] and those who do notwill oppose [it]. Theodore RooseveltTELEGRAM. White House, Washington, May 27, 1903. [*File C7?*] Hon. M. A. Hanna, Cleveland, Ohio. I thank you for your telegram and appreciate your action. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (President's private account.)(Copy) WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON. Butte, Montana, May 27, 1903. My dear Senator: Do you know when I am to make the appointments of the International Commission to decide on the plan for maintaining the level of the Great Lakes? I have heard about it, but I do not know just when I am to act. I shall talk over the matter with you when I see you at Cleveland. By the way, does Mrs. Hanna know that my daughter is to accompany me to the wedding? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. M. A. Hanna, Cleveland, Ohio.TELEGRAM. White House, Washington, May 27, 1903. Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. 56169 41276 of 18427s 47372? 33900 52844 think it 25361 [??????] 52597 53664 38401 10000 junketing 41798, 34036 53279 at [?????] 28040 43758 36556 16440 11698 the 53664 53149 U a w c 34553 36885. Theodore Roosevelt.Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 6, 1903. My dear Senator: I have received your two letters of the 4th and 5th. The President will give the application of Mr. Keeney careful consideration when the matter of those appointments is taken up. Your comment on the political situation was most interesting. We had a great trip to the coast. I wish I could give you some advice about the matter with which you close your letter of the 5th, but I cannot in my present position. Hoping you will appreciate the conditions in this regard, I am, As always, your friend, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. Geo. E. Green, 170 Broadway, New York, N.Y.Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, June 12, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Cannot you have a thorough investigation made of the New York Post Office in connection with what has gone on in the Post Office Department? Could Bristow or some one like him undertake it? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 18, 1903. My dear Sir: The President requests me to write to you and ask if you and Senator Alger cannot recommend to him a first-class civil engineer well versed in the hydraulics of the Great Lakes, for appointment on the international commission to investigate and report on the waters of the Great Lakes. I have written Senator Alger a letter to this same effect. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. J. C. Burrows, United States Senate. A similar letter to the above was sent to Senator Alger on the same date.(copy) WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON June 18, 1903. CONFIDENTIAL My dear Sir: The President is selecting the three members of the Commission, who shall represent the United States, that are to investigate and report upon the condition and uses of the waters adjacent to the boundary line between the United States and Canada, in accordance with a section of [t] the River and Harbor Appropriation Act approved June 13, 1902, and would like to have you advise him whether you can accept appointment on the Commission as the " Lawyer of experience in questions of international and riparian law," as provided in said section. An early reply will oblige. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR ., Secretary to the President. Hon. George Clinton , Buffalo, N. Y.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 18, 1903. My dear Mr. Youngs: All the cases connected with the Post Office Department must of course be followed up with peculiar rigor, for there can be no more heinous offense than a breach of trust by a public official. I want to talk with you about them just as soon as I get a chance. It is unnecessary to say that every possible effort must be made to bring every wrong-doer to justice - and that without the slightest regard as to whether he is of our party or of the other party, or what his social or political standing may be. Every particle of corruption is to be cut out without the slightest reference as to who is hurt. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. W. J. Youngs, United States District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y.Copy of telegram WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 21, 1903 Charles J. Bonaparte, Baltimore, Md. Can you come over tomorrow, Monday, to see me on a matter of importance? Come for lunch or dinner. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Official(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 22, 1903. My dear Sir: Your letter of the 20th instant has been received and in reply I beg to state that the President will take pleasure in appointing you on the commission to which you refer, but he does not wish it made public until he has selected the full committee. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Mr. George Clinton, 1012 Prudential Building, Buffalo, N.Y.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 22, 1903. Sir: As you know, the charges in connection with the Post Office Department are now being investigated by Fourth Assistant Postmaster General Bristow, who has had placed at his disposal by the Postmaster General every resource of the Department, including the services of Mr. Robb, whom you detailed from the Department of Justice to the Post Office Department immediately after the removal of Mr. Tyner. As a result of this investigation, a number of indictments have already been had and it is probable that other indictments will hereafter be asked for. There can be no greater offense against the Government than a breach of trust on the part of a public official or the dishonest management of his of office, and, of course, every effort must be exerted to bring such offenders to punishment by the utmost rigor of the law. The District Attorney's Office, of the District of Colombia, has faithfully and zealously seconded the efforts of the Post Office Department in this matter, but the amount of work in the office is such as to make it difficult, without neglecting other important public duties, to devote all the time necessary to the prosecution of these cases. I suggest, therefore, that if you cannot detail some of your present staff, you appoint special assistants in these post office cases, not only to take up the cases in which indictments have been found or hereafter may be found, but to examine into all charges that have been made against officials in the postal service, with a view to the removal and prosecution of all guilty men in the service and the prosecution of guilty men whether in the service or not, where the cases are not barred by the statue of limitations. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. P. C. Knox, Attorney General.Copy. Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 22, 1903. My dear Sir: Your letter of recent date, forwarding galley proofs of speeches delivered by the President while in California, have been received. Owing to the incompleteness of the proofs submitted I return them without correction. As it is your desire to publish the speeches in full I send you herewith a complete set of corrected copies of all the speeches made by the President while in California. Replying to your inquiry regarding the copyright, it is of course desired that the book should not be copyrighted. I take pleasure in sending you the accompanying photograph of the President to be used in the direction indicated in your letter of the 11th instant. Please be good enough to have proofs of all the matter to be used in the book, together with title pages, etc., submitted to me for approval before the book is completed. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. Hamilton Wright, Chief, Publican Bureau, The California Promotion Committee, 25 New Montgomery Street, San Francisco, Cal. Enclosures.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Strictly personal June 25, 1903. My dear Mr. Bristow: The other day Postmaster General Payne requested you particularly to investigate the whole matter in connection with Mr. Rand. I shall be glad to have this done at as early a date as convenient. By the way, let me urge you if possible to have a report upon the crookedness in the office by some time in August. I should like to have your report and the preliminary report of Bonaparte and Conrad before me by that time. Of course you will have to make a long report of an administrative character, but that can be deferred. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Joseph L. Bristow, Fourth Assistant Postmaster General. P.S. Besides examining the Rand case yourself, if there is any question of any criminality of course bring it before Bonaparte and Conrad.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal June 25, 1903. To the Postmaster General: [*[H.C Payne]*] As regards this matter, please have a report from a Post Office Inspector upon it. The postmaster should be reprimanded for commenting as he does upon Congressman Hildebrand. I do not know whether the Congressman or the postmaster is right as to the removal, and the Department must be governed simply by the merits of the matter. The postmaster is entirely right in holding to his position against the wishes of the Congressman if he deems he ought to, but he is entirely wrong in criticising the Congressman, who is the mouthpiece of the people of his district, for expressing what he believes to be the wishes of the people of the district and for striving to do what he regards as proper and equitable in the matter. The postmaster must be warned that such criticisms will not be received or tolerated by the Department - of course it must be understood that I shall expect the postmaster to state the needs of the situation without reference to the wishes of anyone. T. ROOSEVELT .Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON . June 25, 1903. Personal My dear Mr. Postmaster General: I will not have any more rushing into print without authority in the Post Office Department. Please require an immediate report from Mr. Madden as to what he means by publishing the letter he wrote you the other day. Please call up your chief subordinates and say that I will no longer tolerate going into print without permission and sending matter to the press without authorization. Not one fact in connection with the Post Office Department shall be made public save in proper form and at the proper time. Every subordinate who knows of any wrong must report the same, and it is to be investigated with the utmost thoroughness; and all in connection with it will ultimately be made public, which publicity is to be made either by your orders or by mine. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 26 , 1903. Personal. My dear Sir: I return herewith the proofs received with your letter of the 19th, and beg to call your attention to the parts which have been disapproved. Under no circumstances must it appear anywhere that the publication of the speeches is authorized by the President, or that they were edited by me . As stated in my communication of the 22nd instant, it is desired that the book be not copyrighted . Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. Hamilton Wright, The California Promotion Committee, 25 New Montgomery Street , San Francisco, Cal . Enclosure.[*[7-1-03]*] [ [[shorthand]] [Langerman Gilsey House] [[shorthand]] OB] [* wrote Mr. Langerman am State Dept. 7-1-1903*][*[ATTATCHED TO LANGERMAN 7-1-03]*][*Allen*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON PERSONAL Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 2, 1903. [My dear Sir : The President has received your letter of the 30th ultimo and desires me to ask if you will not refer to what he said when he received the Committee at the White House about the massacre. The President also desires to correct two misconceptions in your letter. There is no question of an attack at all. In the next place in a single day's massacre and outrage on the day referred to a thousand-fold greater agony and abhorrence occurred than in all the states combined from the close of the Civil War to the present day, and the offenses included not only every variety of offense committed by an American mob when it lynches a person, but also every variety of offense committed by the criminals who have thus been lynched. No has more openly and heartily condemned such lynchings and has]more strongly endeavored to put a stop to them than the President. Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Mr. Edward Jay Allen, 307 Fourth Avenue, Pittsburg, Pa.[*L.*] [*File*] [[[shorthand]]] [*Edward Jay Allen 6/30/'03*] [*[ 7-2-03]*]WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300. Mr. Edward Jay Allen, 307 Fourth Avenue, Pittsburg , Pa. PERSONALTELEGRAM. [*Copy*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 4, 1903. Governor Taft, Manila. I open the American Pacific Cable with greetings to you and the people of the Philippines. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM. [*Copy*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 4, 1903. Mr. Clarence H. Mackay, President, Pacific Cable Company, Congratulations and success to the Pacific Cable which the genius of your lamented father and your own enterprise made possible. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. STATE DEPARTMENT, July 6, 1903. 1:16 p.m His Excellency President Estrada Palama, HABANA. I receive with sincere appreciation your greeting of the Fourth instant. The prosperity and welfare of the Republic and people of Cuba are very dear to the Government and people of the United States and in their name I reciprocate your good wishes. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. --JM--{*[To Durbin, Winfeld Taylor Gov. Ind.]*] [*Y*] [*Letter based on this sent to Gov. Durbin of Indiana 8-7-1903*] PERSONAL WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 9, 1903. [*[W T DURBIN]*] My dear Sir: It is wellnigh needless to say that I have shared with you to the full all the alarm and concern which you have expressed over the growth of lynching in this country, and especially over the peculiarly hideous forms taken by mob violence when colored men and even colored women are the victims. Let me at the outset make one point clear, however. In a certain proportion of these cases the man lynched has been guilty of a crime horrible beyond description -- the crime of rape -- often accompanied with acts of fiendish cruelty or of murder. When a negro commits this crime, as when any other man commits it, he forfeits the right to any sympathy of any kind whatsoever. My desire that the hideous crime shall not be hideously avenged by mob violence is due not in the least to sympathy for the criminal, but to a very lively sense of the train of dreadful consequences which follow the course taken by the mob in exacting an inhuman vengeance for his inhuman crime. Moreover, i wish to point out to my colored fellow citizens, with all the emphasis of which I am capable, that in such cases the crime against the colored man is committed not by the mob who lynches the brute, but by the brute who commits the crime -- exactly as the crime against the white race is that committed by the mob. I most heartily commend the action of those bodies of colored men who at Elizabeth, New Jersey, and elsewhere at the time of the recent dreadful crime and dreadful lynching near Wilmington, Delaware, confined themselves to expressing their horror and destestation of the criminal who committed the appalling outrage.2 Every such criminal not merely sins against humanity in inexpiable and unpardonable fashion, but sins particularly against his own race and does them a wrong far greater than any white man can possibly do them. Moreover, this particular crime is of so hideous a type that when the individual criminal alone is considered not the slightest sympathy can be felt for him, no matter what his sufferings may be. Therefore the colored people throughout the land should in every possible way show their belief that they more than all others in the community are horrified at the commission of such a crime, and are concerned in taking every possible measure to prevent its recurrence and to bring the criminal to immediate justice. The slightest lack of vigor, either in denunciation of the crime or in bringing the criminal to justice, is in itself unpardonable. So much for the negro; now for the white. With any effort under the law to expedite the proceedings of justice in the case of this awful crime I have the most hearty sympathy. Every legislator, every judicial and executive officer, should strain every nerve to see that instant punishment is made to follow the deed. No other crime is so evil; no other crime is so certain to awake not merely among the lawless and violent but among many good citizens as well, such a wild and furious spirit of revenge. Measures should be taken to provide for the most summary method for dealing under the forms and by the processes of law with every such case -- speed being recognized as the prime necessity. But the fullest recognition of the horror of the crime and the most complete lack of sympathy with the criminal can not in the least diminish our horror at the way in which it has become customary to avenge these crimes, and at the consequences that are already proceeding therefrom. In one of his essays Oliver Wendell Holmes speaks of the fact that there are certain hideous sights which any3 man who has had the misfortune to see can never wholly remove from his mental retina. The mere fact of his having seen them means a certain dreadful degradation. This is a thousand fold stronger when instead of merely seeing the deed the man has participated in it. Whoever in any part of our country has ever taken part in lawlessly putting to death a criminal by the dreadful torture of fire must forever after have the awful spectre of his own handiwork seared into his brain and soul. He can never be the same man; and in a certain number of cases at least, he will never be as good a man again. The nation, like the individual, can not commit a crime with impunity. If we are guilty of lawlessness and brutal violence, whether our guilt consists in active participation therein or in mere connivance and encouragement, we will assuredly suffer later on because of what we have done. The cornerstone not merely of this republic but of all free government is respect for and obedience to the law. Where we permit the law to be defied or evaded, whether by rich man or poor man, whether the defiance take the form of a crime of greed and cunning or of a crime of brutality, we are by just so much weakening the bonds of our civilization and increasing the chances for its overthrow and for the substitution in its place of a system in which there shall be violent alternations of anarchy and tyranny. The bad effects are just as certain if we tolerant the lawlessness, whether it takes the shape of wrongs done nominally in the interest of labor, wrongs done nominally in the interest of capital, or of wrongs done in the frankly brutal spirit of race or religious hatred. This matter of lynching would be a terrible thing even if it stopped with the lynching of men guilty of the inhuman and hideous crime of rape; but as a matter of fact, lawlessness of this type never does stop and never can stop in4 such fashion. Every violent man in the community is encouraged by every case of lynching in which the lynchers go unpunished to himself take the law into his own hands whenever it suits his own convenience. In the same way the use of torture by the mob in certain cases is sure to spread until it is applied more or less indiscriminately in other cases. In the recent cases of lynching over three-fourths were not for rape at all but for murder, attempted murder, and even less heinous offenses. In one case happening about the same time as the terrible tragedy at Wilmington the victim was a negro school-teacher who attempted to kill a high-school official and inflicted upon him a serious but not a fatal wound. The crime was a serious one, but it was by no means as dreadful as many crimes committed throughout this republic every week by white men as well as by men of other colors. Under our present well-established system of jurisprudence the man could not have been punished with death by any court in the land, nor would it be possible so to punish him unless we deliberately put assault with intent to kill on a par with murder. There was not the slightest cause for mob action for justice was certain to be done. Yet a mob took out the man and not merely hung him, but when he was half dead burned him alive. In another place at about the same time two negro men and one negro woman were [were] reported as having been lynched for share in the murder of a white man. I pick out these facts well-nigh at random. They show in the first place that the spirit of lawlessness inevitably grows and that when mobs with impunity lynch criminals for one cause they are certain to begin to lynch real or alleged criminals for other causes. Moreover they show, most awful of all, that when the minds of men are habituated to the use of torture by lawless bodies to avenge crimes of a peculiarly revolting description, other lawless bodies will use torture in order to punish crimes5 of an ordinary type. Surely no patriot can fail to see the fearful brutalization and debasement which the indulgence of such a spirit and such practices inevitably portends. Surely all public men, all writers for the daily press, all clergymen, all teachers, all men who in any way have a right to address the public, should with all possible energy unite to denounce such crimes and uphold the hands of those engaged in putting them down. Let me repeat that those who are in any way connected with the criminal can themselves do most good by denouncing that criminal's crime by making him and all others like him feel that they are pariahs and outcasts to be hunted down most remorselessly by those upon whom their action brings most descredit and most danger. Let the negro if he is wise most fervently denounce and condemn the hideous wrong done by the negro criminal; but let the white man deal in stern and summary fashion with the white mob which, in punishing the wrong-doing of the negro, itself does great and enduring damage to all our people. In conclusion let me point out one fact upon which it is impossible to lay too great emphasis. Hand in hand with the lawless violence which inflicts terrible punishment outside of the law goes that foolish sentimentality which protests against punishment from within the law. From the same communities in which men and women are put to death outside the law with at least no active opposition from public opinion, come petitions after petitions against the infliction of the extreme penalty in accordance with the forms of law upon those who, after due trial, have been adjudged guilty of crimes deserving this extreme penalty; and the public conscience which is lax in condemning the act of the lynchers is often no less lax in conniving at improper delays in convicting criminals, and improper efforts to secure the pardon of these criminals when convicted. No surer way for the avoidance of lynching can be devised than to see that justice under the6 form of law shall be as expeditious and even-handed as possible. For crimes of peculiar horror it has been proved possible to devise methods which shall secure their legal punishment within a very short period. But as regards the lynching of negroes the fundamental trouble is in treating the criminal not simply as a criminal, but as a criminal of a certain color. All that any man has a right to ask under our government is that he shall be treated squarely and fairly on his own merits. More than this he should never have and less than this it is an outrage to offer him. If he is unfit to vote, then refuse him his vote; but refuse it not because of his color but because of his unfitness. When any community begins to discriminate against a man as regards his rights before the law because of his color, it is paving the way for discrimination against him in many other paths. Where a community tends to take the position that a self-respecting negro who is unobjectionable in point of character and capacity shall not be allowed to practice a means of livelihood or hold a public or private office in the same way that any white man of similar capacity and similar character would be allowed to practice his livelihood or hold his office, there a long step backward has been taken, and woe prepared in the future not only for the negro who is discriminated against but for those who discriminate against him. In the long run the oppressor will surely pay a part of the penalty which he seeks to lay wholly upon the oppressed. This proposition has nothing whatever to do with the question of the average standing and average capacity of one race or of another. I am not asking now whether or not only a fraction of one race can come up to tests by which the great majority of the other race is content to be tested. I am asking only that the same tests be applied to all men or whatever race or of whatever creed. To make peonage laws about the negro, to make laws fordidding him to emigrate, to countenance a public opinion which will not7 permit him to work in any occupation where the white man fears his rivalry, and which seeks to force him to labor on the white man's terms in any occupation in which the white man does not himself wish to labor -- all these acts and the countless others like them, in whatever part of our common country they occur, are a reproach to all of us and are fraught with evil for all of us. They are partly symptoms of and partly causes of the frame of mind which treats the crime of a negro as something which justifies brutal private revenge. Against such a spirit every upright and fearless man should war with all the strength there is in him. Sincerely yours. TELEGRAM . White House , Washington . XX short hand / short hand Oyster Bay , N . Y . July 10 , 1903 . Hon . L. M. Shaw , Auditorium Hotel , Chicago , Ill , The President is away today . Will be unable to advise you until tomorrow afternoon . Please wait in Chicago until then , Think it will be perfectly safe for you to stay there until you finish up your matters . WM . LOEB , JR , Secretary . TELEGRAM . copy PERSONAL White House , Washington . Oyster Bay , N. Y. , July 10 , 1903 . Hon , Simon Wolf , Royal Palace , Atlantic City , N. J. Letter received . The President will not return here until tom- morrow . Think it very inadvisable for either you or the other ge- tlemen who are to be here on Tuesday to say anything publicly until after you see the President , and then you should be guided by his advise in the matter . WM . LOEB , JR . , Secretary . ( Official ) Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 13, 1903. The Postmaster General: [H. C. Payne] Am I safe in if necessary giving an authoritative denial of that New York SUN story about the scandalous mock celebration of the Fourth in the Department? I should like some one of the Assistants to look into the matter and report authoritatively therein. T. ROOSEVELT.[(corr)] Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 13, 1903. My dear Secretary Cortelyou: In accordance with the letter of the Civil Service Commission of July [3d] 6th, the Public Printer will reinstate Mr. W. A. Miller in his position. Meanwhile I will withhold my final decision of the whole case until I have received the report of the investigation on Miller's second communication, which you notify me has been begun to-day, July 13th. On the face of the papers presented Miller would appear to have been removed in violation of law. There is no objection to the employees of the Government Printing Office constituting themselves into a union if they so desire; but no rules or resolutions of that union can be permitted to over-ride the laws of the United States, which it is my sworn duty to enforce. Please communicate a copy of this letter to the Public Printer for his information and that of his subordinates. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Geo. B. Cortelyou, Secretary of Commerce and Labor.Copy. WHITE HOUSE. Washington Personal Oyster Bay, N. Y. July 13, 1903. Personal. My dear Mr. Raftery: I enclose a dollar for my subscription to THE VOTER at your request with the greatest pleasure. I am sure I shall like it. Give my warm congratulations to your wife, and three cheers for the growing Raftery family! Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt Mr. John H, Raftery, 171 Washington Street, Chicago, Ill. (COPY) Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 14, 1903. My dear Mr. Cortelyou: In coneection with my letter of yesterday I call attention to this judgment and award by the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission in its report to me of March 18th, last: It is adjudged and awarded that no person shall be refused employment or in any way discriminated against on account of membership or non-membership in any labor organization, and that there shall be no discrimination against or interference with any employee who is not a member of any labor organization by members of such organization. I heartily approved of this award and judgment by the Commission appointed by me, which itself included a member of a labor union. This Commission was dealing with labor organizations working for private employers. It is of course mere elementary decency to require that all the Government departments shall be handled in accordance with the principle thus clearly and fearlessly enunciated. Please furnish a copy of this letter both to Mr. Palmer and to the Civil Service Commission for their guidance. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Geo. B. Cortelyou, Secretary of Commerce and Labor. Mr. Palmer, the Public Printer, on Wednesday, July 16th, notified Mr. Miller that he had been reinstated and might report for duty any day. Personal Copy WHITE HOUSE , WASHINGTON . Oyster Bay , N . Y . , July 15 , 1903 . To the Attorney General : { P . C . Knox } Please at the earliest moment direct Messrs . Bo naparte and Conrad immediately to take up the Tulloch charges and report to me concerning them ; also direct them to examine all the indictments made and report to me , and to confer with Mr. Bristow , go over all the charges in reference to Post Office affairs which in their judgement are of importance enough to warrant any action by the Attorney Ge- neral 's Office , whether these charges have been laid before Mr . Bri- stow or not , and report to me there on at your earliest convenince . I desire that Messrs . Bonaparts and Conrad proceed as I have indicated at once . I wish to get a report from them on the general situation as regards all the Post Office scandal from a legal stand- point as soon as possible , and I wish this report to be as com- prehensive as possible . While of course they are not to be hur- ried to the point of impairing the thoroughness of their investig- ation , I yet wish this investigation to be begun at once and the conclusions laid before me as soon as is practicable . THEODORE ROOSEVELT . Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 15, 1903 My dear Payne: Do get off for your holiday as soon as possible. That is most interesting about the Indianola post office. You answered Tawney exactly right. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. , July 16, 1903. Personal My dear Mr. Payne: What about the cases of Hazard and Pettit? Have they been reduced and retained? Please ask Mr. Bristow to report to me on these two cases, as well as on that of Mr. Rand. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General.Personal. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 17, 1903. My dear Mr. Villard: I have your letter about General Wood. You quote General Schwan's opinion and that of two of your correspondents, "retired brigadier generals of the Army, each of them of more than forty years' service," as to the evil effects of "promoting comparatively young officers not noted for superior efficiency as military leaders, etc., over the heads of seniors of equal or greater merit in capacity." Now in the first place let me state that your correspondents are wholly wrong as to the facts. Since I have been President I have of course gone over with Secretary Root with the most minute care all the promotions to brigadier generalships ( and while I have generally been guided by his advice, still I think there may have been one or two occasions where I finally decided - it is true in closely balanced cases - to follow my own judgement rather than his). In every case where we have promoted a man who was a junior over the heads of his seniors, it has been after Root has gone with painstaking care through the entire list of men senior to him, and has been as nearly certain as it was humanly possible to be that the man we promoted was very much superior to those passed over. Of course you can get bushels of "retired brigadier generals of forty years' standing" who have absolutely no merit, who have risen to be brigadier generals because they had good stomachs and never took any risks , and therefore simply lived long enough to get their promotions. These gentry are the curse of the Army in war and a detriment to it in peace, and they are those who raise the howl about the promotion of efficient younger men. Schwan stands in an entirely different category. He does not assert that the promotions to which he objects have been made; but that there have been occasional instances in the past where such promotions have been made I do not doubt. Moreover - and this is important - I am certain that every time we promote any man for marked merit, even if that merit is as great[*[7-17-03]*] -2- as Grant's or Farragut's, there will be a number of excellent elderly officers who have themselves at one time done good work who will be deeply shocked and outraged by the promotion. Grant, by the way, was jumped rapidly up and was as young as most of the men to whom objection is now made, when he was promoted. Sheridan was even younger. The plan that Root and I have carried out has been as follows: In making promotions we find that there are two distinct claims entitled to consideration. One is the claim for long and meritorious service in the past. The other is the claim based upon ability to do good work in the present and the future. Unfortunately the claims are not, even in the generality of cases, united in the same person. Of course the record of long service includes the Civil War, and those were naturally the years when most distinguished service could be rendered. The great majority of the men with best records in the Civil War who are now in the service are as a matter of fact not nearly as competent to meet great crises at the present day as younger men. When they did their great work in the Civil War all these men were under thirty. Even if they did well in the Indian warfare, which practically closed twenty years ago, they were only forty or thereabouts; that is, they were of the age that the men upon whom we rely for service now are. War is a merciless selector. Unfortunately I can not be as merciless but I have to try to be. I wish to reward good service in the past and I make a certain proportion of promotions with this specific end in view. That is, I try to encourage good service in the present by showing that it will be the basis for reward even though I well know that some of the men whom I thus reward are not as fit as their juniors. When I promote juniors it is because I believe - or to speak more accurately, because after careful examination I agree with Root's belief, based upon even more exhaustive and thorough examination - that the man is markedly better than any of his seniors, and that he will in all probability render excellent service. Of course Root and I are both[*[7-17-03]*] - 3 - liable to error, as everyone is liable to error. Doubtless we occasionally pass by some man because his light has been hid under a bushel and we do not know of its existence; but we make every effort not to do injustice. If we did not promote these men, and made appointments merely by seniority, as your correspondents would have us do, we should now have a very inferior order of generals in the high places of the Army, and would have shown ourselves unworthy and incapable administrators. Let me give you an example of what we are doing at the present moment. There will soon be two vacant brigadier generalships. Our intention is to recognize long and meritorious service in one case by the appointment of Colonel Carr, the senior cavalry colonel. Our intention is in the other case to promote a man who we believe will make a really first-class brigadier general, who can be of use if war should break out in the immediate future; who will be of use now wherever he is put. We are hesitating between two men. One is Colonel Barry. Colonel Barry is one of the very few officers in the Army whose politics I know. He is a Democrat or Irish Catholic ancestry. I have seen a good deal of him and Root has seen a good deal of him. We both think he possesses energy, courage, power of command, and very decided ability. Lament, having been intimately associated with him while he (Lamont) was Secretary of War, has written to both Root and myself in the most earnest manner for him, basing what he says upon his personal acquaintance with him. His commanding generals have reported about him in the highest terms. Let me point out that the only non-military man who has written for him is a former secretary of War, himself a Democrat, who will probably be one of the men who will play a large part in the campaign against me next year. I mention this merely to show that no political consideration can possibly enter into the matter. But as a matter of fact I incline to think we shall not promote Barry, but Captain Pershing. I had had Barry in mind prior to Pershing's fight in the More country. Pershing has done a lot of hard fighting and done it well, and I believe that in his case I would be recognizing both tried merit in the past and[*[7-17-03]*] -4- large capacity for good in the future - just exactly as was done in my judgment, if you will permit my saying so, in the cases of Leonard Wood and Franklin Bell. M.B. Since writing the above Root has given me reasons which are in my judgment sufficient to show that Barry should receive this appointment and Pershing the next. In other words I am positively certain that your correspondents represent in their views that element in the Army which tells for utter dry rot and inefficiency, and that the course pursued by me[n], and by Root under me, has been not only the right course, but the only course compatible with making the Army efficient and serviceable. Any other course would be disastrous. Let me repeat that I have no question that occasionally in following out this policy errors will be committed. There is no policy worth following out in any branch of life where it is possible to insure complete immunity from error. The minute that the policy of promoting in some cases for merit is adopted it is absolutely certain that the older men who are passed over will claim that the promotion is [for] due to mere favoritism, and will feel a venomous hostility to men like Wood who rise quickly because of their great ability. You say "The old debts of the wars with Spain and the Filipinos have been settled. There are no politicians to be placated in return for support during war time. In almost every other army in the world men are being made generals by virtue of their ability to handle large bodies of men, or by reason of conspicuous service or fitness. Why should not the President now apply the highest tests in his selections for advancement?" This is precisely what I am doing and what I intend to do, and it is because I intend to apply those tests that most certainly I shall do as Root feels I of course ought to do, and promote Brigadier General Leonard Wood in his turn to a major generalship. In doing this I shall act on my declaration which you quote that "Every promotion and every detail under the War Department must be made solely with regard to the good of the service and to the capacity and merit of the man himself. No pressure, political, social,[*{7-17-03}*] -5- or personal, of any kind, will be permitted to exercise the least effect in any question of promotion or detail." No personal, political, and of course no social pressure has been exerted for Brigadier General Wood. Considerable political pressure has been exerted against him because of his relentless activity in hunting down the Rathbene-Neely post-office crowd for their misdeeds in Cuba; and considerable personal pressure has been exerted against him by these who, like General Wilson, felt bitterly at finding that a man their junior in age and service was their great superior in point of ability and of power to render good service. You speak of General Sumner. I served under him. I have a high regard for him. I intend to promote him. He is a good, honest, steady officer. To say that he is fit to do the Army one-tenth the good that Leonard Wood will, is an utter absurdity; and if any military man should tell it to me I would at once set down that military man as himself possessing some marked weakness which showed him to be of but little usefulness in his profession. You say, "Officers cannot be prevented from thinking that so high a place ought not to be filled by an army surgeon." Do you remember the bitter [cry] outcry raised [against] about Grant's promotion because he had been what was called "a sutler"? In any war in which volunteers take part men of all kinds of previous records render efficient service. I was in the Santiago campaign myself. I saw that campaign from beginning to end and I know absolutely who did well and who did ill in it. Wood was first a regimental and then a brigade commander. With two or three exceptions he literally towered above the elderly army officers of the regular service who filled the positions of brigade and regimental commanders. You have studied the Army. Surely you must be aware that at Santiago the great and striking fact in reference to the officers was the excellence of the lieutenants and junior captains, and the comparatively poor quality of the field officers and of all above them. Now the men were all of the same type, but the lieutenants and junior captains were young men, the others were old men who had attained their position by seniority. Many of the[*[7-17-03]*] -6- junior officers were far more fit to command regiments and brigades than were their seniors; this was, for instance, true of Mills and Howze. I therefore come down to your personal objections to Leonard Wood. I am really at a loss what to say when you speak of hearing from Wood's own lips of the "utter lack of principle" which marked his government of Cuba. Will you mind telling me exactly what he said? Inasmuch as his administration of Cuba puts him on a par for instance with Lord Cromer in Lord Cromer's administration of Egypt, it is difficult for me to believe that such admirable results, alike for Cuba and for the United States, could have been achieved by a course of conduct marked by "utter lack of principle". You speak of Wood's relations to Bellairs and Runcie. Bellairs is a newspaper correspondent whom wood liked exactly as he was liked by Chaffee (who will in all probability succeed Young as lieutenant-general), and as he was liked by most of the other Army officers with whom he came in contact. Apparently Bellairs proves to have been a very different type of man from what Wood supposed him to be. But surely this had nothing earthly to do with Wood's character or fitness. He was mistaken in his estimate of a newspaper correspondent. Well, I have been mistaken in my own estimates of newspaper correspondents; and unless I am in error you have been mistaken in estimates of newspaper correspondents whom you yourself employed, not merely associated with. As for Runcie, the two men were very intimate. I have heard Runcie say that Wood had saved his life by an operation he performed upon him when Wood was still a doctor. Runcie in my own presence professed the greatest admiration and gratitude to Wood. Doubtless the two men talked intimately together and doubtless in such intimacy Wood spoke with great freedom about certain other officers whom he did not like. Why, my dear Mr. Villard, every time I have made a promotion to a brigadier generalship you can guarantee that half of the incompetent or only fairly competent colonels who have been passed over [for] have for weeks talked about me with the utmost bitterness, and very possibly have written private[*[7-17-03]*] -7- letters to you explaining their feelings; but I don't hold this against them. I have made a brigadier general of one man who has repeatedly denounced me in private. Now as to what you say about his wishing from McKinley a reward for his work. I am very sorry if he used the expression to you, "I have done the President's dirty work in Cuba for him and I want my reward." It is so unlike anything he has ever said to me that I am astounded. But the mere fact that he said it to you is itself evidence that it was not said in any improper sense. He would not have told you that he had been doing dirty work if by that he meant foul work. All he could have meant was that he had been doing very hard and very disagreeable work. Wood gave up any idea of going into business, for which I happen to know he received several offers, one, of an important character, from Baldwin, President of the Long Island Railroad. His life was bound up in going on in the Army. He could not be made a Colonel or anything of lower rank. He could be made a brigadier general or nothing. To my mind he had won his promotion as brigadier general even more conclusively than Franklin Bell won his - and higher than that I cannot go because Franklin Bell is one of the best men in the service. (Incidentally let me remind you that he is one of those who were particularly slandered in connection with the alleged concentration camp business by the enemies of our Army in the Philippines.) I feel that I would be recreant to my duty to the Army and the country if I failed to recognize Wood's great and conspicuous service and abilities, and now passed him by when his turn came for promotion. Remember that you ask me, not to refuse to jump him out of his position, but to discriminate against him by passing him by. All that is now urged against him should have been urged against his being made a brigadier general - not against his now being promoted in his order to major general. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, THE EVENING POST, P.O. Box 794, New York.Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE. Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y. July 18, 1903. My dear Bonaparte: Good for you! I am delighted that Beavers is indicted. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, Baltimore, Maryland. WHITE HOUSE, (COPY) WASHINGTON. PERSONAL. Oyster Bay, N. Y. July 25, 1903. My dear Mr. Bonaparte: I thank you cordially for your letter and the enclosure. You gave me just what I wished. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, The Algonquin, St. Andrews, N. B.(Copy)` White House Washington Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 25, 1900 Personal. [PC Knox] The Attorney General: Ask Judge Conrad to take up the publication containing the Tulloch Charges, and the other papers connected therewith, and to make a report upon the same to me in conjunction with Mr. Bonaparte. I would like to know if it is proper or expedient for any action to be taken thereon by the Department of Justice. Theodore Roosevelt.(Copy) [*Gray*] Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. July 31, 1903. My dear Judge Gray: Of course you are more than welcome to quote my letter. I feel badly at having asked you to sacrifice some of your hard-earned vacation; but, my dear Judge, I found in dealing with my regiment, and have found ever before and since in public life, that one rather melancholy fact was the necessity of continually asking the best men to do hard and disagreeable work, involving self-sacrifice and danger, for the very reason that they were the best men. You are entitled to all, and more than all, that has been said in your praise in connection the Anthracite Strike Commission. The Chairman of such a body has a peculiar responsibility. Moreover, as mankind always tends to typify a cause or an event by an individual, the chairman in is certain to receive the major part of whatever praise or blame may accrue. If the commission had failed, your name would have been singled out as typifying the failure, and it is right and just that your name should be singled out as typifying the great and wonderful success. It is just exactly what has happened with Taft in the Philippine Commission, and in each case with entire propriety. Moreover, my dear Judge, while I appreciate to the full the work done by each of your colleagues, yet I happen to know that to no one of them is quite so much credit due as to you.- 2 - I entirely agree with you as to the composition of these arbitration conciliation committees. They ought not to consist of two sets of bitter advocates, with one moderator and judge. They ought to consider simply of a set of impartial judges. What you said about the Miller case was what I knew you would say. Of if there are bona fide charges against him, there must be passed upon on their merits. But I wished the decision on the first matter to be as clean-cut and unmistakable as possible. With most sincere regard, believe me, Faithfully yours, THERDORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Geo. Gray, Judge, United States Circurt of Appeals, Wilmington, Delaware. [ca JULY 1903 3 wh ra pe 54 Paid Govt [*Ansd 8-1-1903*] White House Washington DC 1 Hon B F Barnes Acting Secretary - Oyster-Bay NY. (Respectfully referred to the President for approval) Washington, His Majesty, The King of Portugal Lisbon. I most cordially reciprocate your majesty's greeting seeing in the friendly occasion which prompts is a renewed proof of the good will which unites the two countries and peoples. Theodore Roosevelt 340 P [ca. 7-1903] [shorthand][[shorthand]][*[attached to Lunnis, 7-22-03*]TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 1, 1903 Hon. F. B. Loomis, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. The President finds he already had an engagement on August sixth which necessitates postponing Baron Sternburg's visit to the seventh. I have advised Baron Sternburg to this effect [in replying to a telegram from him.] B. F. BARNES, Acting Secretary. (Official)TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 1, 1903. Baron H. Sternburg, The Weirs, N. H. Your telegram received. Shall take pleasure in reserving accommodations at Octagon Hotel. Train leaves Long Island City eight forty-five, reaching here ten four. The President asks me to inform you that he finds he already had an engagement for the sixth which will necessitate asking you to postpone your visit until the seventh. B. F. BARNES, Acting Secretary. (Official)(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 3, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: First, may I ask that you thank Mr. Pagin for me for the admirable work he has done, and say how much I appreciate it? I am very much pleased at the news of those indictments. To get seven contractors, or agents for contractors, is very gratifying. Will you tell Mr. Bristow that when he makes his report to me I want him also to give me a memorandum showing the date of appointment of each man indicted, dismissed or otherwise punished; also the increase in the rural free delivery; and the percentage per year for the last few years, or at any rate for this year and say six years ago; of the total loss of public money and of the total amount of mail delivered per carrier all though the free delivery service? Of course in view of what you say, it is impossible to lay the matters about Perry Heath before Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad at present, but I am very desirous that all possible diligence be used in collecting the information, so that it may all be laid before Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad at the earliest available moment. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C.Form No. 1. THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY. INCORPORATED 21,000 OFFICES IN AMERICA. CABLE SERVICE TO ALL THE WORLD. This Company TRANSMITS and DELIVERS messages only on conditions limiting its liability, which have been assented to by the sender of the following messages. Errors can be guarded against only by repeating a message back to the sending station for comparison, and the Company will not hold itself liable for errors or delays in transmission or delivery of Unrepeated Messages, beyond the amount of tolls paid thereon, nor in any case where the claim is not presented in writing within sixty days after the message is filed with the Company for transmission. This is an UNREPEATED MESSAGE, and is delivered by request of the sender, under the conditions named above. THOS. T. ECKERT, President and General Manager. NUMBER 4. SENT BY Mh. REC'D BY Bo. CHECK 37 Paid. Gov't RECEIVED at Newbury N.H. Aug. 4th, 03. 189 Dated Oyster Bay, N.Y. Aug. 4th. To Hon. John Hay, Newbury, N.H. In reference to my note of the other day am now inclined to believe it would be better message of congratulations should not be sent. Is not this your view. Theodore Roosevelt.(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 6, 1903. Personal. My dear Mr. Payne: While for Departmental reasons it is obviously advisable that the investigations now going on by Mr. Bristow be brought to a conclusion as quickly as is compatible with thoroughness, yet it is still more necessary that they be thorough and complete. I desire the report of Mr. Bristow and any other report which may be necessary to a complete presentation of the results of the investigation submitted to Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad and their opinions taken as to whether any further avenues of investigation should be followed, or any further facts supplied, in order to secure a complete exhibition and redress of any and all wrongs that have been committed in the Department. Please submit a copy of this letter at once to Mr. Bristow and also to Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad for their information. I need hardly say how much gratified I am by the evident thoroughness of the investigation thus far and the clearly expressed and acted-on purpose of the Department to get at all the facts and to punish any wrongdoer who can be reached whether within or without the service. My desire that the advice of Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad should be taken as to further investigations is not because I question for a moment the single minded purpose of the Department, but because from their different point of view ideas may occur to them which may not to you or to me. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H.C. Payne, Postmaster General.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 6, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Thank you for all your letters. The free delivery business will undoubtedly cause us trouble in the future. The farmers are set upon it and the Congressmen are merely responding to the wishes of their constituents when they demand the extension of the system. Yet there will be very grave criticism about the expense. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Enclosures.(COPY) WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 11, 1903. My dear Congressman Hull: The Rural Free Delivery business is a difficult one to handle. It simply is not in our power to extend it any more than we are doing, because we haven't any money. Moreover, it is causing a serious deficit. On the other hand I realize to the full its advantages to the farmers, and the desirability of making them feel in every way that the Government takes the same keen interest in the welfare of the man in the country districts as of the man in the city districts. I will take up the matter with the Postmaster General. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. J. A. T. Hull, Des Moines, Iowa.Personal. [*C. F*] [*Hold*] [*4e Gendre,*] [*Wm C*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. August 13, 1903. My dear Le Gendre: I thank you for your letter and appreciate heartily your courtesy. I was interested in the editorial from the Sun, which you enclosed. But let me say with all possible emphasis that every banking man, or banker, or business man who takes the attitude you describe as being taken by the man you quote, shows himself to be cursed with incredible folly. What does he mean? If you ask him to particularize he could not to save his neck to do so, unless by telling deliberate untruths. If he chooses to exercise intelligence he will see that everything I have done has been in the interest of capital, because the worse foe of capital, of property, is the man who lets an unscrupulous or reckless capitalist do what is improper, just exactly as the worst foe of labor is the man who allows the law to be violated or tyranny to be exercised in the name of labor. Of course to say that the creation of the Department of Commerce caused distrust in the business world is such arrant nonsense that it needs no discussion. To say that the putting of an end to the anthracite coal strike when we were within thirty days and perhaps less of the most awful riots which this country has ever seen, and of a winter which would have left a hideous stain upon our annals as a nation, is not merely absurd -- it is wicked. The only other thing I have done about which men like the individual you quote-2- can complain is the bringing of the suit against the Northern Securities Company. Four judges have unanimously decided that the Government was right in bringing that suit. This being so, it hardly seems worth while to discuss whether it should have been brought or not, unless the capitalists who take the negative side are prepared to state nakedly that laws are not meant to be observed by men of great wealth. Of course this is literally and exactly the ground which in their hearts they do take. Even the individual you quote would hardly dare to assert as much in public. The truth is, there never was wickeder or more dishonest nonsense talked than this talk by these wealthy men. They either know, or should know, that the trouble in Wall Street has come, not in the least from any action taken by the Government, but because of this watering of stocks and loose, speculative methods of a number of people in time past; and if I had not acted as I did in the Northern Securities case we would most assuredly have seen, in the first place, an era of speculative securities companies with great watering of stocks, and the like, followed by a terrific financial crash, and in the next place, a great movement in the country at large of a very formidable character to have the Government take possession of the railroads. It is inexcusable for a banker or a banking man to object to my policy, because I have always explained that I wished no more supervision and regulation exercised than is the case with national banks. In short, the wealthy Wall Street men to whom you refer occupy exactly as selfish and improper an attitude as the misguided or demagogic-3- gogic leaders of labor who have denounced me for my action in giving equal rights to everybody without and within the labor unions, whether wageworkers or capitalists, and for promptly suppressing riots. I do not believe that either set of denouncers represents his supposed constituency with truthfulness. I believe thoroughly in the average business man's good sense and patriotism just as I believe in the average wageworker's good sense and patriotism, and I do not think that the one will be led astray by an unscrupulous or befogged group of Wall Street financiers, nor the other by a set of wealth-seeking demagogues. But most assuredly if they are so led astray for the time being, it will not alter my attitude by one hair's breadth. I should like to be reelected President, but I am a good deal more anxious to see certain ideas in which I believe with all my heart put into effect. If the price of the Presidency is truckling to unhealthy or improper acts by Wall Street on the one hand, or by labor leaders on the other, then I shall emphatically decline to pay it. I am most earnestly anxious to do whatever is right for the business worldm just as I am most earnestly anxious to do whatever is right for the world of labor. Of course I shall consult steadily with the financiers and business men just as I always have consulted with them. Equally, of course, I shall not consult with them as to whether or not they are to obey the law, any more than I should consult with a mob as to whether or not it was to obey the- 4 - law. If on any such issue I am to be beaten, then I cannot help it, for I certainly shall not alter my convictions on points so vital. With great regards, Sincerely yours, Mr. William C. Le Gendre, 59 Wall Street, New York, N. Y.(1903 Aug 13?) (no cards made) [?] [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]]4 [[shorthand]]5 [[shorthand]]6 [[shorthand]](Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 15, 1903 My dear Sir: The President is in receipt of your letter of the 13th instant and requests me to say that he will go over the matter to which you refer with the Post Office Department officials. Very truly yours, B. F. BARNES Acting Secretary to the President. Hon. Geo. E. Green, 170 Broadway, New York, N.Y.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 15, 1903. My dear Sir: By direction of the President the enclosed letter from Hon. George E. Green of New York City is forwarded to you for any comment you may desire to make. Very truly yours, B. F. BARNES Acting Secretary to the President. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General. Enclosure.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 18, 1903. My dear Mr. Bristow: The enclosed letter from ex-Postmaster General Smith explains itself. Will you return it to me after you have looked at it? What are the facts about the graft in the supplies? Are they as Mr. Smith supposes? Also can you in the end give me the figures of 1902 corresponding to those which he gives for 1899? Faithfully yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. Joseph L. Bristow, Fourth Assistant Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Enclosure.TELEGRAM. (COPY) White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y. August 19, 1903. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Remove Pettit. Take no action about the other man until you receive my letter, but consult Cortelyou about the situation. Theodore Roosevelt.COPY. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 19, 1903. My dear Sir: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, the contents of which have been noted. The paper which you mention, however, has not been received. If you will forward another copy I shall take pleasure in calling attention to it. Very truly yours, (Signed) B. F. Barnes, Acting Secretary to the President. Mr. Jas. R. Branch, Secretary, American Bankers' Association, 20 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 19, 2013. My dear Mr. Payne: I am very doubtful whether Warfield should be removed. He ought to have brought the case in the shape of a protest before Postmaster General Smith; but he was acting under the orders of Heath and Beavers, his superior officers, and it is evident that at that time there was much loose work of this kind being done in the Department. I am sure that Postmaster General Smith did not know of this case; but it is evident that Warfield, like many others, had reason to believe that the political advisers of the administration were being given a free hand in such matters. He ought to have reported the case to you, and is to be blamed for not reporting it. Yet I question whether, when he was acting under the orders of a man who was still in the public service as his superior, he should be dismissed for what he did. In any event, I should like to know in full how his office has been otherwise managed. The Civil Service Commission say he has done excellently. Please show this letter to Mr. Cortelyou. Faithfully yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H.C.Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Enclosures. While acting with prompt severity against real criminals,we wish to avoid any panic in these matters. (COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 22, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: The papers you have sent me since my letter to you in the Warfield case change the situation. Was the hearing before you yourself? If not, I think I should like to have you see him with Mr. Robb present, explain to him the gravity of the offence, ask him if he has anything to say, then have both you and Mr. Robb report to me in detail. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C. Enclosures.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 24, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Before proceeding against Mr. Warfield, of Baltimore, be very sure as to the facts about the Washington postmaster. How long did he keep in office those men or women who did no work? Have the cases been minutely compared? We must certainly not make fish of one and fowl of the other. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D.C.[*Mitchell*] COPY. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 25, 1903. My dear Senator [Mitchell] [Fulton]: Before writing in detail as to the case of Mr. Knowles and two or three other cases, let me explain the position I must take as regards all such appointments. There has been a good deal of fraud and a good deal of lax work done in certain land offices in Oregon and elsewhere, and in consequence I have not only endeavored to remove or punish the officials to whose inefficiency or low standard of public duty the bad service has been due, but also to exercise a peculiar vigilance as to the character of the men appointed to succeed them. The conduct of Bartlett as register at La Grande has been, in the opinion of the inspectors, such that he should not be kept in the service a day longer than is absolutely necessary. I cannot permit him to retain his position because there is a deadlock about his successor. He will be removed at once. In appointing his successor, and in appointing all other officers to these places I must keep in mind that it is I who am primarily responsible for the appointment, not the Senators. If I appoint a man who is unfit, then of course you must refuse to confirm him; and as a matter of fact, if you will give me a man of whom I can approve, I will gladly appoint him. There is no one whom I am personally desirous of putting in any of these positions. But I not merely desire, but am firmly determined to have, a thoroughly good type of man in the position; and I cannot surrender to anyone the right to decide for me whether or not I believe the man to be a good one. I cannot permit anyone to say2. to me that such and such a man shall be appointed and no one else; nor if I believe a man to be unfit can I accept anyone else's judgment that he is fit. In return, I have of course no right to insist that the Senate shall accept my judgment as to the man's fitness. They can reject any nominee of mine; and if they do so I will try to find some thoroughly good man whom they will accept. I will neither endeavor to dictate the appointment of a particular man in a position like this to the Senators from a given state, nor will I myself on the other hand consent to appoint any particular man if I disapprove of him. These are the general principles upon which I will act in all the states. Now for their application in this particular case. The report of our special agents convinces me that Mr. Knowles is not the man I wish for register at La Grande under the peculiar circumstances of the case. They say that Mr. Knowles is a man of good personal character, as is Mr. Davis; but that he is easily influenced, that he could be controlled by outside influences, and that he is not strong enough to prevent free swing being given to lumber concerns, timber locators, and other corporations and individuals, whom it would be his duty to oppose. It is not alleged that Knowles would mean to do wrong, but that he is not a man of strength of character sufficient to entitle him to serious consideration. Now, I had gone into this carefully when I announced definitely that I would not appoint Mr. Knowles. If you had given me a man whom I deemed fit I would gladly have appointed him. If the man I have appointed in default of your advice is rejected I shall then seek to find3. some other good man whom you will accept. Accordingly I have selected Edward W. Davis. I am very sorry that you have not given me a man whom I could accept. If you could have done so I would have appointed him at once. I nominate Mr. Davis merely because you have declined to give me any other man, and because my understanding is that Mr. Davis is an excellent man. Furthermore, it is reported to me that the office of the Register and Receiver at Lake View are in a disgraceful condition. The incumbents must be removed forthwith. Will you kindly join with your colleague in recommending to me at once some first class men to put in their places? All I ask is that these men shall be first-class in every way. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.Oyster Bay, N. Y. August 26, 1903. My dear Mr. Wilkie: Referring to the President's proposed trip to Syracuse, N. Y., on September 7th, I write now to say that it has been decided to take four secret officials, and unless you know of objections I shall take Messrs. Tyree, Taylor, Connell, and Sloane. Very truly yours Secretary to the President. Mr. John E. Wilkie, Chief, Secret Service Division, Treasury Department, Washington, D. C.[*8-27-03*] [[shorthand]][ATTACHED TO SHAW] [8-27-03]TELEGRAM. (Copy) White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 29, 1903. John W. Parsons, Esq., 310 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, N. Y. Telegram received. Am afraid too late to do anything to-day account Saturday half holiday, but will try. WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary. (Official)TELEGRAM. (Copy) White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 29, 1903. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C. John W. Parsons representing national association letter carriers wires President that some important band members unable to secure leave of absence to attend convention letter carriers at Syracuse. Presume he refers to New York carriers. By direction of the President his request is referred to you for such action as you may deem proper. WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary. (Official)[*Hitchcock*] [[shorthand]] [*Dubois Miller*] [*E. A Hitchcock Department of the Interior Sept. 3, 1903 .*](Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 4, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: The enclosed seems to me important. I do not see how we can possibly take the ground of turning out a fourth class postmistress in the middle of a term (for by custom four years is regarded as a term) simply because she is personally obnoxious to the Senator. If it was the Senator's home town I should not appoint or reappoint her. Of course, in this particular Delaware case it is unfortunate in any event to have such an issue come up. I do not suppose this case came personally to your attention. It is a small matter in one way, but I believe it will cause us serious trouble if it cannot be righted at once. In turning out Warfield I should like to know the status of Christiancyand the others. From what I know I think Christiancy ten times as much to blame as Warfield, and I do not want to turn out Warfield if Christiancy is kept in. There must be no possibility of an allegation that we turned out a gold democrat who is much less guilty, and left in a republican. My great interest is that the investigation shall be thorough and complete. Subject to this I want the matter closed as soon as possible, I see there are new charges about smuggling. This cam be taken up by Mr. Wynne or anyone else, but let Bristow finish the work he is on at once. Get the reports from Bonaparte and Conrad; turn out all who-2- should be turned out; indicting those who should be indicted; and let us make a clean statement about it at the earliest moment. Meanwhile, about this Delaware post office case, I would far rather incur the hostility of a Congressman or a Senator than do something we ought not to do. The post office department is now under fire and there is much baseless distrust of it in the popular mind. Really you and I are not responsible for the misconduct. It happened before either of us came into office; but as long as this feeling exists we can a hundred-fold better afford to incur the hostility of any politician than to give the slightest ground for belief that we are managing the Department primarily as a political machine. If the real or fancied need of any politician comes in conflict with what you regard as the good of the service or as equity to any individual, disregard that politician utterly and if he complains send him to me. I shall take up any such case myself. As regards the attack you say the New York Journal intends to make upon you, I should merely announce when it is made that you had been for twelve years a director in the First National Bank of Milwaukee; that you see no reason to resign as that bank is not now and never has been a depository for postal funds of any kind - the postal funds of Milwaukee now being and having always been deposited in the National Exchange Bank, in which you have no interest. State that you were formerly a director in the National Surety Company of New York; that when you became Postmaster General you did not know that this company was underwriting the - 3 - bonds of postmasters or of clerks in post offices; that accidentally it came to your attention that it was upon some of the bonds running to your Department and that you thereupon resigned at once from the Company in April last. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C. Enclosure.Personal. (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 5, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: Here is an editorial upon that Delaware case. I feel very strongly that the woman should be reinstated. Just at this time it is peculiarly undesirable that a false impression should get out about the Department, and the way your conversation has been quoted about this has created the very worst possible impression. As I said, if any politician now demands anything of the Department which is not exactly square with the interests of the service and with the rights of the individual, turn him down, and if he complains, send him to me. I appreciate fully the desirability of keeping on good terms with the Senators and Congressmen, and any proper concessions to them I should like to make; but I do not regard the turning out of a postmaster because he or she is "personally obnoxious" as sufficient grounds. Of course, in view of the bitter feeling over the Addicks business, trouble was absolutely certain to come in such a case in Delaware. I feel very strongly that the woman should be reinstated, and then an investigation held. I am glad you will have Bonaparte hear that further statement of the postmaster at Baltimore; but I am very sorry you can not take your trip for I am sure you need it. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General. Enclosure. [*[9-8-03]*] [[shorthand]] To H. C. Payne in ans to letter Sept 8. 1903(Copy) WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 9, 1903. Personal. My dear Mr. Payne: I have your letter of the 8th in regard to the report. That is entirely satisfactory. All I can hope now is that sometime in October, or at least before the special session of Congress occurs, we can make the complete report with my memorandum. I shall be back in Washington Monday, September 28th, and I can see you then, or as soon after as you can make it convenient, and go over the report with you. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C.Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 10, 1903. My dear President Schurman: I am greatly pleased that you like my Labor Day speech. Now as to what you say of the Canal question. Here again I agree precisely with your views. The trouble is that for me to announce my feelings would undoubtedly be taken as equivalent to an effort to incite an insurrection in Panama. I should of course infinitely prefer to get title to the Canal outright, and I do not consent for a moment to the view that Colombia has the right permanently to block one of the world's great highways. Furthermore, I absolutely agree with you that to wait a few months, or even a year or two, is nothing compared with having the thing done rightly; but I can not publicly express my feelings as if I were in private life, because, as I have said, if I should publicly state what I, in the abstract, thought would be most desirable, it would undoubtedly be deemed by the great majority of the people as an effort to bring about that state of affairs in the concrete. If Congress will give me a certain amount of freedom and a certain amount of time, I believe I can do much better than by any action taken out of hand. But of course, what Congress will do I don't know. With heartiest good wishes, I am, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. President J. G. Schurman, East Hampton, L.I., N.Y.[*[ca 9-9-03]*] T J. G. Schurman [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]][*attached to Schurman. 9-9-03*][[shorthand]] [*[ca 9-9-03]*][Enclosed in Richards, 9-9-03](Copy) WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. September 11, 1903. Personal. My dear Bonaparte: The enclosed copy of a letter from Warfield impresses me strongly. I would like to consult with about this Warfield case, as well as all the other post office cases, as soon after October 1st as is convenient. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Charles J. Bonaparte, Baltimore, Md.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE. Personal. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 11, 1903. My dear Mr. Payne: I thank you for your letter about the complaint of the Civil Service Reform Association. I have at once written to Mr. Cooley to find out what they mean by saying that the fourth-class post offices have been classified. I have received a copy of a letter from Warfield to you which has impressed me very strongly. I shall take up all these cases with you when I get on to Washington. I have written to Bonaparte about this Warfield case. Very sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Payne. Postmaster General.[*9/12/03*] [[shorthand]] [*To Thomas Kearns Room 29 Morlan Block Salt Lake City, Utah.*] [*[no cards made]*](Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. September 15, 1903. My dear Sir: I have received and looked through the report of you and Mr. Conrad, filed to-day with the Solicitor General. I have asked Mr. Hitchcock to appoint you for his work on conditions named in your letter. In accordance with your letter about the Elliott and Hatch book typewriter business, I notified Senator Cameron of what you had said, and asked him to communicate with you immediately in the matter. In a fortnight I shall be coming to Washington, and I shall then want to see you and Mr. Conrad at your convenience. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Md.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 15, 1903. My dear Bonaparte: I shall keep the Warfield matter until I see you; and then I shall want to talk with you about the whole affair. I have read through the Tulloch report very carefully and am greatly pleased with it. There are two points about which I wish to speak to you. The first is as to what you say about excepted places, when you quote Madison. It seems to me that the most essential thing as regards civil service reform at present is to keep the business clear from the least taint of hypocrisy. As you know, I have always believed that President Cleveland was most unwise when he made the impossible promise that every office should be filled in accordance with the principles of civil service reform. He could not keep this promise. He never tried to keep it for so much as an hour, and to have kept it in spirit and letter would have meant an absolute and complete break, not only with his party's representatives in Congress, but with his party itself, inside of a week. Fourth-class post offices, for instance, could not now be classified even if it were advisable to try to hold competitive examinations for them, because in the country districts there is practically no sentiment in favor of such classification. Now in the same way I have found that where we make excepted positions it is out of the question to try to keep political motives out of the appointment and removal. To make the attempt amounts literally and exactly to putting a premium upon hypocrisy. It does not(2) stop a single unworthy appointment; and it tempts weak men to perjure themselves, and it causes upright men embarrassment. If it were not for this I should indefinitely increase the number of excepted places, for I do not at all regard the system of written competitive examination as a particularly good one. I simply regard it as better than the alternative spoils system. Such being the case, it seems to me to be in the interest of honesty not to make any effort to apply to these excepted positions, any more than to the non-classified positions, the rule which ought to be rigidly enforced as regards the entire classified and non-excepted places. Now for the next and much more serious matter. I do not want the post office investigation to hang on indefinitely. I am very anxious that it should be closed as soon as is compatible with thorough probing. I am a little uneasy as to what you say as to the probability of the evil conditions of which you speak having continued in the offices of the First Assistant Postmaster General, the Postmaster at Washington, and the Postmaster at New York City since I came into office, or since 1900. Of course my prime aim throughout this investigation has been to find out whoever is guilty and in office and remove him; whoever was guilty and can be reached by process of law and prosecute him; and finally, to find out whatever condition is now wrong, and to right it. If you have any doubt whether Bristow has probed to the bottom the present and recent conditions in the three departments named by you and Conrad, I feel that you ought to see Bristow at once and find out what has been done, and satisfy yourself whether he has done it or not. I wish there to be no doubt that I have cut out every possible evil which it was possible for me to get at. As-3- you know, I have made it my business to see that no human being was shielded if he did wrong. Between ourselves, I may tell you that yesterday a Republican State officer of New York came to me, on behalf of the highest Republican leaders in the State, to tell me that in their judgment the indictment of State Senator Green, with the trouble it would probably cause to the Chairman of the Republican State Committee, rendered it out of the question for me to hope to carry New York in the next presidential campaign. I answered them that if so, I was exceedingly sorry; that no one could possibly be as much interested in carrying New York in the next presidential campaign as I was myself; but that when the question was one of honesty or dishonesty, I neither could nor would permit any consideration as to the future of myself or anyone else to weigh in the balance for one moment; that I should hope to be able to show the public that I was not in any shape or way responsible for the existence of the corruption within and around the Post Office Department, but solely for putting an end to it; but that I thoroughly understood the difficulty of preventing multitudes of ignorant but well-meaning people from being misled by dishonest people in such a matter - for instance, that I thoroughly understood how the New York Sun, Times, Staats-Zeitung and Evening Post would day in and day out endeavor to make it appear that the corruption disclosed in the Post Office Department was somehow or other a reflection upon me, and that it was perfectly possible they would deceive the people into acting on this belief, and that if so I should simply accept the consequences without repining.- 4- In the same way I have felt about Senator Cameron. He is a valued friend of mine. He has always been my supporter. I have liked him and believed in his honesty. He gave me his word that he had done nothing whatever of any kind that was censurable. If the reverse is true I have not one word to say in his behalf, and desire that exact and full justice be done; and for doing it I am perfectly willing to pay the penalty, no matter what it may be. But if, at the same time that at no matter what cost, I do justice and cut out corruption, I can also have it made evident that I am doing justice and that I have cut out the corruption, and that I am not responsible for the iniquity but for cutting it out - why, of course I think it a matter of mere naked right that such showing should be made. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 15, 1903. [*[W A DAY?]*] To the Acting Attorney General: I have read through the report of Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad on the Tulloch charges. I should like the attention of the Postmaster General and of the Secretary of the Treasury called at once to it, especially with reference to the summary of conclusions, and I should like a report from them as to these conclusions. My concern is of course with the actual practices in the Department at present and with the conduct of the men who are now in office, together with the conduct of those men, whether in or out of office, who can be criminally prosecuted for whatever has been done of any illegal nature. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Enclosure.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 15, 1903. Personal. My dear My. Payne: Bonaparte and Conrad have made their report on the Tulloch case. It is a damaging report, for it shows - and I fear conclusively - that the practices that prevailed under Perry Heath were very reprehensible. I shall take up certain parts of it when I see you. Meanwhile, I want to call your attention to the summary, in which it is stated that the conditions complained of probably have existed during the last two or three years in the office of the First Assistant Postmaster General, in the Post Office at Washington, and in the Post Office at New York City. As I understand it, the inspectors under Mr. Bristow have investigated all these three offices, and are able to state definitely what is and has been going on in them. Is this so, and will you call Mr. Bristow's attention to the matter? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon H. C. Payne, Postmaster General, Washington, D. C.[*[ ca. 9-15-03]*] [[shorthand]] act. [[shorthand]] Lynch [[shorthand]][*[attached to Gunst, 9-15-03]:*](Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 18, 1903. My dear Bonaparte: I thank you for your letter. As for Senator Cameron, all I have to say is, first, that I am exceedingly sorry and greatly surprised if the Senator has been guilty, and second, that I of course - and indeed I do not suppose it is really necessary for me to say this - leave the matter entirely in the hands of you and Mr. Conrad and the Department of Justice, and desire nothing whatever in his case, or in that of anyone else, save that exact justice be done, no matter who is hurt or who helped. As for the fourth class post office business I feel somewhat indignant. I cannot believe that Foulke, Procter and Garfield will take the view that they had any idea of classifying the fourth class post offices by the order they submitted to me and which I signed on April 15th. It would hardly be too strong for me to say that if such was the case, I have been led into classifying them by a subterfuge; for they and I have often talked (notably Mr. Foulke has) about putting the offices under the Civil Service law, and we agreed that it was impossible at present, and indeed undesirable, until public opinion was more advanced. We did not discuss classifying them at the time I signed the rule; and during the five months that have since elapsed there has not been a suggestion from the Civil Service Commission or any of its members as to classifying them. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Md.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 19, 1903. My dear M. Izoulet: It will give me great pleasure to have the books translated as you request, but there is no fourth volume coming out this October. There may be a collection of my speeches made next spring. Perhaps that is what you refer to. Have you ever happened to run across my "Winning of the West"? I am afraid it would be too local to be of interest to any but Americans, but perhaps the first volume might stand on a little different footing. Permit me to thank you most warmly for "The Modern City." Curiously enough, I have been about to send for it myself. With great regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. M. Izoulet, Professor of Social Philosophy, College of France, 2 Boulevard St. Germain, Paris. (Sent through State Department) Will you kindly in addition write the publishers of "Oliver Cromwell' and "American Ideals", to make the necessary arrangements? Tell them I desire these arrangements made.9-19-03 (2) [[shorthand]][ATTACHED to SEWALL 9-19-03][*[9-14-03]*] [[shorthand]] oscar stra? [[shorthand]] Lershmon [[shorthand]][[shorthand]] (Shaw) Dr. A)Geo R Carter [[shorthand]] [CA 9-22-03][ATTACH. CARTER 9-22-03][*[9-23-03]*] [[shorthand]] Lewis [[shorthand]] Lewis [[shorthand]] Lewis [[shorthand]][ENCL IN CLARKSON 9-23-03][1882] (Copy) Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 26, 1903. Personal. My dear White: Many thanks for your very interesting letter. I was particularly delighted with what you say about the Alaska business. I most earnestly hope that your forecast is true. The Canadians have had some very ugly articles published, which I was afraid might influence English opinion. This would be unfortunate. It would be a very bad thing for us if there was a deadlock in the present Commission; but it would be a very much worse thing for the Canadians and English, because it would leave me no alternative but to declare as courteously, but as strongly, as possible that the effort to reach an agreement having failed, I should be obliged to treat the territory as ours, as being for the most part in our possession, and the remainder to be reduced to possession as soon as in our judgement it was advisable--and to declare furthermore that no additional negotiations of any kind would be entered into. I look forward to seeing Hamilton, Ribblesdale and Peynder, and especially to seeing you at Christmas. I hope Jack enjoys Harvard. Give my warm regards to Mrs. White. I was greatly interested in Balfour's masterly pamphlet; it is a noteworthy article. Faithfully yours, /s/ Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Henry White, 6 Whitehall Gardens, S.W., London, England.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE. Personal. WASHINGTON. September 28, 1903. The Attorney General: [*[P.C. Knox]*] If it becomes necessary to employ outside counsel in New York, please consider carefully the name of Thomas F. Conway, of 21 Cortlandt Street, New York, and go over it very carefully with me. T. ROOSEVELT.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. September 29, 1903. [My dear Sir:] I thank you and your committee for your courtesy, and I [genuinely] appreciated the opportunity to meet with you. It will always be a pleasure to see you or any [members of [your] the bodies you represent] representatives of your organization or of your Federation as a whole. As regards [this] the [so called] Miller case, I have little to add to what I have already [written.] said. I must govern my action by the laws of the land, which I am sworn to administer, and which differentiate any case in which the President of the United States is a party from all other cases whatever. These laws are enacted for the benefit of the whole people, and cannot and must not be construed as permitting diminution against some of the people. I am President of all the people of the United States without regard to creed, color, birth-place, occupation or social condition. My aim is to do equal and exact justice as among them all. In the employment and dismissal of men in the government service I can no more recognize the fact that a man does or does not belong to a union as being for or against him than I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catholic, a Jew or a Gentile, as being for or against him. In the communications sent me by various labor organizations protesting against the retention of Miller in the Governemnt Printing Office the grounds alleged are [frequently] two fold: 1, that he is a non-union man; 2, that [he is not a man of good private character. The circumstances of the case compel me to believe, as I think you will agree with me, that the charges against his private character are an afterthought brought up only because he is no longer in the union; and that the real reason why his removal is demanded is solely because he is not in the union. Under these circumstances I cannot permit] [charges have been made against him] he is not personally fit [later is] The question of his personal fitness is one [of] to be settled in the routine of administrative detail, and can not be allowed to conflict with the larger question of governmental discrimination for or against him or any other man because is or is not a member of a Union. This is the only question now before me for decision ; and as to this my decision is final.[*American Federation of Labor.*] WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. [*Roosevelt Theodore -*] September 29, 1903. I thank you and your committee for your courtesy, and I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you. It will always be a pleasure to see you or any representatives of your organizations or of your Federation as a whole. As regards the Miller case, I have little to add to what I have already said. In dealing with it I ask you to remember that I am dealing purely with the relation of the Government to its employees [and to the public at large] I must govern my action by the laws of the land, which I am sworn to administer, and which differentiate any case in which the Government of the United States is a party from all other cases whatsoever. These laws are enacted for the benefit of the whole people, and cannot and must not be construed as permitting discrimination against some of the people. I am President of all the people of the United States, without regard to creed, color, birth-place, occupation or social condition. My aim is to do equal and exact justice as among them all. In the employment and dismissal of men in the government service I can no more recognize the fact that a man does or does not belong to a union as being for or against him than I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catholic, a Jew or a Gentile, as being for or against him. In the communications sent me by various labor organizations protesting against the retention of Miller in the Government Printing Office the grounds alleged are two-fold: 1, that he is a non-union man; 2, that he is not personally fit. The question of his personal fitness-2- is one to be settled in the routine of administrative detail, and cannot be allowed to conflict with or to complicate the larger question of governmental discrimination for or against him or any other man because he is or is not a member of a union. This is the only question now before me for decision; and as to this my decision is final.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 1, 1903. Personal. My dear Knox: Your letter gave me real pleasure, for I am always peculiarly pleased to have you think well of what I have done. When you come on Monday can you take lunch with me? Don't if it is at all inconvenient; but I should like to see you and have a brief talk over several things. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. P. C. Knox, Valley Forge, Pennsylvania.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 2, 1903. My dear Mr. Harriman: Are you to be in Washington this fall? If so, I should like to dine or lunch with you. There are one or two matters I should like to go over with you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.WHITE HOUSE, Washington. October 2, 1903. Dear Kermit: I was very glad to get your letter. Am glad you are playing foot ball. I should be very sorry to see either you or Ted devoting most of your attention to athletics, and I haven't got any special ambition to see you shine overmuch in athletics in college, at least (if you go there), because I think it tends to take up too much time; but I do like to feel that you are manly and able to hold your own in rough, hardy sports. I would rather have a boy of mine stand high in his studies than high in athletics, but I would a good deal rather have him show true manliness of character than show either intellectual or physical prowess; and I believe you and Ted both bid fair to develop just such character. There! you will think this a dreadfully preaching letter! I suppose I have a natural tendency to preach just at present because I am overwhelmed with my work. I enjoy being President, and I like to do the work and have my hand on the lever. But it is very worrying and puzzling, and I have to make up my mind to accept every kind of attack and misrepresentation. It is a great comfort to me to read the life and letters of Abraham Lincoln. I am more and more impressed every day, not only with the man's wonderful power and sagacity, but with his literally endless patience, and at the same time his unflinching resolution. Mother and I had a nice ride yesterday. Yagenka behaved well, but upon my word Renown is more nervous and given to shying than ever. "Age[10-2-03] 2. cannot still nor custom wither" the infinite variety of that particular fool's folly. He is worse about automobiles than he ever was, and as they swarm in and around Washington a ride upon him is a live experience. Allan has gone to be trained. Ronald has won golden opinions of all the people around here, as he is very well trained. He sits up beside the driver in the wagon, and follows every one obediently round. He seems to be an excellent city dog. Quentin is the proud possessor of two white rabbits with pink eyes, in which he and Archie revel. Ethel and Archie played tennis yesterday. Your loving father, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Master Kermit Roosevelt, Groton School, Groton, Massachusetts.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 6, 1903. Gentlemen: I enclose herewith statements by Mr. Bristow and Mr. Robb as to certain matters connected with the case of Perry S. Heath and the grand jury, the term of which expired yesterday. I desire to have from you a statement as to whether in your judgment there is evidence upon which Perry S. Heath can be found guilty of violation of the law. If so, it is my intention to direct the resummoning of the grand jury immediately, in order that such evidence may be laid before it for the purpose of securing an indictment, which it would be my desire that you should ultimately prosecute. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad, Special Counsel, Washington, D. C.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 6, 1903. My dear Sir: I note your advice that in your judgment the evidence disclosed to you by Mr. Bristow and the inspectors "is not sufficient to secure a conviction of Mr. Heath of the offense of which he should be charged;" and furthermore, your statement that, as regards my suggestion in relation to calling the Grand Jury together, you "do not see that any good public end can be served by reconvening them." I shall be obliged if you will advise me whether or not Mr. Bonaparte concurs in this view. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Holmes Conrad, Home Life Building, Washington, D. C.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. October 7, 1903. My dear Mr. Knox: Everyone has been telling me that it is well-nigh impossible to get a conviction, from a District jury, of a government official. I feel that every effort should be strained to get convictions - most of all against such scoundrels as Machen, Beavers, Barrett, etc. Besides exercising the greatest care in the choice of juries, can not the District Attorney suggest to the Judge that the jury be shut up? I ask your personal oversight of these cases, or at least, that you should exercise some supervisory or directory care, because they seem to me so vitally important. I rank them second only to the Northern Securities case among all the legal work that has been done under my administration. The offenses committed by these miscreants in the Post Office Department are offenses against the root principle of our government, and indeed of all successful popular government. I am more anxious than I can say to have these people punished, not in the least out of revenge, but for the sake of good government. May I ask you to give somewhat of your personal attention to the matter? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. P. C. Knox, Attorney General.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. October 8, 1903. My dear Congressman: The statement alleged to have been made by the inspector that I "ordered" the indictment of Senator Green, or any one else, is a lie - just as much a lie as if it had been stated that I ordered that any one should not be indicted. My directions have been explicit and are explicit now. Any one who is guilty is to be prosecuted with the utmost rigor of the law, and no one who is not guilty is to be touched. I care not a rap for the political or social influence of any human being when the question is one of his guilt or innocence in such a matter as the corruption of the government service. I note what you say, that the circulation of this report about me may alienate the support of many of Senator Green‘s friends from my administration. Frankly, I feel that any one who would believe such a story must be either lacking in intelligence, or else possessed of malignant credulity. If any one is to be alienated from me by the fact that I direct the prosecution of republican or democrat, without regard to his political or social standing, when it appears that he is guilty of gross wrong-doing - why, all I can say is, let him be alienated. If District Attorney Curtiss has anything which should be known to the Attorney General or to me as regards this suit, I should be delighted to see him. But frankly, I have not the slightest desire to2 see him if his visit is to be in the interest "of the welfare of the party or of my success." In a case like this, where the crime charged is one that strikes at the foundations of the Commonwealth, I should hold myself unfit for the office if I considered for one moment either my own welfare or the interest of the party, or anything else except the interests of justice. Respectfully, Hon. John W. Dwight, M. C., Dryden, N. Y.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 9, 1903. My dear Mr. Harriman: There is no hurry about my seeing you, for the only thing that could be pressing - that is, the financial situation - is not so at present. I was interested in the statement you enclosed. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 10, 1903. Personal. My dear Mr. Bonaparte: I have received your letter in which you advise that the Grand Jury be recovered in the event of Mr. Beach being unable to explain his position. I shall take the matter up with Attorney General Knox at once. Thanking you, I am, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 10, 1903. Personal. My dear Mr. Bonaparte: I laughed when I received your letter at the idea of my good friend Conrad thinking I could thus interpret him. Until I received it, it would literally never have entered my head that anyone could suppose I would be capable of entertaining such a supposition. When I entertain any such feelings of either you or Conrad, you may as well make up your minds that I have lost all faith in public life! Seriously, of course I see that Mr. Conrad would naturally fail to connect the two incidents. . I ought to add, however, that Secretary Shaw has furnished me with the statements of a dozen men, including Mr. Moseley, who testify to Gilmer's want of tact, rudeness, and captiousness in dealing with outsiders. Shaw feels very strongly that Tracewell liked him and had no intention of punishing him, and that if neither Beavers nor Perry Heath nor any of the other wrongdoers had been in existence, Gilmer would nevertheless have been treated exactly as he has been treated. He feels that he could not advise, or agree without protest to Gilmer's reinstatement or promotion at present. Next week or the week after I shall ask Mr. Knox to get Mr. Conrad to meet me with him to go over Bristow's report. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Md.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. October 10, 1903. My dear Mr. Knox: I enclose you Bonaparte's letter. It impresses me a good deal. I feel as Bonaparte does that in view of the circumstances of the case, of Conrad's advice, and of the Grand Jury's statement, it would have been better if the District Attorney had frankly laid the whole case before the Grand Jury. I should like to take this up with you as soon as you get back next week; or perhaps it would be well if you summon Conrad and Bonaparte, and Robb and Beach to a meeting, and afterwards have me see them with you. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. P. C. Knox. Attorney General. Enclosure. [*[Snelling, R Paul]*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 12, 1903. My dear Snelling: I have your letter of the 10th. There is not any possible opportunity for your friend or anyone else to misunderstand the matter of which you write me. I wrote an open letter to the Editor of the News and Courier and to the Mayor himself on the matter, and there definitely and finally stated what had occurred, pointing out what had been done. This was not a secret letter, but an open letter, published everywhere in the South and republished North, and you can find it without difficulty. If a man would not understand that, he would understand nothing private and official. The allegations are unqualifiedly untrue. If you will turn to my letter you will see how full and explicit my statements were and how complete my showing that it was simply impossible, in view of what I had already done and was at the time doing, that any such statements as those alleged could [be made] have been made by me. The whole thing is, my dear Snelling, that either the critics, such as you quote, are not honest or else have wilfully shut their eyes to the facts. In South Carolina I [find] found a large number of white Presidential employees in office and one colored man. This was in a state where three-fifths of the [voters] males of voting age are colored, the other two-fifths being whites, who by fraud and violence suppress the vote of the colored men at the polls, and then claim and exercise representation for them in Congress and in the electoral college ---2- as thoroughly dishonest an attitude as was ever taken by any human being. For good cause I removed the colored employee and appointed a white man, a Southern democrat, in his place. But I wished to appoint some one colored man in office in South Carolina, and when a vacancy occurred I put a colored man, whom all the South Carolinians had told me was an excellent man, into the vacancy, the position being a less important one than that to which Lewis, the colored man, was appointed in Massachusetts; so that in South Carolina, with its sixty per cent, of colored people, I have given this sixty per cent. a less representation than I have allotted to the one per cent. in Massachusetts. All my other appointees have been white. Three-fourths of them have been democrats. Most of them have been Confederates or sons and daughters of Confederates. This is the state of affairs. It calls for no [pledges] apology or justification by me. It does most emphatically call for repentance and [pledge] apology from men like your friend, or like the writer of the clipping you enclose, for their shameful attitude; shameful from every aspect, both as regards their own conduct, and as regards their mendacity about my conduct. Sincerely yours, [Theodore Roosevelt] Mr. R. Paul Snelling, Newton Upper Falls, Mass.Copy [*[PAYNE]*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 15, 1903. Sir: [*[H. C. Payne]*] The recent investigations conducted by your Department relative to the Post Office frauds, have developed the fact that the name of Perry S. Heath is mentioned in connection with certain correspondence, now in the possession of the Government, which purports to have been written by certain persons now under indictment. This correspondence tends to show that Mr. Heath may have been implicated in these alleged fraudulent transactions. It is the opinion of Messrs. Bonaparte, Conrad and the District Attorney that sufficient evidence has not as yet been elicited to convict Mr. Heath of any offense; but under the circumstances it is my desire that you should at once detail one of your most trusted and competent Inspectors for the purpose of making a more thorough investigation. If what is intimated in the communications above referred to can be established by competent evidence, the matter will be laid before the proper District Attorney for presentation to the Grand Jury. Respectfully, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. The Postmaster General.[*[ca 6-16-03]*] Memorandum of proposed letter: I have your letter of the 16th and Governor Hunt has shown me your letter to him. Any reservations made Pursuant to the act of Congress will of course in no wise disturb any claim of right or title that the church may have in and to property so reserved or not reserved. In view, however, of the very brief time left for me to consider the question of detail referred to in your letter before July 1st, it will be impossible to make any final determination as to the validity of the claims of the church. Governor Hunt fully understands that the claims of the church still exist and assures me that he will do all he can to expedite a settlement that will be just and satisfactory. [*to*] [*[to James H. Blenk Bishop of Porto Rico?]*] [*McComas 10/18/03*] [*LS McComas [10-18-03]*] [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]][*Baker*] WHITE HOUSE, Washington. Private and Personal. October 21, 1903. My dear Sir:- I am immensely impressed by your article. While I had known in rather a vague way that there was such a condition as you describe, I had not known its extent, and as far as I am aware the facts have never before been brought before the public in such striking fashion. How emphatically this revelation emphasizes the need of drawing the line on conduct, among labor unions, among corporations, among politicians, and among private individuals alike! The organs of the Wall Street men of a certain type are bitter in their denunciations of the labor unions, and have not a word to say against the iniquity of the corporations. The labor-leaders of a certain type howl against the corporations, but do not admit that there is any wrong ever perpetrated by labor men. Democrats like Mr. Olney grow indignant at what they call revelations of Republican rascality, while they are seeking to profit, as Olney's people in Massachusetts are seeking to profit, by the work of McSweeney, whom we are now preparing to indict for shameless corruption and wrong-doing like that of which the Post Office officials have been guilty. And I regret to say that high Republican politicians come to me end beg me not to expose Republicanrascality, lest it may hurt the party; while men standing high in the business circles of New York, -- men whom I know socially, -- follow a course of conduct which, in its essence, is as immoral as that of any boodle alderman. I believe in corporations; I believe in trade unions. Both have come to stay, and are necessities in our present industrial system. But where, in either the one or the other, there develops corruption or mere brutal indifference to the rights of others, and short-sighted refusal to look beyond the moment's gain, then the offender, whether union or corporation, must be fought, and if the public sentiment is calloused to the iniquity of either, by just so much the whole public is damaged. Can you not come on here and see me some time at your convenience? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, 141 East 25th Street, New York.[*(Knox)*] Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 21, 1903. To the Attorney General: [*[P. C. Knox]*] What has been done about E. H. Baldwin, Assistant District Attorney in New York, in view of his action in the Post Office cases? It seems to me he ought to be removed at once, in view of Bristow's report. It looks unpleasantly as if United States District Judge Ray was bent upon preventing Green's extradition, or whatever it may be called. The developments show that the group of big politicians which includes both Ray and Green are all mixed up together financially and politically, and several of them are implicated in these Post Office scandals and there will probably be a determined effort to prevent our getting hold of Green. Of course, I should like to take the most drastic action possible to get at him. I am convinced that unless we take very strong measures about Green we will never get him down here to be tried. The politicians to whom I refer are republicans, but are in politics for themselves and their pockets first, and they will try to reduce all the proceedings to a farce and cast discredit on the Administration. Judge Ray is himself implicated in the Post Office scandals. Bristow alludes to him in his official position, as Congressman, although not by name, in his report. I hope to see drastic action taken. If Ray goes crooked in this matter and a case can be made against him, I should like to lay the facts before Congress. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.(Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 24, 1903. My dear Mr. Bonaparte: I send you the enclosed clippings anent the Tracewell matter. Now all I wish is that, so far as you feel you properly can, you make clear the difference between the different officials with whom you deal in your report. No human being, politician or other, has spoken to me in favor of Tracewell, excepting Secretary Shaw in the letter I sent you. Politicians have spoken to me on behalf of Castle, Heath, Green, Tyner, Beavers, Machen, Metcalf, and most of the other men implicated. For Tracewell, as it happens, not a human being has said a word except Shaw, and you have before you what he has said - incidentally, you also have all that he has said about the “tone" of the report. Now, so far as the facts warrant it and no further, I would like to make it evident that there is no ground for the allegations that I am turning down your report. One man in a thousand will look carefully into the report and see exactly what the facts are, but I wish if it can be legitimately done to prevent the remaining 999 men from thinking that you have recommended one thing and that I have turned it down. There is a general feeling, for instance, that Heath and Tracewell are in your view about in the same box. As a matter of fact the offenses alleged against the two have nothing in common from my standpoint. If -2- you take this view - and of course not otherwise - can you not in your supplementary report use such language about Tracewell as will make it evident that you are not putting his case on a par with that of Heath or Beavers; that he is not accused of, or implicated in, dishonesty; that the question is merely used of an error [in] of judgment on his part? Do you think this error of judgment such that I ought to dismiss him, if so I should go into the case minutely.? My first purpose is to do exact justice in all these matters. My next is, so far as practicable, to show people that I am doing exact justice; and if possible I should like to prevent men getting the idea that I am shielding any one or differing from you on any important point. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Charles J. Bonaparte, 216 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland. Enclosures.[*[ca 11-1-03]*] [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]] E H R Green [[shorthand]]Is anything to be done with this? [[shorthand]][*[attached to Mason, 12-20-03]*] [[shorthand]] [*[ca 12-20-03]*][C?] Douglas Robinson Jr 422 Mad Ave NY City [[shorthand]] [*[ca 1903]*]COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., November 4th 1903. My dear Senator Penrose: Hearty thanks for your telegram. Pennsylvania has indeed done admirably. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.Copy. November 6, 1903. Personal. My dear Sir George: Permit me to thank you cordially for the two volumes of the second part of the American Revolution. I enjoyed the first part so much that I shall at once begin reading the second, with the certainty of real relaxation and pleasure. I wish you could get to this side while I am in the White House. Cannot you come over? We should so like to have you stay with us. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Care Longmane, Green & Co., London, England.[*Copied on President's Paper 11/16/03*] White House, Washington, November 16, 1903. Dear Dr. Dickie:- I am glad to learn that your church building is to be dedicated on Thanksgiving Day. I congratulate you on this happy result of the persistent and self-denying labors of yourself and your associates, and wish you all many years of happy enjoyment of the privileges you have thus secured. Yours very sincerely The Reverend Dr. J. F. Dickie, Lutpoldsh 30, Berlin, W., Germany.Strictly personal November 16, 1903. My dear Mr. Moran: I return herewith the report of Operative William J. Flynn relating to Messrs. Henkel, Eidman and Hanbury. It is very interesting, and I hope you will follow the matter up. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb Secretary to the President. Mr. W. H. Moran, Acting Chief of Secret Service Division, Treasury Department. Enclosure1 To Edwin Packard. November 17, 1903. My dear Mr. Packard, I do not know whether you are acquainted with the editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal. If so, you can privately show him this letter. In 1900 as candidate for Vice President I was in Butte. At that time in my public speeches and elsewhere I consistently upheld as a matter of course the action of the Administration in dealing with the Coeur d' Alene rioters, and denounced the conduct of Mr. Lentz and his followers who used the so-called "bull pen" matter as a means of stirring up demagogic opposition to the Administration. Butte was intensely Bryanite in feeling and sympathy. I was received, however, by Mr. Malcolm Gillis, a miner, as head of the local committee. He drove with me through the streets packed with men cheering for Bryan to where I was to speak, introduced me from the platform, etc. etc. Afterwards I told him that I thoroughly appreciated the action of those miners and wageworkers who had thus received me, and that I hoped if I was elected Vice President he would bring some of them to Washington. Last spring I was again at Butte, was received with the utmost enthusiasm and friendship, and made a speech under the auspices of the labor union, a copy of which speech I enclose. If you will read it you will find that it is about as good doctrine as could be preached to any body of men, whether labor union, non-union, or business men. Incidentally, I think it is good doctrine to preach to the people who advocate discrimination against labor union men, or who fall into the condition of bourgeois panic which prompts protests against my receiving labor union men at the White House. I have said over and over again that in dealing either with corporations or labor unions I draw the line on conduct and not against unions as such or corporations as such. The very worst position (because the most improper position) that I could assume would be to be afraid of receiving in the White House leaders of labor unions because there has been wrongdoing by trusts. If Mr. Gillis or any of the gentlemen he brings with him has been implicated in criminal wrongdoing, let the editor of the Journal say so and I shall take the matter up. But until this is proved I shall certainly refuse for one moment to believe that a man of Mr. Gillis' character has any2 earthly responsibility for any kind of crime such as the Journal speaks of. I wish the doors of the White House to swing open to reputable wageworkers just as I wish them to be open to reputable capitalists; and I shall no more be influenced to shut them in the faces of one side than to shut them in the faces of the other. Incidentally, if the editor in question had taken the trouble to go to Mr. Cleveland H. Dodge in New York he would have found out the rapidity and thoroughness with which I dealt with a riot in the mines of Arizona last June. Either the editor knows of this or he does not. If he does not, he should be more diligent in seeking after facts before he writes editorials. If he does, then he must know that his reflections on me in the editorial in question have not the smallest justification. Sincerely yours,[*Rewritten (Mem. on Bonaparte & Conrad report on the Tulloch charges)*] [*White House*] [*[Nov 23d 1903]*] The recommendations made in this report have been complied with. The Secretary of the Treasury appointed the commission recommended in recommendation number two. Mr. Bristow's report covers the investigation into the office of the First Assistant Postmaster General. Investigations into the Washington and New York post offices [have] are already [been begun] in progress. Theodore Roosevelt [The Civil Service Commission reports as follows on the abuses of the employment of persons as mentioned in this report: "The Honorable The Postmaster General. Sir: The Commission has the honor to submit herewith, with its approval, the report of an investigation made by its representatives in compliance with your written request of May 4, 1903, and your oral instructions to determine (1) whether all of the employees outside the force of carriers were regularly in the service and entitled to their positions; (2) whether the civil service rules had been observed in the employment and assignment of laborers; and (3) whether there had been a general observance of the civil service law and rules in the administration of the Washington post office during the incumbency of the present postmaster. "In answer to the first question -- whether all employees outside the force of carriers were regularly in the service and entitled to their position, - the report shows that appointments to competitive classified positions in the Washington post office during the administration of Postmaster Merritt have been made in close conformity with the spirit and letter of the civil service rules, except when transfers from outside offices of persons appointed for] [*R?*] [*PO*] [*P. M. G.*] [*[All] [The] [All these documents requests returned to the Post Office Department [???] will be held ready for submission to congress whenever it may choose to ask for them.*] White House, November 24th, 1903 Memorandum upon the various papers submitted from the Department of Justice and the Post Office Department concerning the investigation into the [alleged] [so- called "graft"] corrupt practices obtaining in the Post Office Department, notably in the office of the First Assistant Postmaster General and in the office of the Assistant Attorney General for [the Post Office] that Department. All these documents are herewith [returned] forwarded to the Post Office Department, and will be held ready for submission to congress whenever it may choose to ask for them. It appears that in December, 1902, Postmaster General Payne and Congressman E. F. Loud Chairman of the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads held various consultations regarding the postal service and as a result of these interviews it was determined that as soon as possible after the [adjournment of] necessary appropriations could be made by Congress an investigation should be made of the service, both Messrs. Payne and Loud agreeing [in] as to the need for the investigation and the time when it should take place. Accordingly, an increase of five thousand dollars in the appropriation bill reported in January was made for the express purpose of carrying on the investigation in question. The reasons for the increase in the appropriation were known only to the Postmaster General, to [Mr.] Congressman Loud and to [Mr.] Congressman Bromwell. [of Ohio. (Exhibit A.)] Subsequently, some time in January, information was laid before me by Mr. Seckendorff tending to show improper conduct by Beavers General Superintendent [Beavers], of the division of Salaries and Allowances, and Machen General Superintendent [Machen,] of the Free Delivery System; and by Mr. William Allen White-2- tending to show corruption by or under Tyner, Assistant Attorney General [Tyner] for the Post Office Depts. First Assistant Postmaster General Wynne also informed me that he had become suspicious of the integrity of both Machen and Beavers. After full consultation with Mr. Payne it was decided that Fourth Assistant Postmaster General Bristow should make a thorough and exhaustive investigation of the charges in question and of all matters that might be developed in connection with them. Mr. Bristow's report [(Exhibit B.)] is a record of as thorough a bit of investigating work as has ever been done under the Government. After this investigation had been in progress for [a couple of] about two months it became evident that legal proceedings would have to be undertaken against some of the offenders. Owing to the importance of the case it was deemed advisable that special counsel should be employed, and Messrs. Charles J. Bonaparte and Holmes Conrad were [employed] chosen for this purpose. [Investigation of the Washington Post Office has been made and the New York Post Office are now [is now] being made. The results will be communicated to me later. Exhibits C, D, E and F are letters of mine to the Attorney General and Postmaster General concerning the investigation, the letter of the Postmaster General to Assistant Postmaster General Bristow on the conclusion of his investigation and the reply of Assistant Postmaster General Bristow.] Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad [made various reports (exhibits G. H. and I.)] in their [report upon] review of the report of [Fourth Assistant Postmaster General] Mr. Bristow [they] speak as follows: "We consider the report an exceptionally able,-3- candid and impartial review of its subject matter and that it shows clearly reprehensible misconduct, amounting in many cases to crime, on the part of a number of public officials. It is a voluminous document, but this arises, not from prolixity, but from the nature of the matters discussed. We heartily commend the report and deem its conclusions fully justified by the facts it sets forth; and while regretting in common with all patriotic citizens that the grave abuses of long standing which it reveals should have grown up in the Post Office Department, we consider the exposure of these abuses and the attempts made to punish those responsible for them a work of the highest public utility, quickly and ably performed." In all that is thus said of the report of Mr. Bristow I cordially agree. [*out*] [In connection with the portion of the first report of Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad dealing with Comptroller Tracewell and Auditor Castle the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury is here appended (Exhibit J), and attention should also be paid to what is said on the same subject in the supplemental report of Messrs. Bonaparte and Conrad.] The investigation made by Mr. Bristow discloses a condition of gross corruption in the office of the First Assistant Postmaster General and in that of the Assistant Attorney General for the Post Office Department. [This corruption began in 1893 and has steadily increased in volume since had existed for a term of years.] In the case of the Superintendent-4- intendent of Free Delivery, Machen, [it had gone back ten years,] the evidence [showing] shows that his misconduct began [four days] immediately after his appointment, [which was made] in September 1893 for the case of the General Superintendent of the salaries and allowances, because it began in [?] was approved [?] in 1897. In the case of Assistant Attorney General [?] it has gone on for a number of years, as it is impossible to say exactly when it began. A melancholy feature of the case is that with one exception all the offenders have been for a number of years in the government service. The following is a list of the [seventeen] [sixteen] fourteen Post Office employees in the service at the time this investigation was begun who [are implicated to a greater or less extent] are apparently most seriously implicated in the wrong doing [? of ? varying greatly] together with an account of the steps that have been taken by the Government in each case and a statement of the date of the original appointment of each man in the service. [There are one or two others concerning whom it is not possible as yet to make a definite report.] [? ?? not now in the service to ???] The case of ex-First Assistant Postmaster General Heath, who had left the service over three years before this investigation was begun, [is included upon] is [reported] set forth in the report of Mr. Bristow. James N. Tyner, Assistant Attorney General for Post Office Department, appointed special agent Post Office Department March 7, 1861; with intervals of a few years has been in the service ever since and was Postmaster General under President Grant for [seven] several months; he was removed April 22, 1903; he has since been indicted three times. A. W. Machen, General Superintendent Free Delivery System; appointed clerk in post office at Toledo, Ohio, March 1, 1887, continuously in service ever since save for three years; removed May 27, 1903; has since been indicted fourteen times. George W. Beavers, General Superintendent of Salaries and Allowances; appointed to clerkship in New York post office January, 1881; continuous service ever since; resignation accepted to take effect March 31, 1903; has since been indicted eight times.-5- James T. Metcalf, Superintendent Money Order System; appointed Post Office Inspector February 2, 1882; [served continuously] has been in postal service ever since; removed June 17, 1903; has been indicted once. [G. A. C. Christiancy, Assistant Attorney General, Post Office Department; originally appointed clerk in the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1889; appointed in the Post Office Department January 1, 1901; resignation accepted October 12, 1903.] Daniel V. Miller, Assistant Attorney, Post Office Department; appointed July 1, 1902; removed May 25, 1903; indicted once; R[??] after one mistrial was re-tried and acquitted. [Charles T. McCoy, Assistant Superintendent, Free Delivery Service; appointed [Post Office Inspector] special agent in Free Delivery Service March 18, 1898; resignation accepted October 17, 1903.] [William H. Landvoight, Superintendent Classification Division; appointed temporary messenger August 6, 1875; resignation accepted October 24, 1903.] Louis Kempner, Superintendent Registry System; appointed clerk in New York Post Office August, 1886; removed October 21, 1903. Charles Hedges, Superintendent City Free Delivery Service; appointed assistant superintendent free delivery service July 1, 1898; removed July 22, 1903. James W. Irwin, Assistant Superintendent, Free Delivery Service; appointed post office inspector June 27, 1887; removed September 16, 1903; indicted once. W. Scott Towers, Superintendent Station C, Washington, D. C.; appointed clerk Washington post office November, 1890; removed October 1, 1903; indicted three times. Otto F. Weiss, Assistant Superintendent Registry Division, New York Post Office; appointed clerk New York post office June, 1890; removed October 21, 1903. T. W. McGregor, clerk, Free Delivery Division, in charge of supplies; appointed Post Office Department March 11, 1891; removed June 5, 1903; indicted twice.-6- C. E. Upton, clerk, Free Delivery Division; appointed July 1, 1900; removed June 5, 1903; indicted once. M. W. Louis, Superintendent Supply Division; appointed [New York] Kansas City post office April 17, 1897; removed October 21, 1903. Charles B. Terry, clerk, Supply Division; appointed September 20, 1900; removed October 21, 1903. As shown in Mr. Bristow's report, and as partially indicated by the actions in the several cases, these cases show widely varying degrees of culpability. Among outsiders indictments have also been found against [George E. Green] H. J. Barrett, formerly in the Post Office Department; from May 11, 1889 to September 20, 1893, and from June 1, 1897 to December 31, 1900. George E. Green Diller B. and Samuel A. Groff. William C. Long, formerly in the Post Office Department; from April 17, 1890 to August 15, 1893. Isaac S. McGeehan; George H. Huntington; George E. Lorenz, formerly postmaster at Toledo, Ohio, from August 3, 1886 to July 9, 1890. Martha J. Lorenz; John T. Cupper; H. C. Hallenbeck; W. D. Doremus; Eugene D. Scheble; William G. Crawford; Deputy Auditor Post Office Department; from June 12, 1893 to September 15, 1897. Maurice Runkle; Norman R. Metcalf; Leopold J. Stern; Edmund H. Driggs; George F. Miller; Joseph M. Johns.-7- Several of the above have been indicted two, three or five times each. The three chief offenders in the Government service were Tyner, Machen and Beavers. The friends of Tyner have advanced the theory that in his case the chief offender was really his [wife's] nephew, by marriage, Barrett, who was his assistant in the office for a part of the time, and that Tyner's offenses are due to his failing bodily and mental powers. The facts set forth in Mr. Bristow's report do not tend to substantiate the validity of these excuses for Tyner, while they show literally astounding misconduct in Barrett. For Machen and Beavers no excuse of any kind has been alleged. In the case of Metcalf, the Superintendent of the Money Order System, the most vigorous protests were at first made on his behalf by a large number of [quite] reputable citizens, and also by others who were at the time deemed reputable, but who it has since been discovered were profiting by Metcalf's misconduct. One of them has been indicted in connection with him. [An extraordinary thing about this whole affair is that until] When these investigations were begun, some nine months ago, many of the chief offenders who have been indicted or dismissed, or both, as above enumerated, were considered to have excellent reputations. A number of the most respectable people in the land offered voluntary testimony on behalf of Mr. Tyner. [when his name first appeared.] So highly were Messrs. Beavers and Machen thought of by those who had been brought into-8- close connection with them that Congress actually provided at its last session for raising the salaries of both, the salary in each case being increased five hundred dollars, to take effect at the beginning of the fiscal year on July first last. By that date they were both out of office, and the Department of Justice was taking steps to have them indicted. During Machen's term of service he was twice investigated by Congress, once by a committee of the Senate and once by a committee of the House, but cleared on each occasion. Yet at that very period, as has been shown in the present investigation, he was engaged in the corrupt business for which he has now been removed and indicted. This is no reflection upon the committees who conducted the investigation; for as skillfully had Machen concealed his wrongdoing that it was only [fully] revealed [by] after months of laborious and exhaustive work by trained detectives. [after suspicion had been aroused.] The details of the corruption are set forth in full in Mr. Bristow's report and need not be recapitulated by me. As regards Messrs. Beavers and Machen the corruption took the form of bribery and blackmail in connection with the purchase of government supplies. There was no direct [They did not take the form of direct] theft of public moneys, the pecuniary loss to the public coming from the unnecessarily high price paid for certain articles, or from the inferior quality of certain other articles, or from the fact that unnecessary or worthless articles were purchased and used. [As regards all these articles, Messrs. Machen, Beavers and the others either blackmailed the owners or accepted bribes from them, the public of course ultimately paying the amount of the blackmail or bribe in addition to the amount which the article was really worth; and of course under such system of graft corruption articles in reality worthless or unnecessary were frequently purchased and used.] In the office of the-9- Assistant Attorney General for the Post [Dept] Office Department, under Tyner and Barrett, far greater wrong was inflicted upon the public than could be measured by a pecuniary standard, for in this office the corruption of the government officials took the form of favoring [gambling schemes], get-rich-quick [schemes] concerns, and [other swindles of a like nature] similar swindling schemes; in other words, the [sharpers] [scoundrels] criminals whom it was the sworn duty of these government officials to prosecute, paid [the government officials] them for permission to fleece the public unmolested. [Under Beavers and Machen the offenses took the form of bribery and blackmail in connection with the purchase of government supplies.] I heartily approve of the recommendation of Messrs. Conrad and Bonaparte that the statute of limitations be extended in the case of government servants to a period of at least five years, for the persons who in such positions of trust engage in corrupt practices can ordinarily conceal their guilt for a longer time than [the present] is covered by the present [?] statute of limitations. This recommendation has been laid before Congress in the report of the Attorney General, and it is earnestly hoped that it will be acted upon favorably. Moreover our experience shows that outsiders claiming political influence sometimes sell their influence to candidates for office, or in other words blackmail these candidates. There should be legislation which will permit of summary dealing with such offenders. [There is another piece of needed legislation to which I should like to call your attention, although it [which] is not touched upon in the present report. [*(No)*] [Moreover [?] experienced in certain districts in the smaller states [?] and elsewhere showed the [?] A year ago we found in certain states that outsiders claiming political influence [sometimes sell] had been selling their influence to candidates for postmasterships office, or in other words blackmail[ing] these candidates, some of whom were women, and forcing them to pay money. The abuse was greatest in certain]-10- [*no*] [districts in Georgia, but it had existed elsewhere. In the districts involved we put a stop to the abuse by public notification that the individuals claiming to possess influence in making recommendations would no longer be allowed directly or indirectly to make such recommendations; and we presented to the local federal authorities the names of the offenders in order that they might be prosecuted. It appeared, [however] on the effort being made, that there was no federal statute under which [they] the offenders could be reached. The cases were brought to the attention of the state courts, but no information has been given that any punishment was inflicted. It is greatly to be desired that Congress should enact legislation which will permit of summary dealing with such offenders. However, no new legislation is not so much needed, as an honest administration of the laws we now have] However, the prime need is not new legislation, but the punishment of [the offenders] those who offend against existing laws. The Post Office Department is making certain changes in the methods of administration, notably in the method of inspection, by which the service will be improved and the chance of [undiscovered] corruption [existing so long undiscovered] existing without discovery [will be] be minimized; but the only way to meet [this] the real evil is [by changing the personnel] [to remove the offenders] to punish the offenders, by reward in any event, and where possible [to secure their additional punishment] by prosecution under the criminal statutes, [and by taking every step possible to punish the offenders.] In any great business, public or private, wrong-doing is certain at times to occur. The way to [minimize] guard against it is rigorously to scrutinize the character of those appointed, carefully to supervise their actions after appointment, and finally, to punish with relentless severity those who go wrong. All [these methods are being tried at this moment.] this is being done. [in the Post Office Department at the time] [It is a misfortune in the]-11- [Post Office Department, as in every other branch of the government service, when in the appointment, promotion or removal of any employe whose functions are merely ministerial, attention is paid to aught else than the character and capacity of the individual and the needs of the service. Wherever the civil service law applies no other consideration now comes in; where the civil service law can not be applied the effort is made to [minimize,] exclude, so far as is possible, all considerations save [the consideration of] the good of the service. In filling the vacancies created by the removals or resignations above mentioned, [no consideration whatever will [should]] nothing will have weight save the need of the whole people of the United States that their postal service should be administered on a clean [an honest], efficient, and economical basis.] But the immediate reformation of the service [and] by the turning out of the offenders [are] is not in [themselves] itself enough to meet the demands of justice. The cases against both those within and those without the Post Office Department, who by their acts have brought themselves within the grasp of the law, will be pushed with the utmost vigor. [It is not enough that the wrong doer shall be dismissed from office.] Every effort must be made to see that both [he] the delinquent official and the outsider[s] who shares his guilt are punished to the limit of the law. In pursuance of this policy the individuals above enumerated have been indicted. In no case has the indictment been [had] sought save where the officials of the government were convinced of the man's guilt; and in every case the government will exhaust every expedient in its power in the effort to see-13- that justice is meted out to the offender. [root of our national well-being. The toleration of the wrong, not the exposure of the wrong [the wrong's exposure,] is the real offense.] Those in the public service whose duty it is must ever be vigilant in the detection of wrong-doing, fearless in its exposure, relentless in its prosecution; [and finally] but in the last resort, when everything which the public official, whether legislator, judge or executive officer, can do has been done, it remains for the jury, drawn from the people and representing the people, to do even-handed justice, shielding the innocent, but declining to be misled by any plea into refraining from punishment of the guilty.-12 - [that justice is meted out to the offender.] No crime calls for sterner reprobation than the crime of the corruptionist in public life, and of the man who seeks to corrupt him. The bribe giver and the bribe taker are equally guilty. Both alike sin against the primary law of the State's safety. All questions of difference[s] [on] in party policy sink into insignificance when the people of this country are brought face to face with a question like this, which lies at the root of honest and decent government. On this question, and on all others like it, we can afford to have no division among [decent] good citizens. In the last resort good laws and good administration alike must rest upon the broad basis of sound public opinion. A dull public conscience, an easy-going acquiescence in corruption, infallibly means debasement in public life; and such debasement in the end means the ruin of free institutions. Self-government becomes a [painful] farce if the representatives of the people corrupt others or are themselves corrupted. Freedom is not a gift which [tarries long in the hands of cowards, and neither is it a gift which] will tarry long in the hands of the dishonest, or of those so foolish or so incompetent as to tolerate dishonesty in their public servants. Under our system all power comes from the people, and all punishment rests ultimately with the people. [In public life the bribe giver and the bribe taker alike sin against the people. Such a [the] crime against the body politic is worse than any similar crime against a private individual, because it is a crime which strikes at the] The toleration of the wrong, not the exposure of the wrong, is the real offense. Theodore Roosevelt446 [*Packard*] [*Book 13*] Personal. November 26, 1903. My dear Mr. Packard: I have your letter of the 25th instant, with enclosure. These men, not all of whom were miners, by the way, came here and were at lunch with me, in company with Mr. Carroll D. Wright, Mr. Wayne MacVeagh, and Secretary Cortelyou. They are as decent a set of men as can be. They all agreed entirely with me in my denunciation of what had been done in the Coeur d'Alene country; and it appeared that some of them were on the platform with me when I denounced this type of outrage three years ago in Butte. There is not one man who was there, who, I believe, was in any way, shape or form responsible for such outrages. I find that the socialistic members of the unions in Butte denounced these men for coming here, in a manner as violent-- and I may say as irrational--as the denunciation in the article you sent me. Doubtless the gentleman of whom you speak as your general manager is an admirable man. I, of course, was not alluding to him; but I most emphatically was alluding to men who write such articles as that you sent me, or as those of the Sun. These articles are to be paralleled by the similar article in the populist and socialist papers when two years ago I had at dinner at one time Pierpont Morgan, and at another time J. J. Hill, and at another time, Harriman, and at another time Schiff. Furthermore, they could be paralleled by the articles in the same type of paper which at the time of the Miller incident in the Printing Office were in a condition of447 [*[11-26-03]*] -2- nervous anxiety because I met the Iabor leaders to discuss it. It would have been a very great misfortune if I had not met them; and it would have been an even greater misfortune if after meeting them I had yielded to their protests in the matter. You say in your letter "I knew, of course, that you were on record as opposed to violence.” Pardon my saying that this seems to me not the right way to put the matter, if by "record" you mean utterance[s] and not action. Aside from what happened when I was Governor in connection, for instance, with the Croton dam strike riots, all you have to do is to turn back to what took place last June in Arizona - and you can find out about it from Mr. Cleveland Dodge of New York. The miners struck, violence followed, and the Arizona Territor[y]ial authorities notified me they could not grapple with the situation. Within twenty minutes of the receipt of the telegram, orders were issued to the nearest available troops, and twenty-four hours afterrwards Gen. Baldwin and his regulars were on the ground, and twenty-fours hours later every vestige of disorder had disappeared. The miners’ federation in their meeting, think at Denver, a short while afterwards, passed resolutions denouncing me. I do not know whether the Mining and Engineering Journal, or Mr. Rickard, paid any heed to this incident or knew of it. If the Journal did I suppose it can hardly have failed to understand that to put an immediate448 [*[11-26-03]*] -3- stop to rioting by the use of the United States army is a fact of importance beside which the criticism of my having "labor leaders" to lunch, shrinks into the same insignificance as the criticism in a different type of paper about my having those "trust magnates" to lunch. While I am President I wish the labor man to feel that he has the same right of access to me that the capitalist has; that the doors swing open as easily to the wage- worker as to the head of a big corporation -- and no easier. Anything else seems to me not only un-American, but as symptomatic of an attitude which will cost grave trouble if persevered in. To discriminate against labor men from Butte because there is reason to believe that rioting has been excited in other districts by certain labor unions or individuals in labor unions in Butte, would be to adopt precisely the attitude of those who desire me to discriminate against all capitalists in Wall Street because there are plenty of capitalists in Wall Street who have been guilty of bad financial practices and who have endeavored to override or evade the laws of the land. In my judgment the only safe attitude for a private citizen, and still more for a public servant, to assume is that he will draw the line on conduct, discriminating against neither corporation nor union as such, nor in favor of either as such, but endeavoring to make the decent number of the union and the upright capitalist alike feel that they are bound, not only by self-interest but by every consideration of principle and duty to stand together on the matters of449 [*[11-26-03]*] -4- most moment to the nation. With thanks for your courtesy, I am, Very sincerely yours, [*Theodore Roosevelt*] Mr. Edwin Packard, 45 Cedar Street, New York, N. Y.(Copy) [1880] Personal. November 26, 1903. My dear White: I am sure I shall enjoy seeing Durand, and I look forward to your arrival in order that I may talk over many things. All of my people are enthusiastic over your treatment of them this summer. The Alaska and Panama settlements coming in one year make a very good showing, do they not? I shall get Cuban reciprocity through, too. Sincerely yours, /s/ Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. Henry White, American Embassy, London.[*[Platt]*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal November 28, 1903. My dear Senator Platt: The Sun quotes you as being against General Wood. Of course I do not believe this, but in view of our relations, and of your being the Senator from my own State, I should like you to know the exact facts. At present I am promoting Wood in strict order of seniority. He was taken out of his order - just as Franklin Bell and others were taken out of their order - by President McKinley, because of his great and distinguished services. He is now being opposed in such a way and under such circumstances as to render it out of the question for me to submit to his rejection without placing the facts in a light which will permit of no misunderstanding. As I say, any statement that he is being jumped out of his turn is a pretense and a falsehood. That accusation would have applied when he was made a brigadier general three years ago, but he is now being advanced in his regular order. Any statement that he is now being advanced because of personal favoritism on my part is of course equally a pretense and a falsehood. He was advanced by President McKinley. I am doing nothing but refusing to reverse President McKinley's action. Five times he has been confirmed as general by the Senate on President McKinley's nominations twice as brigadier general of volunteers, twice as major general of volunteers, and once as brigadier general in the regular army. He received his colonelcy on the recommendation of his commanding officers under whom he served as2 line officer in the Apache campaigns, General Miles, General Lawton, General Forsyth and others specifically recommending him because of his gallantry and his great efficiency for the command of a regiment in the Spanish War. All that McKinley did for him I most heartily approved. I should have felt it an injustice had it not been done for him, but as a matter of fact my own share has been merely to promote him in the order of seniority. Now he is being held up on various accusations, which, however, reduce themselves down to those coming from Runcie and those coming from Rathbone. As regards Runcie's statements I have just received the following letter from Ray Stannard Baker: Denver, Colorado, November 22,1903. My dear Mr. President: I have been reading with great regret the account of the attacks on General Wood in the Senate. It so happens that I was intimately concerned with the unfortunate publication of the Runcie article in the North American Review. The writing of an article - not, however, an article attacking General Brooke - was first discussed in the most casual sort of way one night at General Wood's quarters in Santiago by Major Runcie and myself. General Wood was present, but, as I remember, took no part in the conversation. Subsequently the subject was discussed several times by Major Runcie and myself and I agreed, if he wrote an article, to find a publisher in New York. Upon my return Major Runcie sent me the article, and, as a purely friendly service, I sent it to General Harvey of the North American Review. Subsequently Major Runcie accused me of violating a confidence - this was after the article had begun to cause trouble - in allowing his name to be used with the article. With this, however, I had not the slightest thing to do, and fortunately I retained his letter, which I now have, in which he gave permission for the use of his name if necessary. The North American Review people regarded it as necessary. I tried to explain these matters properly to The Sun people, apparently without result. If these facts, given here in barest outline, will help in any way in defending General Wood I should be overjoyed to make a public statement. Of course I can't say what may have gone on between General Wood and Major Runcie privately, but I do know that in our conversations nothing was said that could in any way be stretched3 to mean that General Wood desired any public criticism of General Brooke. General Wood talked to me very frankly, like the soldier he is, but in confidence, of course, and as to the charge that he wanted me to attack General Brooke's administration in print, nothing could be more absurd. This shows conclusively that for the article about which so much has been said, Runcie was solely responsible; that Baker had nothing whatever to do with Wood in preparing it. It is too late now for Runcie to claim that Wood inspired that article. A year and a quarter after it was written and all the controversy had arisen, Wood came up for promotion to brigadier general. Runcie said nothing, and it is now too late for him to speak. His word can not for one moment be taken against Wood's. As for Rathbone, he has the natural feeling against Wood which the dishonest official always has against the decent man who has exposed him. Rathbone is a convicted thief. He, with Neeley, belonged to the same set of post office officials which included Beavers and Beavers’ companions at Washington. He, assisted by two or three of his own stamp, for equally sinister reasons, has been indulging in these slanders against Wood. In other words, Wood is being punished to please the criminal whom he hunted down, and the punishment falls upon him because he was a good and faithful servant and merciless towards corruptionists. This government can not afford, under any circumstances, to let it be known that if a public servant, and especially a public servant in one of our insular dependencies, hunts down a powerful corruptionist, he will himself be punished for having done so. The prominent position given to Rathbone in the opposition against Wood has made the case one of far greater importance than if it affected merely Wood's personal4 Fortunes. Wood has rendered, since he received his first commission of brigadier general of volunteers. - that is, during the time he has served as a general officer - greater services than any other officer of the rank of general during the same period; and it would be a cruel injustice to him and a great determent to the army to refuse him this promotion. But under the peculiar circumstances of the case [*, *] it would be a far greater wrong to the public service as a whole, for it would amount to serving notice on all our public servants, and especially upon our public servants and especially upon our public servants in the in the Philippines and elsewhere, that if that venture to expose and punish corruption among public officials who have influence behind them, they may themselves expect punish instead of reward as their portion. Such a position would be an intolerable one for this government to assume. Sincerely yours, Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate. COPY. Personal. WHITE HOUSE, Washington. December 10, 1903. My dear Sir: The president requests me to ask you to be good enough to send him a report concerning a speech alleged to have been made by Major General MacArthur about impending war between the United States and Germany, referred to in the enclosed telegram from Mr. George Brumder of Milwaukee, Wis. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr. Secretary to the Present. Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of War. Enclosures.Copy. Personal. December 12, 1903. My dear Sir George: I have finished the second part of the American Revolution, and I have enjoyed it so much that I must send you a line to say so. I feel that it is far and away the best account of the revolution written by any one. For interest, for delightful humor, for absolute fair-mindedness, for exactness in narrative, for profound insight, (and for the English!) -- why, my dear sir, no other book on the Revolution so much as approaches it. There are two or three points you raise which I should like to discuss with you, but they are not important. I earnestly wish you could get to this side. I should so like to have you spend a few days with us at the White House. Can't you come over this winter or next? Only it must be before March 4, 1905! Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Bart., Care of Longmans, Green and Co., 91 Fifth Avenue, New York.COPY. Personal. WHITE HOUSE, Washington. December 12, 1903. My dear General Young: The President requests me to return the enclosures which accompanied your letter of the 11th instant, in relation to the alleged statements by General MacArthur concerning impending war between the United States and Germany, and to ask you to be good enough to send him copies of these communications with General MacArthur's reply to your cable, when his reply has been received. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr. Secretary to the President. Lieutenant General S. H. M. Young, U.S.A., War Department. Enclosures.[*File C*] [*Calendared*] [*MacArthur*] [*[George Robert Carter]*] (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 14, 1903. (Cable) Carter, Governor, Honolulu, Hawaii. General MacArthur reports that an officer of the Hawaiian National Guard embodied in an official report his memory of a conversation with General MacArthur six days after the event, which report was submitted to you and through your office made public. The matter in this report is so obviously improper for a public document that its publication was a gross impropriety. I desire immediate and full information on the subject. How those responsible for the publication could fail to estimate the gravity of the situation they were creating, I am unable to understand. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Official[*Harvey, Geo*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal December 19, 1903. My dear Mr. Harvey: I wish to write a word about the Panama business, because in your cartoon, about which we spoke, you got at the root of the matter from the standpoint of righteous national interest. In its essence, what has happened is that Colombia tried to hold up the United States, and that the United States has taken away its gun. Now, if a road agent tries to hold up a United States official, and the United States official is quick enough and has nerve enough to wrest his gun from him, I have scant patience with the hysterical sentimentalist who bewails the act on the ground that maybe the road agent did not mean to shoot, and that anyhow the gun was his and should be immediately restored to him. Still less have I patience with those who, for their base purposes of political partisanship, seek in such case to get party aid by sacrificing the nation's interests. At present, under the lead of Senator Gorman, every effort is being made to dragoon the democratic senators to voting in a mass against the treaty. Of course, now as at all other periods of our history, no treaty can be put through by a mere party vote; for we have not now, and very rarely does any party have, a two thirds majority in the Senate. The treaty-making power is, of course, the high exercise of the functions of the nation's power in international affairs, and should never be approached from the merely2 party standpoint. It would never occur to me to think of the Panama project as a party project. The building of this canal has been something upon which the American people has set its mind for many decades. The precedents upon which I have acted were set by Polk, by Cass, by Bayard, no less than by Grant and by Seward. If the democratic senators act as a unit they can doubtless defeat this treaty. Whether it will be for their political advantage to do so, you are as competent to judge as I am. It is but the bare truth to say that, as far as I am personally concerned, I would rather see this treaty ratified and the digging of the canal begun, if in order to achieve this end it were necessary that I should neither be nominated or elected, than I would see my own election at the cost of the abandonment of the treaty, and therefore of the canal. You and I differ widely on many political questions, and I should never write you in reference to any of these questions. But we feel alike - as I think all good Americans should feel alike - on this great national issue. Is there not some way in which you can help prevent the democratic senators from taking an attitude alike as foolish and so wicked, from the standpoint of the national honor and interest? Faithfully yours, Mr. George Harvey, Editor Harper's Weekly, 331 Pearl Street, New York.Copy THE WHITE HOUSE Washington Personal. December 19, 1903. My dear Bellamy: Many thanks for your letter. I am a little surprised at what you tell me about Mgr. O'Connell. I have always thought very highly of him, and the Archbishop especially recommended him to me. He wanted me to write something for the Archbishop. I told him of course that I could not interfere in such a matter, as it was none of my business who was made Cardinal; that personally I had a very strong friendship and admiration for the Archbishop, and that individually it would please me greatly to see him made Cardinal, just as it pleased me when Dr. Satterlee was made Bishop of Washington; but that I could no more interfere in one case than in the other - in short, that my feeling for the Archbishop was due to my respect for him as a useful and honorable man - just such a feeling I had had for Phillips Brooks and for many other clergymen of various denominations; but that I could not as President in any way try to help any clergyman of any denomination to high rank in that denomination. I shall carefully consider what you have to say as to the Vatican acting as umpire between Panama and Colombia. It may be that something can be done in that direction, although I am not sure. Of course I could not personally suggest the Vatican as an umpire. With regards to Maria, Faithfully yours, (signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Bellamy Storer, Ambassador of the United States, Vienna, Austria.Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [*Personal; not for publication.*] [*Not sent - attended to in telephone conversation with Senator Warren, who called up.*] December 22, 1903. My dear Senator Warren: I enclose you this alleged interview with you in the Herald. It is perhaps unnecessary to say that I am sure you did not give it out in this form. What I said was, that the assertion that I was putting Wood up now for the purpose of making him a lieutenant general hereafter was sheer nonsense, and that it was out of the question for me to promise in any way what I would or would not do about the lieutenant generalship in the future, because entirely unforeseen matters might come up; but my understanding of the situation was that the question of General Wood's appointment to the lieutenant generalship would not come up during my term of service, even if I were nominated and elected next year; that is, that it would come up after March 4, 1909. Of course, I do not wish any elaborate statement like this to be made public, if only for the reason that it would look as if you and I were talking over what should be done in the event of my having another term as President. The simple statement is that I have made no promise whatever for or against General Wood or anyone else; that what I said was that if General Wood were made Major General now, it did not in the least signify that he would be lieutenant general three years hence, or six years hence, or at any time, and that my promoting him now in order of-2- seniority to be major general was most emphatically not to be taken as showing that even if I had the power I would promote him over the head of anyone else to be lieutenant general. If you have seen the Herald story you will see that it actually says that I would not promote General Wood, at a time when it would mean putting General Grant, General Funston and others over his head. Of course any such statement as to my intentions would be on its face absurd. I am very sorry this statement should have appeared. I have of course not dreamed of forming any intention in my mind as to any future promotion of General Wood. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt Hon. F. E. Warren, United States Senate. Enclosure.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. December 23, 1903. My dear Mr. Secretary: The President desires complete copies of all orders, telegrams, letters and reports relating to the landing of sailors or marines on the Isthmus of Panama, or the movements of naval vessels, for the purpose of preventing interruption to free transit under the treaty of 1846, covering each and every occasion since 1846. Will you be good enough to have the copies prepared and sent to the President at your earliest convenience? Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. William H. Moody, Secretary of the Navy.Copy Personal THE WHITE HOUSE Washington, December 27, 1903. My dear Bellamy: The enclosed article is but one of several of the same kind which have appeared, and letters are beginning to come to both Hay and myself on the same subject. I need hardly point out that but few things could be more embarrassing or more mischievous than to have had the opportunity given for such articles to appear. What has occurred shows clearly that it is hopeless for you to expect that people will appreciate the difference between what you, as an American Catholic, in your private capacity, say, and what you, as an American Ambassador, say. I take it for granted that you supposed you were speaking merely in your private capacity to people who would not misunderstand you, and who would not repeat what you said. Your faith has evidently been misplaced. In view of what has occurred I must ask you, while you are in the United States service, to take no part either directly or indirectly in such a matter as this, and hereafter to repeat to no man what I have said to you concerning the subject of the article. You have doubtless yourself seen, by what has occurred, that such action can have only mischievous results. I have the heartiest admiration for Archbishop Ireland. I should be delighted to see him made cardinal, just as I was delighted to see Lawrence made the Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts; just as I have been delighted at various Methodist friends of mine who have been made bishop. But as President, it is none of my business to interfere for or against the advancement of any man in any church; and as it is impossible to differentiate2 what I say in my individual capacity from what I say as President - at least in the popular mind, and apparently also in the Roman mind - I must request you not to quote me in any way or shape hereafter. Have you ever written any one, excepting John Hay or myself, stating that the removal of Hurst was wrong? I do not believe you have, but the other day some one quoted you to this effect. I need hardly say that under no circumstances must you write to an outsider commenting upon a removal made by my direction on Secretary Hay's recommendation, and on absolutely conclusive proof of misconduct and unfitness. With love to Maria, believe me, Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Bellamy Storer, United States Ambassador, Vienna, Austria. EnclosurePersonal THE WHITE HOUSE Washington, December 30,1903. My dear Bellamy: In my last letter to you I wrote you as to a report I had heard about your writing a letter concerning the dismissal of Hurst. This came to me from an outside source, and I did not credit it. Since then Secretary Hay has sent me over a letter to Senator Hanna which the latter put before the Department with a request that he be given information in order to answer you. Secretary Hay feels, of course, exceedingly indignant over your having written in such a manner to any outsider, and feels that there should be some official rebuke. Because of our personal relations I write in this way to you instead. I hardly think you could have thought exactly what you were writing. You say, for instance, about the dismissal of Hurst, "I do know the manner of his removal, in a way I should be ashamed to employ with a common servant. * * * I have never known, if what I hear is the case, of a more sudden or unexpected action of any administration. * * * It may be none of your business nor mine, but I know you do not like injustice." Of course, this amounts to a bitter attack upon the administration of which you are a part. You make charges of a grave nature against the Secretary of State and the President under whom you are serving. If these charges were true that would not, in my opinion, justify you in writing to the Senator in such fashion. As it happens, they are absolutely without foundation. No case was gone into more carefully than this. I have reports before me from Ambassador McCormick and from a special and trusted agent of the Department - a man in whose judgment the Department has absolute confidence. No other action was possible in view of these reports. 2 I know, my dear Bellamy, that you have not intended to do anything disloyal or improper, but surely on thinking over the matter you will see that there would be but one possible construction to be put upon such a letter from you. Think of the effect if your letter were made public! Let me repeat to you that, in reference to matters affecting the Catholic church, events have conclusively shown that while you are Ambassador you must keep absolutely clear of any deed or word in Rome or elsewhere which would seem to differentiate your position from that of other Ambassadors. The mere fact of the report in the newspapers about your calling at the Vatican has had a very unfortunate effect. I dare say you did not call; you may merely have seen some Cardinal privately; but the unpleasant talk over the affair emphasizes the need of extreme circumspection while you are in your present position. While I am President and you are Ambassador neither of us in his public relations is to act as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile; and we have to be careful, not merely to do what is right, but so to carry ourselves as to show that we are doing what is right. I shall ask you not to quote me to any person in any shape or way in connection with any affair of the Catholic church, and yourself not to take action of any kind which will give ground for the belief that you as an American Ambassador are striving to interfere in the affairs of the church. With love to Maria, Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Bellamy Storer, United States Ambassador, Vienna, Austria.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 30, 1903. My dear Mr. Harriman: I have just received your letter about the appointment of Mr. Ralston. There are one or two points in reference to the case which I should like to go over with you, if you feel that you care to come to Washington. Is there a chance of your doing so? Very truly yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.[*R*] [[shorthand]] [*To Richard Harding Davis Dec [ ] 1903*] [*Roosevelt. Theo*][*(Friars)*] [*[1903?]*] [*7 copies*] In the matter The United States representatives in the Philippines [have] are [earnestly] merely endeavoring in this to [realize the asportation [wishes] as well as] to meet the wishes, as well as the needs, of the Philippino people. [The Philipinos] [They] It is not the United States government which objects to the presence of the friars; it is the catholic population of the Philippine Islands. The lay catholic population, and the parish priests of native and non-Spanish blood, are practically a unit in deciding both to expel the friars and to confiscate their lands out of hand. This proposed2 confiscation without compensation [was one] of the church lands was [the] one of the fundamental policies of the insurgent government under Aguinaldo. Recognizing the intensity and practical amount of this feeling among the Philippinos, [the United States representative has proposed has desired to recognize this feeling] and at the same time [the long demand] [desiring] to avoid causing loss to the church, the United States governmental representatives proposed to [by] paying for the lands out of the public funds if the friars would retire from the [orders] island, and give places to other religious of their own faith who might be able to accomplish for their religion what they themselves had [?] originally failed to [to] to accomplish 3 in making this proposal the United States representatives were well aware that [it was not] financially it was only of benefit to the church; for the former congregation of the objectionable friars now [could] refuse to receive them and [?] hold the land in adverse possession [and] The friars could only be restored to their parishes by such affirmative governmental action as under our communication can not be taken. [The civil authorities in the Philippines are trying in good faith to [meet] represent the]-4- some of the most eminent Catholic prelates and Catholic laymen in this country. That the government might be attacked by certain extreme anti-Catholics for making the arrangement, we though probable; but it never occurred to us for a moment that there would be any opposition from any Catholic source to a course of conduct so obviously in the interest of and intended to benefit both the Catholic population of the Philippines and the church from whom the actions of the friars has tended to estrange them. It seems to me that the agitation over this matter is hardly warranted. The government has tried to arrange what it believed and still believes would be the best settlement; but as one of the parties in interest does not accept its belief, the government will take the decision with entire good humor and will try to do the best it can as things are. There has been no intention of expelling the friars in the sense that you use the word expel. The simple facts are that the government found the Catholic population of the Philippines, which practically includes almost the entire civilized population of the islands and very much of the uncivilized or partly civilized portions, in a bitter quarrel over the friars. The lay Catholics and the parish priests wanted to expel the friars and to take their lands without compensation. The orders which were menaced naturally wished to be kept where they were and to get the full money's worth of their lands. After a great deal of thought, it seemed to all of the Americans,-5- Protestant and Catholic, who were on the spot, that the best thing to do was to try to bring the two parties together and remove the source of irritation, to the very great benefit of both the population and the church, by seeing whether the friars would not leave if the government purchased their lands -- for of course if the government did not purchase their lands nobody else will, as they are now held in adverse possession, while their own parishioners will not allow the friars to come back to the parishes. This proposition was put before the Holy See as a business matter by the government of the Philippines. It was not put before the Holy See on our initiative, but at the repeated and earnest suggestions of some of the most prominent Catholics in the United States, including some of the highest dignitaries of the church. As the proposition has been rejected, we shall simply accept the fact that one obstacle to the thorough pacification and prosperity of the islands has not been removed, and we shall go ahead and do the best we can notwithstanding it.] There are certain great fundamental principles to which our government is irrevocably pledged. Among these principles is that of complete religious liberty - the state and church being sharply separated, neither performing the functions of the other, and no discrimination being made for or against any creed, but strict justice being done to the professors of all alike. I challenge the finding in all history of an instance in which a more resolute effort to achieve such ends has been made than the effort which is now being made and[[shorthand]] W.L.J. 1-11-1904.[*Sutherland*] Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 13, 1904. My dear Mr. Sutherland: Mr. Scott has just shown me your very kind letter to him. Believe me, I appreciate it. I wish I could see you some time. With real regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. George Sutherland, Keith Building, Salt Lake City, Utah. [*[see Scott, Hon Charles F. 1/13/04] *] WHATE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 14, 1904. My dear Mrs. Wood: I have just sent the enclosed to Senator Scott. Sincerely yours, Mrs. Leonard Wood, 23 Lanier Place, Washington, D. C. Enclosure. [*see Scott, N. B. 1/14/04 ??????*] WHITE HOUSE Mrs. Leonard Wood, 23 Lanier Place, Washington, D. C.Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Jamary 14, 1904. My dear Senator Scott: On page 5 of your review of the evidence concerning General Wood you give a long quotation from General Wilson, containing his account of an alleged interview with me held some three years ago and purporting to repeat a private conversation he held with me at that time when a guest in my house. It of course seems to me that there was no warrant whatever for receiving or considering this account of an alleged private conversation held with me by General Wilson three years ago. It would have been grossly improper for General Wilson to have repeated it if it had been true, and the mere fact that he was willing to do so is presumptive evidence that it was not true; for General Wilson well knows that the President of the United States cannot go into a personal discussion with another man, least of all on a matter of veracity. The conversation never occurred. Not only did I never say to General Wilson the things he alleges, but he never said to me the things he alleges. I cannot write you or anyone else for publication in this matter, but by turning to page 834 of the testimony before the Committee, you would have seen that Secretary Root stated on my-2- authority that no such conversation as that alleged by General Wilson as occurring between himself and myself regarding General Wood's presence at the Santiago fight ever took place. I regret that you should have given currency to this false statement without appending the statement of Secretary Root, made on my authority that it was false. I do not suppose anything can be done about it now, but it does seem to me that if you were going to insert General Wilson's testimony at all on this point of his conversation with me, that it was mere justice to me to insert Secretary Root's answer thereto. Very truly yours, Hon. N. B. Scott, United States Senate.Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 14, 1904. My dear Senator Scott: On page 5 of your review of the evidence concerning General Wood you give a long quotation from General Wilson, containing his account of an alleged interview with me held some three years ago and purporting to repeat a private conversation he held with me at that time when a guest in my house. It of course seems to me that there was no warrant whatever for receiving or considering this account of an alleged private conversation held with me by General Wilson three years ago. It would have been grossly improper for General Wilson to have repeated it if it had been true, and the mere fact that he was willing to do so is presumptive evidence that it was not true; for General Wilson well knows that the President of the United States cannot go into a personal discussion with another man, least of all on a matter of veracity. The conversation never occurred. Not only did I never say to General Wilson the things he alleges, but he never said to me the things he alleges. I cannot write you or anyone else for publication in this matter, but by turning to page 834 of the testimony before the Committee, you would have seen that Secretary Root stated on my-2- authority that no such conversation as that alleged by General Wilson as occurring between himself and myself regarding General Wood's present at the [Santiago] San Juan fight ever took place. I regret that you should have given currency to this false statement without appending the statement of Secretary Root, made on my authority, that it was false. I do not suppose anything can be done about it now, but it does seem to me that if you were going to insert General Wilson's testimony at all on this point of his conversation with me, that it was mere justice to me to insert Secretary Root's answer thereto. Very truly yours, Hon. N. B. Scott, United States Senate.[For attachment see 1-14-04]Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Jamary 14, 1904. My dear Senator Scott: On page 5 of your review of the evidence concerning General Wood you give a long quotation from General Wilson, containing his account of an alleged interview with me held some three years ago and purporting to repeat a private conversation he held with me at that time when a guest in my house. It of course seems to me that there was no warrant whatever for receiving or considering this account of an alleged private conversation held with me by General Wilson three years ago; It would have been grossly improper for General Wilson to have repeated it if it had been true, and the mere fact that he was willing to do so is presumptive evidence that it was not true; for General Wilson well knows that the President of the United States cannot go into a personal discussion with another man, least of all on a matter of veracity. The conversation never occurred. Not only did I never say to General Wilson the things he alleges, but he never said to me the things he alleges. I cannot write you or anyone else for publication in this matter, but by turning to page 834 of the testimony before the Committee, you would have seen that Secretary Root stated on my-2- authority that no such conversation as that alleged by General Wilson as occurring between himself and myself regarding General Wood's presence at the Santiago fight ever took place. I regret that you should have given currency to this false statement without appending the statement of Secretary Root, made on my authority that it was false. I do not suppose anything can be done about it now, but it does seem to me that if you were going to insert General Wilson's testimony at all on this point of his conversation with me, that it was mere justice to me to insert Secretary Root's answer thereto. Very truly yours, Hon. N. B. Scott, United States Senate.WHITE HOUSE. Hon. N. B. Scott, United States Senate. Personal.COPY The White House, Washington, D. C. January 15th 1904. PERSONAL My dear Mr. Barnes: I thank you cordially for your letter of recent date, and was interested in all you wrote. As regards Colonel Ham, I think very highly of him, and should an opportunity arise I shall be glad to see if something cannot be done for him. At present, however, I am trying to place Captain Landon, and until he is provided for I am unable to give any definite promise as to what I can do in the matter. It was delightful having Mrs Barnes and you here at dinner. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. William Barnes Jr., Albany, N. Y.[[shorthand]] Redfield Proctor 1-15-04 [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]] Ford [[shorthand]] Ford [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]][*[attached to draft, TR to Proctor 1-15-04]*][*Proctor*] WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON January 15, 1904. My dear Senator Proctor: In view of the fact that a minority report has been made as to the case of Brigadier General Wood, who has been nominated as a major general by me, and that in this report, on page 5, an alleged conversation of mine with General Wilson is given, without any reference to the fact that Secretary Root stated, on my authority, that no such conversation had ever occurred, I deem it proper to write you this letter. The conversation in question purports to be a repetition of a private conversation held by me with General Wilson while he was my guest at my private house, three years ago. No such conversation ever took place. Not only did I make no such statements as General Wilson there alleges, but he made no such statements to me as he there alleges. On the morning of July 1st, the day of the San Juan fight, General Wood and I were under shrapnel fire together, the time when several men of my and other regiments were killed or wounded. He then marshaled the brigade, my regiment being that day in the lead, and in person conducted us to the San Juan river. My regiment crossed and went to the right, in pursuance of orders. I was informed at the time that General Wood personally superintended the crossing of the other two regiments over this, which was nicknamed the "Bloody Ford," and which was at that2 time swept by a heavy fire, being then the most dangerous part of the field. On that day I heard various officers of the regulars speak with admiration of the coolness and efficiency with which General Wood was performing his duties at the ford. The field of battle was much cut up with hills and jungle, and as it happened I did not see General Wood personally again until about night-fall, when he joined us at the extreme front. I think he was the first general officer to join us there, though I can not distinctly remember whether he or General Wheeler was earliest up. I heard of him several times during the day, however. My memory is that I once received an order from him; and I - and so far as I know every one else whom I talked to or saw - knew that he was on the field and doing his duty well. Yours truly, Hon. Redfield Proctor, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate.Hold WHITE HOUSE Hon. Redfield Proctor, Chairman, Committee on Military Affairs, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 18, 1904. Personal. My dear Dr Shaw: I am returning to you to-day proofs of galleys 61 to 120. I notice that at the beginning of some of the speeches capitals are used for the first word or two, but that this is not uniform throughout these proofs. Neither was it done in proofs one to sixty. It is immaterial wh ch plan is followed; but as proofs one to 60 had passed out of my hands, I have marked 61 to 120 to conform to them in this particular. In one or two instances in proofs one to sixty I noticed that the type in the headings did not conform to that generally used, a change having apparently been made inadvertently. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. P.S. Apparently your proof readers have not read --proof at all, which accounted for the delay in sending it back.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 20, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: Will you please make the following change in galley 45, which has been returned to you? Lines 10 and 11 strike out "The great civilized nations, dating back into", and substitute "from". The address at the dedicatory exercises of the new high school building Philadelphia, November 22, 1902 (galley 153) is out of place. It should come just before the address at the Founders' Day Banquet of the Union League, Philadelphia, November 22, 1902, which appears on one of the earlier galleys. Very truly yours, Win. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Dr. Albert Shaw, &cPersonal Copy. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 20, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: What have you decided about the subject index for the book of speeches? This should be as comprehensive as possible, to bring out the President's salient expressions of principles, political and otherwise. Unless you prefer to have this prepared in New York we can prepare one here if you will send us page proofs. Please let me know about this as soon as you can. Very truly yours, etc.Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 21, 1904 Copy. My dear Dr. Shaw: I return herewith the proof of your introduction. The President has read it and thinks it is excellent. With regard, Sincerely yours, etc.Personal WHITE HOUSE, Copy. WASHINGTON. January 21, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: The president does not wish Wm. Allen White's article included. in the volume of his speeches and messages, so please be sure that it is left out. He thinks it preferable that the volumes should be confined strictly to his own speeches and paper and your introduction. In the galleys containing the headings of the President's messages to Congress I find that the word "MESSAGE", occupying a line by itself immediately following each heading was inadvertently left in. It should be taken out as it is superfluous. Very truly yours, etc.[*[ca 1-22-04]*] [[shorthand]] Yorkes [[shorthand]]Copy. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Wire January 23,1904. Dr. Albert Shaw, etc. Replying to your letter of 22nd the President would like to have included reference in Governor's messages to franchise acts and trusts as his position on those questions while Governor is referr d to in speeches. Balance of Governor's messages can just as well be cut out. Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary.Copy. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 23, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: The president has received your letter of the 22nd instant. He hopes you will have a most pleasant trip. He thought the introduction exactly right in every way. Very truly yours, etc.Copy Personal. The White House, Washington, D.C., January 25, 1904, My dear Sir George: On the whole we have cause to be grateful to Professor Bury for his address inasmuch as it called out your really noble article on history; for the small amount of damage which Bury can do will be infinitely outweighed by the good you have done. Nor will this good be confined to students and scholars, from whichever point they approach the study of history; surely many busy men will feel the gratitude that I feel toward one who says what we know ought to be said but which we lack both the power and the time to say. As for me personally, inasmuch as I have to keep an iron grip on my temper as regards all men who in actual practice at the moment wittingly or unwittingly proceed on false theories of government or upon false applications of good theories, it is fine satisfaction to be able to get angry with Mr. Bury and at the same time have the comfortable feeling that it does no harm either to him or to me: Of course in your article what you said constructively - where with wealth of illustration you showed what history could do and could mean to statesman, to philosopher, to lover of literature, to the mere private citizen who possesses catholicity of taste,- even outweighs the value of your destructive criticism of Mr. Bury’s contentions. In particular I wish to thank you for your emphatic protest against those writers who in endeavoring to be moderate and-2- impartial succeed in leaving the impression that there is really no difference between the good and the evil, the great and the small. True impartiality, true justice, is as far as possible removed from the dreadful habit of painting all character drab-colored. Hamden and Washington are doubtless not pure white, and here and there it might be possible to find touches of gray in the character of Philip of Spain and Louis the XVth of France; but we do violence to the facts, and ethically we sin if in comparing the four men we fail to show that by every canon of the higher life - social, political, spiritual - two are white and shining souls and two stand in that black circle which numbers the meanest and most contemptible and yet sometimes the most dreadful enemies of mankind. The “impartiality” which would only study the flaws in the character of the two great and good men and set forth the occasional tricks of virtue in the two evil doers would be a shame [?] and a mockery. But aside from your actually showing what history should be, I am exceedingly glad that you spoke so plainly of Mr. Bury’s proposition to make it what it should not be. I am sorry to say that I think the Burys are doing much damage to the cause of historic writing. In a very small way I have been waging war with their kind on this side of the water for a number of years. We have a preposterous little organization [called I think the American Historical Association,] which, when I was just out of Harvard and very ignorant, I joined. Fortunately I had enough good sense, or obstinacy, or something, to retain a subconscious belief that, inasmuch as books-5- has been to produce shoals of little scientific men, who though free from Audubon's shortcomings were also completely free from any touch of his greatness. During these years the scientific college people have as a rule worked on the theory that the highest duty of a wouldbe naturalist - whom, by the way, they call a biologist - is to work in a laboratory with a complex apparatus which will enable him to study for an indefinite period minute infusoria and to write upon sections of tissue. All of this is excellent work if it is understood that it is work merely of preparation, that it represents only the gathering of material for some man of large mind to mould into matter of importance. But as it is treated as the be all and end all, the result has been a lamentable dearth in America of work in the abstract sciences which is of notable and permanent value. I have a friend,Hart Merriam, who is a great mammalogist. He himself suffers a little from this wrong training, and I am afraid he never will be able to produce the work he could, because he cannot see the forest for the trees, yet cannot make up his mind to write a great lasting book, inasmuch as there continually turns up some new series of shrews or meadow mice or gophers concerning which he his not quite got all the facts; and he turns industriously aside once more to the impossible task of collecting all these relatively unimportant facts. Still he does understand that we should not leave to story books the vital life histories of our birds and mammals, and he at least has aspirations toward the proper kind of production; |-6- but he is almost unable to find among college graduates any one fit to act as his assistant in the field or to help him find out the facts which should be found out; for the average college graduate of a scientific turn has had all his impulse toward originality carefully taken out of him, and he leaves college a stereotyped well meaning little creature, only fit for microscopic work in a laboratory. Now such work is good, but it is chiefly good in so far as it gives a wider and deeper foundation of knowledge to the scientific man like Darwin or Huxley; or even to the nature-writer like John Burroughs or White or Selborne. There - I have not been able to deny myself the pleasure of writing you this wholly irrelevant letter. Meanwhile I have kept waiting a good friend from whom I am anxious to learn some facts regarding the present political conditions in California, and I must have him up; so good by and good luck. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir G. O. Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. February 3, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: The proofs of the index to the address and state papers have not yet been received. I would be glad to have them submitted as soon as they are ready. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, 13 Astor Place, New York.[*[Brieson, Arthur von]*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Confidential February 15, 1904. [*Not sent*] My dear Mr. Von Briesen: There was a time when I think Carl Schurz rendered real services - perhaps I might call them great services - to this country. Occasionally of recent years he has shown sanity and patriotism, as for instance in his recent article on the colored question in the South. On all such occasions I have been glad to give the frankest and fullest recognition of his services. But my own view is that, on the whole, he has for many years represented exceedingly undesirable tendencies and principles in public life. I do not think that the young American of today should have Carl Schurz held up to him as an example. As I say, when he behaves well, as he did about the colored question in the South recently, I am only too glad to say of him, and to him personally, that I think he has done well. But on the whole, of recent years, I think he has done ill. I think he has been one of the forces for evil and not for good. I think his example has been unfortunate and his influence bad. Under such circumstances it would be difficult for me - or at least it seems at first sight that it would be difficult for me, consistently with my own self-respect - to take a stand such as I have taken as regards no other citizen of this country, and to endeavor to secure signal honor of an unprecedented kind for him. Moreover, I do not believe that2 Congress would take any step as you suggest [at all], and certainly not without the most bitter debate and without the opposition of all the men I think stand for most in that body. I hope you will understand me. I have none but the kindliest feelings toward Mr. Schurz. But it seems to me questionable whether, even if we had the ability, we would be morally justified in paying signal and unusual honor to a man who has done for good no more than [any] many other American citizens, and who has offset his stand for good by lamentable public shortcomings in judgment and action. I hate not to agree with you, but I feel I ought to write you in this way. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt Mr. Arthur von Briesen, 49 Wall Street, New York.Copy [*C7*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. February 18, 1904. Dear Judge: Do not think me hard-hearted and suspicious if I put down the hero of that special-delivery-stamp letter as a crank of the first water. How much do you really know about him? He is evidently a gentle, harmless creature, but I fear that he is much worse than dangerous - that is, that he is a long-winded bore. Don't you think it would be better for me not to see him unless he can tell me the specific thing it is he wishes to see me about? A roving commission to do away with evils in trusts, labor unions and the like, without any hint of specific methods, makes me feel rather doubtful. I am very busy; and though I have time for recreation (including that which a worm-eaten heart can take in light opera) I have not time for an hour's discussion of intricate subjects with a gentle, fuddled friend, who never gets any "Torrader." What do you know of the man? Cannot he write me any questions he has to put to me? Always yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. O. W. Holmes, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, 1720 I Street.[*CF*] Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. February 23, 1904. My dear Senator: The President requests me to send you the accompanying letter from Booker Washington, suggesting that Charles W. Anderson, of New York, be sent as a delegate to the national convention from one of the New York districts, and to ask if the suggestion is a feasible one. Please return Mr. Washington's letter with your reply. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate. Enclosure(COPY) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. February 24, 1904. My dear Mr. Williams: I take it for granted that there is no intention of making the Louisiana delegation all white. I think it would be a mistake for my friends to take any such attitude in any State where there is a considerable negro population. I think it is a great mistake from the standpoint of the whites; and in an organization composed of men whom I have especially favored it would put me in a false light. As you know, I feel as strongly as any one can that there must be nothing like “negro domination." On the other hand, I feel equally strongly that the republicans must consistently favor those comparatively few colored people who by character and intelligence show themselves entitled to such favor. To put a premium upon the possession of such qualities among the blacks is not only to benefit them, but to benefit the whites among whom they live. I very earnestly hope that the Louisiana republicans whom I have so consistently favored will not by any action of theirs tend to put me in a false position in such a matter as this. With your entire approval I have appointed one or two colored men to office in Louisiana. There must certainly be an occasional colored man entitled by character and standing to go to the National Convention. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. F. B. Williams, Patterson, Louisiana. [*Return to Sec. Loeb.*](Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. February 28, 1904. My dear Senator: Many for your kind note, and especially for what you did in connection with the call for the Senate convention. I have no question but what your judgment in the Anderson case is all right. I am glad that the Governor is coming down here. Let me know before he comes. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate. COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., March 4th 1904. My dear Senator Penrose: I was very sorry not to see you this morning. Senator Beveridge had come in ahead of you and I had Senator Platt to come by appointment. I could not refuse to see Senator Beveridge, of course, and I had to make even Senator Platt delay a few months in consequence. If you could telephone me in advance if you are coming up before ten, I can make arrangements to see that you are shown in at once. Unless I do receive such telephone messages I have to make the absolute rule that I shall see no one until ten o'clock; or else, as was the case this morning, I am unable to get through my mail. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, United States Senate.(Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 16, 1904. Dear Mr. O'Brien: I have your letter of the 14th instant, and am glad to know that you are well, as is evident from the enclosed clipping. While there would be no objection to your mentioning the matter orally, the President can not permit the use of his name in connection with any advertisement. He has to make this an invariable rule, and any exception would cause him great embarrassment. With best wishes, Sincerely yours, WM. LOEB, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. John J. O'Brien, Care Boston Herald, Boston, Massachusetts.[*[Oltrogge]*] Personal. Copy. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 16, 1904. My dear Mr. Oltrogge: I have your letter of the 15th and the five sets of the books and two copies of the portrait have also come. I have turned the President's sets over to him and also one set to Mr. Barnes. The President is greatly pleased with the appearance of the volumes. When you were here you seemed to think that I was a little modest in the number of sets you should send us. The President would very much like to have six more, and if you can send this number on we shall be greatly obliged to you. In reference to the Speeches and Messages, I am delighted to know that you will be able to ship them soon. Please address them to me at the White House. With many thanks I beg to remain, Very truly yours, etc. Mr. John F. Oltrogge, Supt. Collier & Son, N.Y.C. [*Wm. Loeb, jr.*]]Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 16, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: Many thanks for your letter of the 15th. I received five sets from Colliers yesterday, which it turns out was all I had asked for. I have put in a request for six more sets, however, and hope that they will be willing to send them to me. We all like the looks of the edition very much. They advised me this morning that they are making up 500 copies of the speeches and messages and asked for shipping directions, which I give them. I am looking forward to the receipt of your edition. It was much a pleasure to see you the other day. Faithfully yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, New York, N. Y.Copy. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 17, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: I write to say that in the second volume of the Presidential Addresses and State Papers, Colliers Ed., I find that pages 473 to 496 have been transposed to follow page 448. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, New York, N. Y. Many thanks for the two sets received this morning.WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON, April 22, 1904. My dear Sir: Referring to the subject matter of your call on the President yesterday and to the letter of Mr. Tandy and yourself and accompany papers, I beg to state that the President has carefully considered the question, but fears there is nothing he can do. If the President had been advised in time he would have been glad to take steps to the end that the colored people should have a proper exhibit at the exposition, showing the intellectual, moral and industrial development of the race. It is now too late for him to act in the matter; but, as stated above, had it been called to his notice in time he would have been very glad to take it up. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR. Secretary to the President. Hale Giddings Parker, Esq., Chicago, Ilinois.Copy. WHITE HOUSE, Washington, April 26. 1904. Personal. My dear Cardinal: I have seen Mr. Waring, but I do not wish to recommend him to the Commission until I find out if they act favorably upon my recommendation of Mr. Dominick I. Murphy. I might easily wear my welcome out. Will you permit me to say one thing referring to our recent correspondence concerning Bishop Hendrick's appeal? You have recently signed a petition asking that we shall promise ultimate independence to the Filipinos. Of course, the promise of ultimate independence would mean nothing to the Filipinos unless they construed it, as they certainly would, to mean independence within a very few years. If such a promise was made by us one of the first consequences would be that the position of Bishop Hendrick and the other American Bishops would grow literally intolerable. The agitation of the petition for ultimate independence is playing directly into the hands of the men who are intriguing against Bishop Hendrick and the other Bishops, and renders just so much more difficult the task of Governor Luke Wright and the Government behind Luke Wright in trying to protect Bishop Hendrick and his colleagues. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Cardinal Gibbons, Baltimore, Md.[*[Enc. in Carpenter 5-5-04]*]COPY The White House, Washington, D.C. May 2nd 1904. My dear Mr Barnes: It seems almost impossible to explain the most obvious fact at certain times. I have no power to select Mr O'Brien. The Commission select him. If you had any acquaintance at all with that commission you would understand that when I say they select him I mean that neither I nor anyone else could dictate to them their choice. I strongly recommended Mr O'Brien to them. I have been given to understand that they have definitely refused to consider his name for the position. You have probably noticed that I offered O'Brien the San Domingo mission which he did not feel he could accept. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon William Barnes Jr., Albany, N.Y.Copy. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, May 6th., 1904. My dear Admiral, I am in receipt of your letter of April 18th. You are very kind, and I appreciate your writing. May I through you convey to those whose sympathy you extend, my appreciation ? The tragedy on the "Missouri" was a dreadful one. I take no little pride, however, in the entire coolness and good conduct of all on board the ship during the succeeding minutes, when it was uncertain whether any second the ship might not founder. And I am especially pleased with the fact that both on the "Missouri" and on the other ships the target practice, which was of course uninterrupted by the accident, showed if anything a slight improvement after it occurred. Of course, everything possible must be done to prevent the recurrence of an accident of this kind, but I believe that under the conditions of modern war on the seas there is bound to be some danger in preparing for it, provided this preparation is really thorough. This fact we must face. How I wish I could see you to talk over some of the events of the fighting in the far East! With great regards Sincerely yours, (Sgd.) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Vice-Admiral Charles Beresford, R.N., Commanding Channel Fleet. Office of the Admiralty. London, England.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 12, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: Can you not come down here some time next week and take lunch with me? Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 17, 1904. Dear Mr. Harriman: Can you take lunch with me Monday, May 23rd? Is this entirely convenient? Would dinner on Wednesday or Thursday be better? Sincerely yours, (signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.Personal May 19, 1904, My dear President Wheeler: Treat this of course as in strict confidence. Cortelyou will take Chairmanship of the National Committee. I am thinking of putting Metcalf in his place. He is the only Californian whom as yet I have seen, whom I feel I would like to put in the Cabinet. Will you wire me how you think the nomination would be received in California, if Metcalf were willing to accept? I have spoken to you of this before. I understand that he is very well thought of. Of course I may not appoint him. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, University of California, Berkeley, California.COPY. WHITE HOUSE, Washington, May 23, 1904. My dear Mr. Stranahan: I am directed by the President to state that if any action is contemplated in reference to the displacing of John Stiebling's friends in the custom house the President wishes you would advise with him concerning the matter. Very truly yours, (signed) WM. LOEB, Jr., Secretary to the President. Hon. N. N. Stranahan, Collector of Customs, New York, N. Y.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 28th 1904. HON. BOIES PENROSE BEAVER, PA. ACCEPT MY DEEP AND SINCERE SYMPATHY IN THE LOSS OF SENATOR QUAY. THEODORE ROOSEVELTWHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 28, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: Many thanks for your letter of the 27th. All right, I shall wait until I hear from you further. The copy of your address has come to hand and I shall read it with interest. Pray accept the enclosed copy of my Presidential speeches and messages. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.Copy. Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 28, 1904. My dear Sir George: My blunder in my last letter brought me a better reward than I deserved, because owing to it I have read your son's “Age of Wyckliffe" with great pleasure. Pray congratulate him from me upon all that he is doing. (I find reading a great comfort. People often say to me that they do not see how I find time for it, to which I answer them (much more truthfully than they believe) that to me it is a dissipation, which I have sometimes to try to avoid, instead of an irksome duty. Of course I have been so busy for the last ten years, so absorbed in political work, that I have simply given up reading any book that I do not find interesting. But there are a great many books which ordinarily pass for "dry" which to me do possess much interest - notably history and anthropology; and these give me ease and relaxation that I can get in no other way, not even on horseback!) The Presidential campaign is now opening. Apparently I shall be nominated without opposition at the Republican Convention. Whom the Democrats will put up I do not know, and of course no one can forecast the results of the contest at this time. (There is one point of inferiority in our system to yours which has been very little touched up, and that is the way in which the Presidential office tends to put a premium upon a man's keeping out of trouble rather than upon his accomplishing results. If a man has a very decided character, has a strongly accentuated career, it is normally the case of course that he 2 make ardent friends and bitter enemies; and unfortunately human nature is such that more enemies will leave their party because of enmity to its head than friends will come in from the opposite party because they think well of that same head. In consequence, the dark horse, the neutral-tinted individual, is very apt to win against the man of pronounced views and active life. The electorate is very apt to vote with its back to the future! Now all this does not apply to the same extent with your Prime Minister. It is not possible for the politicians to throw over the real party leader and put up a dummy or some gray- tinted person under your system; or at least, though perhaps it is possible, the opportunity and the temptation are much less.) In my own case, for instance, I believe that most of my policies have commanded the support of a great majority of my fellow-countrymen, but in each case I have made a certain number of determined foes. Thus, on Panama I had an overwhelming majority of the country with me; but whereas I am not at all sure that any Democrat will vote for me because of my attitude on Panama, there are a certain number of mugwumps who will undoubtedly vote against me because of it. So as regards Cuban reciprocity. The country backed me up in the matter, but there is not a Democrat who will vote for me because I got Cuban reciprocity, while there are not a few beet-sugar men who will vote against me because of it. In the same way the whole country breathed freer, and felt as if a nightmare had been lifted, when I settled the anthracite coal strike; but the number of votes I shall gain thereby will be small indeed, while the interests to which I gave mortal offense will make their weight felt3 as of real moment. Thus I could go on indefinitely. However, I certainly would not be willing to hold the Presidency at the cost of failing to do the things which make the real reason why I care to hold it at all. I had much rather be a real President for three years and a half than a figurehead for seven years and half. I think I can truthfully say that I now have to my credit a sum of substantial achievement - and the rest must take care of itself. With renewed regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Welcome, Stratford-on-Avon, England.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 3,1904. Dear Mr. Harriman: I like the man you mention in your letter, but I do not think that he comes up to the other one. I know the other's capacity from seeing him working in Congress. Of the two, for this position the Congressman is the best. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 9, 1904. My dear Sir: In behalf of the President permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of this date, and to assure you that he appreciates the compliment paid him by the recent action of your Society. Very truly yours, (Signed) B F BARNES, Acting Secretary to the President Mr. T H Herndon, American Cross of Honor, 1443 Corcoran Street, Washington D C[*Wright*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, June 16, 1904. Personal. My dear Mr. Wright: Yesterday I saw Dr. John Graham Brooks whom, on May 16th, you assigned to conduct an investigation into the labor difficulties in the State of Colorado. Mr. Walter B. Palmer of your Bureau, who was assigned for the same purpose by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor on May 2d, has not yet made his report. I am immensely impressed by and gravely concerned at, what Dr. Brooks reports. When Mr. Palmer reports, I shall see what he has to say too. Then I shall communicate with you in order that we may take up for discussion the question whether or not it would be advisable for you yourself to proceed to make a thorough and searching investigation into the causes of, and the facts relating to, the controversies in question. I hope you are enjoying your holiday. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Station A, Marblehead, Mass. P.S. Sec'y. Cortelyou informs me that Mr. Palmer will not report for a fortnight.TELEGRAM. (Copy) White House, Washington. Valley Forge, Pa. June 19, 1904. Odell, Auditorium Hotel, Chicago, Ill. In Response to your request for advice it seems to me that Cohen has unusual fitness for Committee on Resolutions and Ward for National Committeeman, but these are suggestions merely, as I am entirely content to abide by the decision of you and the Senator as there may be reasons which should control of which I know nothing. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Charge President's private acct. White House, Washington, D. C.) TELEGRAM (Copy) White House, Washington. Valley Forge, Pa. June 19, 1904. Hon. Elihu Root, Auditorium Hotel, Chicago, Ill. Have just received from Odell the following telegram "For Committee on Resolutions choice between Lauterbach, Quigg and Cohen. Whom do you prefer? Also give suggestion as to National Committeeman, choice between Warren and Ward. Senator Platt and I would like quick response." to which I have sent the following answer: "In response to your request for advice it seems to me that Cohen has unusual fitness for Committee on Resolutions and Ward for National Committeeman, but these are suggestions merely, as I am entirely content to abide by the decision of you and the Senator as there may be reasons which should control of which I know nothing." If you have anything to suggest as to any action I should take or should not take in this matter please wire me instantly. Please consult Bliss. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Charge President's private acct. White House, Washington D.C.)[*Tyner*] (Copy) White House, Washington. June 24, 1904. Sir: I am directed by the President to say that your letter of the 11th instant addressed to him, was received and was referred to the Department of Justice for inquiry into the statements made therein, and for such report as the facts ascertained might appear to require. A report has been received from the Department of Justice, and considered by the President, who further directs me to inform you that the facts disclosed in such report abundantly confirm the views as to your official conduct heretofore expressed by him in his message to Congress prepared after three indictments had been presented against you by a grand jury and warrant the action taken in your removal from office, and do not allow him to withdraw the expressions or annul the action. The President naturally shrinks from saying anything that will diminish any comfort you may have derived from the verdict of the jury, but he is advised that you were not tried for the wrong doing to which he referred, but for conspiracy with Barrett to do the wrong; which he is advised is a wholly different matter, as one may be guilty of doing wrong and not guilty of conspiring to do so. Yours respectfully, (Signed) Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. James N. Tyner, 1507 Kenesaw Avenue, Washington, D.C.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 25, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: I shall have your letters in behalf of Pay Director Boggs filed for presentation in the case as soon as it comes up. Meanwhile, let me thank you for the implication that I shall be in office on April 1st next. With regard, Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt, Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 29, 1094. My dear Mr. Harriman: I thank you for your letter. As soon as you come home I shall want to see you. The fight will doubtless be hot then. It has been a real pleasure to see you this year. Very truly yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.[*Page T. n*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 29, 1904. My dear Mr. Page: I have received your letter about the movement to raise a Thomas Jefferson memorial fund as an endowment for the University of Virginia. I most earnestly wish you success, and I feel that the moment you have chosen is most opportune, owing to the reawakened interest in Jefferson's great work caused by the centenary of the Louisiana Purchase. Your work should commend itself not only to those who are especially interested in the cause of higher education in the South, but to all who are interested in the cause of higher education throughout our country. You need a large sum for such a memorial, and I can not help feeling that you will get it if the most eminent men of the country, irrespective of section or party, can have the matter laid before them and are satisfied, as they should be satisfied, as to the great merit of the movement. The University of Virginia occupies a unique position among our educational institutions. On the first board of visitors to the institution were [Mr.] Jefferson, [Mr.] Madison, [Mr.] Monroe, [(and chief Justice-Marshall)]. The university was one of Jefferson's cherished ideas -- a project which occupied his whole time and attention during the latter years of his life. It has never had an endowment requisite to its barest needs. Now in the great exposition at St. Louis the country is proclaiming the centennial of the achievement in which Jefferson2 took the leading part; the achievement which, in the purchase of the then territory of Louisiana, definitely established this country as the greatest nation of the Western Hemisphere. Surely this celebration should not be brought to a close without leaving on the nation some other mark than the memory of its grandeur. The movement to this end can most properly take the form of a monument forever to Jefferson's genius; a monument far more enduring than bronze, and which will fully realize one of his greatest ideals. It would be a good thing if the people of this country, North and South, East and West, should come forward and establish a Jefferson fund for the university as a fit culmination for the great celebration of the present year. Jefferson wrote his own epitaph to be inscribed on the [marble] granite shaft that marks his grave at Monticello. In this epitaph he did not recite the offices he had held, but the three deeds he had done which he esteemed of most worth to his fellow men, and the epitaph runs as follows: "Here was buried Thomas Jefferson, Author of the Declaration of American Independence, the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, and Father of the University of Virginia." The American people can surely be appealed to with confidence to carry out Jefferson's work in the way which he would himself have regarded as most gratifying, by endowing, as it should be endowed, the noble institution of learning which he founded. I earnestly hope for the success of your movement. Sincerely yours, Mr. Thomas Nelson Page, President General Alumni Association of the University of Virginia.[*[ca 6-1904]*] [[shorthand]] Sent [[shorthand]] [[shorthand]] Odell [[shorthand]] end quote [[shorthand]] [[shorthand]] Bliss [[shorthand]][*Sent*] [*[ca 6-1904.]*] [[shorthand]] Cohen [[shorthand]] Ward [[shorthand]]COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., July 1st 1904. Dear Senator: I have forwarded your letter to Secretary Metcalf at once, and will speak to Mr Cortelyou and him this afternoon about the matter of the Commissioner of Manufactures. I do not know anything about that place. It has been left vacant a year, has it not? I have an indistinct idea that they determined not to fill it; but I shall let you know at once. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.Personal Copy Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 15, 1904. My dear Mr. Grohman: My copy of the “Master of Game" has come, together with Winthrop Chanler’s copy, which I have sent to him. I am very busy now, as you can easily imagine, but I must take time to say how I admire the book in the form you have produced it. I am ashamed that we haven't more Americans who appreciate what it amounts to. Every copy of the book ought to find a purchaser in this country if there was not a purchaser in Europe! I am really disappointed. With hearty regards, I am, in great haste, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Without excepttion the book is the finest thing of the kind I have seen. Mr. W. A. Baillie-Grohman, Schloss Matzen, Brixlegg, Tyrol, Austria.(Copy) Personal. Oyster Bay, N. Y. July 16, 1904. My dear Commissioner Wright: By direction of the President I forward to you the accompanying papers, which he would like you to read through; and some time after he arrives in Washington, which will be the 26th instant, he wishes you would give him a report on the observations of the two officials from your Department who have been to Colorado in connection with the enclosure. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Washington, D. C. (Copy) July 27, 1904. My dear Sir: I send you herewith a letter from Mr. John H. Murphy, Denver, Colorado, for consideration in connection with previous communications from Mr. Murphy on the same subject. Very truly yours WM. LOEB, JR. Secretary to the President. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Washington, D. C.Speak to the President 1500 - [[shorthand]] Edw Coykendall [[shorthand]] [ [[shorthand]] ] [*[ca 7-20-04]*][*Wright*] WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 4, 1904. Personal. Sir: I received your letter of July 30th, together with the report of John Graham Brooks, dated July 4th, and have read both with the utmost care. I am inclined to agree with the opinions expressed in your letter. The state of facts set forth in the report of Mr. Brooks, however, is so extraordinary that before taking final action I should like to have the independent report of your other representative, who is now in Colorado. I desire, of course, that this report be as full and exhaustive as possible, but so far as is consistent with thoroughness I should like to have it expedited as much as possible. When you have received it and gone through it, will you kindly communicate it to me with your comments, that I may then take all the papers in the case, submit them to the Attorney General and go over them with him, to the end that I may see whether any action by the national government is required or permitted in the premises. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Department of Commerce and Labor.[*Wright*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, August 5, 1904. Sir: Since writing you in response to your letter, I have received the enclosed letter from John H. Murphy, addressed to my secretary, and also have received the enclosed pamphlet entitled "The Criminal Record of the Western Federation of Miners," and the enclosed newspaper clipping of a statement by Governor Peabody. Mr. Murphy asks that I do one of two things: either send troops into the State on my own initiative to protect the miners who, he asserts, are menaced by an organization known as the Citizens Alliance; or else to instruct District Attorney Cranston to take action on behalf of the miners and against those who, he claims, have violated the United States laws. Mr. Murphy evidently does not see what the logical result of the first of the two actions he suggests would be. His claim is that the striking union miners are by mob violence prevented at the present time from going to their homes, and are jeopardized and menaced in their persons; and that as the local authorities fail to give them protection, the President should send in troops to protect them. Of course, if this claim should be acted on in this instance I should also have to act upon it wherever in any district non-union men claimed that strikers or union men had jeopardized their persons or property, or had been guilty of disorder. This would mean that the United States Government would be continually sending troops into particular States or cities, or particular counties, on the assertion of some individual or individuals that either the county authorities including the sheriff, or the mayor and police, or the governor and militia, were unable or unwilling to afford them adequate protection. If this claim were well founded the United States Government would have been required to send its army into the anthracite[*[8-5-04]*] 2. regions of Pennsylvania two years ago, although the Governor and Legislature had not asked that this be done - action on my part which, you may remember, was urged by the more thoughtless among the operators at the time. The request of Governor Peabody that I should send United States troops into Colorado last fall was not granted because in my opinion - arrived at after consultation with Attorney General Knox and Secretary of War Root - the conditions prescribed under the Constitution for such action had not been complied with. Having refused to send them in at the request of one side, we are now asked to send them in at the request of the other, under a view of the situation which, if adopted, would render it necessary for the national government generally to displace the local authorities in the preservation of peace and order. The second alternative request of Mr. Murphy will be referred to the Department of Justice. But before turning this matter over to the Attorney General and calling for a report from him and from District Attorney Cranston, I desire of course to receive the information which your Department is now gathering, and which it has means of obtaining which are not at the disposal of the Department of Justice. I particularly desire to know whether those whom Mr. Murphy represents, who are in fact claiming to come before the United States as a court of equity, come before it with clean hands. I wish your investigator in Colorado to have the pamphlet and newspaper statement which I enclose laid before him, and to report exhaustively on the facts therein set forth, when he makes his complete report to you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Department of Commerce and Labor. [*Penrose*] COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. August 6, 1904. My dear Senator Penrose: It is with great regret that I write you to say that McWade, the Consul General at Canton, must be removed. Assistant Secretary Peirce has just returned from his trip to the East. I am sorry to say that his investigation showed that the worst reports about McWade were true. He has not only been guilty of gross corruption in many different lines, but of indecent and drunken behaviour in public, and has become a source of scandal to the entire business community. I find from Taft that before Taft left the Philippines McWade's bad reputation had become a source of public knowledge throughout the East, and I am now receiving letters and cables protesting against him. I fear there is just complaint against many of our consuls in the East, although in no other case has there been such flagrant wrongdoing. Evidently it is a mistake to appoint these men as they have been appointed in the past. There are many countries in Europe in which the temptations to go wrong are not very great, and the conditions of life and work are such that the ordinary man, appointed in the ordinary way, can do perfectly satisfactory work; but in these eastern places I shall hereafter try to fill the vacancies by promotion, or by choosing men of so high a type that there can be no question whatever as to what they will do. In[*[8 - 6 - 04]*] 2. this place in Canton in particular I shall either fill the place by promotion, or by appointing some man of whom either the Department has personal knowledge, or whom I myself have personally known and trusted. We can not run any risk whatever of any repetition of such conduct as McWade has been guilty of. As early as possible when a vacancy occurs in Europe, I shall be glad to receive a recommendation from you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.COPY [*Moody, Wm H.*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. August 9, 1904. To the Attorney General: I have had rumors of efforts to make the District Attorneys and Marshals of Alabama change the deputies under them for political reasons. Of all the officers of the Government, those of the Department of Justice should be kept most free from any suspicion of improper action on partisan or factional grounds. Please direct the District Attorneys and Marshals in question that they are to retain and appoint their subordinates, whose duties are purely non-partisan and non-political, on grounds of fitness only, and without regard to other considerations. I am particularly anxious that the Federal Court in a State like Alabama should win regard and respect for the people by an exhibition of scrupulous non-partisanship, so that there shall be gradual growth, even though a slow growth, in the knowledge that the federal courts and the representatives of the Federal Department of Justice insist on meting out even-handed justice to all. No politician has a right to dictate in any manner to one of these officials. I would like a copy of this letter communicated to the officers in question. (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT[*Wright - coal strike*] WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 10, 1904. Personal. Dear Mr. Wright: Is there any way by which I could have an authoritative investigation and report on the very interesting matter set forth in the enclosed editorial from the Chicago Tribune? If the unions are doing such work as this they are very valuable. Would it be possible to have the matter investigated? What do you hear of the anthracite coal strike? I am uneasy about it. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Station A, Marblehead, Mass.Leishman? AUG 12 1904 1 [Leishman] We regard Turkish memorandum as not unfavorable, and you would not be justified2 in leaving in view of it's receipt. You will drop the Ambassador question3 leaving it in abeyance. The President will consult congress on the subject: The Lane settlement4 is satisfactory Endeavor to secure satisfactory action upon school question on bases not5 less favorable than the French Myrtilene agreement. [We do not reject arbitration as a first rev[?]6 Inform Admiral that fleet can now leave. Inform Turkish government that in view of [this]7 engagements contained in that memorandum fleet has been directed to leave but that8 [in view of] considering the repeated delays and failures to give us justice in the past th9 President must insist upon these engagements being fulfilled immediately [before Congress meets] or he10 will be obliged to lay the whole matter before Congress with a recommedation for appropriate action Copy THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. August 12th, 1904. PERSONAL My dear Senator: I am anxiously waiting a line from you about McWade. The scandal has become intolerable. I am receiving all kinds of protests by letter and cable about him. I have received some important ones since I wrote you, and I don't see how I can delay very much longer. There is no possible question as to the man's guilt; no possible question as to what action we must take. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.(Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. August 13, 1904. My dear Commissioner Wright: I wish your investigator in Colorado to see Mr, John H. Murphy, 502-3 Kittridge Building, Denver, Colorado. Mr. Murphy is the counsel of the Western Federation of Miners and he can present their side of the case as probably no one else can. I, of course, wish both sides of the case presented, and the absolutely impartial judgment of the investigator after the presentation has been made, so I desire that Mr. Murphy be seen. Will you ask your investigator also to read the articles of Walter Wellman? There are certain alleged conversations that Walter Wellman gives which I should much like to have officially confirmed or denied. I suppose your investigator has already read Ray Stannard Baker's article in McClure’s Magazine several months ago. If it becoms necessary for me to act, or merely lay before Congress a statement of what has occurred, I want to know fully the facts, and I do not care a rap of my finger who is hit - friend or foe, union or non-union man, capitalist or laboring man. If the Western Federation of Miners has so acted as to encourage criminality in the past, to put a premium upon violence, I want to know it. If, on the other hand, the employers have done similar acts, I want to know that. If it be true that not only were the cooperative stores plundered, but at the present moment the local vigilance committee, or whatever it is called, declines to permit -2- those cooperative stores to be opened, I want to know it. If it be true that the Portland Mine is not allowed to run with union labor; that the Governor and the State forces, or the Citizens' Alliance, decline to permit men who are members of the Western Federation of Miners or some other union, merely because they belong to such organizations, to work in the Portland Mine, I wish to know it. Do have your investigator give me all the facts. Have him see Mr. Murphy and any other champion[s] of the miners. Have him see any and all representatives whom he can reach on the other side, from whom he can get any information. Let him be sure of he facts. Are you satisfied that the man you have out there is thoroughly fit to do this very important work as it should be done? I want this investigation to be carried on in the spirit and with the resolution and with the intelligence that Messrs. Garfield and Sargent showed in carrying on their investigation into the Miller case in the Government Printing Office; or my dear Mr. Commissioner, still more simply, in the spirit and with the thoroughness with which you carried on the investigation into the Pullman car strike. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Department of Commerce and Labor. (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 22, 1904. My dear Colonel Wright; I see in to-days papers an account of what certainly seems like an extraordinary development in Colorado - that is, mob action by the citizens' alliance resulting in the wrecking of the cooperative store of the federation of miners and the deportation of the people connected with it. It is alleged that the Governor has been appealed to to send in troops, but that he has not interfered. It is also alleged, apparently with proofs, that this act of lawlessness is to avenge numerous other acts of lawlessness of a similar kind committed within the last few years by the Western Federation of Miners. I do not see, however, that this excuses it; nor, on the other hand, do I see how it requires action by me. At the same time, I shall ask you to have your agent include a full account of this matter in his report. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Carroll D. Wright, Commissioner of Labor, Washington? D. C. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM COMPANY [*Hay*] No 1. Ca. Bo. 75 Paid, Gov. Rec'd at Newbury, N.H. Aug. 23, 1904. Dated. Executive Office Oyster Bay, N.Y. Sug. 22. Hon. John. Hay, Newbury, N.H. Please keep in touch with Ades and with me on the Chinese neutrality matter. I do not wish Adee to make any conclusive committal as to our not interfering. It seems to me clear that the Russian ships should either to disarmed or forced to leave the port or else we cannot expect Japan to refrain from attacking them. If necessary [*, *] please come down he to see me. (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. (Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 24, 1904. My dear Moody: The enclosed letter from Sargent, telegram from Murphy, and editorial from the New York Press explain themselves. I also send you copies of letters I have written to Sargent and to Stewart, who is conducting Peabody's political campaign as I understand it. If the newspaper reports are true, Peabody's action is unpardonable. He has deliberately sanctioned the criminal usurpation of State sovereignty by an irresponsible mob. If I had power I should interfere at once, putting down mob work with equal firmness and severity, whether it was committed by the Federation of Miners or by the Citizens' Alliance. I wish there was some action we could take. Is it worth while calling upon the District Attorney for an immediate report to us on the situation? Or could we have some special Assistant Attorney General like Robb or Purdy investigate the matter to see what action we can take? Do let me know what you think. Will you please write to Morton, saying you do so at my request, and tell him the situation in full about Harry Davis and the command of the squadron? I like Davis, and Lodge is my closest friend, but we can not have anything done that will damage the Navy by rewarding any one if there has been insudordination of any kind. Please write Norton with entire frankness. I have written him saying that I expect you to write this. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Wm. H. Moody, Care of Hon. Whitelaw Reid, Upper St. Regis, N.Y.[*[Col. Coal Strike Moody Wright]*] (Copy) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. August 25, 1904. My dear Moody: In talking over matters with Root and Cortelyou last night I found that they felt strongly, and I agree with them, that the situation in Colorado was such that we ought to know just where we stand, and if I am called upon to make a decision I should not have to make it on ex parte statements or accounts compiled from the newspapers. They feel that the Department of Justice should be looking into the matter. Accordingly, I send you the enclosed formal letter. If you could get Purdy or Robb, or some man of first class ability and fairness who will put himself in touch with the lawyers representing the Federation of Miners, such as John H. Murphy of Denver, and with the best men of the other side, and who in his report will show the history of the Federation of Miners and the troubles in Cripple Creek which have led up to the present troubles, I think it would be an excellent thing. It looks to me as if Peabody had behaved very foolishly, and had winked at mob action so long as the mob action was on his side. If you get a chance at any time to get into the neighborhood of Oyster Bay, I should like to see you about this matter. Of course have nothing said about the man being sent. Let it be found out after he has been at work in Colorado. Then if any demand comes upon me for action, or I am taunted with inaction, it will be advantageous to say that we had acted some time previously. I do not believe we can act, any more than in a case of lynching; but I should like to have something authoritative to go. I wish I could see you. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. William H. Moody, Upper St. Regis Falls, N. Y. COPY OYSTER BAY, N. Y. September 2nd 1904. Dear Senator: I have your letter of the 31st ultimo. I have at once written to the State Department, directing that unless there is good reason of which I know nothing, and which will have to be strong, Sorsby is to be put into Ecuador in case of a vacancy arising. Now, won't you answer me about McWade? I do not see how I can possibly keep him, but I have been holding off action because I do not want to take any action which you might construe as discourteous. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.COPY Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 15th 1904. Messrs Josiah J. White, Frederick W. Seward, Francis P. Fremont and William Barnes, Saratoga, N.Y. I thank you for your telegram, and extend to you my heartiest greetings. I join with you in the determination to make the future of the Republican Party as useful to the Nation as its past has been. THEODORE ROOSEVELTCOPY The White House, Washington, D. C. September 22nd 1904. PRIVATE My dear Barnes: It seems to me that we ought to be able to wage a most successful aggressive fight against Herrick, and of course you are peculiarly able to show him up. There is no need of epithets but simply of a plain recital of the facts as to his scandalous combination of the judgeship with that of the county partisan leader. His nomination is an outrage on the proprieties. This should be shown up and made everything of. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. William Barnes, Jr. Albany, N. Y.Personal. The WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. September 23, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: I thank you for your letter. At present there is nothing for me to see you about, though there were one or two points in my letter of acceptance which I should have liked to discuss with you before putting it out. With regards, and thanks for your kind letter, believe me, Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York. COPY The White House, Washington, D. C. September 26th 1904. PERSONAL My dear Mr Barnes: I shall write Governer Odell in reference to the request of John T. McDonough's friends that he be nominated to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Judge Herrick. It seems to me from every standpoint this would be a proper and desirable thing to do. McDonough did well as a judge in the Philippines. He performed his duties as Secretary of State of New York excellently. He is a Catholic of Irish descent, but as an American no less than as a public officer he has shown that he knows no discrimination between Catholic and Protestant. The wageworkers would have the utmost confidence in him, and he has always shown himself to be a safe and conservative man. I feel that his nomination at this time would be a very good thing all around. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon, William Barnes Jr., Headquarters Republican National Committee, 1 Madison Avenue, New York. [*Collier*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. September 26, 1904. Dear Sir: I have received your letter. Unquestionably feeling as you do you should leave the Department. You state in your letter that under your original appointment as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General in connection with the anti-trust law that you did not do the work which you were appointed to do. This appointment has lapsed. You held under that commission for a little over a year and you are now out of it. The time for you to have discovered that you were not doing the work that you were paid to do, if such were the fact, was while you were holding that office, and you should have come to me then. I shall certainly not take up now the question as to whether you were performing the duties you were paid to perform during the year and over that you held the position when you made no complaint to me in reference thereto. At present you are holding office under the specific law creating a solicitor for the Department of Commerce and Labor. There is nothing in this law requiring the solicitor to do work in connection with the enforcement of the anti-trust laws, so that what you say has no reference whatever to your present appointment. In the first annual report of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor it is specifically set forth than an officer of the Department of Justice had been detailed to act as solicitor, in order to meet the requirements of the Department in the way of legal assistance, but that the arrangement was merely temporary and that a definite appropriation should be made to enable the2 Department to employ its own solicitor. There was therefore no concealment of the facts of your temporary appointment from Congress, and you are now employed as solicitor in pursuance of the request of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor that such a solicitor should be provided for the purpose of dealing with the cases which arise before the Department involving questions of law. When I decided to appoint you solicitor the Attorney General advised me not to do so on the ground that he considered you inefficient and not possessing either the industry or the ability which warranted your continuance in the service of the Department. Mr. Cortelyou, however, although he said he had not been satisfied with all that you had done, believed that you would improve and desired that you should be given a trial as the regular solicitor. I accordingly made the appointment. You enclose a letter from Commissioner Garfield, written in response to one of yours in which Mr. Garfield gives his views as to the functions of the Bureau of Corporations and its methods of action. This letter it appears was based upon one of yours which you wrote to Mr. Garfield stating what you understood his position to be. In view of your present threat, for it amounts to such, to make public his letter in the hope of making thousands of Republicans leave the party because of their feelings about corporate wealth and restriction of monopoly, I regard you as having sent an adroit decoy letter. I do not feel that Mr. Garfield fully set forth in his letter the function of the Bureau, and I do not accept his letter to you as an authoritative expression of that function. The circumstances of the correspondence show that he, answering in good faith a letter seemingly in good faith from you, and having his mind fixed only upon meeting your query as to whether you3 should render him service which he did not desire to have rendered, expressed himself more carelessly that he would have done had he had the slightest reason to suppose that any public use would be made of his letter. Of course the Bureau of Corporations cannot enforce the anti-trust laws. You can hardly be ignorant of the fact that they can only be enforced through the Department of Justice. But I feel that it can be an aid to the Department of Justice through the services it renders to the President in collecting information tending to show the existence of monopoly, or the restraint of trade, or acts in violation of law. However, this is not a question which it is necessary for me to consider. I shall speedily have before me the report of the Bureau as to the work it has done this year, and that report I shall lay before Congress. From what I an informed I believe that the work already done by the Bureau has many times over justified its existence and has shown that a very great field of usefulness has opened to it. I regard your conduct in this matter as being unprofessional and dishonorable. You have made a threat. You have been asking for all kinds of other offices. You expect that I will yield to your threat lest it might do damage politically just at this time. I decline to be blackmailed by you. I decline to accept your resignation and hereby remove you. Mr. Wm. Miller Collier, Solicitor, Department of Commerce and Labor.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C., September 28th 1904. PERSONAL. Dear Senator Penrose: Will you read the enclosed wail of agony from Senator Scott? It will show you some of my difficulties when it comes to finding even such a small place as this. I have been at my wits’ end to know what to do. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. September 28, 1904. Sir: This case comes to me in the form of an appeal for the reversal of the decision of the Treasury Department made by the Acting Secretary of the Treasury in a matter peculiarly within the control and business knowledge of the Treasury Department. Complaint was made that a sufficient hearing had not been given to the parties in interest, and that the decision was so grossly unjust as to warrant the President's interference. It is, of course, out of the question for the President to take up as an original proposition, and as if the appeal was specifically reserved by law for the President, such a case as this unless the circumstances are [altogether] extraordinary. The present case does not, in my judgment, came within the category of extraordinary cases where I would be willing to reverse the action of the Department. I have examined all the testimony put before the Department in this case with care, and I do not consider that the showing is sufficiently strong to warrant the unusual action of reversing the action of the Department. [However in this particular case for the reasons set forth by you, I consider the action taken to ???? Dept. to be proper.] The testimony seems to establish the fact that the present stamp is used as a trade mark by the cigar importers; that this trade mark is very valuable to them and therefore confers an advantage upon them-2- as against the manufacturers of cigars in the United States; and furthermore, that cigars are in effect the only commodity imported into the United States that receives the benefit of such a trade mark - imported silks, cottons, food products, etc., etc., having no such government trade mark upon them. The strength of the opposition to the proposed change shows that this government stamp does give a pecuniary advantage to those using it. This is, of course, wrong. The Government's business is to collect the revenue and to provide against fraud so far as may be; but once the revenue has been paid and the goods admitted it is not the Government's business to furnish a guarantee in the form of a trade mark for the benefit of the goods. This should be left in the tobacco business exactly as it is in all other business. It is argued by one side that the proposed change will diminish the chances of fraud, and by the other that it will increase them. This is a matter peculiarly for the decision of the Treasury experts, and I must assume that it has been carefully considered by you. Accordingly, I decline to interfere with the action [order] of the Department. Very truly yours, Hon. H. A. Taylor, Acting Secretary of the Treasury.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. September 28, 1904. Sir: This case comes to me in the form of an appeal for the reversal of the decision of the Treasury Department made by the Acting Secretary of the Treasury in a matter peculiarly within the control and business knowledge of the Treasury Department. Complaint was made that a sufficient hearing had not been given to the parties in interest, and that the decision was so grossly unjust as to warrant the President's interference. It is, of course, out of the question for the President to take up as an original proposition, and as if the appeal was specifically reserved by law for the President, such a case as this unless the circumstances are [altogether] extraordinary. The present case does not, in my judgment, come within the category of extraordinary cases where I would be willing to reverse the action of the Department. I have examined all the testimony put before the Department in this case with care, and I do not consider that the showing is sufficiently strong to warrant the unusual action of reversing the action of the Department. The testimony seems to establish the fact that the present stamp is used as a trade mark by the cigar importers; that this trade mark is very valuable to them and therefore confers an advantage upon them-2- as against the manufacturers of cigars in the United States; and furthermore, that cigars are in effect the only commodity imported into the United States that receives the benefit of such a trade mark - imported silks, cottons, food products, etc., etc., having no such government trade mark upon them. The strength of the opposition to the proposed change shows that this government stamp does give a pecuniary advantage to those using it. This is, of course, wrong. The Government's business is to collect the revenue and to provide against fraud so far as may be; but once the revenue has been paid and the goods admitted it is not the Government's business to furnish a guarantee in the form of a trade mark for the benefit of the goods. This should be left in the tobacco business exactly as it is in all other business. It is argued by one side that the proposed change will diminish the chances of fraud, and by the other that it will increase them. This is a matter peculiarly for the decision of the Treasury experts, and I must assume that it has been carefully considered by you. Accordingly, I decline to interfere with the action of the Department. Very truly yours, Hon. H. A. Taylor, Acting Secretary of the Treasury.[*[ca 9-1904]*] [[shorthand]] G.W. Perkins COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C., October 3rd 1904. PERSONAL. Dear Senator: I have your letter of the 1st. If you do not object I shall keep these various matters open until after election. I think it would be better. I am very glad that you take an optimistic view of West Virginia. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C., October 6th 1904. My dear Senator: T. V. Powderly has been suggested to me for one of the present vacancies. If I can avoid it I think it would be better not to fill them at present. Powderly, however, might be a good man to appoint. What do you think of it? Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 10, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: When you wrote me before I did not feel the situation was such that I was warranted in asking you to take the trouble to come down here, but in view of the trouble over the State ticket in New York I should much like to have a few words with you. Do you think you can get down here within a few days and take either lunch or dinner with me? Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., October 10th 1904. HON. BOIES PENROSE, PHILADELPHIA, PA. Have promoted Wynne to be Postmaster-General, which I take for granted is pleasing to you. When I did this was under the impression that he was from the District of Columbia. Find he was from Pennsylvania, and was backed by Senator Quay when he was made First Assistant Postmaster General. If you can come on here will go over whole matter in detail with you. THEODORE ROOSEVELTPersonal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 14, 1904. My dear Mr. Harriman: A suggestion has come to me in a roundabout way that you do not think it wise to come on to see me in these closing weeks of the campaign, but that you are reluctant to refuse, inasmuch as I have asked you. Now, my dear sir, you and I are practical men, and you are on the ground and know the conditions better than I do. If you think there is any danger of your visit to me causing trouble, or if you think there is nothing special I should be informed about, or no matter in which I could give aid, why of course give up the visit for the time being and then a few weeks hence, before I write my message, I shall get you to come down to discuss certain government matters not connected with the campaign. With great regard, Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 15, 1904. My dear Mr. Philbin: I have your letter of the 14th. I hope you can take either lunch or dinner with no when you pass through Washington. Let me know what day you are to be here. Mr. Roche has certainly not been commissioned by the Government to do anything. I have no doubt that he is trying to bring the natter as it should truthfully and fairly be brought before the people. You say that "It is therefore doomed necessary that Mr. Sutherland should correct his misstatements and offer apologies to two colleges, namely, the Notre Dame, and Georgetown. Of course I shall find out exactly what Mr. Sutherland's side of the case is before I take up the question of his offering apologies to anyone. That there was any wilful intention on his part to do wrong is I am sure not the case. However, I shall find out exactly the facts from him. To Notre Dame I have arranged to send 15 students and to Georgetown 4. You say that you are still confident that the harm that has been done can be remedied. As regards the harm done to the Colleges in question, or to the Filipino youth, I am absolutely certain that it can be remedied for it is in my power to remedy and that power will be exercised. Secretary Taft cordially agrees with me that the wishes of the parents of these Catholic Filipino students are to be consulted in placing them in colleges and that hereafter those among these students who wish to follow non-technical courses of study will first be-2- given the chance to attend Catholic colleges and the offer to those colleges will be made in terms which cannot possibly be misunderstood. Moreover, so far as it can be done I shall have those who have been already allotted to the different colleges changed to Catholic colleges if their parents or they themselves prefer it. If there is any question of remedying harm that has been done me I know you will not misunderstand my saying what I am about to. Up to a certain point I am willing to make large concessions to prejudice and to exercise a large patience with suspicion. But where in the most unequivocal fashion again and again, not by word but by deed and in a manner which is incapable of honest misunderstanding, I have shown my good faith, I do not feel inclined to make any effort once more to prove that good faith, and I shall certainly decline to admit that my policy and acts, judged not by some sporadic act of a subordinate of whose very existence I have never heard, but by the general course of administration, needs the slightest apology or justification. Two years ago Father Wynne was wholly in error as to the actual facts about the friars in the Philippines, as to the way in which they were regarded by the natives and as to the course this Government should pursue in reference to them. Had the course he then urged been adopted it would have meant great damage to the Filipinos , and the ruin of the Catholic church in the islands; and unquestionably the cause of Aglipayanism in the Islands has received a great impetus from the action, for instance, of Bishop Rooker, whereas the course followed by this Government in arranging at Rome and through the delegate to the Philippines for the purchase of the friars' lands has been of the greatest advantage both to the Philippines and to the church. I have been prepared for attack by certain good but-3- narrow Protestants Protestants who might fail to understand under the peculiar circumstances of the case, our action, though primarily: a benefit to the Catholic church, was also a benefit to the whole Philippine people, and therefore was one which our American Government, being the custodians of the interest of the Philippine people, should take. But it is astounding to me that the Catholics should fail to see both the wisdom and the high purpose with which we have acted. So groundless is any accusation to the contrary that it would fall utterly stillborn if it were not for the inflammation always caused by a political campaign. Thus I an informed that the Democrats, in addition to making what capital they can out of what Father Wynne been doing, are preparing to circulate documents said to be based upon the protest of a Catholic Bishop in the Philippines - I suppose Bishop Rooker - against what he has been pleased to call our favoritism toward the Aglipayans - that is our refusal to proceed against them without warrant of law and by subversion of the law. Archbishop Harty, I am happy to say, has shown wisdom and temperate good feeling in all the matter. I have confidence in his judgment and shall always be delighted to listen to advice from him. I do not wish any man to vote for me because he is a Jew, Catholic or Portestant. I do wish the support of every man if I can gain it by showing that my policy has been throughout to give a square deal to every man; to treat the Catholic as well as the Protestant and no better; the Protestant as well as the Jew and no better. I enclose you copies of two documents compiled by the American party which the Democrats are circulating in the almost purely native American Republican country districts where they think it would be useless to try to convert the voters to Democracy but at least they can keep them away from me. You will-4- notice that my having you as a guest is one of the enormities alleged against me! Now there is a touch of grim comedy in the fact that the Democrats are circulating such pamphlets against me at the same time they are endeavoring to make all the political capital possible out of what Father Wynne is doing directly on the opposite side. Sincerely yours, Hon. Eugene A. Philbin, 52-54 William Street, New York, N. Y. (Copy) Personal October 15 1904 My dear Mr Postmaster General: I am directed by the President to advise you that he does not desire any action taken concerning the postmasterships at Pleasant Lake and Flint in the County of Steuben, Indiana, until some time next month, and that when the cases are taken up he wishes to refer to confidential communications on the White House files. Very truly yours, (Sgd) Wm Loeb Jr Secretary to the President. Hon R J Wynne, Postmaster General[*sent 10-19-04*] White House, Washington, October 19, 1904 My dear Mr. Ambassador: I have received your personal note of the 15th instant, informing me, at the request of the Government of Saxony, of the death of King George. I learn with sorrow of this, the passing away of the last of Germany's prominent leaders in recent wars and the last of her Field Marshals. He has left in the example set by his simple life and in the high sense of duty which inspired him an enduring lesson. To the Government of Saxony I desire to express my profound condolences on the occasion of the death of her King. To you, personally, who saw your entire active military service under King George, I offer my heartfelt sympathy. On the reception from the American Embassy at Berlin of the news of the death of King George, Mr. H. Percival Dodge, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, was instructed to attend the funeral as the representative of this Government and to express, His Excellency Baron Speck von Sternburg, etc., etc., etc.2 press, in the name of the United States and in my own, condolence and sorrow. I am, my dear Baron Sternburg, Very sincerely yours,[*Lawson, Tho. William*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 21, 1904. Private. My dear Mr. Lawson: I wish to thank you for your announcement that you intend to support me. Now, this letter is private; not in the least because I am afraid of its being made public, but because if I write to one man I shall have to write to many others. Your correspondent from Toledo says: "You cannot possibly be ignorant of the fact that Mr. Roosevelt stands for Addicks and his record and that he turned down in favor of Addicks the good men who went from Delaware to the late National Convention opposed to that pirate, and recognized said Addicks as 'it' in Delaware." To use your own vigorous language, your correspondent when he spoke this way lied. When I use the expression "lied" I do not mean merely that he told an untruth, but that he has told it willfully and maliciously; because if he is capable of reading at all he knows that there is not one word of truth in what he has said. It is a lie to say that I stand for Addicks and his record; a lie to say that I turned down in favor of Addicks the good men from Delaware who went to the late National Convention against him. It is a lie to say, as your correspondent does, that I am a co-worker in politics of Mr. Addicks; that I acknowledge him as a leader and associate with him socially and politically.-2- I have never made an appointment for Mr. Addicks since I have been President. I have seen him perhaps three times, just as I have seen thousands of other men of every shade of political belief and of every kind of standing in politics - just as I have seen Mr. John Sharp Williams, for instance. I suppose your correspondent has been reading the New York Evening Post, than which there is no more mendacious sheet, no a more grossly slanderous sheet, in this entire country, I should be glad to have you send him a copy of this letter. With regard, Sincerely yours, Mr. Thomas W. Lawson, Boston, Massachusetts. 1 B Cancel Lawson letter [* [[shorthand]] 10-22-1904 Not sent*]-2- I have never made an appointment for Mr. Addicks since I have been President. I have seen him perhaps three times, just as I have seen thousands of other men of every shade of political belief and of every kind of standing in politics - just as I have seen Mr. John Sharp Williams, for instance. I suppose your correspondent has been reading the New York Evening Post, than which there is no more mendacious sheet, nor a more grossly slanderous sheet, in this entire country. I should be glad to have you send him a copy of this letter. With regard, Sincerely yours, Mr. Thomas W. Lawson, Boston, Massachusetts.[*[For attachment see 10 -21 04]*]1 B Cancel Lawson letter [* [[shorthand]] 10-22-1904 Not Sent*][*[attached to draft TR to Lawson 10-21-04]*](COPY) Personal THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 22, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: Is it not amusing that Culberson should have produced as something entirely new that letter of mine to you, which was published nearly a year ago? I send you a letter from Collier and a copy of my answer thereto. Evidently our friends in Missouri have not been discreet in the use they have made of your letter to them. I never saw a copy of your letter, but I know you did not say in it that I thought Walbridge was a better man than Folk. I do not know enough of either of them to discuss their relative merits as individuals; but of course I am for the Republican ticket in Missouri as elsewhere, without any regard to the fact that I thought (and am inclined still to think) that it would have been better policy for the Republicans to have made no nomination against Folk. What queer creatures the Colliers are! They have been endeavoring to persuade me that they have been supporting me, whereas their attitude has been one of a neutrality which has been on the whole harmful to me. Now they want to denounce as a forgery a letter which they have never seen and which, of course, does not contaim what they say it does contain. My own judgement is that it is folly to permit the publication of your letter or any authorized statement about it either by Collier’s or2 any one else. As I said, our Missouri friends have evidently blundered in the use they have been making of it. If you are willing to send me a copy of what you wrote I shall be glad; but do not do this if you have the slightest hesitation about it. In any event, I shall tell the Colliers not to allude to the letter in any shape or way. It seems to me it would be idiotic to do so. Don't you think you had better tell the Colliers to make no allusion of any kind or sort to this letter, telling them at the same time that I have never seen it! Always yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Dr. Albert Shaw, Hastings, N. Y. EnclosurePersonal (Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 25, 1904. My dear Mr. Collier: I sent to Dr. Shaw a copy of the last letter I wrote you and asked him to kindly send me a copy of the letter he had written. I have not yet heard from him. Meanwhile, it seems to me you confuse two matters which I thought I had made clear in both of my preceding letters. You remember that you wrote to me that it was alleged that I had said that Walbridge was a better man than Folk. I wrote that I had said nothing of the kind; neither that Walbridge was better than Folk, or Folk better than Walbridge; but that of course I was supporting the republican ticket in every State. I also said in effect that there was less reason for my supporting Folk than for Folk supporting me, and also less impropriety, as I did not live in Missouri and could not vote for or against him; whereas he must vote for President and must therefore vote for either Parker or me. Mr. Lincoln Steffens, for instance, informed me that Mr. Folk was "for me", or words to that effect. I would have been indeed a fool if I had thought that this meant that Mr. Folk if nominated on the democratic ticket for Governor could come out in my support. You speak of Mr. Hapgood and others apparently expecting that I would throw the weight of my personal influence for Folk against a republican nominee in Missouri. Does Mr. Hapgood or any one else advocate Mr. Folk's throwing the weight of his vast personal influence in Missouri for me? The position is an2 absurdity in either case; but it is not merely an absurdity, but a piece of dishonesty to take the position that this should be done in one case and not in the other. In other words, the position must be either that Mr. Folk ought to support me and is wrong in not doing so, and that I ought to support Mr. Folk and am wrong in not doing so, or else (what is of course an axiomatic truth) that it is absurd to expect any such action merely because each of us believes that the other is an honest man who has rendered in certain respects service to the public. I shall again write to Dr. Shaw and ask to see his letter. If he has merely stated that of course I am for the republican ticket and that the statement that I am either covertly or openly advocating Folk's election is untrue, why then he is speaking exactly as I have said he could speak. If he has said that I regarded Walbridge as a better man than Folk or that I have attacked Folk in any way, then he has, of course unconsciously, misrepresented me. If he has made the first statement he has made what he was entirely authorized to make, and what twenty other men, including my Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Hitchcock, have been authorized to make - the authorization being given in each case in consequence of questions to them from men who had been informed that I was supporting Folk. I do not see how I could make myself clearer; but let me recapitulate. I feel very differently toward Mr. Folk from the way I do toward Mr. Parker or Mr. Herrick. I believe that he is a man who has3 rendered distinguished service to the cause of good government - service as great as and but little if at all greater than that rendered by Mr. Wynne, my present Postmaster General, and Mr. Bristow, my present Fourth Assistant Postmaster General - service in no shape or way to be compared with that rendered by Mr. Knox, Mr. Taft, Mr. Root, Mr. Moody, Mr. Hay, and various other men around about me in public life. If it be true that he has consented to go on the ticket with two of the worst boodlers upon whom he is making war, I feel he has either committed a grave error or a grave wrong; but I do not know the exact facts about this and it is unnecessary for me to try to find them out. On the other hand, I am informed that Mr. Walbridge is a man of excellent reputation and character, who would make an excellent Governor, a man for whom all republicans can with clear conscience vote. Under such circumstances it is difficult to discuss seriously the proposition that the republican party candidate for the Presidency should directly or indirectly favor Mr. Folk. Mr. Folk is of course actively supporting Mr. Parker on the stump - actively advocating his election. As I have said before, I should indeed be a fool if I objected to this or felt that the fact that I had rendered Mr. Folk a service in the past, and that he has personally expressed to me his admiration for what I was doing, entitled me to feel injured because he does not take as a candidate a position which would not be merely ludicrous but impossible; which would be a grave wrong to those supporting him - just as grave a wrong as it would be to my supporters if I supported him. Perhaps I ought to add very distinctly one thing. I do not in the least agree that between Judge Parker and myself there is room for wavering, for hesitating, and for doubt. It seems to me a monstrous 4 perversion of what is right to say that the election in the State of Missouri, or in any other State, can in any shape or way rank in importance with the national election; and to compare what Mr. Folk as District Attorney has done, with what has been accomplished under this Administration during the past three years by the Department of Justice, by the Department of State, and by the Secretary of War, by the Philippine Commission, with what has been done in Panama, in the settlement of the coal strike, in the settlement of the Alaskan boundary, and in a dozen other matters, is in my eyes the kind of a mistake made by the man who thinks that the election of an alderman is of more consequence than the election of a President. I do not merely claim the support of republicans, I claim the support of all upright and independent men who think correctly on public questions. The matters that I have above enumerated, like the handling of the Philippines, of the Venezuela question, of the Alaskan boundary, of the coal strike, of the Northern Securities suit, of Panama, of the Post Office frauds, are not properly party questions any more than the infinitely less important matters undertaken by Mr. Folk are properly party questions; and on a far larger scale I have the same right to appeal to independent voters than he has. You are of course at liberty to show this to Mr. Hapgood, but equally of course I do not wish any other use made of it. I shall let you know as soon as I hear from Dr. Shaw. I may add that I never spoke of Dr. Shaw's letter to any one excepting Dr. Shaw, and of course never gave any one else any authority to use it. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Of course until I see Dr. Shaw's letter no positive statement can be made about it. Mr. Robert J. Collier, 416 West Thirteenth Street, New York, N. Y.Personal (Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 25, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: I send you Collier's last letter and a copy of my answer to it. Of course, if I can legitimately avoid having Collier's do me another grave injustice in addition to the many it has done during this campaign, I want to try. Apparently they cannot understand the distinction between your quoting me as saying that Walbridge was a better man than Folk, and as saying that as a matter of course I was supporting Folk. If you are willing I should greatly like to see a copy of the letter you wrote to Missouri. I may add that I never spoke of that letter to any one that I remember, and certainly never gave any one except you any authority to use it. Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.,, Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, 13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y. Enclosure.File COPY [10-29-04] October 26th 1904. Dear Mr Cortelyou: "I have just been informed that the Standard Oil people have contributed $100,000 to our campaign fund. This may be entirely untrue, but if true I must ask you to direct that the money be returned to them forthwith." I then say that it is entirely legitimate to accept contributions, no matter how large they are, "on the terms on which I happen to know that you have accepted them, that is, with the explicit understanding that they were given and received with no thought of any more obligation on the part of the National Committee, or of the National Administration, than is implied in the statement that every man will receive a square deal, no more and no less, and that this I shall guarantee him in any event to the best of my ability." I then state that the big business men have a great stake in the welfare of the country, and therefore in the continuance of our party in power, and if they contributed "for the purpose of securing such National welfare and with no thought of personal favors to them, why! they are acting as is entirely proper; but we cannot under any circumstances afford to take a contribution which can be even improperly construed as putting us under an improper obligation." I continued by saying that in view of my past relations with the Standard Oil Company (i.e. the open clash I2 had had with them when they opposed the enactment of the law to create a Bureau of Corporations, and the fact that the Department of Justice me already investigating some of their acts) I believed that such a construction would be put upon receiving any aid from them. I continued that in returning the money to them", wish xx it made clear to them that there is xxx not the slightest feeling against them, and that they can count upon being treated exactly as well by the Administration, exactly as fairly as if we had accepted the contribution. They shall not suffer in any way because we have refused it, just as they would not have gained in any way if we had accepted it. But I am not willing that it should be accepted, and must ask that you tell Mr Bliss to return it." October 27th 19)4. "My dear Mr Cortelyou: "Supplemental to my letter of yesterday containing my request that any contribution which the Standard Oil people may have made to the campaign be immediately returned, I wish to say that my judgment is to the propriety of this action is confirmed because of the fact brought into special prominence by the Standard Oil Company's publication in the newspapers (which I saw after my letter was written and sent) that much importance seems to be attached to the political attitude of3 this company. Furthermore, in view of the open and pronounced opposition of the Standard Oil Company to the establishment of the Bureau of Corporations, one of the most important accomplishments of my Administration, I do not feel willing to accept its aid. I request therefore that the contribution be returned without further delay. Of course I do not wish any public statement made about this matter, nor to take any step that would seem as if I were casting any reflection upon the Standard Oil people or their motives in making the contribution." October 29th 1904, Telegram to Mr Cortelyou. "Has my request been complied with? I desire that there be no delay."[*File*][*[ca 10-26-04]*] ES. [[shorthand]][*[attached to Martin, 10-26-04]*]Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, October 27, 1904. My dear Mr. Collier: I have received a long letter from Dr. Shaw. He insists strongly that he cannot be mistaken that said that I thought Walbridge was a better man than Folk "as candidates for the office of Governor of Missouri under the present political circumstances of that State." My memory is equally clear-- I an equally positive-- that I did not use the expression; but most certainly I should not go into any public discussion of any kind on the point. Dr. Shaw, in his letter, writes me as follows: "On the day before yesterday I was called up on the telephone by Mr. Adams, of McClure's Magazine, and Mr. Norman Hapgood, of Collier's. They undertook to inform me that some kind of use was being made in Missouri of this particular letter. Yesterday I happened unexpectedly to meet Mr. William F. Saunders on the street in New York. I spoke to him about the matter, and told him that these gentlemen (Mr. Adams, as I understood it, representing Mr. Lincoln Steffens) had told me the letter was being made use of. Mr. Saunders assured me that no public use of any kind had been made of the matter, but said that the letter had been shown in confidence to certain Republicans in order that they might know clearly your entire cordiality towards the Republican movement in Missouri. In talking over the telephone to Mr. Adams and Mr. Hapgood on the day before yesterday, I had said that my information was to the effect that there had been a most assiduous attempt on the part of the Democrats to convey the impression to every high-minded and independent Republican in Missouri that you were personally favorable to Mr. Folk's election as Governor. If the facts are as they have been stated to me, this attempt in Mr. Folk's interest has been extremely disingenuous and unfair. I have no direct knowledge of my own as to the facts. I said, however, to these two gentlemen that if any use had been made of the letter from me to Saunders, it probably was in a private and confidential way and for purely defensive purposes as against a most offensive and dishonorable attempt to put you on the Democratic side in the Missouri campaign. I have no words to express as emphatically as I should feel like doing my detestation of the practice of a class of men who attempt to give a public character to a matter of private and confidential correspondence. I can conceive of no reason why you should not regard Mr. Walbridge as the better candidate of the two for Governor of Missouri, and - apart from your consistent rule not to be participating actively in State situations - I can see no reason why you should not be sending to Mr. Walbridge every possible message of political sympathy and good-will. If it should appear that Judge Parker had sent earnest wishes for success to Ur. Kern as the Democratic candidate for Governor of Indiana, or to Mr. Peck as the Democratic candidate for Governor of Wisconsin, I confess myself unable to see why the Republicans Should be surprised. On the contrary, it would be cause for surprised comment on both sides if it were thought that such encouragement had been2 intentionally withheld. The Missouri Republicans in turn might well have felt it a cause of surprise if they had been left to suppose that your sympathies this year were with the Democratic candidate for governor as against the Republican candidate." Let me again state that of course this whole matter is one which I should never dream of discussing in public, and one which it greatly surprises me to have any person, attach importance to. The entire correspondence you are very welcome to show Mr. Hapgood and Mr. Lincoln Steffens, but also only for their private use. I wish, in summing up, again to state with all possible emphasis that I cannot conceive of anyone failing to understand my position in the matter, or failing to sympathise with it. That for partisan purpose, during the closing days of the campaign, my position can be misrepresented, is of course possible; but that it can be misunderstood, or viewed save with entire commendation, I believe is impossible. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Robert J. Collier, 416 West 13th Street, New York, N.Y.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Copy. Personal. October 27, 1904. Mr. dear Dr. Shaw: I have just received your letter and the supplementary letter of your Secretary. Our difference of memory would chiefly be as to the statement that I said that Walbridge was a better man than Folk, and even here our variance is more a matter of terminology. As expressed in the letter of your secretary, my view is in effect as you have put it; not that Walbridge is the better man, but that he is the candidate to support. I felt just as you do about Collier and Hapgood writing to me as they have, but I have become case-hardened to answering all kinds of people on all kind of subjects about which they really have no right to information. I have sent certain extracts of your letter to Mr. Collier, as they put the case even more strongly than I had already put it to him. Do come down here just as soon as you can. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, 13 Astor Place, New York, N. Y.[*Penrose*] COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C. October 28, 1904. My dear Senator: I have gone carefully through Bunn's affidavit and through the testimony of Bunn himself before the Civil Service Commission, and looked through the circular. I am sorry to say that it seems to me out of the question to excuse Bunn. This circular contains advice as to how Mr Bunn's political subordinates are to act and to fill up certain blanks as well as collect subscriptions from office holders and forthwith give them to Mr Bunn as financial secretary of the Ward Committee. Among the things that they are required to report to Mr Bunn about these federal office holders is what use each one is as an organization worker, and if he is of no use what "hustler should be recommended for appointment in his stead." Furthermore, "as a voluntary contributor are his contributions the amount suggested? Does he contribute appreciatively, begrudgingly, defiantly, or ignore the organization altogether?" The man is also warned not to let the man "dodge responsibility under the bug-a-boo of civil service;" and warned that public employees frequently want "promotion, increase of salary, transfers, help when in trouble, reinstatements, and favors of various kinds" upon the basis of the record which is thus to be made up and transmitted to Mr Bunn. Mr Bunn says that he did not know that this circular was sent out, but as he particularly states that he has long been a2. [10-26-04] member of the committee which sent out these circulars, it is absolutely incredible that he should not have known that either this circular or one somewhat like it was being sent to the office holders. In his testimony he admits that the sole function of the committee of which he was secretary was to collect assessments for political purposes, and that these assessments came "practically entirely from office holders." His own statement shows that even if he was not guilty of complicity in the issuance and distribution of the circular, yet the committee of which he was secretary was actively engaged in the collection of assessments from office holders, and that he actively participated in the work himself. I take all this from Bunn's own testimony and from an examination of the circular itself, and make my decision purely in reference thereto. Mr Bunn's plea is that inasmuch as he occupied an accepted position he did not think the law applied to him. Now, my dear Senator, as you know I have again and again in the case of the Philadelphia Post Office found that this excuse of ignorance of the law, or of good intentions, was advanced to cover wrongdoing, and I have again and again accepted it and let the guilty party off with a reprimand, with atonement for the wrong done wherever this was possible, and with a statement that any further wrongdoing would be followed by punitive measures on my part. It is out of the question for me to follow this course any longer. I cannot accept the plea of ignorance of the law which Bunn makes, and I do not believe the plea of ignorance about the circular which he makes, and I have no alternative but to direct[*10-26-04*] 3. his removal. I suppose you won't like this, and I am awfully sorry; but I beg you to believe that if it were possible for me to act in any other way I would do so, and it is only because I have no alternative that I remove Bunn. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, 1417 Locust Street, Philadelphia, Pa.Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, October 29, 1904 Strictly personal. My dear Dr. Shaw: I enclose you copies of the two letters submitted to me to-day. It shows the kind of work that is being done by the writer of one letter, whom I think is Adams of Collier's, and it also shows that the Republicans have made a most improper as well as a most indiscreet use of your letter. I must ask you to write, or better still to wire, them at once withdrawing that letter, and also to state to them that your memory and mine do not agree as to the objectionable sentence where it is stated that I said Mr. Walbridge was a better man than Mr. Folk. You are positive that I said it. I am positive that I never said it and never made a personal comparison of any sort between Mr. Walbridge and Mr. Folk - I could not have done so because I do not know enough of them to try to make a comparison. Now, there is this difference of opinion, and as the letter has been so used I shall ask you to have it withdrawn forthwith. You are most welcome to substitute in it the statement that the President is, of course, in favor of the Republican State ticket of Missouri, as in every other State, and that any assertion that he is openly or secretly supporting Mr. Folk is untrue, but that the President wishes it understood that he has neither said or will say anything in disparagement of Mr. Folk and that he is not making any personal comparisons between Mr. Folk and Mr. Walbridge for or against either of them. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Dr. Albert Shaw, Hastings-on-the-Hudson, N. Y. P.S. I wish you would come down here as early as possible next week and spend the night.TELEGRAM. Copy. White House, Washington. October 31, 1904. Hon. Thomas J. Akins, U. S. Subtreasury, St. Louis Mo. Personal. Please take no action on matter contained in my letters until you see letter written by Dr. Shaw to Mr. Saunders to-day with my approval. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (President's private acct.) Copy. Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 31, 1904 My dear Mr. Akins: In reference to my letter of Saturday, I have to say that Mr. Shaw has written a letter completely stating the facts. He has sent it to Mr. Saunders. Will you get a copy of it from Mr. Saunders, and see that no use whatever is made of, and no circulation given to, Mr. Shaw's first letter? This last letter of Mr. Shaw's puts the case so clearly that no one can misunderstand it unless willfully. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Thomas J. Akins, U.S. Subtreasury, St. Louis, Mo.Copy. Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 31, 1904. My dear Dr. Shaw: I have seen the copy of your letter to Mr. Saunders, which seems to me to exactly meet the case. I send you a copy of a letter I have just sent to Mr. Akins in regard thereto, also a copy of a telegram to Mr. Akins. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Dr. Albert Shaw, Review of Reviews, 13 Astor Place, New York. [*(Wm. Flewellyn Saunders, (Sec'y Businessmen's Assoc'n of St. Louis and close friend of Wallbridge) A.S.*][*07*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Copy of cablegram sent to the Department of State to be transmitted on November 3, 1904: His Excellency, President Amador, Panama. Accept the felicitations of this Government on the first anniversary of Panaman independence. (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.COPY The White House, Washington, D. C. November 9th, 1904. My dear Mr. Barnes: Pray let me thank you most cordially and warmly for what you have done in this election. I appreciate it to the full. With regard to Mrs. Barnes, Believe me, Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. William Barnes Jr., Albany, N. Y.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C., November 9th, 1904. My dear Senator Penrose: Upon my word, among all phenomenal returns the Pennsylvania figures are the most phenomenal. I congratulate you and cordially thank you. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose Philadelphia, Pa. [*Hobson, R.P.*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. November 12, 1904 Personal. Sir: I have received your letter. I cannot at present answer it at length; but I feel that there is one thing that I ought to say to you. Your successful opponent for Congress, Mr. Heflin, expressed a wish that on a certain occasion another Czolgosz might have killed me with a bomb. He afterwards said that this utterance was jocular; but, if so, it was not a wise kind of joke. In a recent speech you stated that if I was not overthrown in this election, I would later be overthrown in more tragic fashion. Now, surely you know what words mean, and that taking your words in their ordinary significance, taking them as they would be more or less clearly understood by most men, and especially by men of violent temper, they amounted to an incitement to assassination. It seems to me that before you and Mr. Heflin give me advice as to how I should [*[For attachment see 11-12-04]*] behave toward the South, you should both of you learn, not from the standpoint of the North and South or the East or the West, but from the standpoint of the interest of the Nation that to use language about the President which is equivalent to incitement to assassination is not only deeply discreditable to the man using it, but represents injury to the Nation as great as that man's ability will permit. Very truly yours, Mr. Richmond Pearson Hobson, Greensboro, Alabama.[*attached to TR draft to Hobson 11-12-04*] James Thomas [?elflin?] File Do not sendWHITE HOUSE Mr. Richard P. Hobson, Greensboro, Alabama. Personal.[*Johnson, R. U*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. November 12, 1904. Personal. My dear Mr. Johnson: I thank you for your letter. But what do you man by saying that you think the solemnity of the exceptional tribute to me will “move me to a magnanimity toward the South which will break up what is left of a dangerous sectionalism"? For three years I have been more than magnanimous towards the South; and the dangerous sectionalism has gone on in spite of this magnanimity, and I think partly because men like you in the North have hesitated to speak as you ought to have done about this attitude in the South. Low tariff or high tariff is of very small importance compared to rebuking the infamous attitude that the South took, and forced the Democratic party to take, in this election; and those who supported the Democratic party have done their best to keep up “the dangerous sectionalism" which you deplore. I wish you would think over the actual facts of the case,[*[For attachment see 11-12-04]*] and you will realize that there is an element of absurdity in writing me to be magnanimous in order to break up a dangerous sectionalism, when I have been magnanimous and when the dangerous sectionalism has not been broken up, and when it is now dangerous in large part because well meaning people for various reasons, all of them unimportant, have stood by the party which in this election that has just closed represents literally and without one particle of exaggeration not one single electoral vote excepting that of the dangerous sectionalism of which you speak. Sincerely yours, Mr. Robert Underwood Johnson, The Century Company, Union Square, New York, N. Y.[11-12-04] File Do not send[attached to draft TR to Johnson 11-12-04]Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. November 24, 1904. My dear Sir George: It was a real pleasure to hear from you. I was saying the other day to John Morley how much I regretted that it did not seem likely that you could get over here. By the way, Morley spent three or four days with us, and I found him as delightful a companion as one could wish to have, and I quite understand the comfort he must have been to you when you sat beside him in the House. Incidentally, it is rather a relief to have you speak as you do about the tedious and trivial quality of most of the eloquence in the House. I am glad to find that it is characteristic of all parliamentary bodies, and not merely of those of my own country! We won a great triumph at the elections. A candidate is so apt to hear nothing but the favorable side that I have kept my mind absolutely open to accept either defeat or victory. Most of my friends were very confident, but no one anticipated such an overwhelming triumph. Now I know that it is [utterly] practically impossible to avoid the personal equation, and as I am naturally very proud and happy over the victory, and equally naturally, very sure that on the whole my acts and the policies I stood for were right and therefore deserved approval by the people, it follows as a corollary that what I am about to say must be taken with a large and liberal measure of discount. But trying to look2 at the matter disinterestedly, it does seem to me that it was a good thing to have the people decide for the candidate and the perty representing the positive side - the side of achievement in many different directions - instead of for the colorless candidate and the party whose position had become one of negation, criticism and obstruction merely. Moreover, while Mr. Parker was not at all a dangerous man for the country to put at the head of affairs, and while there was nothing of great menace to the country's immediate material interest in the success of his party, under his leadership, it is also true that the Democratic canvass this year was on a thoroughly insincere and unworthy basis, and it is never wholesome to have the people vote "Yes" to a lie. From the outset Mr. Parker's attitude, and the attitude of the party behind him, were one of trickiness and double-dealing. All they wished for was success, and every principle and conviction was handled, only from the standpoint of getting votes. I thoroughly believe in handling a campaign so as to get votes, but I do not believe in lying directly or indirectly for this purpose, or in doing anything cowardly or base for this purpose. Mr. Parker and his supporters wished to be for the gold standard strongly enough to secure the gold vote, and yet not strongly enough to hurt the feelings of the silver people. They wished to be for free trade, and yet in the same breath to assure the protectionists that they had nothing whatever to fear as regards the tariff. They wished to use language about the Philippines which would convince the3 so-called anti-imperialists that they intended to give them up, while at the same time the promise could be construed so as to mean that they would not be given up for half a century or a century to come. They wished to be understood as being for the [good and advancement] cutting down of the army and navy, and yet be able to give private assurances that in each case the action would be nominal. They endeavored to make the labor people feel that I was not radical enough in my action to suit them, and yet to make the big financial magnates understand that at bottom Parker was a conservative who could be trusted by them not to do the radical things I had done. In short, the canvass was one with which all students of history are familiar, for it occurs every now and thon in every free country. To use the continental terminology, it was an effort to unite the extreme right and extreme left against the middle. It is rare indeed that the success of such an effort is a healthy sign for the body politic. By the way, I venture to send you a volume of my speeches and addresses made since I was President. This volume really contains the platform upon which I stood in the last election; and to me one of the gratifying features of the canvass was that in my speech[es] and letter of acceptance and subsequent statement, and in the speeches of my great supporters, Root, Knox, Hay, Taft and Moody, there was nothing said in which we did not believe with entire faith, and nothing promised whatever except that the Government would be continued along the lines followed in the last three years. We won on clean-cut issues, stated with absolute truthfulness, and with only the promise that our performance4 in the past could be taken as the measure of what our performance would be in the future. Although the canvass was naturally at times a good deal of worry for me, I did not have to do much work. Each Nation has its conventions. Whereas a Prime Minister is expected to take the stump on his own behalf, with us it is regarded as improper for a President to do so. This is the kind of custom which could be disregarded in a great emergency, but which it is never wise or politic to disregard for insufficient reasons. In the same way it has become one of our customs, with even more than the conventional force, that no President is to have a third term; whereas in England the longer a Prime Minister serves, the more he is esteemed as having been true to his party. Naturally, an Englishman can not understand the force that a custom like this has upon the American mind; and I see that the Spectator can not understand, exactly as John Morley [can] could not understand, my immediate announcement that I had no intention of accepting a third term. If it were not for the certainty of fools misunderstanding the terminology and failing to see that a short-term elective King has nothing whatever in common with a hereditary King, I could best express to a foreigner the President's power by putting it in that form. Of course a constitutional King reigns all his life and does not govern at all, while the President never reigns, but governs most actively; and the President, in the actual exercise of his power, resembles the Prime Minister far more than he does a functionary like the French President. But his power is even5 greater, and therefore it is natural that the people should desire to hedge it about with certain restrictions, and above all to make it certain that it can only be of limited duration. I think the feeling healthy myself; and moreover I feel very strongly that at least in our country, a public man's usefulness in the highest position becomes in the end impaired by the mere fact of too long continuance in that position. People get tired of the everlasting talk about Aristides; and moreover Aristides himself, after a certain number of years, finds that he has really delivered his message and that he has a tendency to repeat it over and over again. For example, suppose that there was no third term tradition in our government, and none of the valid reasons (as I regard them) against a third term: it would yet be true that in 1908 it would be better to have some man like Taft or Root succeed me in the Presidency, at the head of the Republican party, than to have me succeed myself. In all the essentials of policy they look upon things as I do; but they have their own ways of thought and ways of expression, and what they did and said would have a freshness which what I did and said could not possibly have; and they would be free from the animosities and suspicions which I had accumulated, and would be able to take a new start and have a much greater chance of achieving useful work. After eight years in the Presidency, not only is it unwise for other reasons to re-elect a man, but it is inadvisable because it is almost certain that some one can be found with the same principles, who, from the mere fact that he is some one else, can better succeed in putting those principles6 into practice. This is a rambling digression. When I started out I merely meant to show why it was essential for me to have interpreters like Hay, Knox and the others, who could set forth on the stump what I had done and what I intended to do. In my hours of leisure I did a good deal of reading. I re-read your history of our Revolution and liked it more than ever, but came to the conclusion that you had painted us a little too favorably. I also re-read both your Macaulay and your Fox, and then re-read Macaulay's history. When I had finished it I felt a higher regard for him as a great writer, and in the truest sense of the word a great philosophical historian, than I have ever felt before. It is a pretty good test of an author to have a President, who is also a candidate for the Presidency, read it in the midst of a campaign with the keenest appreciation of its wisdom, of its knowledge of the motives and acts of men who were engaged in the difficult task of self-government, and with at the same time a great sense of relaxation and pure enjoyment. All the motives and tendencies for good and for evil of which Macaulay shows the working in the England of the end of the Seventeenth Century, were at work right around me in the America of the beginning of the Twentieth Century. Of course some were strong and some were weak now, compared to what under the utterly different conditions they had been in another land two centuries before; but fundamentally they were all there, and the wise man who was neither a mere doctrinair nor a vicious man, had to meet them and7 make the best of them now as then. Do you recollect Abraham Lincoln's speech, just after he was re-elected in 1864? It runs as follows: "*** The strife of the election is but human nature practically applied to the facts of the case. What has occurred in this case must ever occur in similar cases. Human nature will not change. In any future great national trial, compared with the men of this, we shall have as weak and as strong, as silly and as wise, as bad and as good. Let us, therefore, study the incidents of this as philosophy to learn wisdom from, and none of them as wrongs to be revenged. *** "*** now that the election is over, may not all having a common interest reunite in a common effort to save our common country? For my own part, I have striven and shall strive to avoid placing any obstacle in the way. So long as I have been here I have not willingly planted a thorn in any man's bosom. While I am deeply sensible to the high compliment of a reelection, and duly grateful, as I trust, to almighty God for having directed my countrymen to a right conclusion, as I think, for their own good, it adds nothing to my satisfaction that any other man may be disappointed or pained by the result. "May I ask those who have not differed with me to join with me in this same spirit toward those who have?" It seems to me that aside from its fine and noble quality, it has in it the real philosophy of statesmanship. I read a number of other books during the campaign; Rhodes's excellent history, for instance, and a good deal of Dickens. In the American characters in Martin Chuzzlewit, Dickens made a mistake in generalizing and insisting that all Americans were represented in his figures, which of course is as nonsensical as to say that Pecksniff, Bill Sykes and Sir Mulberry Hawk, taken in the aggregate, typify all of English society. But all the same I would like to have Martin Chuzzlewit studied as a tract in America. Hearst and Pulitzer are Jefferson Brick8 and Colonel Diver, in a somewhat fuller stage of development; while Senator Carmack of Tennessee, Congressman John Sharp Williams of Mississippi and Governor Vardaman of Mississippi, not to speak of Senator Tillman of South Carolina, are Hannibal Chollop and Elijah Pogram. Faithfully yours, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland, England.Strictly personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. November 30, 1904. [*Harriman*] My dear Mr. Harriman: Mr. Loeb tells me that you called me up to-day on the telephone and recalled my letter to you of October 14th in which I spoke to you of a desire to see you before sending in my message as I wanted to go over with you certain govermental matters, and you added that you had heard that I had referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission; that you regretted this and wished I had left it out. In writing to you I had in view, especially, certain matters connected with currency legislation, and had not thought of discussing railroad matters with you. However, if it had occurred to me, I should have been delighted to do so; but if you remember when you were down here both you and I were so interested in certain of the New York political developements that I hardly, if at all, touched on governmental matters. As regards what I have said in my message about the Interstate Commerce Commission, while, as I say, I should have been delighted to go over it with you, I must also frankly say that my mind was definitely made up. Certain revelations connected with the investigation of the beef trust caused me to [wright] write the paragraph in question. I went with extreme care over the information in possession of the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the Bureau of Corporations before writing it. I then went over the written paragraph again and again with Paul Morton, who is of all my Cabinet the man most familiar with railroad matters of course, and with Root, Knox, Taft and Moody. It is a matter I had been carefully considering for two years, and had been gradually though reluctantly coming to the conclusion that it is unwise and unsafe from every2. standpoint to leave the question of rebates where it now is, and to fail to give the Interstate Commerce Commission additional power of an effective kind in regulating these rates. Let me repeat that I did not have this question in mind when I asked you to come down, but that I should most gladly have talked it over with you if it had occurred to me to do so; but as a matter of fact, as you will remember, when you did come down to see me, you and I were both so engaged in the New York political situation that we talked of little else; and finally that the [question] position I have taken has not been taken lightly, but after thinking over the matter and looking at it from different standpoints for at least two years, and after the most careful consultation with Morton, Taft, Moody, Knox, and Root, as to the exact phraseology I should use. I do not send you a copy simply because I have given no one a copy, not even the men above mentioned. It is impossible if I give out copies of any portions of my message to prevent the message being known in advance; and the three press associations who now have the message are under a heavy penalty not to disclose a word of it before the appointed time. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosecelt. E. H. Harriman, Esq, 120 Broadway, New York, N. Y.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C., December 1st 1904. My dear Senator: All right, I shall wait about Judge Wickersham until I see you; but I ought to say to you that Senator Knox, after having through his agents carefully investigated the matter, has become very strongly in favor of Judge Wickersham's re-appointment. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.[*(38)*] [*[DE 1, 1904]*] [*WILKINS]*] My dear Sir: The President has requested me to send you the enclosed check for fifty dollars, $25 of which is a contribution from himself and $25 from Mrs. Roosevelt to the work of your association. &c &c [*W.Loab Jr*] *[Copy of letter to Mr. Wilkins dated Dec 1 1904*] [*shall ck $25 be sent this year?*] [*Yes*][*12-5-04*] [[shorthand]] Also letter on page 232 of President's personal book[[shorthand]][*attached to TR to MacMillan & Co. 12-5-04]*]Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 5, 1904. Gentlemen: A year or two hence I may publish a volume consisting of various hunting sketches I have written for Scribner's Magazine and elsewhere. In this I should like to use some of the material contained in your volume on the deer and antelope, edited by Caspar Whitney. About three of the chapters I wrote I should like to reproduce substantially as they are. The other two I should either not use at all or take short extracts from them. Mr. Whitney says he is entirely willing to have me do this if you are. I write to know if I could make some arrangement with you by which it could be done. I would like to get all of my writings on the subject together in one volume. Scribner's will publish it. With regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Messrs. Macmillan & Co., 66 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 5, 1904. [* [see Williams John Sharp Nov. 30, 04] *] My dear Mr, Williams: I am a little at a loss to know how to answer your letter. I have read what you say about the Confederate veteran. Surely you must know that I have always spoken with the heartiest admiration, not only of the valor shown by the Confederate soldiers, but of their sincere devotion to the right as it was given them to see the right. You say, in effect, that though I understand the East and the West, I do not understand the South. I am certainly greatly puzzled by some of the difficulties I have encountered in the South, and above all I am puzzled at the recklessness of speech employed by the South's political leaders and by the editorial writers of the South's largest newspapers; but the thing that puzzles me most is how to persuade the South to let my words and actions speak for themselves, and how to persuade the leaders of southern thought, at least in public life, truthfully to state these words and speeches. It seems to me that there is nothing I have 2 said that requires explanation, and that my whole policy of action requires no explanation. The trouble has arisen not in the least from what I have said or done, but from the way in which what I have said and done has been misrepresented in the South. Take your own State of Mississippi, with which you are of course familiar. In this State there are between 2300 and 2400 positions filled by appointment either of the President or of the Postmaster General. Of these positions, within a fraction of 99 per cent. are filled by white people, the great bulk of them being Democrats and either ex-Confederates or the wives, sons, or daughters of ex-Confederates. With trivial exceptions,I have had no complaint ever made against any of these office holders, and I understand that on the average they represent a high standard of probity and efficiency. If this is not so, either you or one of your colleagues can at any time, by calling my attention to any given case of misfeasance, be certain that it will be immediately corrected and the offender punished. It is therefore evident that, so far as the federal appointments in your State are concerned, the only thing necessary to make the 3 people contented with them is to state the facts as they are. Only about one per cent. of the appointments are of colored men; and of these few appointments, the great majority are in the exclusively colored communities in the black belt. I need hardly point out, when such is the state of things, to argue from it that there has been any action on my part to bring about negro domination or miscegenation, or social intermingling between colored and white people, is as ludicrous as to try to connect it with the doctrine of transubstantiation or the nebular hypothesis. So much for the question of federal appointments in Mississippi. Now as to the question of legislative and executive policies. These policies have all been undertaken for the good of the nation as a whole; but some of the most important among them (notably, for instance, my Panama policy, and my policies as regards the Caribbean Sea generally) while in the interest of the nation as a whole, are more in the interest of the Gulf States than of any other portion of our country. In some very important steps my policies have been merely carrying to fruition4 the old-time policies of the Henry Clay Whigs of the South and South-west. In other respects they have been carrying to fruition the policies of the old-time Jackson, Benton and Houston Democrats of the South and South-west. So it seems to me the veriest absurdity to speak of any policy of mine, external or internal, as being carried on with a view to anything but the interests of all the country. Any opponents, South or North, East or West, have a right to criticise my public acts with which they disagree; but when the criticism takes the shape of misrepresentation of facts, or the ascription of non-existent motives, it ceases to be legitimate. Some of the attacks that have been made upon me by public men high in your party - perhaps the most notorious offender being in your own State - have been of such a character that a gentleman can not even repeat them for the purpose of answering them, their foulness saving their authors from answer for reasons similar to those which Macaulay gives as saving Barere from the criticisms of historians. I can at least repeat what Senator Morgan of Alabama said in a letter printed in the Vicksburg Herald of October5 23d last, in which he speaks of me as "a man who, to gratify his ambition, would make such a badgering threat to excuse the fact that he is the son of a daughter of the South." You yourself were reported as having used similar language, stating that I had attacked the South in an effort to make the northern people forget that I was the son of a southern woman. I hope that you were incorrectly reported, but Senator Morgan's statement appeared over his own name. Incidentally, the statement that I had made a badgering threat of any kind was untrue. But this is not the point upon which I wish to dwell. The point is the gross impropriety of ascribing, without one particle of warrant, so base a motive to the President of the United States. I do not believe that since our history began we have ever had a President, from whatever section of the country he came, of such abject character as to Unlike the utterance I have alluded to above, such a statement as this of Senator Morgan is not foul, because it can be quoted; but its6 ascription to the President of the United States of motives so mean and so base that neither I nor any other man who has been President, and so far, any other man who has ever been a candidate for President, could entertain them, is in itself an act of the gravest impropriety - of an impropriety so grave that no answer whatever is required, not even the statement of the self-evident fact that the accusation has not, and the man making it knows it has not, one particle of foundation in truth. Again, Congressman Heflin, of Alabama, expressed a wish that on a certain occasion a Czolgosz had murdered me with a bomb. In other words, he incited the assassination of the President of the United States. I need hardly point out the effect such words may have upon evil and violent men whose passions are strong and whose intellect is weak. They may not result in the assassination of the President about whom they are spoken, and yet may contribute somewhat to a state of feeling which may cause the assassination of other Presidents. In certain of your speeches you spoke as follows: (Insert)7 Mr. Kitchin, of North Carolina, was doubtless responsible for some of the most flagrant falsehoods to which you thus gave circulation, and for others even more flagrant which you did not quote. Now, when you speak of my not understanding the South, or of the South not understanding me, don't you think that the chief elements in causing the condition which you seem to deplore are misstatements like those which I have quoted above? I make every allowance for the effect of partisan heat, but some of these speeches of yours were carefully prepared and written down and delivered to the press in advance of your making them. There are in the South no great public leaders and no great newspapers who will state my case, and when the people of the South are day after day told by their leaders things that are not true about me, it is natural that they should be misled. The chief need of the South, so far as I am concerned, is that the truth should be told. I do not think you have harmed me by telling these falsehoods, but that is a matter of small moment. I am not concerned with whether I am harmed or helped. I am concerned with whether the people of your State and the people of the8 South generally, whose well-being, moral and material, is as dear to me as that of the poeple of any other portion of our country, have been hurt of helped. When Senator Carmack tells me that I have gained the support of the North by attacking the South (a statement which Senator Carmack well knows to be untrue, for he can not point out one word I have uttered since I have been President in which there has been an attack upon the South); when you and other gentlemen of your standing, and when the leading papers of the South, all united in persistently and continuously ascribing to me motives which I am incapable of holding, and misrepresenting my every act, how is it possible that the South should not be misled? I do not blame the people of the South who have been misled. I blame the leaders of the South who have misled them. You have just been speaking about the proposition to reduce the representation of the South in Congress. I am not now prepared to say anything one way or the other on this subject. I appreciate to the full the difficulties the South has to encounter. So far as the South9 will allow me I wish, working through southerners like Judge Jones, of Alabama, to do all that in me lies to help her to a safe and honorable way out of these difficulties. But you should yourself make allowance for some difficulties which the North itself has in consequence of what is done in the South. You come from a district in which for every one white man there are three colored men. In your district that one white man has in various ways first suppressed the votes of the three colored men, and in the next place, in the Electoral College and in Congress himself casts their votes as if they were the votes of four men. Now you are entitled to have your vote count as equal to the vote of any man in Missouri or West Virginia, in Maine or in Oregon; but you are not entitled to have your vote count as equal to four men in Missouri, West Virginia, Maine and Oregon. If of the black men in your district the enormous majority are too ignorant, too shiftless, or too vicious to be entrusted with the ballot, why bar them out from such trust; but bar them out not because they are black men but because they are ignorant, 10 shiftless or vicious when judged by the same tests which would be applied to ignorant, vicious and shiftless whites. Each State has, subject to the constitution, the right to regulate its own suffrage; but let that suffrage be regulated honestly. To sum up, then, it seems to me that what the South really needs at this moment more than anything else is to have her leaders in politics and in the press state the truth as it is, state facts as they are, whether this truth concerns the President of the United States or any one else, or whether it concerns the situation at home. Very truly yours, Hon. John Sharp Williams, House of Representatives.8 In the last campaign there was literally no form of foul slander which was not repeated again and again in southern newspapers and by southern speakers. Such slander may, although in this case it did not, temporarily injure the man about whom it is uttered; but it is certain in the long run to injure those who utter it and the community in which it is listened to and accepted. Emerson has said that in the long run the pleasantest falsehood is a more unpleasant companion than the most unpleasant truth; but in this case the falsehoods were not merely unpleasant, they were revolting. Often, as in the case for instance of its being alleged that I was not at the battle of San Juan, they were so idiotic that it is impossible that they should be believed, even at third or fourth hand; and I need not point out to you the dangerous effect upon any individual's character of persistently repeating what he knows to be untrue.Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 8, 1904. Gentlemen: I hate to do anything that you would prefer not to do, but I do very much wish to have all the material written by me gathered into volumes which shall contain nothing but my own writings; and accordingly I will close with your offer, and send you herewith the $250 for the privilege of using so much as I desire of the material contained in my chapters in the volume on deer and antelope of Mr. Whitney's series. It may be several years before I make use of the permission. Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. The Macmillan Company, 66 Fifth Avenue, New York. EnclosureCOPY The White House, Washington, D. C. Personal December 12th 1904. My dear Mr Barnes: I am very sorry but it is out of the question to appoint Mr Davison. He is the one man against whom I have had an emphatic protest from the Grange. The Grange has two candidates - one from New York, Mr Dawley, and the other representing the rest of the Grange people of the United States, Mr Jones. The American agriculturalist people have another candidate, Mr Johnson. I [have] decided finally that as there was such irreconcilable differences among them I should tell Wilson to take the best man to be found for the position, and he has appointed Mr Hays, the President of the State Agricultural College of Minnesota. Mr Davison’s appointment was not possible in view of the violent opposition of those whom it was most desirable to have feel in sympathy with the new appointee. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon, William Barnes Jr., The Evening Journal, Albany, N. Y.Personal. December 13, 1904. My dear President White: I have just seen an account of a speech of yours in which you are quoted as using this language: "Much as I admire President Roosevelt as a true man, we have seen today the sorry example of the mistake a strong man can make. The President has appealed to by a colored Baptist minister to save the latter's son from the gallows for the murder of a farmer in Canada. The President listened to the appeal, and has succeeded in securing a commutation of sentence. I don't admire the President for that.” No such incident as that you quote has ever taken place. I never heard of the case as far as I now recall. The Department of Justice has no record of the case, and the action of the Department of State is set forth in the following telegram from the Consul-General at Ottawa: "No communication of any kind received from White House with reference to case of son of colored Baptist minister, convicted of murder. A letter from father was transmitted to me by Department State and forwarded by me to Canadian minister of justice. No intervention suggested, and no request for clemency by me. John G. Foster, Consul-General." You will see from the above that the statement you made is without foundation in fact. I do not know where you got your information, but I am sure you will agree with me that when a public man of your prominence makes such a statement and accuses the President of such conduct he ought to be sure of the facts. As you know, once such an accusation is made,2. even a retraction of similar publicity never undoes the damage done. Very truly yours, Dr. Andrew D. White, Cornell University, Othaca, N Y.[*Copied in President's letter book*] (Copy). WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Dec. 15th, 1904. My dear M. Mistral, Mrs. Roosevelt and I were equally pleased with the book and the medal; and none the less because for nearly twenty years we have possessed a copy of "Mireille". That copy we shall keep for old associations' sake; though this new copy, with the personal inscription by you, must hereafter occupy the place of honor. All success to you and your associates! You are teaching the lesson that none more need to learn than we of the west, we of this eager, restless, wealth-seeking nation; the lesson that after a certain not very high level of national well-being has been reached, then the things that really count in life are the things of the spirit. Factories and railways are good up to a certain point; but courage and endurance, love of wife and child, love of home and country, love of lover for sweetheart, love of beauty in man's work and in nature, love and emulation of daring and of lofty endeavor, the homely, work-a-day virtues and the heroic virtues,-- these are better still, and if they are lacking no piled-up riches, no roaring, clanging industrialism, no feverish and many-sided activity, shall avail either the individual or the nation. I do not undervalue these things of a nation's body; I only desire that they[12-15-04] 2. shall not make us forget that besides the nation's body there is also the nation's soul. Again thanking you, on behalf of both of us, believe me, Very faithfully yours, (Signed) : Theodore Roosevelt. To M. Frederic Mistral. Copy WHITE HOUSE, Washington, Dec. 15th, 1904. My dear M. Mistral; Mrs. Roosevelt and I were equally pleased with the book and the medal; and none the less because for nearly twenty years we have possessed a copy of "Mireille". That copy we shall keep for old associations’ sake; though this new copy, with the personal inscription by you, must hereafter occupy the place of honor. All success to you and your associates! You are teaching the lesson that none more need to learn than we of the west, we of this eager, restless, wealth-seeking nation; the lesson that after a certain not very high level of material well-being has been reached, then the things that really count in life are the things of the spirit. Factories and railways are good up to a certain point; but courage and endurance, love of wife and child, love of home and country, love of lover for sweetheart, love of beauty in man’s work and in nature, love and emulation of daring and of lofty endeavor, the homely, work-a-day virtues and the heroic virtues - these are better still, and if they are lacking no piled-up riches, no rearing, clanging Industrialism, no feverish and many-sided activity, shall avail either the individual or the nation. I do not undervalue those things of a nation’s body; I only desire that they shall not make us forget that besides the nation's body there is also the nation's soul. Again thanking you, on behalf of both of us, believe me, Very faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. To M. Frederic Mistral. (The above letter was sent in the President's handwriting.)[*Choate*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 24, 1904. My dear Mr. Ambassador: I have just received your letter of resignation, coupled with your private letter in which you ask that it be accepted and give reasons therefor which would seem to be controlling. It is with genuine reluctance that I accept it. You have rendered not merely loyal but distinguished service. Not since Mr. Adams has any of our Ambassadors to England served as long as you have served; and not since Mr. Adams has any Ambassador in your position rendered more devoted and more efficient service to the country. I thank you with all my heart, not only as President, but as an American citizen, for what you have done; and your countrymen, you may rest assured, appreciate it to the full, and when you return will show you by their affectionate welcome [how] that the great place you already had in their regard and esteem has grown even greater. Distinguished though your career has been, no part of it has been more distinguished than that which [fell] has fallen within the last six years.You ask as to the time when you can take your departure, but you mention that you had hoped to complete and dedicate while yet in England your memorial window to John Harvard in St. Saviour's Church. You say that you still hope to accomplish this before your recall reaches you. If the delay will not inconvenience you I should like to have you arrange to stay until you can dedicate this window personally. Accordingly, subject as I say to your convenience, I shall ask you to let me know the date when you expect to dedicate it, and I shall then notify you, accepting the [the] resignation at a time shortly subsequent thereto. But be sure to let me know if this is not entirely convenient. With warm regards to Mrs. Choate, believe me, Sincerely yours, Hon. Joseph H. Choate, American Ambassador, London, England. [*To Secy Hay for correction and return T R*][*[ca 1904]*] [[shorthand]] Frenor = [[shorthand]] Stewart = [[shorthand]] Attached [[shorthand]] [*[1904]*] BARON KAMEKO, TOKIO, JAPAN. AM DOING ALL I CAN BUT JAPANESE WAR THREAT FOR SUCH INADEQUATE REASON EMBARASSES JAPAN BEST FRIENDS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT [[shorthand]] [*55745*] [*Senator Shelby Moor Cullom*] Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 10 1905. My dear Senator Cullom: I notice in connection with the general arbitration treaties now before the Senate that suggestions have been made to the effect that under them it might be possible to consider as matters for arbitration claims against certain States of the Union in reference to certain State debts. The holders of State debts take them with full knowledge of the constitutional limitations upon their recovery through any action of the National Government and must rely solely on State credit. I write to say, what of course you personally know, that under no conceivable circumstances could any such construction of the treaty be for a moment entertained by any President. Such a claim against a State could under no conditions be submitted by the general Government as a matter for arbitration; any more than such a claim against a county or municipality could be thus submitted for arbitration. The objection to the proposed amendment on the subject is that it is a mere matter of surplusage, and that it is very undesirable, when the form of these treaties has already been agreed to by the several Powers concerned, needlessly to add certain definitions which affect our own internal polity only; which deal with a matter of the relation of the Federal Government to the States which it is of course out of the question ever to submit to the arbitration of any outside2 tribunal; and which it is certainly absurd and probably mischieveous to treat as possible to be raised by the President or by any foreign power. No one would even think of such a matter as being one for arbitration or for any diplomatic negotiation whatever. Moreover, these treaties run only for a term of five years; until the end of that period they will certainly be interpreted in accordance with the view above expressed. Very truly yours, Hon. S M. Cullom, United States Senate. [*I think it would sound better if these two sentences (1) and (2) were transposed.*] [*[In handwriting of John Hay, attached to page 1 of Roosevelt to Cullom 1-10-05]*][*Cullen*] Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 10, 1905. My dear Senator Cullom: I notice in connection with the general arbitration treaties now before the Senate that suggestions have been made to the effect that under them it might be possible to consider as matters for arbitration claims against certain States of the Union in reference to certain State debts. The holders of State debts take them with full knowledge of the constitutional limitations upon their recovery through any action of the National Government. I write to say, what of course you personally know, that under no conceivable circumstances could any such construction of the treaty be for a moment entertained by any President. Such a claim against a State could under no conditions be submitted by the general Government as a matter for arbitration; any more than such a claim against a county or municipality could be thus submitted for arbitration. The objection to the proposed amendment on the subject is that it is a mere matter of surplusage, and that it is very undesirable, when the form of these treaties has already been agreed to by the several Powers concerned, needlessly to add certain definitions which affect our own internal polity only; which deal with a matter of the relation of the Federal Government to the States which it is of course out of the question ever to submit to the arbitration of any outside2 tribunal; and which it is certainly and probably mischievous to treat as possible to be raised by the President or by any foreign power. No one would even think of such a matter as being one for arbitration or for any diplomatic negotiation whatever. Moreover, these treaties run only for a term of five years; until the end of that period they will certainly be interpreted in accordance with the view above expressed. Very truly yours, Hon. S. W. Cullom, United States Senate.X [*[ca 1-11-05]*] [[shorthand]] 1905 [[shorthand]] 1909 [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 18, 1905. Cablegram Baron H. Sternburg, [Paris, France.] [*German Ambassador*] Have not only sounded the government you mention about its disinterestedness through formal channels, but also personally through its Ambassador at Washington. Expect to receive formalle answer. As you by this time know, we have received answers from England and Italy which take the exact ground that Germany and the United States do about maintaining the integrity of China, and [as to neutrality] about the neutral powers positively declining in the event of peace to accept any territorial compensation for themselves. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*see Sternburg, Baron H Speech*] [*1/17/05*] [*[1-27-05]*] [[shorthand]] $100.[*Dawes*] Copy Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 29, 1905. My dear Mr. Dawes: I liked your article, but I thought it unduly pessimistic; and I do not believe, my dear sir, that I quite agree with you as to the needlessness of some kind of Government supervision of corporations. Minister Bryan is a good fellow and a satisfactory Minister. I intend to keep him, but I do not think at present he can be promoted. I know all the good work he and his father did in the last campaign. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Charles G. [*ates*] Dawes, Central Trust Company of Illinois, Chicago [*article on Corporation problems for Saturday Evening Post.*] (Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. January 29, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: It is very kind of you to desire to have my picture painted to be put in the Albany Capitol, and I shall break through my rule and have it done. Only, my dear sir, the painter must do with me what he did with you - that is, take but three thirty-minute sittings! I cannot spare more. It does not seem very nice for me to make any conditions when I am accepting so generous an offer, but I simply have to because my time is so taken up. As regards the other matter, I shall to-morrow call you up on the telephone. It was a great pleasure seeing you the other night. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. E. H. Harriman, Esq., 120 Broadway, New York.(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. January 29, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: Before receiving your letter I had in a way become committed to Fowler. He was our candidate for Congress, and his nomination seemed to me to be absolutely right. What influenced me most was Chief Justice Kent's emphatic endorsement of him. I may add that the only protest I received against Wells was on the ground (which I think is wholly untrue) that he is a Santa Fe man. What is there against Fowler? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. E. H. Harriman, Esq., 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. January 31, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: I have your letter of the 30th. As I wrote you, I am afraid I am committed to Fowler and I do not see very well how I could get out of it. It would be very unpleasant for me, with Morton in my Cabinet, to say that I reject him, merely because I had heard that he was "a strong Santa Fe Man," unless there was some specific objection to him. I need hardly tell you that if I appointed him I would twist his neck as if he was a chicken the moment I found he was showing one particle of favor to the Santa Fe, or for the matter of that, to the Southern Pacific, or any other railroad, just as I would twist it if I found he was discriminating against any railroad. How would it do for me to write him this in practically these words? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. E. H. Harriman, Esq., 120 Broadway, New York.[*[attached to Seaman 2-9-05]*] [[shorthand]] $50 - [[shorthand]][*71*] Written out by hand. Confidential. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. February 20, 1905. Mr. President: I thank you for your confidential letter. Your quotation of me is substantially correct when you say that I addressed you as follows on the occasion of your visit to me as Colombia's agent in the Panama matter: "If you had been President of Colombia you would have saved Panama, because you would have known how to safeguard its rights and the interests of all and would have avoided the revolution which caused its secession from Colombia. In that case my Government could have helped Colombia to be one of the richest and most prosperous countries of South America." Like you, I desire to draw a veil over the past; but my dear Mr. President, as you speak of your country as being deeply injured by my country, do let me point out to you that in the words of my own quoted above I was endeavoring to show why I thought you would have saved Colombia from the trouble that befell her had you been her President. This country, so far from wronging Colombia, made every possible effort to persuade Colombia to allow herself to be benefited. I can not seem by remaining quiet to countenance for one moment the idea that this country did anything but show a spirit not merely of justice but of generosity in its dealings with Colombia. Had you been President, I firmly believe that this spirit would have been met with a like spirit from Colombia, and that therefore Colombia, by the mere fact of ratifying the treaty agreed upon with the United States, would have prevented the2 revolution [of] in Panama, and would have itself become rich and prosperous. You say you are lacking at present the means of arranging in a decorous manner the pending questions between Colombia the United States and Panama, and you ask me to do justice and thereby help you. Of course if I can help you in any way I will; but, my dear Mr. President, I do not quite understand what it is expected we shall do. If the people of Panama desire to take a plebiscite as to whether or not they shall resume connections with Colombia, most emphatically I have no objections and will be delighted so to inform them; but I can not press them unless they desire to do it. So about their assumption of a portion of Colombia's debt. We have stated that in our judgment this should be done by Panama, and we were informed by their minister here, Mr. Bunau-Varilla, that they intended to do it; but we can not force them to do it. As for the purchase of the Islands which I understand Colombia would like to sell to us, our Navy Department does not deem it to our interest to procure them, and I am very much afraid that a treaty for their purchase would not be approved by the Senate of the United States. I have shown your letter to Mr. Hay. I wish I could write you in a manner that would be more agreeable. With profound respect, I am, Sincerely yours, General R. Reyes, President of Colombia, Bogata, Colombia.THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. March 2, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: I am pleased that Mr. Curtis is to exhibit his really marvelous collection of Indian photographs in New York. Not only are Mr. Curtis' photographs genuine works of art, but they deal with some of the most picturesque phases of the oldtime American life that is now passing away. I esteem it a matter of real moment that for our good fortune Mr. Curtis should have had the will and the power to preserve, as he has preserved in his pictures, this strange and beautiful, and now vanishing, life. Hoping that his exhibition will have the success it deserves, I am, Very sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 3, 1905. My dear Mr. Secretary: The President has noted the letters from Ambassador Durand and Minister Townsend which accompanied your communication of this date, and I return them to you herewith. October would suit the President best to receive the Rear Admiral and his officers. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. John Hay, Secretary of State. Enclosure.[[shorthand]] [*[ca 3-05]*][*[attached to Barnard 3-9-05]*}Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. March 28, 1905. [*[F. B. Loomis?]*] To the Acting Secretary of State: I have carefully considered the following cablegram from Minister Dawson: Secretary of State, Washington, Under pressure foreign creditors and domestic peril, Dominican Government offers nominate a citizen of the United States receiver southern ports pending ratification protocol; four northern ports to be administered under the award. Forty-five per cent total shall go Dominican Government, fifty-five to be deposited New York for distribution after ratification. Creditors to agree take no further steps in the meantime and receiver to have full authority to suspend importers preferential contracts. Italian, Spanish-German, and American creditors except the Improvement, accept unconditionally, Belgian French representatives will recommend acceptance. Some modus vivendi absolutely necessary. I am ready, if desired, start Washington, D. C., twenty-eighth to explain details and modifications to plan obtainable; whole matter can be held open during my absence. DAWSON. I direct that the Minister express acquiescence in the proposal of the Government of Santo Domingo for the collection and conservation of its revenues, pending the action of the United States Senate upon the treaty, to the end that in the meantime no change shall take place in the situation which would render useless its consummation or bring complications into its enforcement. The Secretary of War of the United States will present for nomination by the President of the Dominican republic men to act in the positions referred to, in both the northern and southern ports. The utmost care will of-2- course be taken to choose men of capacity and absolute integrity, who, if possible, shall have some knowledge of Spanish. All the moneys collected from both the northern and southern ports, not turned over to the Dominican Government, will be deposited in some New York bank to be designated by the Secretary of War and will there be kept until the Senate has acted. If the action is adverse the money will then be turned over to the Dominican Government. If it is favorable it will be distributed among the creditors in proportion to their just claims under the treaty. Meanwhile Mr. Hollander will thoroughly investigate these claims, including the claim of the American Improvement Company, and will report in detail all the information he is able to gather as to the amount actually received by Santo Domingo, the amount of indebtedness nominally incurred, the circumstances so far as they are known under which the various debts were incurred, and so forth. This action is rendered necessary by the peculiar circumstances of the case. The treaty now before the Senate was concluded with Santo Domingo at Santo Domingo's earnest request repeatedly pressed upon us and was submitted to the Senate because in my judgment it was our duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call for aid, inasmuch as we were the only power who could give this aid, and inasmuch as her need for it was very great. The treaty is now-3- before the Senate and has been favorably reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It is pending, and final action will be undoubtedly be taken when Congress convenes next fall. Meanwhile Santo Domingo has requested that the action above outlined be taken; that is, she desires in this way to maintain the status quo, so that if the treaty is ratified it can be executed. With this purpose in view I direct that the proposed arrangement be approved. It will terminate as soon as the Senate has acted one way or the other. (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, April 3, 1905. My dear Mr. Stewart: I have your letter of the 31st ultimo, enclosing copy of telegram sent to Mrs. G, W. Boyd by Major Hooper of the Denver and Rio Grande Railway. We will use the Denver and Rio Grande with pleasure on our trip to Denver. Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Mr. Philip B. Stewart, Colorado Springs, Colorado.(Extract) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route April 8, 1905. Personal. Dear Will: x x You are acting exactly right about Morocco. I wish to Heaven our excellent friend, the Kaiser, was not so jumpy and did not have so many pipe dreams. Tell Speck I have read his letter with the greatest attention; that there is at present nothing for us to do in Morocco; that I shall wait until I get home before trying to discuss it with him. x x THEODORE ROOSEVELT.XYZTELEGRAM. [*C. F. Sent in cipher*] White House, Washington. Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Hon. F. B. Loomis, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C. Referring to your cipher message of the seventeenth, tell our Minister to Morocco not to commit us in any way but to be friendly with both French and Germans. The American Government never interferes about loans it being our consistent policy to let American financiers decide such matters for themselves. Cannot anything be done about Gordon-Cumming as assistant to Fox? Am chagrined at the trouble which has occurred over his appointment. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Collect Gov't rate The White House, Washington, D. C.)[*CF*] Copy Dictated by the President in camp, East Divide Creek, Colorado. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Dear Speck: Your letter containing the Emperor's communication about Morocco is the first thing that has made me wish I was not off on a hunt, for I hardly know how to arrange out here what the Emperor requests. As I told you before, I dislike taking a position in any such matter like this unless I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in entangling our Government in the matter. You do not have to be told by me that I am already working in the most cordial agreement with the Emperor about China and the Japanese-Russian war, while I have matters of my own in Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Panama to which I must give attention and from which I do not feel it right to be diverted; but I have told Taft substantially what you have said in your letter excepting the portion about the communication from the Italian Government which the Emperor requested me to treat as purely confidential. Will you take this letter at once to Secretary Taft, show it to him, and tell him exactly how far you want us to go in sounding the British Government. Meanwhile I shall write him, quoting the proposal of the Emperor as to our sounding the British Government and shall suggest his finding out from Sir Mortimer what the British Government's views in the matter are. I do not think I should go any further than this at present. I am sorry I am not in Washington, for I should at once see the British Ambassador myself and let you know just how things stood. Thank Admiral von Tirpitz for the very interesting memorandum of the Navy. xxx Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT per W. L. Jr. Baron H. Sternburg, German Ambassador, Washington, D. C.[*CF*] Copy Dictated by the President in camp, East Divide Creek, Colorado. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Confidential Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Dear Will: I think you are keeping the lid on in great shape! Apparently the Santo Domingo pot is not bubbling much at present, but we have troubles enough elsewhere. The Kaiser's pipe dream this week takes the form of Morocco. Speck has written me an urgent appeal to sound the British Government and find out whether they intend to back up France in gobbling Morocco. I have told him to see you and lay the matter definitely before you. There was one part of the Kaiser's letter which he asked me to treat as strictly confidential, and I do not know whether Speck will tell you about it or not. In any event, my theory is that if Sir Mortimer, or O'Byrne (or whatever the First Secretary's name is) is in any rational mood and you think the nice but somewhat fat-witted British intellect will stand it, that you tell them just about what I am going to write. I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter. At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each Nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of each other from sheer fear of each other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that2 Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England. I am very clear in my belief that England utterly over-estimates as well as mis- estimates Germany's singleness of purpose, by attributing to the German Foreign Office the kind of power and of aim which it had from '64 to '71. I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. But I have to leave a large discretion in your hands in this matter, for if we find that it will make the English suspicious - that is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany - why we shall have to drop the business. Fortunately, you and I play the diplomatic game exactly alike, and I should advise your being absolutely frank with both Speck and the British people along the lines I have indicated, unless you have counter suggestions to make. Remember, however, that both parties are very suspicious. You remember the King's message to me through Harry White and his earnest warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to us - an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon. x x x Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT L. P.S. If you decide it wise to see the British Ambassador at all, do be careful to explain to him that we are taking sides neither with France nor Germany, but that we would like to convey Germany's request for information to England, and that we are acting in thus conveying it simply from a desire to make things as comfortable between England and Germany as possible. x x x xTELEGRAM. [*C.F. Sent in cipher*] White House, Washington. Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Hon. Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. In the Japanese matter inform the Japanese Minister that as matters are at present it seems to me distinctly best that there should be direct negotiations between the Japanese and the Russian Governments regarding all the terms of peace. As to what those terms should be, neither I nor anyone else can at the moment definitely advise; but I am clear that at the present time the negotiations should be directly between Russia and Japan and should include all the possible terms of peace; it being of course understood that Japan is adhering to her position of maintaining the open door in Manchuria and of restoring it to China. As regards Morocco I have written. In reference to Panama I authorize you to send Barrett to Venezuela and Bowen to Chili with the understanding that [he] Bowen will be sent to Brazil next September when Spooner's man can go to Chile. Have written about Sands and Panama legation. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. (Sent in cipher.) Glenwood Springs, Colo., April 25, 1905. Hon. B. F. Barnes, Assistant Secretary, The White House, Washington, D.C. Telegram containing matter handed you by Secretary of War received tonight. It will be submitted to the President tomorrow. Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary. (Collect Government Rate, The White House, Washington, D.C.)TELEGRAM (Sent in cipher.) The White House Washington. Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 25, 1905. Hon. Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C. Courier has just brought in following memorandum of telegram from President: "On state of facts set forth in your telegram I entirely agree with the opinion you express as to the Japanese protest in reference to the French position concerning neutrality. I do not understand that we are yet called upon to take any position openly." WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary.TELEGRAM (Sent in cipher.) White House, Washington. Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 27, 1905. Hon. Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. Am a good deal puzzled by your telegram and in view of it and the other information I receive I shall come in from my hunt and start home Monday, May eighth, instead of May fifteenth as I had intended. This will be put upon the ground of general condition of public business at Washington, so as to avoid talk about the Russian-Japanese matter. Meanwhile ask Takahira whether it would not be advisable for you to see Cassini from me and say that purely confidentially with no one else to know at all I have on my own motion directed you to go to him and see whether the two combatants cannot come together and negotiate direct. Say that in my judgment it is far better that there should be no reservations on either side; that I cannot help feeling that they can make an honorable peace and that it seems to me it would be better as a preliminary to have an absolutely frank talk between the representatives of the two powers without any intermediary at all. If Takahira approves of this act accordingly. If not wire me and at the same time tell the Japs that I shall take the matter up as soon as possible after I return to Washington. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Collect Government rate The White House, Washington, D. C.)COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 12th 1905. My dear Senator Penrose: Would it be possible to appoint Hammerling to the office of Collector of Internal Revenue for the Northeastern District of Pennsylvania? As you know, Hammerling was of use to the National Committee last year, and is said to be a good man. If I can make this appointment I should like to. What is your judgment in the matter? Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.Copy. Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 13, 1905. My dear Sir George: I prize "Cawnpore". I have read it with real pleasure, and am ashamed of myself for not having read it before. I don't like to tell you how much I think of it lest you might believe me exaggerating. But your son will surely understand my feelings at the chance of reading for the first time the account of a great historic tragedy written in his father's prose. Now, as to a very small prejudice of mine.[*[Found mutilated 10-11-56 - KS]*]4 tion of the future. But it is not to be expected that they should be free from prejudice against and distrust of the white race. Just at present they feel rather puffed up over their strength. Even if they are ultimately victorious I think it would have paid them better to have made peace after Moukden without extorting a money indemnity from the Russians, for a few months war would eat up whatever they would get in the end by way of indemnity. I so advised them at the time. But they took a different view; and from the Russians it was impossible to get a straightforward answer at all; and so there is nothing to do but let them work out their own fates. I have recently been reading with much interest De La Gorce's History of the Second Empire. I wonder if you will agree with me when I say that it seems to me that the England of Palmerston and Russell, like the United States of to-day, is too apt to indulge in representations on behalf of weak peoples which do them no good and irritate the strong [a] and tyrannical peoples to whom the protest is made. It seems to me that the protest on behalf of the Poles to Russia in '63, and the protest on behalf of the Danes to Germany about the same time, were harmful rather than beneficial. Out in the west we always used to consider it a cardinal crime to draw a revolver and brandish it about unless the man meant to shoot. And it is apt to turn out sheer cruelty to encourage men by words and then not back up the words by deeds. I am all the time being asked to say something on behalf of the Jews in Russia, of the Armenians in Turkey, of the people of the Congo Free State, etc., etc. It does not do always to refuse. England rendered a real and great service to Italy by her sympathy and championship, forinstance. But it certainly does harm to be always harping of5 the sympathy which finds expression only in words. I think that by speaking, though very gently and cautiously, for the Jews in Russia we were able to accomplish a little, a very little, toward ameliorating their conditions. As for the Armenians in Turkey, if I could get this people to back me I really think I should be tempted to go in to a crusade against the Turk. But as this is of course a sheer impossibility I simply dare not give expressions to my sympathy and indignation, lest harm and not good should result. Moreover, I have plenty of evils to fight here at home, evils connected with race prejudice, especially against the negro, evils connected with the tyranny of corporations and the tyranny of the labor unions. Corporations are indispensable and I believe in labor unions; but both are potent weapons for evil, when under the control of unscrupulous men. However, this letter has run to a dreadful length already; as you wont come to this side of the water, when I am through being President I shall have to come to your side of the water, and then there will be many things I shall wish to talk over with you and tell you about. Lady Trevelyan will be pleased to know that John Hay is better. He writes me rather gloomily but I have every confidence that I shall have him back in the State Department soon. I wish you knew Taft, whom I have had acting as Secretary of State as well as Secretary of War in Hay's absence. He was Governor General of the Philippines. He is the man through whom I have been doing my work about the Panama canal. He has no more fear in dealing with the interests of great corporate wealth than he has in dealing with the leaders of the most powerful labor unions; and if either go wrong6 he has not the slightest hesitation in antagonizing them. To strength and courage, clear insight, and practical common sense, he adds a very noble and disinterested character. I know you would like him. He helps me in every way more than I can say - and so did his predecessor, Elihu Root, whom perhaps you met while he was in England on the Alaskan Boundary matter. , Just at present in addition to helping me in these larger affairs of state, he has stood by me like a trump in some horrid matters I have had to deal with, in which the question of the personal integrity of certain officials became involved. Of all the hideous tasks which I occasionally have to perform, the worst is that of dealing with corruption. Most of the men in the government service are honest and decent fellows, but now and then I come across corruption of an entirely brutal type. The only thing to do is to cut it out, but the process is rarely pleasant. At the moment I have two United States Senators under indictment. It is a painful and humiliating thing to see members of so great a legislative body guilty of this kind of criminal offense; but the real service to the country consists, not in smothering up the misconduct, but in doing everything than can be done to bring the wrong-doers to justice. Of course there are always all kinds of worries than cannot be avoided under any systems of government, and just as the man responsible for the government at the moment gets praise to which he is not entitled, so he has to accept blame for what is in no way his fault. At the moment, as is usually the case at the opening of an administration, I am having at least as much praise as is good for me. In a year the inevitable reaction will take place, and I fear there will be a certain basis for in in the condition of the revenues and expenses. We have a good accumulated surplus;7 but this year there is a slight deficit. If Congress persists in refusing to alter the revenue laws and yet in appropriating more money than is yielded by the Treasury receipts we shall have serious trouble. Yet I am very doubtful whether we can get Congress to realize this, and either cut down everything to the last limit, or provide additional revenues. There is no use of the veto on my part which will meet the situation; and therefore a year or two hence we are liable to have to face either a deficit or the exceptionally difficult task of revising the tariff to procure an increase of revenue, with the certainty of causing bitter anger and resentment in the different sections of the country. With regards to all your family, believe me, Ever faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, 8, Grosvenor Crescent, S.W., London, England. Copy THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 24, 1905. My dear Miss Boardman: Your letter of the 24th instant has been received and the President thanks you for your courtesy. He will have pleasure in becoming a member of the Red Cross, as you request. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Miss Mabel T. Boardman, American National Red Cross, Colorado Building, Washington, D.C.Copy. Confidential Only you and Nannis must see this. June 5, 1905. Dear Cabot: While we had thought that the probabilities favored Togo's victory, most of us, and certainly I, had thought that the fight would be close, that there was some chance for the Russians, and that at least there would be a terrible battering of the Japanese ships. No one anticipated that it would be a rout and a slaughter rather than a fight; that the Russian fleet would be absolutely destroyed while the Japanese fleet was left practically uninjured. Both Takahira and Cassini came to see me shortly after the fight. The Japanese evidently want peace, but only if they can get it pretty nearly on their own terms. The Russians hitherto seem helplessly and soddenly unable to decide what they want or how they are to get anything if they do want it. At the Japanese Government's request, but to use their own expression "on my iniative" - that is, they desired the request made, but desired that it should be on my own motion and that they should not in any shape or way appear as asking (and you are the only human being who knows they have asked me except Edith, though I shall have to in the end tell both John Hay and Taft) - I told Cassini to say to the Czar that I believed the war absolutely hopeless for Russia; that I earnestly desired that she and Japan should come together and see if they could not agree upon terms of peace; and that I should like to propose this if I could get the assent of Russia and then of Japan, which latter I thought I would be able to get. I could not be sure that Cassini would tell this to the Czar for he is afraid of saying what is disagreeable to his superiors; but I hardly knew what to do else. Meanwhile I had found that Germany and France were both anxious that peace should be made, and both agreed with me as to how [it] the first steps should be [made] taken. Takahira had also seen Speck, and I think that one result- probably of an unexpected kind as far as the Japanese were concerned - appearedCopy. Confidential. June 5, 1905. Only you and Nannis must see this. Dear Cabot: While we had thought that the probabilities favored Togo's victory, most of us, and certainly I, had thought that the fight would be close, that there was some chance for the Russians, and that at least there would be a terrible battering of the Japanese ships. No one anticipated that it would be a rout and a slaughter rather than a fight; that the Russian fleet would be absolutely destroyed while the Japanese fleet was left practically uninjured. Both Takahira and Cassini came to see me shortly after the fight. The Japanese evidently want peace, but only if they can get it pretty nearly on their own terms. The Russians hitherto seem helplessly and soddenly unable to decide what they want or how they are to get anything if they do want it. At the Japanese Government's request, but to use their on expression "on my iniative" – that is, they desired the request made, but desired that it should be on my own motion and that they should not in any shape or way appear as asking (and you are the only human being who knows that they have asked me except Edith, though I shall have to in the end tell both John Hay and Taft) – I told Cassini to say to the Czar that I believed the war absolutely hopeless for Russia; that I earnestly desired that she and Japan should come together and see if they could not agree upon terms of peace; and that I should like to propose this if I could get the assent of Russia and then of Japan, which latter I thought I would be able to get. I could not be sure that Cassini would tell this to the Czar for he is afraid of saying what is disagreeable to his superiors; but I hardly knew what to do else. Meanwhile I had found that Germany and France were both anxious that peace should be made, and both agreed with me as to how [it] the first steps should be [made] taken. Takahira had also seen Speck, and I think that one result – probably of an unexpected kind as far as the Japanese were concerned – appeared-2- in the action of the Kaiser as set forth in the following cable to me: "Mr. President: "The German Emperor has asked me to say to you that he considers the situation in Russia so serious that, when the truth is known at St. Petersburg in regard to the recent defeat, the life of the czar will be in danger, and the gravest disorders likely to occur. The Emperor of Germany has written to the Czar, therefore, urging him to take immediate steps toward peace. The Emperor said to me: 'I called his attention to the fact that the Americans are the only nation regarded by the Japanese with the highest respect, and that the President of the United States is the right person to appeal to with the hope that he may be able to bring the Japanese to reasonable proposals. I suggested to the Czar to send for Meyer and charge him with a message to President Roosevelt, or to empower me to put myself in direct communication with the President. Please inform the President privately, from me personally, of the steps that I have taken, which I hope will be for the benefit of the world.' Tower." This did not mean my views, for I do not desire to be asked to squeeze out of Japan favorable terms to Russia, so I at once had Meyer sent the following dispatch: "Memorandum for dispatch to be sent by the State Department: "Ambassador Meyer will at once call on His Majesty the Czar and say that he does so by personal direction of the President to urge upon His Majesty the desirability of his consenting to the request of the President to have representatives of Russia meet with representatives of Japan to confer as to whether peace can not now be made. The President speaks with the most earnest and sincere desire to advise what is best for Russia. It is the judgment of all outsiders, including all of Russia's most ardent friends, that the present contest is absolutely hopeless and that to continue it can only result in the loss of all Russia's possessions in East Asia. To avert trouble, and, as he fears, what is otherwise inevitable disaster, the President most earnestly advises that an effort be made by a direct interview without intermediary between Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, to see if it is not possible for them to agree as to terms of peace. The President believes it would be better for the representatives of the two Powers to discuss the whole peace question themselves rather than for any outside Power to do more than endeavor to arrange the meeting - that is, to ask both Powers whether they will not consent to meet. After the meeting has been held it will be time enough, if need be, to discuss suggestions as to the terms from any outside friend of either party. If Russia will consent to such a meeting the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and that the President believes he will succeed. Russia's answer to this request will be kept strictly secret, as will all that has so far transpired, nothing being made public until Japan also agrees. The President will then openly ask each Power to agree to the meeting, which can thereupon be held. As to the place of meeting, the President would suggest some place between Harbin and Mukden; but this is a mere suggestion. The President earnestly hopes for a speedy and favorable answer to avert bloodshed and calamity." I communicated the contents of this dispatch to Speck, Jusserand and O'Beirne for their respective Governments. The Kaiser will back it up and I hope Delcasse will too, by representations at St. Petersburg.-3- I do not believe there is much chance of this bringing about peace, for I suppose the Czar, who seems in a thoroughly Chinese mood, will refuse to do anything. If he does, then all I can say is that his blood must be on his own head. In a few months, more or less - certainly in a year or so - the Japanese will take every Russian army or fortress on the Pacific Slope, and will practically drive Russia east of Lake Baikal. In any event, I have done what I could to help toward peace. I think I a little over-stated the case about Durand in my last letter to you. He is a high-minded, conscientious public servant and I like him personally. But he is very slow. In this crisis he has been away at Lenox - which I have been glad of as O'Beirne is a really much more satisfactory man through whom to act. Do not do anything to hurt Durand, and do not express any opinion unless it is asked for; but if either the King or Lansdowne should ask as to what man we would think best, you might dwell upon the good qualities of Spring-Rice. The only thing is, remember to be cautious, so that they can not hold us responsible for making Springy a success. With love to Nannie, I am, in great haste, Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Lodge, Care Coutts & Company, Bankers, London, England. P. S. I wish I could tell you all the funny details of these negotiations of Takahira and Cassini with me. Of course if the Russians go on as they have gone ever since I have been President - and so far as I can find out, ever since the Spanish War - they are hopeless creatures with whom to deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; they have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts in the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no knowledge of their own strength or weakness, and they are helplessly unable to meet emergencies. About the Japanese, I feel as I always did. I do not pretend to know the soul of the nation, or to prophesy as to what it will do in the future. I do not suppose I understand their motives, and I am not at all sure that-4- they understand mine - although I should think they were plain to any people. Takahira, as instructed by his Government, has evidently wanted to feel his way with me. His Government does not quite like to tell me what its plans are, but wants to develop them a little at a time. Thus, they have asked me to find out how England feels as to the terms they should ask. Naturally England responded that it could not say until it knew what the proposed terms were; and it then transpired that Baron Rothschild had said he would raise a loan for Russia with which Russia should pay Japan the proposed indemnity if Russia could be persuaded to accept peace on such terms. Evidently the Japanese have been uncertain whether the British Government knew of this offer or not, and took the roundabout way through me to find out. Of course not only Cassini but Jusserand are very gloomy over Japan's attitude toward outside nations in the future. That Japan will have her head turned to some extent I do not in the least doubt, and I see clear symptoms of it in many ways. We should certainly as a nation have ours turned if we had performed such feats as the Japanese have in the past sixteen months; and the same is true of any European nation. Moreover, I have no doubt that some Japanese, and perhaps a great many of them, will behave badly to foreigners. They can not behave worse than the State of California, through its Legislature, is now behaving toward the Japanese. The feeling on the Pacific slope, taking it from several different standpoints, is as foolish as if conceived by the mind of a Hottentot. These Pacific Coast people wish grossly to insult the Japanese and to keep out the Japanese immigrants on the ground that they are an immoral, degraded and worthless race; and at the same time that they desire to do this for the Japanese and are already doing it for the Chinese, they expect to be given advantages in Oriental markets; and with besotted folly are indifferent to building up the navy while provoking this formidable new power - a power jealous, sensitive and warlike, and which if irritated could at once take both the Philippines and Hawaii from us if she obtained the upper hand on the seas. Most certainly the Japanese soldiers and sailors have shown themselves to be terrible foes. There can be none more-5- dangerous in all the world. But our own navy, ship for ship, is I believe at least as efficient as theirs, although I am not certain that our torpedo- boats would be handled as well as theirs. At present we are superior to them in the number of ships, and this superiority will last for some time. It will of course come to an end if Hale has his way, but not otherwise. I hope that we can persuade our people on the one hand to act in a spirit of generous justice and genuine courtesy toward Japan, and on the other hand to keep the navy respectable in numbers and more than respectable in the efficiency of its units. If we act thus we need not fear the Japanese. But if as Brooks Adams says, we show ourselves "oppulent, aggressive and unarmed", the Japanese may some time work us an injury. In any event we can hold our own in the future, whether against Japan or Germany, whether on the Atlantic or the Pacific, only if we occupy the position of the just man armed -- that is, if we do the exact reverse of what the demagogues on the one hand and the mugwumps on the other would like to have us do.[*Howell, Clark*] Private THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 12, 1905. My dear Mr. Howell: I am sorry you are not coming up here. As yet I do not see my way clear about speaking on the Jefferson Davis incident as you and Governor Johnston and other friends have suggested. The reason is not due to any reluctance on my part to state, what I [should] would gladly state, that writing when I was young I used improper severity [of statement about it.] in my comments [about] on him. Nor yet is it reluctance to make the further statement, which I should freely do, that when he wrote me a [very foolish] rather ill-tempered and undignified letter, instead of ignoring it I answered it with an acerbity which, being a young man, struck me at the time as clever, whereas it does not strike me as in the least so now. [On the contrary,] But if I retracted what I said, or rather, pointed to what I said later as giving my mature judgment, I would either have to [give] convey a false impression, or else, by now [reiterating] stating my reasoned-out convictions about Davis, give still further offense. I can speak of Lee, of Stonewall Jackson, of Albert Sidney Johnston, of Joseph E. Johnston, with the heartiest respect and admiration, and not only be free from [a] any suggestion of the false, but also free from [a change] [of to] any suppression of the truth. I can not conscientiously speak of Jefferson Davis in words that will give pleasure to my hearers in Montgomery and in other places in the South without being guilty of a suppression of the truth as I see the truth. Under such circumstances it2 seems to me that the wise thing is, not to allude to a subject upon which my hearers and I disagree, when on the great fundamental questions to which I desire to allude we [both] do agree. I believe not merely in the valor, the self-devotion, the resolution of the people of the South in the Civil War, but I believe in their deep sincerity, in their conviction that they were right, in their fealty to the right as they saw it. I believe that these qualities were shared by many of their leaders -- even by some who, like Yancey, I think were [ill-advised and unwise to the last degree.] both mischievous and wrongheaded. There are others of their leaders of whom I do not believe this. Academically, in a historical document, if the need arises I shall always feel it my duty to say what I think about both classes of leaders; but it certainly does not seem worth while [to me] to go into it otherwise unless I am forced to. [Frankly, it seems to me preposterous] In view of the extreme freedom of statement indulged in often from this country about every northern leader (including if that is of any consequence myself), during the last half-century, and its folly of expecting anyone to retract or explain that statement, it seems hardly worthwhile for any person now to feel offended about what I said twenty years ago of Jefferson Davis. If you will go back twenty years further you will find plenty of bitter statements by southern leaders about the course of Benjamin F. Butler in New Orleans, about the course of Thaddeus Stevens, especially during the reconstruction period, in the House of Representatives. If you were in the North at the home of Butler, or at the home of Thaddeus Stevens, and felt conscientiously and deeply as a matter of sincere conviction, that Butler had done [certain] things that were [wrong] outrageous in New Orleans, or that Thaddeus Stevens' course in the House about reconstruction was [unwise] and] conceived in a spirit of [bitter] rancorous animosity toward the South (and this no matter whether your judgment [was] were correct or not), I should feel that the best and wisest thing for you to do was to speak on the beliefs we as a people3 have in common, and not attempt to say anything which could not be wholly satisfactory to your hearers unless it was unsatisfactory to you yourself. With regard, Sincerely yours, Mr. Clark Howell, Editor, The Constitution, Atlanta, Georgia. [P. S. When President McKinley made his trip to the South I do not understand that he made any allusion whatever to Jefferson Davis. Am I in error? My own belief is that I [should] had better speak of the people as a whole, and not of any special [one] leaders; and not go into the rather academic, and not necessarily important, question of the exact apportionment of praise]THE WHITE HOUSE Mr. Clark Howell, Editor, The Constitution, Atlanta, Georgia. Private[*[6-12-05]*] [[shorthand]] ascerbity [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]] Yancey [[shorthand]]4 [[shorthand]] Thaddeus Stevens [[shorthand Butler [[shorthand]] add P.S.5 P.S. [[shorthand]][*[attached to draft - TR to Howell 6-12-05]*]THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington. June 12, 1905. Sir: I have received and carefully considered your letters of the 31st ultimo and 3rd instant. I entirely agree with your conclusions. In my opinion you would be wholly without justification in proceding individually against the officers of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway for contempt when neither the Interstate Commerce Commission nor the special counsel you have employed have developed a single fact of any kind beyond the holding of their offices tending to implicate any one of these officers. One of the officers, Mr. Morton, is a member of my Cabinet. This fact is not to be allowed to shield him, nor on the other hand is it to be allowed to cause him to be singled out, or the officers with whom he is associated to be singled out, for attack. At about the same time that the injunction was obtained against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe an injunction was obtained against several other western railroads. Subsequently it was developed by the Interstate Commerce Commission that under the guise of a division of rates, unlawful rebates were given by these railroads to the International Harvester Company, just as a rebate was given by the Atchison in the case of the Colorado Fuel Company. Upon attention being called to the cases by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the unlawful practice was abandoned in the Harvester case, as it was abandoned in this case of the Colorado Fuel Company. The two cases stand precisely on a par. No one has suggested, and as far as I am aware no one has thought of suggesting, that we should proceed individually against the officers of the roads engaged in this International Harvester Company affair; yet the case is exactly parallel to this Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe case, and if such action as you have refused to take was taken against the officers of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, it would also have to be taken in the case of the International Harvester Company against the officers of every Railroad running west of Chicago. There is of course no possible excuse for discriminating one case from the other.[* [6-12-05] *] 2 [You advised me to direct the submission of the printed evidence taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission (the only evidence before the special counsel) to Judge Phillips, who hadissued the injunction, to see whether on this published evidence, in which there is not a syllable directly bearing on Mr. Morton or any one of his colleagues in the management of the road, action could be taken against any one of them personally. I did not take this advise for two reasons. First; if it were not for Mr. Morton's being in my Cabinet, neither you nor I would dream of following such a course in this instance; and we could not follow it save on condition of also following it in the case of the Harvester Company and in all similar cases - which, in my judgement, would put us in a wholly untenable position. Second: I have received from Mr. Morton a letter, of which I enclose you a copy, together with a copy of my reply. In it you will see that Mr. Morton not only states in the most unequivocal manner that he had no knowledge whatever of the unlawful practice complained of, but also shows by the quotation of documents issued underhis direction, that all such unlawful practices were specifically forbidden by him, and that the attention of his subordinates was repeatedly called to the necessity of complying with the law in this respect. When there is thus not one shadow of testimony against him, and when whatever evidence has been submitted shows explicitly that he is not guilty, it seems to me that there is no warrant whatever for our proceeding against him.] The course that you have followed in dealing with all these corporation matters, has been coherent and resolute, and has had my heartiest approval. The aim of the Administration has been in the first place to stop the unlawful practices. We have not proceeded personally against any of the officers unless there was legal evidence showing that their conduct had been wilfully of such a nature as to render it our duty to try to punish them personally no less than to try to put an end to the objectionable practices. You perhaps remember that when the Administration brought the Northern Securities suit there was much criticism of us for not undertaking criminal proceedings against the principal directors in the Northern Securities Corporation. The view of the Administration at that time was that such a proceeding would be unjust to the men concerned and not to the advantage of the public. Events have, I think, shown this view to be correct. In the same way, when a year or two ago injunctions were obtained against the corporations known popularly as the Beef Trust, no effort was made at the time to proceed personally[*6-12-05*] 3 against the individuals in these corporations. Since then testimony has been offered us to show that the packing companies have violated this injunction and that the violation was deliberate and wilful on the part of a number of individuals. Of the weight and sufficiancy of this evidence it is not for me to judge. With my approval the Department of Justice, with the assistance of the Department of Commerce and Labor, has for some months been endeavoring to find out whether or not they can obtain legal evidence of such willful and deliberate violation of the injunction by any individual. If the grand jury now sitting in Chicago find indictments against any individuals connected with the packing corporations, it will be because in their judgement such legal evidence of the violation of the injunction has been laid before them. [If you at any time get legal evidence of any such wilful and deliberate violation by any officer of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe or of any other railroad running west of Chicago, of the injunction in the Colorado fuel case, or of the injunction in the International Harvester Company case, you will of course proceed as you have already proceeded in the Chicago beef-packing cases. But at present not only has there been no such evidence produced, but there has been no attempt to produce such evidence; and as regards Mr. Morton, there is seemingly conclusive testimony to the contrary.] You will not, however, take action against any official of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad which you do not take against the official of any other railroad under precisely similar circumstances In both this Colorado fuel case and in the International Harvester case I direct that proceedings for contempt against the companies be taken by the Government. Whether, as the cases develop, proceedings against individual officers become necessary must depend in each instance upon whether testimony is obtained showing that such individual officer has either by act or connivance been personally guilty in the matter. If there are any railroads guilty of the practices which we have enjoined other railroads from following, but which have not themselves been enjoined, proceedings should be begun to put them under similar restraint. You have expressed your doubt as to whether the injunction granted is in sufficiently explicit terms to cover either the case of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe or the similar case of the International Harvester Company. I agree, however,[* [6-12-05] *] 4 with your feeling that even though there is such doubt, an effort should be made to obtain the judgment of the court on the question. ] Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. William H. Moody, Attorney General. Enclosures. NAVY DEPARTMENT Washington June 5, 1905. My dear Mr. President: Now that I have tendered and you have accepted my resignation of the position of Secretary of the Navy, I wish to make a statement in regard to the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe - Colorado Fuel & Iron Company alleged rebate case which has occupied so much attention and has been made the occasion of so much unjust criticism of the Atchison Company's management and of myself. The arrangement referred to was entered into in the year 1901, prior to the time that the restraining orders enjoining the Western railroads from cutting rates or departing from published tariffs were issued, and prior to the passage of the Elkins Bill. The people chiefly interested in the smelting and mining business of Southern Arizona and Northern Mexico were large consumers of coal and coke. They were dissatisfied with the quality of coke they were getting from the ovens along the line of the Atchison Railroad in Colorado, and threatened to use Eastern coke exclusively or build a railroad of their own to coal properties which they might obtain, unless lower prices were made on the coal and coke that they were receiving at El Paso and Deming. Those same people were making all sorts of experiments with fuel oil, with the idea of substituting it altogether, if possible, for coal, and they did it with such good effect that in part they did substitute oil for coal, thereby cutting down the amount of coal consumed. All of these things, taken in connection with[*[6-12-05]*] 5 the undoubted financial ability of the people interested to build additional railroads and develop either coal or oil fields, menaced a traffic worth nearly a million dollars a year to the Atchison system; and solely for the protection of the railroad, so far as its officers were concerned, an understanding was entered into between the railroad, the Colorado Fuel Company, and the El Paso and Southwestern people, the terms of which were: 1. The Colorado Fuel Company was to supply the coal at a very low price at the mines in Colorado, $1.15 per ton. This is all they received for the coal, and there was nothing additional paid them in the way of a rebate or otherwise. 2. The railroad company was to haul the coal at a very low rate to El Paso and Deming, the rate being $2.90 per ton. This was in reality a division of a rate not usually published. 3. The El Paso and Southestern people were to receive and pay for the coal $4.05 per ton at El Paso and Deming, and it was to be used by the railroad itself and the industries along its line. The tariff covering this arrangement was published so as to show the freight rate to be $4.05 per ton instead of the delivered price at El Paso and Deming, and did not separate the freight rate from the cost of the coal at the mines as it should have done. Until the investigation of the case by the Interstate Commerce Commission, I did not know personally how the matter was being handled, so far as the publication of the tariff was concerned. My own connection with the case was to see that the [tariffs] traffic was secured by[x] to the Atchison rails, and, after that, details were left to subordinates. Thousands of tariffs are published every year. When this arrangement was entered into, the Colorado Fuel Company owned, operated, or controlled as selling agents, all the coal properties on the Atchison line in Colorado from the district in which the rate applied, or, in other words, it was the only shipper of coal from that district over the Atchison rails, and there was in no sense any unjust discrimination against any other Colorado producer. It was a good thing for the coal district and for the State of Colorado, as well as for all other parties interested in the contract. The following year, or in 1902, the injunctions were issued. I suppose it was not known to you, certainly not to the public generally, that it was the testimony which I gave before the Interstate Commerce Commission on the practices of western railroads, so far as[6-12-06] 6 grain, dressed beef and provisions arrangements were concerned, that made it possible to secure the injunctions. You can confirm this by asking Chairman Knapp of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or Judge Bay, who was at that time the special counsel for the Commission. Without my evidence, it is quite unlikely that the injunctions could have been obtained. I was anxious to see all the western railroads prevented from doing things I know were irregular and calculated to do the railroads, as well in the public generally, great injustice. I was aware of the fact that the practices about which I testified were general, and they either had to be stopped in some way or they would certainly have [grwon] grown a great deal worse. When the injunction order was issued by the court, positive instructions were given by me verbally to my subordinates to comply in every respect with its terms. These instructions were issued to everybody concerned, in writing, and are a matter of record, as is my correspondence on the subject, all of which will confirm what I say. My chief lieutenants in the management of the traffic of the American Railroad know all about this matter and the following instructions issued at that time confirm the statements that I make, viz: ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD CO. A-200 Chicago, Ill., March 6, 1902. Maintenance of Rates. To all Agents: You are no doubt advised through the press and other sources that the Federal authorities are about to take steps not only to secure the immediate enforcement of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce, but to punish those guilty of violations. You are also fully aware of the earnest efforts that this Company has made to conduct its business in conformity with the law. The indications are now that many of the strong railroad lines of the country, both competitors and connections, are disposed to adopt a similar policy, and while the reform may be slow, we believe that it will be effective, that the time is not far distant when we shall be able to demonstate the strength of our line under a maintenance of rates. We are satisfied that the time has come when it is no longer safe for the officers, agents or patrons of the railroads to be parties to arrangements that can in any sense be considered as in violation of the law. You will therefore be careful to see that nothing is done by yourself or your subordinates that is in any way at variance with the policy outlined herein, and will do all you can to secure similar action on the part of our competitors, reporting to this office as heretofore any deviations from published tariffs or regulations on the part of other lines. Yours truly, J. E. GORMAN, General Freight Agent. When the Elkins Bill became a law early in 1903, all of my instructions were reiterated and the most positive orders issued that under no circumstances or conditions would any deviation from the law be permitted. The following order confines[6-12-05] fines this, viz: A.185 Chicago, February 16, 1903. Regarding Elkins Bill. To Freight Traffic Representatives: I hand you herewith a copy of what is known as the Elkins Bill that to-day became a law. You will notice that it is plain and specific as to its terms, and no departure therefrom will be permitted so far as this company is concerned. Please acknowledge receipt. Yours truly, W. H. Biddle, Freight Traffic Manager. Notwithstanding all of these precautions, the old arrangement of billing the coal and coke at a delivered price, and not separating the freight rate[s] from the price of the commodity in the tariff, was not corrected until some time last November. It was evidently not regarded in the tariff-printing bureau as an irregular arrangement, and entirely escaped attention. It might be considered that it was a "misplaced switch" in that bureau, and neither the President of the railroad, nor Mr. Biddle, the freight traffic manager, nor myself, was any more responsible for it personally than is the president or vice president or general manager of any great railroad for the train service which may result in a bad wreck. All of our orders were carefully considered and carefully issued, but, so far as this particular case is concerned, seem to have been overlooked. At the time this contract was made I had no interest whatever in the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company. I sold my stock in that company and all its auxiliary companies when I left its employ, before entering the service of the Atchison road in 1895, and have not been a stockholder of it or any of its subordinate companies since. My only interest in the Colorado Fuel & Iron Company was to get all the business I could from it for the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company. I have been a railroad man for over thirty years and a railroad officer for most of that time, and I have done my utmost to bring about decent railroad practices. I have always been opposed to rebates and all kinds of "graft" in the business, and I do not believe there is another railroad officer in the western country who has tried to be fairer in his relations to the public or more fearless in denouncing and trying to prevent the evils and abuses of railroad management. At the same time, I have been just as insistent in demanding that the railroads should have fair play. Great injustice has also been done in the management of the Atchison road in this matter. No railroad in the western country has more clearly recognized the rights of the public or more definitely declared itself at all times in favor of[*[6-12-05]*] [*8*] fair trade relations, and no railway in the west has made more of an effort carefully to observe the requirements of the law. Very respectfully, PAUL MORTON. THE PRESIDENT. WASHINGTON, June 12, 1905. My dear Mr. Morton: I have received your letter of the 5th instant in reference to your own action concerning the [r] rebates which the Interstate Commerce Commission have found to have been granted by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad to the Colorado Fuel Company at the time you were the Vice President of the railroad. Not a shred of testimony so far as I know has been presented from any source, whether by the Interstate Commerce Commission or by the special counsel employed by the Department of Justice, which personally implicates you in granting these rebates. In your letter you show not only that you were ignorant of the existence of such rebates, but that you had taken every possible step to see that neither in this case nor in any other were any rebates granted, and you quote documents which show that your subordinates were repeatedly and explicitly warned to obey the law as regards those rebates, as well as in all other respects. With this showing on your part, and in view of the fact that, as I have said, not a shred of testimony has been produced against you from any source whatever, I do not think that you need pay any further heed to the accusations that have been made against you. I do not myself need any corroboration of any statement you make; but if I did need it, it would be furnished by the boldness and frankness with which over three years ago, and before any of the proceedings with which we are now dealing took place, you testified to the entire truth in connection with the taking of rebates from the railroads; and it is deeply discreditable that this testimony should not only now be quoted against you, but with shameless perversion of the truth should be quoted as having been given by you in this case. At the time when you gave this testimony the Interstate Commerce law in the matter of rebates was practically a dead letter. Every railroad man admitted privately that he paid no heed whatever to it, and the Interstate Commerce Commission had shown itself absolutely powerless to secure this heed. When I took up the matter and endeavored to enforce obedience to the law on the part of the railroads in the question of rebates I encountered violent opposition from the great bulk of the[*[6-12-05]*] [*9*] railroad men, and a refusal by all of those to whom I sppke to testify in public to the very state of affairs which they freely admitted to me in private. You alone stated that you would do all in your power to break up this system of giving rebates; that you strongly objected to it; but that as long as the law was a dead letter the railroads, which preferred to obey it, were enforced to disobey it if they were to continue in business at all, under the competition of their less scrupulous fellows. I agreed with you cordially that the only way in which it would be possible to secure the enforcement of the law would be by making it effective against all railroads alike, as if some were allowed to violate it, it necessarily meant that the others in self-protection would be driven to violate it also, and I cannot too heartily commend the fearless and frank way in which you, (and you alone) came forward and in the interest of the Government and the public gave legal evidence of the facts which every one in interest privately admitted to exist, but which the Interstate Commerce Commission had previously been unable legally to establish. It was primarily due to this testimony of yours that we were able to put [as] so nearly effective a stop to the system of rebates as it then existed. You rendered a great public service by your testimony. You enabled the Government to accomplish in the interest of the public what it could not otherwise have accomplished, and you showed yourself to be, more than any other railroad man with whom I came in contact, zealous in your endeavor to see that the law should no longer remain a dead letter, but that all the railroads alike should be required to obey it. Your manliness and frankness in this matter attracted my particular attention. It showed you to be, in my judgement, a man whose word could be trusted absolutely, and whose desire to do full justice and to have it done could likewise be trusted. When a vacancy occurred in the Navy Department I made up my mind that I wished you in Cabinet - where, permit me to reiterate, you have shown yourself to be one of the most faithful and devoted public servants with whom it has ever been my good fortune to be connected. You came in at my urgent request and in spite of your natural reluctance to accept the very heavy financial loss in which taking the position of Secretary of the Navy necessarily involved you. I certainly would not shield you because you are in my Cabinet; but equally certainly I shall not sanction an[6-12-05] 10. attack upon you which I would not dream of sanctioning if you had not become a member of my Cabinet. Since I accepted your resignation as a member of Cabinet you have undertaken perhaps the greatest and most important work now open to any business man, in assuming control of Equitable Life Assurance Society. You do not need to be told again the confidence I have in you and my believe in your absolute sincerity of purpose and your unflinching courage. I know that the mere fact that you have consented thus to take control of the Society means that there will be a genuine attempt to make a new, clean management, a control really and honestly in the interest of policy holders, and one which will make impossible the crooked and objectionable practices that have hitherto prevailed in the Society. Ex-President Cleveland in consenting to act as one of the three trustees to hold the stock of the Society and to use the voting power of such stock in the selection of directors, concludes his letter by saying: "We shall be safer if we regain our old habit of looking at the appropriation to personal uses of property and interests hold in trust, in the same light as other forms of stealing." In other words, you and Mr. Cleveland intend to see that the affairs of the Society are managed not merely with the honesty requisite in order to keep clear of criminal proceedings, but with the fine sense of honor which recognizes in the trustees - and that is what the man responsible for the management of any great business corporation is nowadays - the duty of managing his business affairs with a high sense of obligation not only to the stockholders and the policy holders but to the general public. Mr. Cleveland has especially stipulated that he is to be absolutely free and undisturbed in the exercise of his judgment; you have especially stipulated that you are to be absolutely free and undisturbed in the exercise of your judgment. I have faith not only in your will to do right, but in the judgment which will enable you to do right. As I understand it, the majority of the stock is to be put in the hands of a Board of Trustees, of which Mr. Cleveland has accepted the chairmanship, and they will have absolute control, subject, as to the majority of the directors, to the policy holders' instructions, and subject, as to the minority directors, to exercising their own judgment without control. Your own policy will be I know to give the policy holders a square deal, and to clean house thoroughly. You would not take such a position if you did not have a perfectly free hand, and if you were not unhampered[*[6-12-05]*] 11. hampered by commitments to anybody. I do not congratulate you upon entering upon this work, for I do not wish to congratulate any man when he puts his harness on, but rather to wait until he takes it off. But I do wish to express to you not only my belief in you and in your success, but my strong feeling that you have undertaken one of the most important public duties that can befall any man just at present. The scandal which has been so deplorable for the Equitable Life Assurance society has also had effects far beyond the Society itself. Not only is it lamentable to think of the condition of hundreds of thousands of poor people all over the country who have found their confidence shaken in the provision which they had made for their families and for their old age by putting the savings of years in this Society, but the loss of confidence thereby created affects the whole insurance business of the country and weakens that great tendency for the promotion of thrift and providence. Your success in your new position will mean not only a great achievement for you, but a great achievement for the American public. In business conditions as they are to-day the head of one of these great insurance societies should be regarded as just as emphatically a public servant as if he were occupying any office through the direct vote of the people. He should be held to the same strict accountability if he goes wrong, and he is entitled to the same need of praise if by doing his duty fearlessly, honestly and intelligently he increases the stability of the business world, raises its moral tone, and puts a premium upon those habits of thrift and saving which are so essential to the welfare of the people as a body. Incidentally, it seems to me that what has occured furnishes another argument for effective supervision by the national government, if such supervision can be obtained, over all these great insurance corporations which do an interstate business. With earnest good-wishes, Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Paul Morton, Chairman, Board of Directors, Equitable Life Assurance Society, New York, N. Y.[*[6-12-05]*] 11. hampered by commitments to anybody. I do not congratulate you upon entering upon this work, for I do not wish to congratulate any man when he puts his harness on, but rather to wait until he takes it off. But I do wish to express to you not only my belief in you and in your success, but my strong feeling that you have undertaken one of the most important public duties that can befall any man just at present. The scandal which has been so deplorable for the Equitable Life Assurance Society has also had effects far beyond the Society itself. Not only is it lamentable to think of the condition of hundreds of thousands of poor people all over the country who have found their confidence shaken in the provision which they had made for their families and for their old age by putting the savings of years in this Society, but the loss of confidence thereby created affects the whole insurance business of the country and weakens that great tendency for the promotion of thrift and providence. Your success in your new position will mean not only a great achievement for you, but a great achievement for the American public. In business conditions as they are to-day the head of one of these great insurance societies should be regarded as just as emphatically a public servant as if he were occupying any office through the direct vote of the people. He should be held to the same strict accountability if he goes wrong, and he is entitled to the same need of praise if by doing his duty fearlessly, honestly and intelligently he increases the stability of the business world, raises its moral tone, and puts a premium upon those habits of thrift and saving which are so essential to the welfare of the people as a body. Incidentally, it seems to me that what has occured furnishes another argument for effective supervision by the national government, if such supervision can be obtained, over all these great insurance corporations which do an interstate business. With earnest good wishes, Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Paul Morton, Chairman, Board of Directors, Equitable Life Assurance Society, New York, N. Y.(First Draft, June 14, 1905.) So much for the case as affecting Mr. Loomis. There remains to be considered the case as affecting Mr. Bowen, against whom Mr. Loomis has made counter charges. Mr. Bowen has denied that he made "charges" against Mr. Loomis. This is a mere matter of terminology. In his letter to Secretary Taft, of April 2nd, beginning "My dear Bill:", and signed "Herbert", he writes" "As I understand that you are to be the head of the Department of State during the absence of Mr. Hay, I feel that I ought to see that you are fully informed as to the terrible scandal in the situation here: consequently I enclose herewith copies of papers, which have been in Mr. Hay's hands, and which will furnish you with the facts that I think you should know." Then follow[s] certain cablegrams, including a report that Mr. Loomis was paid a check [which] and that the custodian of the Bermudez Lake had in his possession this check and also a letter promising that the United States would not intervene, and that the President of Venezuela felt safe, because of these facts; a copy of a letter to Mr. Hay, of February 18, 1905, in which [he] Mr. Bowen distinctly states his belief that this alleged, and as it turns out, wholly fictitious check, and wholly fictitious letter [are] were [now] in the hands of President Castro, who, because he had them undoubtedly had not feared to refuse arbitration with the United States. [He] Mr. Bowen then furnishes documents, which he says were found by him in the legation safe a year ago, and were sent by him to Mr. Hay, together with many other documents; and Mr. Bowen states that Mr. Hay intimated in return that he had performed his whole duty by sending these documents to him. Mr. Bowen makes certain comments onb the documents as follows: "To Mr. Russell, now Minister to Colombia through the influence of Mr. Loomis" ( which statement, incidentally, is [wholly] untrue) [and though stated by Mr. Bowen as a fact, is an invention on his part]. Mr. Bowen again says: "Mr. Loomis collected the Mercado claim from the Venezuelan Government, got a share of it for a small sum, and never reported the case to the Department of State." And again he says: "He dealt with Buchanan, whom Loomis subsequently got appointed Minister to Panama" (which is again an [ridiculous] untruth, [though so positively stated by Mr. Bowen;] Mr. Loomis had nothing whatever to do with the appointment of either Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Russell.) [To assert that these statements are not "charges" against Mr. Loomis is nonsense.] In Mr. Bowen's statement, dated at East Orange, May 10th, he says: "I have never preferred charges against Mr. Loomis,"; [and] yet three lines further down he says that to his mind it has been proved conclusively that Mr. Loomis is "a dishonest official"; and a few lines further down says that he had not "preferred charges" against Mr. Loomis and that "none were needed. The documents themselves were charges, evidence and proof." These documents, Mr. Bowen explains, were submitted to Mr. Hay in the spring of 1904, and that a year had passed without further action by Mr. Hay (which, by implication at that, looks as if Mr. Bowen were accusing Mr. Hay also of misconduct). [It therefore appears that Mr. Bowen's charges are in effect against Mr. Hay as well as against Mr. Loomis.] In this same communication of May 10th, Mr. Bowen goes on to say "that I was justified in so doing ([Viz:] that is in securing the publication of the attackc on Mr. Loomis) I have but to show how Mr. Loomis abrogated the agreement that President Roosevelt and Mr. Hay had authorized me to make with the Venezuelan Government; how he thus ruined our whole case; and how he seemed likely to bring still further disgrace on our Government." Mr. Brown then goes on to state that, after he had received by cable, January 10th, from Mr. Hay, one telegram of which he approved, [that] "a protocol arrived by cable from Mr. Loomis!", and that this protocol, as he calls it, [*and of which he complains,*] he answered by a telegram to Mr. Hay. [And] He adds, "I was, of course, even more astounded than the Venezuelan Government was that Mr. Loomis should thus destroy my work and influence, override the decision of President Roosevelty and Mr. Hay, and derogate from our prestige as a strong and straight nation." And he ends this letter by the following statement: "If the newspaper representatives were influenced by me, I was justified in trying to influence them, because Mr. Loomis was dishonest while Minister at Caracas, and as Assistant Secretary of State was guilty of abrogating the agreement President Roosevelt and Mr. Hay had authorized me to make with the Venezuelan Government; and because he deceived and seemed likely to continue to deceive, the Government, and people of the United States." It is, [of course, utterly] disingenuous [*for Mr. Brown*] [to] repeatedly to use such language, and at the same time to insist that he has made "no charges" against Mr. Loomis. [Moreover, as I have said, these charges are not only against Mr. Loomis, but also against Mr. Hay, and against the President of the United States, so far]d [as the President of the United States had any knowledge of the transactions. For instance] Moreover, it is quite impossible that Mr. Bowen can believe that the telegram signed by Mr. Loomis, as Acting Secretary of State, which he calls a protocol, really proves that Loomis "was guilty of abrogating the agreements President Roosevelt and Mr. Hay had authorized me to make with the Venezuelan Government." Mr. Bowen's statement is shown to be absolutely untrue of the statement of the [soli?] of the Department of State, Mr. Penfield. But his own statements has within itself its own refutation on this point. He shows in his [own] statement that he at once answered this cable of Mr. Loomis by a cable to Mr. Hay, who would thus have had his attention specifically called to [it] the Loomis "protocol", even if he had not known of it before, and even if he had been so neglectful of his duty as not to inquire what cables had been sent in the matter with which he was dealing. As a matter of fact the Loomis cable in question was [prepared] sent by direction of Mr. Hay, with the assistance of Mr. Penfield, and was [sent] signed by Mr. Loomis, simply because on the day that it was sent it happened that Mr. Hay was confined to his [room] house and could not get down to the State Department. It is on its face an absurdity to suppose that Mr. Hay, who returned to his duties in the State Department within a day or two, and who was repeatedly going over this whole Venezuelan matter, and cabling to Bowen about it and receiving cables from him in return, could have been ignorant if such a cable had been sent by [Mr.] Loomis during his, Mr. Hay's, absence, [even though the telegram had not been written by Mr. Hay, himself, which was actually the case. It is quite impossible that Mr. Bowen really believes such an] allegation [in his charges] on this point is in reality a charge against Mr. Hay rather than against Mr. Loomis, [Mr. Bowen's In his letter to Mr. Taft, in which he called his attention8 [tion to the documents which he had already laid before Mr.Hay, and the comments that he makes on these documents, taken together, likewise amount [themselves] to a charge against Mr.Hay.] Mr. Bowen furnished his charges against Mr. Loomis, and some of the documents in reference thereto, to representatives of a New York newspaper. The names of the representatives of the newspaper to whom he furnished this information were John Grant Dater and Nicholas Biddle. Mr. Dater testifies as follows: Testimony of Mr. Dater. Secretary Taft: That you subsequently saw Mr. Bowen, and that in the course of the conversation, Mr. Bowen, possibly without your invitation, confirmed the statements that you had theretofore heard rumored with respect to Mr. Loomis and his relation to the Asphalt Company. Mr. Dater: Yes sir, and other matters. Secretary Taft: That Mr. Bowen was very full of the subject. Mr. Dater: Absolutely. Secretary Taft: And talked about it with a great deal of earnestness? Mr. Dater: He certainly did. Secretary Taft: And he expressed the hope that some day his side of the story would be printed? Mr. Dater: Yes, sir. Secretary Taft: Mr. Bowen showed you no letters? Mr. Dater: No sir, he showed me no letters. Secretary Taft: Did he show you a copy of the letter which he sent to me? Mr. Dater: He did not. I did not know that he had communicated with you. I understood it was with secretary Hay.f Secretary Taft: Or any of the documents upon which he based his claim of Mr. Loomis' guilt? Mr. Dater: I do not think I could answer that directly. I would rather not answer. The testimony of Mr. Biddle is as follows: Secretary Taft: In one of those articles you wrote appeared a statement concerning a letter written by [Mr.] Loomis asserting an interest in the Mercado Claim, which was published in the Herald. Mr. Biddle: Yes sir. Secretary Taft: Did you get that from Mr. Bowen? Mr. Biddle: I did. Secretary Taft: You requested it from him, or did he hand it to you in the course of a casual conversation? Mr. Biddle: I spoke to Mr. Bowen about the charges in a general way, and he told me he would give such information as he had and set me right on the entire thing, and he would show me certain letters that he had forwarded to the State Department. Secretary Taft: And they included this Mercado letter,- the letter of Mayers to Loomis? Mr. Biddle: Yes sir. Secretary Taft: I suppose you saw the same letters that Bowen gave me - one was the Mercado claim, second, the Mayers letter, and the third has slipped my mind. There was a letter to Mr. Hay written by Bowen. Mr. Biddle: I saw that at different times.g Secretary Taft: Just run your eye over these letters. (Letter of Mr. Bowen to secretary Taft, dated April 2, 1905, enclosing copies of papers which had been in Mr. Hay's hands, as follows: Telegram to Mr. Hay, from Mr. Bowen, dated Feb. 20, 1905; telegram to Bowen from Mr. Hay, dated Feb. 24, 1905; telegram to Mr. Hay from Mr. Bowen dated Feb. 25, 1905. Letter to Mr. Hay from Mr. Bowen, dated Feb. 18, 1905. Letter to Mr. W.W. Russell from F.B. Loomis, dated August 25, 1900. Letter to Mr. Loomis from ----- Mayers, dated July 9th, 1900). Mr. Biddle: I have seen all of these, and it seems to me there was some additional letter. x x x x x x x Secretary Taft: Did Mr. Bowen know that you were a correspondent? Mr. Biddle: Yes sir. I first met Mr. Bowen at the time of the blockade in Venezuela, and I obtained information from him at that time. He knew who I was of course, and I went to him as the Herald man. I told him what I had heard, and he was frank about giving me further information. Secretary Taft: Did he express a desire, one way or the other, to have the truth known? Mr. Biddle: He told me a great many times that he thought he was in a very unfortunate position, that being the U. S. Minister he could not go forward and be quoted when anything occurred so as to set himself right. He thought the instructions that he was receiving from the Department were very unfortunate, and that he was getting the blame for the entire thing. Secretary Taft: And, therefore, that he would like to have his own side stated sometime. Mr. Biddle: He told me a great many times that he could not be quoted, but would like it if his side could be stated. I think that he was most anxious to have certain facts come out. x x x x x x x The fact that Mr. Bowen did make such statements, [and told these] to the representatives of this newspaper, Mr. Dater and Mr. Biddle, is corroboratedh by a letter from Robert K. Wright, of the New York and Bermudez Company, under date of April 2nd, which states that "Mr. Bowen allowed Mr. Biddle to read a letter which he is sending to Mr. Taft, and to which are attached copies of several dispatches that Bowen had previously written to Mr. Hay, x x x (he addressed him as My Dear Bill and signed himself Herbert). xx x Mr. Biddle tells that he was not shown the letters in confidence, nor were any restrictions placed upon him by Mr. Bowen. "Of course Mr. Wright could have have had such intimate knowledge of Mr. Bowen's letter to Mr. Taft only through Mr. Bowen's having shown this letter. Mr. Bowen himself admits that he showed these letters and made these statements to the representatives of the newspaper in question. I have already quoted his remark in his statement of May 20th, "if the newspaper representatives were influenced by me, I was justified in trying to influence them, because Mr. Loomis was dishonest while Minister [to] at Caracas." In the same statement he says that Mr. Loomis' friends [repeated his charges] asserted that I instigated the publication of the scandal with which his name is associated. That charge may be true. Whether it is or not the newspaper correspondents who were in Caracas alone know. x x x As the scandal was generally known throughout the whole community, I talked with them about it. x x x I certainly never attempted to keep them silent. On the contrary, I urged them to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." In his letter to me of June 8th, he says: "I had several private interviews with both Mr. Biddle and Mr. Dater, in regard to information which they werei sending to the Herald. x x xx In order to make my side of the case perfectly clear I explained to them confidentially how Mr. Loomis' record in Caracas and the influence to which he must consequently bend balked me in my work. x x x I felt that I could safely trust them. In all governmental and diplomatic circles it is customary to trust and use the press. In no other way can information be got before the public that the public should possess. What I wanted our people to know was not the Loomis scandal alone but the whole situation in Venezuela. x x x I did not believe for a moment that either Mr. Dater or Mr. Biddle would quote me, or attempt to reproduce from memory any paper I showed to them; and I supposed, of course, that they would present the whole case to our people and not merely the Loomis scandal. In fact they assured me that the interviews would be regarded by them as entirely confidential. x x x If my name is associated with the scandal it is only because there was a breach of faith somewhere." Again in his letter of June 14th, he says, "I talked with the Herald men, because they said they would not betray my confidence. They did betray me, and one of them even tried to produce from memory the Mercado Claim, which I showed to him confidentially." In short, it appears from Mr. Bowen's own statement, as well as from those of Messrs. Dater and Biddle, and the letter from Mr. Wright, that Mr. Bowen while Minister at Caracas instigated and requested, and actually secured the publications of attacks on the Assistant Secretary of State, and furnished to the press copies ofj documents believed to reflect upon the Assistant Secretary of State, which documents were already before the Secretary of State for investigation. Mr. Bowen's excuse for this conduct, as far as it can be made [up] out, seems to be that he expected the newspaper men to keep his connection with the charges secret. In other words, he apparently regards his case as improved by the [statement] claim that he secured this attack upon his official chief in a furtive and underhanded manner and that he did not intend that his connection with the attack should be divulged. Of course such conduct [would be] is [inexcuble] inexcusable, and [would] shows Mr. Bowen's entire unfitness to remain in the diplomatic service, without regard to whether the charges he has made against Mr. Loomis [were] are true or false. Even if Mr. Loomis had been guilty, Mr. Bowen's conduct would be unpardonable. Inasmuch as Secretary Taft's careful investigation of the charges shows them to be false, his attitude appears in an even worse light. But it must be kept in mind that his [own] unfitness for the service is clearly established by his own conduct, without any reference to [any] [the] the question of Mr. Loomis' [conduct.] actions. [I therefore find that Mr. Bowen's usefulness in the diplomatic service is at an end, and direct that he be forthwith dismissed. [?][(First Draft, June 14, 1905.) Page a.] It appears from [all] the testimony that Caracas is seething with scandal, and that all kinds of accusations are rife, not merely against Mr. Loomis, and Mr. Bowen, but against practically every other diplomatic representative, now residing, or who has recently resided, there. There is no excuse whatever for repeating the injurious and malicious gossip circulated about these various men. The enemies of Mr. Bowen have furnished, or offered to furnish, any amount of such gossip concerning him, but have not been allowed to do so. Mr. Bowen, himself, however, has not only furnished and brought [forth] forward [all] a great deal of such gossip [that he could lay hold of,] about Mr. Loomis, but has evidently been one of the main sources from which it originated. He tried to tamper with the [telegraph] cable operator through our consul at La Guyia, Mr. Goldrich, in order to secure what he hoped would be incriminating telegrams against Mr. Loomis. Mr. Goldrichs reply was "It would be dishonorable to do what you ask of me". Mr. Goldrich in his letter of May 3d 1905 says "Mr. Bowen never lost an opportunity to belittle Mr. Loomis's character ability, etc, when he spoke to me of him and seemed to bear an extraordinary animus against his predecessor." [He] Mr. Bowen asked one of the men he himself produced as a witness, Senor Pastor to enter into the employ of a certain company for the purpose of [stealing other] obtaining (in plain words, of stealing) documents which he hoped might incriminate Mr. Loomis. He has evidently for many months, indeed for the last two years, devoted himself to hunting up every piece of scandal or gossip of which he [could get wind,] heard, affecting Mr. Loomis, until it has seemingly become a monomania with him, and has caused him to show [an utter and] complete disloyalty not only to the service to which he belongs, but to the country which he has represented.(First Draft, June 14, 1905.) Page A Mr. Bowen's conduct is [peculiarly] especially reprehensible, because of the damage it has undoubtedly done to the interest of this country. We hold a peculiar position toward our sister republics lying south of us. In all our dealings with these republics we should endeavor not merely to act courteously, justly and generously, but to make it evident that we are thus acting. Any corrupt dealing, any misconduct by one of our representatives to these countries, calls for the sternest punishment; and, save only corrupt dealing, the worst and most flagrant misconduct of which one of these representatives can be guilty is to give currency to or secure the publication of scandalous attacks upon the service of which he is a member, or upon one of his superiors, a responsible head of that service; for such attacks are certain to be circulated to the discredit of our government and our people, not only in the newspapers of our own country, but in the newspapers of the various Latin American republics. [And] No matter how baseless they are, no matter how complete the refutation of the charges, they do a damage that cannot be wholly repaired. [*I find that Mr. Bowen's usefulness in the Diplomatic service is at an end, and I direct that he be forthwith dismissed.*] [*[see letterbook June 21, 1905, to W. H. Taft]*](Copy) [*H*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 15, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: Here is the letter I am sending to Minister Takahira. The messenger will wait for any suggestion you may have in returning it to me. With high regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*AP*] Comte Cassini, Russian Ambassador.[*Roosevelt, Theo*] (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 15, 1905. [*Cassini*] My dear Mr. Ambassador: I saw the Japanese representative yesterday afternoon and have heard from him again this morning. I have now notified him that in accordance with the despatch you sent me yesterday I shall appoint Washington as the place of meeting. If you find it hot here you can arrange that the conference take place in some more northern locality. If you can come to the White House at 3 o'clock this afternoon I will tell you the details. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Comte Cassini, Russian Ambassador, Washington, D. C.Memorandum of statement made by the President to the Russian Ambassador, at the White House, June 15, 1905: The President has received from Japan the statement that with the object of a definite conclusion of terms of peace they intend to clothe their plenipotentiaries with full power to negotiate and conclude such peace, subject of course to ratification by the home Government. The President earnestly hopes that Russia will endow her plenipotentiaries with similar powers, so that they may, if they are able to come to an agreement with the Japanese plenipotentiaries, negotiate and conclude the terms of peace, subject of course to approval by the home Government of Russia. The President feels not only that every effort should be made to come to an agreement on terms which both parties can accept, but that the steps should be taken so as to convince even the most doubting that there is such earnest purpose. This result will be accomplished, in the President's belief, by the appointment of plenipotentiaries as suggested above. The Japanese Government intends to appoint at least two plenipotentiaries. The President suggests that it might be wise for Russia to appoint at least two likewise. This is of course a mere suggestion of the President's.Memorandum for the Japanese Government given by the President to Minister Takahira, June 15, 1905. The President regrets that Japan did not feel able to accept The Hague as the President suggested, but in accordance with Japan's wishes he has notified Russia that Washington will be the place of meeting. Russia will accept Washington, although of course she would have preferred The Hague. The President most strongly urges the inadvisability of requesting a categorical answer on the lines of the Japanese despatch received to-day (June 14th). The President would much have preferred if Russia's answer to his identical note had been couched in the same language that was used in the Japanese note, but the Russian note used the President's own language, which language has been submitted by the President to the Japanese Government before he used it, and it would put both the President and, in his opinion, the Japanese Government in a false and untenable position if the Japanese now refuse to meet, in spite of the fact that the Russian answer uses the exact language of the President's request. Moreover the President feels most strongly that the question of the powers of the plenipotentiaries is not in the least a vital question, whereas it is vital that the meeting should take place if there is any purpose to get peace. If there was no sincere desire to get peace, then the fact of the plenipotentiaries having full powers would not in any way avail to secure it. But if, as the President hopes and believes, there is a real chance for peace, it makes comparatively-2- atively little difference what the formal instructions to the plenipotentiaries may be. It is possible, of course, that an agreement may not come, but the President has very strong hopes that if the meeting takes place it will be found that peace can be obtained. The President has urged Russia to clothe her plenipotentiaries with full powers, as Japan has indicated her intention of doing. But even if Russia does not adopt the President's suggestion, the President does not feel that such failure to adopt it would give legitimate ground to Japan for refusing to do what the President has, with the prior assent of Japan, asked both Powers to do.(copy) [*G*] White House, WASHINGTON. June 15, 1905. My dear Mr. Takahira: I handed to Count Cassini the memorandum, but I took it back on finding that the questions therein raised were virtually answered; one by a message from the Russian Government, handed to me in French, that as regards the plenipotentiaries " l' Empereur nommere en son temps des personnes tenant un très haut rang dans le service de l'Etat et jouissant de la confiance de Sa Majesté"; the other by the statement to me of Count Cassini that the use of the word plenipotentiary meant of itself that as a matter of course the Russian delegates would have full power, if they were able to agree with the representatives of Japan, to negotiate a treaty, this treaty equally, of course, to be subject to the ratification of the home government. I am taking steps to try to choose some cool, comfortable and retired place for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, where the conditions will be agreeable, and there will be as much freedom from interruption as possible. With great regard, Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Kogora Takahira, Minister of Japan 1310 N Street, Washington, D. C.[*[For enc. see memo 6-15-05]*][*KM*] TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Sent in cipher. STATE DEPARTMENT? June 16, 1905. 8.00 p.m.) Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg. You will please immediately inform Count Lamsdorff that I was handed by Ambassador Cassini a cable from him dated June 13 which ran as follows: "As regards the place of the proposed meetings its choice is of only secondary importance since the plenipotentiaries of both Russia and Japan are to negotiate directly without any participation by third powers. If Paris, so desiarble for many reasons, encounters opposition, then the Imperial Government gives the preference to Washington over all other cities, especially since the presence of the President, initiator of the meeting, can exercise a beneficent influence toward the end which we all have in view." Accordingly after having received word from Japan that she objected to The Hague, and before I received any notification whatever about The Hague from Russia, I notified Japan that Washington would be the appointed place and so informed Ambassador Cassini. I then gave the same announcement to the public. It is of course out of the question for me to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the incident as closed, so far as the place of meeting is concerned. If Count Lamsdorff dos not acquiesce in this view you will please see the Czar personally and read to him this cable stating to Count Lamsdorff that you are obliged to make the request because of the extreme gravity of the situation. Explain to Count Lamsdorff and if necessary to the Czar that I am convinced that on consideration they will of their own accord perceive that it is entirely out of the question for me to now reverse the action I took in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, which action has been communicated to and acquiesced in by Japan, and has been published to the entire world. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. --JM--[*Dulany*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 17th 1905 To Dulaney, I hope you are getting better and will soon be well. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. The above was written on a card in the President's handwriting, and sent to Dulany with flowers. [*To [William B. Dulany.*][June 18, 1905] -2- and Japan's course has not always been satisfactory. Perhaps you will be interested at knowing exactly how I handled the affair, so I shall now give it to you, documents and everything. But of course this letter must be most carefully guarded, as it will cause real trouble if it should get out. I made my first move in the peace negotiations on the request of Japan in the following telegram handed to me by Takahira; [and which Japan] it had been sent to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan on the 31st of May: With reference to your telegram of the 28th of May, you are hereby instructed to say to the President that Japan's signal naval victory having completely destroyed the force upon which Russia confidently relied to turn the tide of the war, it may be reasonably expected that the Government of St. Petersburg will turn now its attention to the question of peace. The Japanese Government still adhere to the conviction that the peace negotiations, when they come, should be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents, but even in such case friendly assistance of a neutral will be essential in order to bring them together for the purpose of such negotiation and the Japanese Government would prefer to have that office undertaken by a neutral in whose good judgment and wise discretion, they have entire confidence. You will express to the President the hope of the Japanese Government that in actual circumstances of the case and having in view the changed situation resulting from the recent naval battle, he will see his way directly and entirely of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiation and you will add that if the President is disposed to undertake the service, the Japanese Government will leave it to him to determine the course of procedure and what other Power or Powers, if any, should be consulted in the matter of suggested invitation. You will ask the President whether in his opinion the Japanese Government can, with a view to facilitate the course (?) advantageously take any other or further action in the matter and you will make it entirely clear to the President that the Japanese Government have no intention by the present communication (?) to approach Russia either directly or indirectly on the subject of peace. I was amused by the way in which they asked me to invite the two belligerents together directly on my own motion and initiative. It reminded me of-3- the request for contributions sent by campaign committees to office holders wherein they are asked to make a voluntary contribution of ten per cent. of their salary. It showed a certain naiveté of the part of the Japanese. I then saw Cassini and made the proposition to him. Cassini answered by his usual rigmarole, to the effect that Russia was fighting the battles of the white race (to which I responded by asking him why in that case she had treated the other members of the white race even worse than she had treated Japan); that Russia was too great to admit defeat, and so forth, and so forth. However, I spoke to him pretty emphatically, and he said he would communicate my views to his home Government and find out if they were agreeable to my request. Meanwhile I had been keeping in touch with Speck and Jusserand, and suddenly received an indication of what the Kaiser was doing. I sent you a copy of his telegram in my last latter. Partly because of this telegram, and also partly because I could not be sure that Cassini would really tell his home Government what I had been doing or Lamsdorff would tell the Czar what I wished, I made up my mind to have Meyer see the Czar in person, and I sent him the cable about which I wrote you in my last letter. I then had a perfectly characteristic experience, showing the utterly loose way in which the Russian Government works. On June 6th Cassini showed me a despatch from his Government in which they declined my proposition; or rather did not answer it at all, but said that they would not ask either peace or mediation, but asked me to exercise a-4- moderating influence on the demands of Japan and to find out what these demands were. The next day Meyer sent me the following despatch, which of course directly reversed Cassini's action: The Emperor assured me yesterday afternoon that he was convinced that his people did not desire peace at any price and would support him in continuing the war rather than have him make what would be considered dishonorable terms. The Emperor, however, authorized me to say that he accepts and consents to the President's proposition, as cabled to me, with the understanding that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and that the President is to act on his own initiative in endeavoring to obtain the consent of Japanese Government to a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, without intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for them to agree to terms of peace. It is of the utmost importance that Czar's answer and acceptance is to be kept absolutely secret, as well as all that has so far (transpired,) nothing being made public until Japan also agrees. The President will then openly, on his own initiative, ask each power to agree to a meeting. The Emperor said that as yet no foot has been placed on Russian soil, that he realized that Saghalien could be attacked very shortly, therefore important to get Japan's consent at once before attack is made. The Czar desired me to inform him at the earliest possible moment of Japan's answer. He assured me he had the greatest confidence in the President and that he hoped to see the old friendship return which had formerly existed between the two countries, and that he realized that any change which had come about was due to the press and not to the governments." Cassini was not notified of this and insisted that Meyer had misquoted the Czar and got his words wrong. I had this statement cabled over to Meyer, who got the authority of Lamsdorff to say that he had quoted the Czar correctly and that his (Meyer's) despatch, which was shown to Lamsdorff, was an accurate account of what had been said. Cassini's words were that Meyer "might have misinterpreted or forgotten-5- what the Emperor had said." He told this to Cal O'Laughlin, a very good little fellow, whom he has been using as a means of communicating with me, with Speck, and with Takahira, as regards these peace matters. Is not this characteristically Russian? Cassini also sent various other messages to me by O'Laughlin, including a protest against my seeing so much of the Japanese Minister and of the representatives of the neutral Powers. I told O'Laughlin that I regarded this protest as impertinent, and requested that Cassini would not repeat it. He also protested that I was trying to make Russia move too quickly, and was very indignant over my order interning the Russian ships at Manila, saying " this is not the time to establish new principles of international law." As you probably saw, I had declined to allow the Russian ships to make any repairs that were rendered necessary by the results of the battle, and then had them interned. I informed Cassini that it was precisely the right time to establish a new principle of international law, when the principle was a good one, and that the principle [had been] is now (?) established. Meanwhile I published my identical note, as follows: June 8, 1905. Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg, Russia. Inform the Czar's government that Japan has consented to the proposal. Then present to the Russian Government the following despatch, which is identical in terms with one that is being sent to Japan: When this dispatch has been received by both Governments it will be made public in Washington. "The President feels that the time has come when in the interest of all mankind he must endeavor to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged. With both Russia and Japan the United States has inherited ties of friendship and good will. It hopes for the prosperity and -6- welfare of each, and it feels that the progress of the world is set back by the war between the great nations. The President accordingly urges the Russian and Japanese governments not only for their own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace with one another. The President suggests that these peace negotiations be conducted directly and exclusively between the belligerents; in other words that there may be a meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries or delegates, without any intermediary, in order to see if it is not possible for these representatives of the two powers to agree to terms of peace. The President earnestly asks that the Russian Government do now agree to such meeting, and is asking the Japanese Government likewise to agree. While the President does not feel that any intermediary should be called in in respect to the peace negotiations themselves he is entirely willing to do what he properly can if the two powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting. But if even these preliminaries can be arranged directly between the two powers, or in any other way, the President will be glad, as his sole purpose is to bring about a meeting which the whole civilized world will pray may result in peace." Then Cassini must have been told by his Government what had happened, for he called upon me and notified me that the Russian Government thanked me and adopted my suggestions. I am inclined to think that up to the time he had received the message which he then communicated to me, that his Government had told him nothing whatever as to their attitude toward peace. Now occurred a rather exasperating incident. The Japanese answer to my identical note was as follows: June 10,1905. Minister for foreign affairs has handed me the following answer to the dispatch embodied in your telegram of the 8th instant: "The Imperial Government have given to the suggestion of the President of the United States, embodied in the note handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the American Minister on the 9th instant, the very serious consideration to which, taking into consideration its source and its import, it is justly entitled. Desiring in the interest of the world as well as and in the mutual -7- interest Japan the reestablishment of peace with Russia on terms and conditions that will fully guarantee its stability, the Imperial Government will, in response to the suggestion of the President, appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia at such time and place as may be found to be mutually agreeable and convenient for the purpose of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and exclusively between the two belligerent powers." Cassini in his verbal statement to me accepted just as unreservedly, but after he had thus accepted I received the following dispatch from Lamsdorff through Meyer: June 12,1905. The following note is just received from the foreign office, which I transmit in full: "I did not fail to place before my August Majesty the telographic communication which your excellency has been pleased to transmit to me under instructions of your government. His majesty, much moved by the sentiments expressed by the President, is glad to find in it a new proof of the traditional friendship which unites Russia to the United States of America, as well as an evidence of the high value which Mr. Roosevelt attaches even as his Imperial Majesty does to that universal peace so essential to the welfare and progress of all humanity. "With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, 'In order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to agree to terms of peace,' the Imperial Government has no objection in principle to this endeavor if the Japanese Government expresses a like desire." This note is of course much less satisfactory than Japan's, for it showed a certain slyness and an endeavor to avoid anything like a definite committal, which most naturally irritated Japan, while at the same time as it used the very words of my identical note it did not offer grounds for backing out of the negotiations. But Japan now started to play the fool. It sent a request for me to get a categorical answer-8- from Russia as to whether she would appoint plenipotentiaries who would have full power to make peace, and hinted that otherwise Japan did not care for the meeting. Meanwhile Russia had proposed Paris for the place of meeting, and Japan, Chefoo. Each declined to accept the other's proposition. I then made a counter proposition of the Hague, which was transmitted to both Governments. It was crossed, however, by a proposition from Russia that the meeting should take place in Washington. Japan measured my proposition positively declining to go to Europe and expressing its preference for the United States, as being half way between Europe and Asia. Russia having first suggested Washington I promptly closed and notified both Japan and Russia that I had thus accepted Washington. Then to ease the Japanese mind I presented to Cassini the following memorandum: Memorandum of statement made by the President to the Russian Ambassador, at the White House, June 15, 1905: The President has received from Japan the statement that with the object of a definite conclusion of terms of peace they intend to clothe their plenipotentiaries with full powers to negotiate and conclude such peace, subject of course to ratification by the home Government. The president earnestly hopes that Russia will endow her plenipotentiaries with similar powers, so that they may, if they are able to come to an agreement with the Japanese plenipotentiaries, negotiate and conclude the terms of peace, subject of course to approval by the Home Government of Russia. The President feels not only that every effort should be made to come to an agreement of terms which both parties can accept, but that the steps should be taken so as to convince even the most doubting that there is such earnest purpose. This result will be accomplished, in the President's belief, by the appointment of plenipotentiaries as suggested above. The Japanese Government intends to appoint at least two plenipotentiaries. The President suggests that it might be wise for Russia to appoint at least two likewise. This is of course a mere suggestion of the President's.-9- After my conversation with him I wrote the following letter: June 15, 1905, My dear Mr. Takahira: I handed to Count Cassini the memorandum, but I took it back on finding that the questions therein raised were virtually answered, one by a message from the Russia Government, handed to me in French, that as regards the plenipotentiaries "l'Empereur nommere en son temps des personnes tenant un tres haut rang dans le service de l'Etat et jouissant de la confiance de Sa Majeste"; the other by the statement to me of Count Cassini that the use of the word plenipotentiary meant of itself that as a matter of course the Russian delegates would have full power, if they were able to agree with the representatives of Japan, to negotiate a treaty, this treaty equally, of course, to be subject to the ratification of the home government. I am taking steps to try to choose some cool, comfortable and retired place for the meeting of the plenipotentiaries, where the conditions will be agreeable, and there will be as much freedom from interruption as possible. With great regard, Very truly yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Kogora Takahira, Minister of Japan, I had previously sent this letter to Cassini in the following note: June 15, 1905, My dear Mr. Ambassador: Here is the letter I mm sending to Minister Takahira, The messenger will wait for any suggestion you may have in returning it to me. With high regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Comte Cassini, Russian Ambassador. To which he responded in the following: Washington, le 15 Juin 1905. Monsieur le President: Je m’empresse de Vous restiteur avec mos meilleurs remercioments la lettre adressee a Mr. Kogoro Takehira dont wous avez bien voulu me donner connaissance, et j'ai i'honneur d'ajouter que je partage -10- les vues qui s'y trouvent exposes. Veuilles agreer, Monsieur le President, l'assurance de ma plus haute consideration. CASSINI Monsieur le President des Etats-Unis. Then came a new complication. I received from Meyer the following communication: June 16,1905. Your cable of 15th received. While at Foreign Office, yesterday, Lamsdorff informed me that he had cabled Cassini, Washington, that morning, that The Hague would be most acceptable to Russia as a place of meeting. I told him that I had received word, confidentially, that the President is doing what he properly can to get both governments to agree upon The Hague. On returning to the Embassy I cabled what Lamsdorff had said * * * * * this morning, in compliance with your instructions. I informed Lamsdorff that the President, before the receipt of my cable and in accordance with the statement of the Russian Government made to him through Cassini, Washington, that Washington, D.C., as the place of meeting would be agreeable to Russian Government, the President had notified Japanese Government that Washington, D.C., (would be?) named as the place of meeting, this being agreeable to both Russia and Japan, it is too late now for the President to reverse his action and that such a course would doubtless not be acceptable to Japan. Lamsdorff acknowledged that Cassini, Washington, had received the above instructions but claims that he cabled Cassini, Washington, in reply to his cable about The Hague before he was informed of any final decision as to Washington; that The Hague was preferable to them for many reasons, that they desired it instead of Washington on account of the distance, that Washington was also undesirable on account of the summer heat and the fact that they were changing ambassadors. I called his attention to the fact that the negotiations as to the meeting place had been carried on through his ambassador at Washington, and asked him if he would read me his cable instructions to Count Cassini, Washington, D.C., on this matter. This he however avoided. I assured him that I considered it extraordinary procedure on Russia's part to endeavor to force the President to reverse his action after having taken such action on a favorable representation from their ambassador as to Washington for a place of meeting; also that I believed it might be a serious and embarrassing matter if they now continued to press for The Hague. Lamsdorff then said he would have to consult with the Emperor and that he would cable Cassini, Washington. which I answered as follows:-11- June 16, 1905. Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg. You will please immediately inform Count Lamsdorff that I was handed by Ambassador Cassini a cable from him dated June 13 which ran as follows: "As regards the place of the proposed meeting its choice is of only secondary importance since the plenipotentiaries of both Russia and Japan are to negotiate directly without any participation by third powers. If Paris, so desirable for many reasons, encounters opposition, then the Imperial Government gives the preference to Washington over all other cities, especially since the presence of the President, initiator of the meeting, can exercise a beneficent influence toward the end which we all have in view. " Accordingly after having received word from Japan that she objected to The Hague, and before I received any notification whatever about The Hague from Russia, I notified Japan that Washington would be the appointed place and so informed Ambassador Cassini. I then gave the same announcement to the public. It is of course out of the question for me to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the incident as closed, so far as the placer of meeting is concerned. If Count Lamsdorff does not acquiesce in this view you will please see the Czar personally and read to him this cable stating to Count Lamsdorff that you are obliged to make the request because of the extreme gravity of the situation. Explain to Count Lamsdorff and if necessary to the Czar that I am convinced that on consideration they will of their own accord perceive that it is entirely out of the question for me now to reverse the action I took in accordance with the request of the Russian Government, which action has been communicated to and acquiesced in by Japan, and has been published to the entire world. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. I have not heard anything more, but I cannot tell in the least what I shall hear. Meanwhile I gave to Takahira the following memorandum: Memorandum for the Japanese Government given by the President to Minister Takahira, June 15, 1905. The President regrets that Japan did not feel able to accept The Hague as the President suggested, but in accordance with Japan's wishes he has notified Russia that Washington will be the place of meeting. Russia will accept Washington, although of course she would have preferred The Hague. The President most strongly urges the inadvisability of requesting a categorical answer on the lines-12- of the Japanese dispatch received to-day (June 14th), The President would much have preferred if Russia's answer to his identical note had been couched in the same language that was used in the Japanese note, but the Russian note used the President's own language, which language had been submitted by the President to the Japanese Government before he used it, and it would put both the President and, in his opinion, the Japanese Government in a false and untenable position if the Japanese now refuse to meet, in spite of the fact that the Russian answer uses the exact language of the President's request. Moreover, the President feels most strongly that the question of the powers of the plenipotentiaries is not in the least a vital question, whereas it is vital that the meeting should take place if there is any purpose to get peace. If there was no sincere desire to get peace, then the fact of the plenipotentiaries having full powers would not in any way avail to secure it. But if, as the President hopes end believes, there is a real chance for peace, it makes comparatively little difference what the formal instructions to the plenipotentiaries may be. It is possible, of course, that an agreement may not come, but the President has very strong hopes that if the meeting takes place it will be found that peace can be obtained, The President has urged Russia to clothe her plenipotentiaries with full powers, as Japan has indicated her intention of doing. But even if Russia does not adopt the President's suggestion, the President does not feel that such failure to adopt it would give legitimate ground to Japan for refusing to do what the President has, with the prior assent of Japan, asked both Powers to do, and sent to Griscom the following dispatch: June 16, 1905, Griscom, American Minister, Tokio: The President has informed Minister Takahira that he considers it most unwise for Japan to hang back or raise question over the wording of the Russian note about the sending of delegates to the peace conference, For Japan to now hang back will create a most unfortunate impression in this country and in Europe, At present the feeling is that Japan has been frank and straightforward and wants peace if it can be obtained on proper terms, whereas Russia has shown tendency to hang beck. It will be a misfortune for Japan in the judgment of the President if any action of Japan now gives rise to the contrary feeling. Moreover in the President's judgment there is absolutely nothing to be gained by such action on the pert of Japan, No instructions to the plenipotentiaries would be of any avail if they did not intend to make peace. But if, as the President believes, the force of events will tend to secure peace if once the representatives of the two parties can come together, then it is obviously most unwise to delay the meeting for -13- reasons that are trivial or of no real weight. The President regretted that Japan would not accept The Hague as the place of meeting, but in accordance with Japan's wishes he has arranged for the meeting to take place in the United States. The President has the assurance of the Russian Ambassador that the Russian plenipotentiaries will as a matter of course have full power to conclude a definite treaty of peace, subject to the ratification of the home government; but even if this were not so the President feels that it would be most unwise for Japan now to withdraw from the meeting, especially in view of the terms in which the President's identical note was couched, and he also feels that if the meeting can be secured the really important step toward obtaining peace will have been taken, without any reference to the exact form in which the plenipotentiaries receive their instructions. Communicate this to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I had already received from Takahira the following confidential memorandum: You are hereby instructed to express to the President our thanks for the steps which he has taken in the interest of peace. You will say to him that the Japanese Government believe he has very clear appreciation of their present disposition as well as the principles by which they have been guided throughout the struggle. But even at the risk of repetition they will restate their attitude. The war, from Japan's point of view, is essentially and exclusively one of self-defense. It has never, so far as she is concerned, possessed any element of self-aggrandizement. Accordingly, the demand to be formulated by Japan will only be commensurate with the original objects to be attained, and even in the sequel of the decisive battles of Mukden and the Japan Sea, she has no intention of demanding anything excessive. Her territorial and financial demands will be found to be wholly consistent with that attitude. The demand for territorial cession will be limited to Saghalion and the indemnity to be demanded will be moderate and reasonable containing nothing of a consequential or exemplary nature. * * * * * The above is in answer to my report on the conversation of the President on the night of the 3rd May (June?) (Saturday). T. Meanwhile I have been explaining at length to both Russia and Japan the folly of haggling over details. I have treated both Takahira and Cassini with entire frankness, saying the same things in effect to each,-14- except that I have of course concealed from every one - literally every one - the fact that I acted in the first place on Japan's suggestion. I told Russia that it was nonsense for her to stick at trifles, but if the war went on she would lose all her possessions in eastern Asia and that the blow to her would be well-nigh irreparable; that while I had not sympathized with her at the outset I should be very sorry, because of my real regard for the Russian people and because of my regard for the interests of the world generally, to see her driven out of territory which had been hers for a couple of centuries; and that I had hoped she would make up her mind that she would have to make concessions in order to obtain peace because her military position was now hopeless, and that however future wars might come out this war was assuredly a failure. To the Japanese I have said that if they made such terms that Russia would prefer to fight for another year, they would without doubt get all eastern Siberia, but that in my opinion it would be an utterly valueless possession to them, while they would make of Russia an enemy whose hostility would endure as long as the nation herself existed, and that to achieve this result at the cost of [the] an additional year of loss of blood and money and consequent strain upon Japanese resources seems to me to be wholly useless. Japan now has Port Arthur and Korea and the dominance in Manchuria, and I should feel that the less she asked for in addition the better it would be. I also told them that if I thought their place I should cheerfully have accepted Russia's proposition to go to The Hague,-1-5- or for the matter of that to go to Paris, because I should have been only too glad to give Russia the shell as long as I kept the kernel. The latter expression, by the way, interested Takahira very much and I had to explain at some length what I meant. In short, the more I see of the Czar, the Kaiser, and the Mikado the better I am content with democracy, even if we have to include the American newspaper as one of its assets - liability would be a better term. Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I am utterly unable to say whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotiations at any moment. Japan is, of course entirely selfish, though with a veneer of courtesy, and with infinitely more knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it. I should not be surprised if the peace negotiations broke off at any moment. Russia, of course, does not believe in the genuineness of my motives and words, and I sometimes doubt whether Japan does. It is for the real interest of Japan to make peace, if she can get suitable terms, rather than fight on for a year at a great cost of men and money and then find herself in possession of eastern Siberia (which is of no value to her) and much strained by the struggle. Russia had far better make peace now, if she possibly can and find her boundaries in east Asia left without material shringkage from what they were ten years ago, than to submit to being driven out of east Asia. While for the rest of us, while Russia's triumph would have been a blow to civilization -16- her destruction as an eastern Asiatic power would also in my opinion be unfortunate. It is best that she should be left face to face with Japan so that each may have a moderative action on the other. As for Japan, she has risen with simply marvelous rapidity, and she is as formidable from the industrial as from the military standpoint. She is a great civilized nation; though her civilization is in some important respects not like ours. There are some things she can teach us, and some things she can learn from us. She will be as formidable an industrial competitor as, for instance, Germany, and in a dozen years I think she will be leading the industrial nation of the Pacific. The way she has extended her trade and prepared for the establishment of new steamship lines to all kinds of points in the Pacific has been astonishing, for it has gone right on even through the time of this war. Whether her tremendous growth in industrialism will in course of time modify and perhaps soften the wonderful military spirit she has inherited from the days of the Samurai supremacy it is hard to say. Personally, I think it will: but the effect will hardly be felt for a generation to come. Still, her growing industrial wealth will be to a certain extent a hostage for her keeping the peace. We should treat her courteously, generously and justly, but we should keep our navy up and make it evident that we are not influenced by fear. I do not believe she will look toward the Philippines until affairs are settled on the mainland of Asia in connection with China even if she ever looks toward them, and on the mainland in China her policy is the policy to which we are already committed. -17- Within twenty-four hours an incident has occurred which exactly measures the difficulty of trying to get peace for Russia. Since writing the above Meyer sent me the following cable about Lamsdorff's attitude: June 17, 1905. Your cable received. Your instructions carried out as to Minister for Foreign Affairs. He acknowledges the instructions cabled to Cassini on June 13, which were sent on the Czar's approval. States that he sent last evening further instructions and explanations through Cassini and before making any reply to me wishes to await the reply of Cassini and then advise His Majesty of the same. Meantime Lamsdorff will forward to-day copy of your cable to the Emperor, and will inform me of His Majesty's decision, although the official response will probably be formally sent through Cassini, as Lamsdorff claims that the matter is a question carried on through Cassini and not between Lamsdorff and myself, and for the present Lamsdorff practically declines to ask for audience for me with the Emperor. There was nothing in the interview which would necessarily indicate that Russia would in the end refuse Washington. And at the same time the Associated Press published from St. Petersburg the following dispatch: St. Petersburg, June 17, 1905. The question of the place of meeting of the Russian and Japanese representatives has been re-opened and there is a possibility that The Hague instead of Washington may be selected. After the announcement that Washington had been selected Russia expressed a desire to have the selection reconsidered and exchanges to that end are now proceeding between foreign minister Lamsdorff and Ambassador Meyer and Washington. Russua's preference for the Hague is based on the obvious advantages that it is entirely neutralized, the capital of a small state and the site of the arbitration court and also by consideration of time. But my original cable to Meyer evidently called the bluff, as is shown by the following cable from Meyer and letter from Cassini: -18- Petersburg, June 17, 1905. President Roosevelt, Washington. Have just received the following from Lamsdorff: Je m'empresse d'informer votre excellence que sa majeste empereur ne voit anoun obstacle au choix de Washington pour la reunion et les pourparkers des plenipotentiaries Russes at Japonais. Meyer. Washington, le 17 Juin 1905. Monsieur le Président, Vu certains bruits répandu a par la presse, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que, conformént à un télégramme official que je viens de recevoir à l'instant même, Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon Augusts Maître, accepts définitivement Washington comme lieu de réunion des plénipotentiaires Russes et Japonais qui seront appelés à négocier les préliminaires d'un traité de paix. Agréez, Monsieur le Président, l'assuance de ma plus haute considération. CASSINI. By the way I think it is beautiful the way in which Cassini virtually begins his note by speaking of the rumors given currency by the press, just as if his government had not explicitly informed me that is desired to change the place from Washington to The Hauge. What I cannot understand about the Russian is the way he will lie when he knows perfectly well that you know he is lying. It is this kind of thing which makes me feel rather hopeless about our ultimately getting peace. I shall do my best, but neither the Czar nor the Russian Government nor the Russian people are willing to face the facts as they are. I am entirely sincere when I tell them that I act as I do because I think it in the interest of Russia, and in this -19- crisis I think the interest of Russia is the interest of the entire world. I should be sorry to see Russia driven completely off the Pacific coast and driven practically east to Lake Baikal, and yet something like this will surely happen if she refuses to make peace. Moreover, she will put it out of the power of any one to help her in the future if she now stands with Chinese folly upon her dignity and fancied strength. It is a case of the offer of the sibylline books. I told Cassini, and through Delcasse told the Russian home government, immediately after Port Arthur that they ought to make peace at once. I reiterated this advice as strongly as possible after Mukden. In each case my advice was refused and the result is so much the worse for Russia. Japan is suspicious too, and does not always act as I should like her to, but it behaves infinitely better than Russia. Of course it will make heavy demands. No power could fail to after such astounding victories. Remember that you are to let no one know that in this matter of the peace negotiations I have acted at the request of Japan and that each step has taken with Japan's foreknowledge, and not merely with her approval but with her expressed desire. This gives a rather comic turn to some of the English criticisms to the effect that my move is really in the interest of Russia and not merely in the interest of Japan, and that Japan is behaving rather magnanimously in going into it. My move-20- is really more in the interest of Russia than of Japan, but it is greatly to the interest of Russia also. Well, I do not have much hope of getting peace, but I have made an honest effort, the only effort which offered any chance for success at all. I shall tell you all about my experiences in connection with Germany, France and Morocco when I see you. Nest love to Nannie. I am so glad you and she approve of Bonaparte. You know he has always been a straight Republican except in the Blaine campaign, when he left us as Roger Wolcott and Frank Lowell did. Ever yours, Hon. H. C. Lodge, Care of Coutts & Company, Bankers, Mondon, England.TELEGRAM, Copy White House, Washington. June 19, 1905. Griscom, American Minister, Tokio. In the first place inform the foreign office that of course not one member or attache of the Japanese peace delegation or any one else connected with the Japanese Government will be sked a question or required to make a statement of any kind by the immigration authorities. Also express to Baron Komura my deep appreciation of his expressions conveyed by your cable of the eighteenth. I shall give to Mr. Takahira at length the reasons that influenced me so that he may communicate them in full to Baron Komura. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.Confidential WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 19, 1905. Dear George: First let me tell you how pleased I am with what you have done since you have been Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Now as to the Russian attitude, both as set forth in your last letter and as shown by the statements I see in the press. It may well be that the effort to obtain peace at this time will prove entirely abortive. The Japanese have won an overwhelming triumph. They have completely destroyed the Russian Navy so that all chance of a counter-attack on them by Russia is at an end. They have shown the most signal superiority on land over the Russians. In my judgment the contest from the Russian standpoint is, humanly speaking, hopeless. It may take six or eight months or a year if the war goes on, but in the end, at some such period of time, the Japs will have taken Vladivostock and Harbin and driven the Russians completely from the Pacific Coast and Eastern Asia. When this has happened Japan will simply have to hold the bridge-head of a 5000-mile-long bridge, for this is what the Siberian railroad is. Such a feat will not cause her any great drain of resources, so that it seems to me that Russia should make up her mind that, humanly speaking, defeat is inevitable; and that if Russia persists in the fight she may escape the payment of indemnity when peace is made six or eight months or a year hence or thereabouts, but she will do it by giving up all Eastern Siberia, all Eastern Asia, by surrendering territory which she has had2 for over two centuries. If she thus surrenders it I do not believe she will ever get it back. She had far better pay a reasonable indemnity now and surrender Saghalin, for do what she may this war is a failure. She can never redeem herself in this war, and the longer she keeps it up the worse it will be for her. Let her show the wisdom Japan showed in 1894. Japan was faced by an overwhelming force in the shape of the combination of Russia, Germany and France. Instead of persisting in a hopeless fight she promptly surrendered Port Arthur, gave up all that she was required to give up, and bided her time. If Russia makes peace now she will be imitating Japan's wisdom in 1894. I hope that there will never come war again and that Japan and Russia can get along on a permanently peaceful basis; but at any rate this war is a failure, and however disadvantageous it is to make peace now, it will be much worse if making peace is deferred. As I wrote to Lodge, it is a case of the offer of the sibylline books. I urged Cassini, and through Jusserand I understand that Delcassé urged the Russian Government, immediately after Port Arthur to make peace. I again urged this upon Cassini after Mukden, pointing out that Rojestvensky would probably be beaten (although I could not guess how completely he would be beaten), and that it was all to make peace while the fleet was still in being and was to a certain extent a threat against Japan. But Russia was puffed up with pride and would not make peace at that time. Now, if she is wise, she will secure peace at the cost of any sacrifices which will still leave her in East Siberia. Peter the Great made peace with the Turks by surrendering the Crimea. In 1855 Russia made peace with the English, French and Turks by a surrender of territory. In either3 case to have insisted upon going on with the war would have meant the conversion of a serious check into a possibly irretrievable disaster The same is true now. In advising this I speak for Russia's interest, because on this point Russia's interests are the interests of the world. I do not want to see her driven off the Pacific Slope, but if through a Chinese haughtiness and inability to face facts the Russian Government and people permit the war to go on, no power can intervene to save them from their ultimate defeat, and it will be far worse for them in the end. I shall do my best to persuade Japan to be moderate. I have already pointed out to them that Eastern Siberia is of no value to them; that they had better save the years of blood and money that its conquest would cost; and that they had better accept reasonable terms. But in any event Russia should make up her mind that she [will] must not lightly throw away peace and thereby almost inevitably have to face worse things in the future. In my efforts I have been actuated by an earnest desire to stop bloodshed, not merely in the interest of humanity at large and in the interest of other countries, but especially in the interest of the Russian people, for I like them and wish them well. You know Lamsdorff and I do not, If you think it worth while, tell either him or the Czar the substance of what I have said, or show them all or parts of this letter, You are welcome to do it. But use your own discretion absolutely in this matter. Russia has net created a favorable impression here by the appearance of quibbling that there has been both over the selection of the place 4 and ever the power of the plenipotentiaries when Russia will appoint. It would be far better if she would give an impression of frankness, openness and sincerity. Always yours, Hon. G. V. L. Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg, Russia.Personal. [*Schneder*] Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, June 19, 1905. My dear Dr. Schneder: Will you personally thank for me the Mayor of Sendai for his photograph which has interested me, as well as the citizens of Sendai who sent me the swords and flags, for their very beautiful gifts, which are now in the White House? Be sure to impress them with how much I appreciate their kindness. I am greatly interested in what you tell me of your visit to Count Katsura. I have just your feeling about the Japanese Nation. As for their having a yellow skin, if we go back two thousand years we will find that to the Greek and the Roman the most dreaded and yet in a sense the most despised barbarian was the white-skinned, blue-eyed and red or yellow- haired barbarian of the North - the men from whom you and I in a large part derive our blood. It would not seem possible to the Greek or Roman of that day that this northern barbarian should ever become part of the civilized world - his equal in civilization. The racial difference seemed too great. Now, my feeling is not only personally but officially about the Japanese Nation that they are a wonderful and civilized people, who for instance can teach this people as well as learning from it, and who are entitled to stand on an absolute equality with all the other peoples of the civilized world. In art, in many forms of science, in military matters and industrial matters they have a position which entitled them to the hearty respect of every other nation. There are bad Japanese, of course, just as there are bad Americans. My policy is to try to treat Japan the Nation just exactly as I would like to have Japan treat the United States; and to treat each individual Japanese strictly on his merits, just as I would like each American treated. I should hang2. my head with shame if I were capable of discriminating against a Japanese general or admiral, statesman, philanthropist or artist, because he and I have different shades of skin; just as I would hang my head with shame if I were capable of thus discriminating against some man with black hair and black eyes because I have brown hair and blue eyes. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Dr. D. B. Schneder, 557 Robeson Street, Reading, Pennsylvania.Copy Personal CS WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 20, 1905. Dear Speck: Pray thank His Majesty and say that if I have been of any use in keeping the peace I am of course more than glad. I shall be in Massachusetts for the next two days, but will see you Friday or Saturday. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, The German Ambassador, Deer Park, Maryland.[*[Taft]*] [*War*] THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON [*WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF NO. __________ JUNE 21 1905 MILITARY INFORMATION DIVISION*] Sec. of War, Have Parker brought back from Venezuela; & warn him not to expect govmt to be used against a foreign official hereafter; let him report it confidentially to his superior. T. R.[see Parker Frank]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 23, 1905. My dear Judge Holt: In speaking of Minister Bowen's possible "indiscreet actions", you say that "indiscretion is not crime and does not deserve to be punished like crime". Now, my dear Judge, this is not a case of indiscretion at all. In explicit violation of my circular letter and in violation of all recognized standards of official good conduct, the Minister divulged to certain newspaper correspondents the charges he was making against Loomis, and showed them for publication documents which, he asserted, incriminated Loomis, at the time he had laid, or was about to lay, these documents before the Department of State. Supposing that you charged a Justice of the Supreme Court at Washington with corruption, and secretly requesting that your name be not quoted, gave these charges for publication to the New York Herald, and furnished to the Herald copies of the papers upon which you relied to prove the charges; and supposing that this was done at the time that you had submitted thesepapers to some superior body having authority, for its decision in the matter. Do you think that such a course could be called merely indiscreet? You know Taft. I have turned over the investigation of the charges against Loomis to him; but I am very sorry to say that it seems to me that Bowen's course was utterly indefensible whether Loomis plead guilty or not. Sincerely yours, Hon. George Chandler Holt, United States District Judge, New York. [*Holt, G, C*] [*[6-23-05]*]COPY WHITE HOUSE, Washington, June 23, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: I hope to see you at nine Sunday evening. Meanwhile, pray communicate to His Majesty that in accordance with the suggestion I made to Ambassador Jusserand in pursuance of the letter you sent me, the French Government informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that it has ceased its opposition to a conference of the powers on Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be arranged between Germany and Prance. Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French Government to the holding of this conference. I had not believed that the Emperor would be able to secure this assent and to bring about this conference, from which undoubtedly a peaceful solution of all the troubles will come. I need not say to you that I consider such peaceful solution as vitally necessary to the welfare of the world at this time, and in view of its having been secured by the Emperor's success in obtaining this conference, I wish again to express my hearty congratulation. It is a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, The German Ambassador. [*15*]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 24, 1905. [*[F B LOOMIS]*] To the Acting Secretary of State: The State Department will immediately issue a circular to all our diplomatic and consular representatives in China setting forth the following facts and stating that it is issued by direct order of the President: Under the laws of the United States and in accordance with the spirit of the treaties negotiated between the United States and China all Chinese of the coolie or laboring class - that is, all Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled,--are absolutely [prevented] prohibited from coming to the United States; but the purpose of the Government of the United States is to show the widest and heartiest courtesy toward all merchants, teachers, students and travelers, [?] who alone or [or with] their wives and [minor] minor children [and their] [body and house servants], may come to the United States, as well as all Chinese officials or representatives in any capacity of the Chinese Government together with their body and household servants. All individuals of these classes are allowed to come and go of their own free will and accord and are to be given all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions accorded the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation. The President has issued special instructions through the Secretary of Commerce and Labor that while laborers must be strictly excluded, the law must be enforced without harshness, and that all unnecessary inconvenience or annoyance toward those persons entitled to enter the United States must be scrupulously avoided. The officials of the immigration department have been told that no harshness in the ad-WHITE HOUSE, Washington. June 24, 1905. To the Acting Secretary of State: The State Department will immediately issue a circular to all our diplomatic and consular representatives in China setting forth the following facts and stating that it is issued by direct order of the President: Under the laws of the United States and in accordance with the spirit of the treaties negotiated between the United States and China all Chinese of the coolie or laboring classes ~_that is, all Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled,- are absolutely [prevented] prohibited from coming to the United States; but the purpose of the Government of the United States is to show the widest and heartiest courtesy toward all merchants, teachers, students and travelers, who alone or with their wives and minor children may come to the United States, as well as all Chinese officials or representatives in any capacity of the Chinese Government, together with their body and household servants. All individuals of these classes are allowed to come and go of their own free will and accord and are to be given all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions accorded the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation. The President has issued special instructions through the Secretary of Commerce and Labor that while laborers must be strictly excluded, the law must be enforced without harshness, and that all unnecessary inconvenience or annoyance toward those persons entitled to enter the United States mist be scrupulously avoided. The officials of the immigration department have been told that no harshness in the administration-2- ministration of the law will for a moment be tolerated, and that any discourtesy shown to Chinese persons by any official of the Government will be cause for immediate dismissal from the service. The status of those Chinese entitled freely to enter the United States is primarily determined by the certificate provided for under section six of the set of July 5, 1884. Under this law the diplomatic and consular representatives of the United States have by direction of the President been instructed before viseing any certificate strictly to comply with the requirements of that portion of section six which provides as follows: "and such diplomatic representative or consular representative whose indorsement is so required is hereby empowered, and it shall be his duty, before endorsing such certificate as aforesaid, to examine into the truth of the statements set forth in said certificate, and if he shall find upon examination that said or any of the statements therein contained are untrue it shall be his duty to refuse to indorse the same." The certificate thus vised becomes prima facie evidence of the facts set forth therein. The immigration officials have now been specifically instructed to accept this certificate, which is not to be upset unless good reason can be shown for so doing. Unfortunately, in the past it has been found that officials of the Chinese Government have recklessly issued thousands of such certificates which were not true, and recklessness has also been shown in the past by representatives of the American consular service is viseing these certificates. The purpose of this Government is to make these vised certificates of such real value that it is safe to accept them here in the United States. This will result in doing away with most of the causes of complaint that have arisen. The -3- Chinese teacher, student, merchant, or traveler will thereby secure before leaving China a certificate which will guarantee him against any improper treatment. But in order that this plan may be carried out it is absolutely necessary that the diplomatic and consular officers instead of treating their work in viséing these certificates as perfunctory, shall understand that this is one of their most important functions. They must not issue any such certificate unless they are satisfied that the person to whom it is issued is entitled to receive it, and they will be held to a most rigid accountability for the manner in which they perform this duty. If there is reason to believe that any certificate has been improperly issued, or is being improperly used, a thorough investigation will be made into its issuance. The only way in which it is possible, while fully carrying out the provision of the law against the immigration of Chinese laborers, skilled or unskilled, to secure the fullest courtesy and consideration for all Chinese persons of the exempt classes, such as officials, travelers, merchants, students, and the like, is through the careful and conscientious action of our diplomatic and consular representatives under the proposed policy of the Department of Commerce and Labor. The change will simplify the whole administration of the law; but it cannot be made permanent unless the diplomatic and consular representatives do their full duty and see to it that no certificate is issued with their visé unless the person receiving it clearly comes within one of the exempt classes and is fully entitled to the privileges the certificate secures for him.-4- Accordingly all our diplomatic and consular representatives in China are warned to perform this most important duty with the utmost care. (C) Copy. from T.R. WHITE HOUSE, Washington, June 25, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: I have received from M. Jusserand the following extract from a telegram sent to him by M. Rouvier: "You reported to me your conversation with President Roosevelt who asked you to inform us that, according to his views, much prudence should be used in present circumstances, and that we ought to consider the idea of a conference as a concession we might make ... Be so good as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have received from us due consideration and have caused us to take the resolution we have just adopted. We had first thought that, in order to remove the erroneous impressions held about our action in Morocco, it would be enough to show that it threatens no interests whatsoever. But now we have gone further, and have declared that we are ready to accept a conference, in spite of the serious reasons we had to entertain objections against such a project." I shall ask, Mr. Ambassador, that in forwarding this information to His Majesty you explain that it is of course confidential. I need hardly tell you how glad I was to secure this information from the French Ambassador. As you know, I was at first extremely reluctant to do anything in the matter which might savor of officious interference on my part; and I finally determined to present the case to the French government only because I wished to do anything I properly could do which the Emperor asked, and of course also because I felt the-2- the extreme importance of doing everything possible to maintain the peace of the world. As you know, I made up my mind to speak to France rather than to England, because it seemed to me that it would be useless to speak to England; for I felt that if a war were to break out, whatever might happen to France England would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case I did not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight with England, and instead I made a very earnest request of France that she should do as the Emperor desired and agree to hold the conference. The French Government have now done just what at His Majesty's request I urged should be done. Now in turn I most earnestly and with all respect urge that His Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this yielding to his wishes by France. I trust that the Emperor understands that I would not for any consideration advise him to do anything that would be against the interest or the honor either of himself or of his people any more that I would counsel such an action as regards my own country; and I say conscientiously that I am advising just the conduct that I would myself take under like circumstances; and I venture to give the advice at all only because, as I took the action I did on the Emperor's request, it seems but right that in reporting the effect of this action I should give my own views thereon. I say with all possible emphasis that I regard this yielding by France, this concession by her which she had said she could not make and which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany but a triumph. You know -3- know that I am not merely a sincere admirer and wellwisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty. I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns of today who have their faces set toward the future, and that it is not only of the utmost importance for his own people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired. I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less that to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is. With high regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, German Ambassador.Anglo-French Treaty concerning Morocco. April 8, 1904. "The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morrocco" (Art. II.) "The two Governments being equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty both in Egypt and Morocco, declare that they will not, in those countries, countenance any inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes, or of railway transport charges." (Art. IV.) [*[Both Governments reserve to themselves in Morocco and Egypt]*] "the right to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest." (Art IV.) "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar the two Governments agree not to permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast." [*[between Metilla exclusively and the River Sebon, exception being made for the places presently occupied by Spain]*]. (ART. VII.) [*War Dept*] (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 26, 1905. [*[R.S. OLIVER?]*] To the Acting Secretary of War: In view of your memorandum no rebuke will be administered to Parker, the attache at Venezuela, for he can hardly be held to be accountable for the grossly improper action of his chief. I feel, however, that he should be brought back from Venezuela at once. Please have this done. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[*?*] Cambridge, Mass., June 28, 1905. Sir: Your resignation, tendered in accordance with the request of Secretary Taft made by my direction, is hereby accepted. Very truly yours, Mr. John F. Wallace, Chief Engineer, Isthmian Canal Commission, Washington, D.C.[[shorthand]] Hold [*[ca. 6-29-05]*] [[shorthand]][*[attached to [Morris?], 6-29-05*]TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., June 30, 1905. Hon, Herbert H. D. Peirce, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. referring to your letter twenty-ninth instant enclosing copy of cable from Ambassador McCormick please cable General Porter that he has been appointed by the President Special Ambassador and from his late position he will be considered as the senior of the two Special Ambassadors to arrange on behalf of the United States for the receipt of the body of Paul Jones. In the actual delivery of the body General Porter as Special Ambassador will deliver it to Special Ambassador Loomis. Have this information cabled to Mr. Loomis and advise Ambassador McCormick that it must be arranged not as a slight in any way upon Mr. Loomis any more than the delay in the appointment [in the appointment] of Porter was a slight upon Porter, but is designed by this Government to recognize Porter's great services and at the same time to show the keen interest of the Government by having sent over a Special Ambassador to assist at the function. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official)WHITE HOUSE, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., June 30, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: In answer to your note of June 26th I have requested a special report thereon by Secretary Shaw and will communicate with you further. Now as to your note of June 28th, I earnestly hope that France will act along the lines therein indicated. I shall communicate with Jusserand today so that if any backing of mine is of use it may be made effective. Will you thank the Emperor most warmly for his courtesy? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, Ambassador of Germany, Deer Park, Maryland.TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 1, 1905. Hon. Rudolph Forster, Assistant Secretary to the President, The White House, Washington, D.C. Please deliver to Minister Takahira the following dispatch: "President has just received from the Russian Government the statement that owing to the ill health of Nelidoff it will substitute for him Ambassador M[*A*]uravieff now at Rome and formerly Minister of Justice. The Russian Government further states that it may nominate in addition to Rosen, the second plenipotentiary, a third plenipotentiary and certain delegates to examine any special questions which may arise. The President has answered that of course each Government can send on additional plenipotentiaries and delegates if it so desires. The President has also received through Ambassador Mayer the following note from Count Lamsdorff: 'By the fact of the nomination of the plenipotentiaries of the two countries and by the fixing of the date and the place of meeting, the question of peace has reached a definite stage. Under these-2- conditions I believe I should address myself to your excellency in begging you kindly to inform me if, conforming to the idea expressed by President Roosevelt, the Japanese Government does not consider that there is some ground to proceed at the present time to the conclusion of an armistice, of which the terms and conditions could be fixed by direct agreement between the commanders-in-chief of the two armies." The President hopes that the Japanese Government will see its way clear to granting the Russian request and will authorize him to state to the Russian Government that the generals commanding the two armies may forthwith negotiate for an armistice, if it is the manner in which the Japanese Government thinks it proper the armistice should be carried on. The President has secured the acceptance by Russia of Washington instead of The Hague as a meeting place and has secured the authorization by her to publish on Monday the fact that the Russian plenipotentiaries, like the Japanese plenipotentiaries, will be empowered to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace, subject to ratification by the respective home Governments.-3- From all the information the President can obtain both from St. Petersburg and from Paris he believes that Russia intends to make peace, and he is of the opinion that peace can be secured. He therefore thinks it very desirable that the request for the armistice if possible should be granted. Moreover the President understands that the rainy season is about to begin during which military operations would be very difficult, and if the President is correct about this the objection to granting the armistice would be minimized. The President has hitherto declined to consider any suggestion from the Russian Government about an armistice, but the negotiations have reached such a stage that he no longer feels at liberty to refuse to speak. Wm. LOEB, JR., Secretary." (Official)(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 1, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: What are your movements this month? Can you come out and take lunch with me some time? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. Cipher cablegram. STATE DEPARTMENT. July 1, 1905 (6:00 p.m.) Meyer, St. Petersburg. On Monday I shall announce the appointment of plenipotentiaries by name stating that they will be clothed with full powers to negotiate and conclude treaty of peace subject to ratification by home governments. I shall at once bring matter of armistice before Japanese Government and endeavor to obtain its consent to the Russian proposition. Of course cannot guarantee success but shall do what I can to secure the Japanese agreement. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. --JM--WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. EnRoute, July 5, 1905. Dear Commissioner Macfarland: Referring to the recent allegations concerning a violation of the speed law by the chauffeur of the automobile in which I was riding, I am informed that a letter of a Mr. Pittman Mann containing a number of absolute untruths was given out at your office before Major Sylvester received it. It is an outrage that such a letter should have been made public. I desire to know in full [from you] who was responsible for giving this letter out, either before or after it reached Major Sylvester, and if the person who [xxx] gave it out has been punished. This letter of Mr. Mann alleges a flagrant instance of partiality in the enforcement of the law. This is a deliberate misstatement on the part of Mr. Mann. It is true that he says he is not responsible for the accuracy of the account, but he predecated his remarks upon the hypothesis that the account was correct. Of course such a statement does not excuse the slander which has gone the rounds of the press, apparently through the fault of the District Commissioners in letting the letter get out. The chauffeur was not arrested, and of course ought not to [be] have been. He was warned according to regulations and obeyed the warning, and that was all that he was called upon to do. I [shall expect a prompt] would like a report in detail [from you] as to why and by whom this letter was permitted to be given to the press. Very truly yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H. B. F. Macfarland, President, District Commissioners, Washington, D. C. [*Can you tell me if Mann[?] is in the government service?*] [*PF*] [*Spooner, John C*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 7, 1905. My dear Senator Spooner: In a confidential memorandum from our Minister to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Dawson, he writes as follows: I cannot too strongly urge the advisability of refraining from so amending the treaty as unnecessarily to wound Dominican national pride and susceptibilities. Dominicans have reluctantly reconciled themselves to the hard necessity of accepting foreign customs collectors, but I doubt whether I could persuade them to confer explicitly on these collectors extra-territorial immunity. I am informed that such an amendment has been proposed by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. In substance and in practice the Dominican Government will concede such immunity without a murmur or a hitch, but the Dominican reading and writing public would bitterly resent a treaty provision that flagrantly and in so many words violates their constitution, deprives their country of one of the most essential attributes of sovereignty and places it in the eyes of the world in the same category as Turkey, China, or Morocco. Santo Domingo believes that it deserves as good treatment in this respect as the European powers have given Greece." Now, my dear Senator, I shall ask you to pardon my writing you very frankly from the standpoint of the interests which we both have equally at heart, You can have no idea of the way in which we are hampered by any such amendment as this in trying to carry out any kind of decent and effective foreign policy, Personally, I of course feel very strongly that there was no need of amending the Santo Domingan treaty. Though of no real consequence, some of the amendments were possibly advantageous, but such an amendment as this would probably destroy the treaty. Now, what I want is to avoid amendments that will render it impossible to get the treaty through. The average amendment put in-2- I regard as merely rather foolish, because [???] unnecessary; but I know that there are people who like to feel that they have made some trifling change, and it may be necessary for you to conciliate these people in such a way--just as in the anthracite coal arbitration business I secured the consent of the capitalists by making the utterly foolish change of title of Clark from labor man to sociologist. I do not in the least object to seeing amendments of this kind put in as matters of expediency in getting the treaty through the Senate; but I do earnestly hope that amendments that will kill the treaty will not be pressed. Of course, as you know, I feel in the strongest way that this whole matter of amending treaties comes in the same category as that of the veto [??] by the President of legislation. Each is a power which it is necessary on occasions to exercise, [???] but if either power is exercised too frequently it is a matter of certainty that those exercising it are abusing it, to the detriment of the interests of the nation. Cleveland, for instance, was immensely praised by many of his [???] adherents for the multitude of his vetoes, and he was especially praised as to putting a check upon the encroachments of the legislative [???] branch As a matter of fact, most of his vetoes were foolish, [???] though it was eminently proper that he should make three or four of them. [???] Thus it is in the matter of amendments to a treaty. The Senate has the right to amend any treaty, just as I have the right to veto every bill.-3- But it would be [xxxxx] almost as bad that the right should never be exercised at all [xxxx] as that it should be exercised too often. People will tell Senators that they are "standing up against the encroachments of the executive" when they put in these amendments, just similar people told Cleveland he was standing up against the encroachments of Congress. In each case if the Government of the country is to be conducted well it is necessary that the executive and the legislative branches should work together. Much can be done by consultation in advance, As you know, I do my best to have no action taken by the State Department of any importance in treaty making matters without previous consultation with you and certain other Senators, and so in important legislative matters the Speaker and various leaders of the two houses sometimes consult me in advance - although with nothing like the frequency that I consult you and other members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in advance about treaties. If we do not manage to work together in these matters it will be a bad thing for the country, and it is a severe reflection upon our whole system of government. This system is postulated upon self-restraint by the different officials in the exercise of certain undoubted rights - just such rights as the veto power of the President, and the power of the Senate to amend the treaties. I believe you will find Root a good man with whom to get on. I have asked Minister Dawson to call upon you and go over these -4- Santo Domingan matters. If we find that it is impossible to achieve the desired result by treaty, I shall of course try to make some other arrangement which will prevent disaster to Santo Domingo and damage to the interests of the United States, but any such arrangement must of necessity be but a makeshift from every standpoint. The particular scheme which may be used as an alternative in this case I shall consult you about if it becomes necessary to try it. The Santo Domingans would prefer it, but I do not want to take it up. With regards to Mrs. Spooner, Sincerely yours, Hon. John C. Spooner, Pittsburg, New Hampshire.Keep these notes for awhile [7-11-05?] [J.B.Bishop to Chas. McCabe No. cds. made] [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]][[shorthand]]5 [[shorthand]][[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]] [*J.B.Bishop To Charles McCabe 7-11-05*](COPY) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 18, 1905. My dear Mr. Bostock: In connection with your book on the training of wild animals, in which I was greatly interested, I would like to ask whether you find that the puma or cougar shows a different kind of temper from the leopard or old world panther, and from the jaguar? I ask this because in hunting it I have found it to be compared to the big bear, a cowardly animal, and if what I read of the danger of hunting the Indian and African leopard is true, then the puma is not nearly as formidable as the leopard or the jaguar - in short is not nearly so formidable as the big spotted cats, though it is as big and as formidably armed. Have you noticed any difference in your work among these species taking the average of one and comparing it as to temper, ferocity, &c., with the average of the other? Of course there are wide individual differences; but that is not what I am after at present. I notice that you say there is little or no difference between the tiger, lion, leopard or jaguar. With regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Frank C. Bostock, Esq., Care of Century Company, New York, N.Y.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 18, 1905. My dear Mr. Morgan: I have just received a letter from Senator Lodge telling me that King Leopold insisted upon seeing him, evidently to talk about the Chinese railway matter. The letter is so important that I quote in full what Lodge says of the conversation with the King: "Before lunch the King talked about the Chinese R.R. He asked me if I knew anything about it. I said nothing except what I had read in the newspapers; that I had no personal interest in the enterprise whatever but that as a public man interested in the development of our commerce in the East I had seen with great regret that we were to sell the R.R.; that I thought it would be a blow to our prestige and commerce in the East, as I most certainly do. He said that he and his people were large owners in the road, that he was very averse to selling; that he thought the property would be of very great value (I think he is right); that the movement was not from Pekin but was conducted by a certain powerful Viceroy through the Chinese Minister and that the threat to withdraw the concession was only a bluff. He said Morgan told him that the amount was not to him serious enough to make him at his age enter on a struggle with the Chinese Government and that they had no assurance that our-2- government would stand behind them. I told him that our government would not and could not advise American investors to hold or to sell property but that we should not permit any government to withdraw a concession or violate the rights of American citizens and if our people wanted to hold on our government would certainly stand behind them and would permit no wrong to be done to them. He said that he had written you in regard to it and asked me if I would write you and give my opinion which I said I would gladly do. He said if assured that the government would stand behind them he believed Morgan and the American investors would hold on and that prompt action was necessary as the final decision was to be had on August 4th. I think it would be a real misfortune to let go this great line of railway - a blow to our prestige and to our commerce in China which we want to foster in every way. I hope you think that my answer was correct about our attitude. He said that Root as counsel was advising sale; that Mr. Hay whom he saw at Nauheim was against it; that Rockhill, and Loomis confirms this to me, was strongly against it. I should attach great weight to Rockhill's opinion. I wish something could be done to make our people hold on and of course if they wish to hold on we could not allow the Chinese to wrest a concession from them. Indeed I do not think they would try it. Perhaps you can make Root see the economical and political importance of our holding that R.R."-3- Now, my dear Mr. Morgan, it is not my business to advise you what to do. From the standpoint of our national interests I take entorely Lodge's view. I cannot expect you or any of our big business men to go into what they think will be to their disadvantage. But if you are giving up this concession, if you are letting the railroad slip out of American hands, because you think that the Government will not back you up, I wish to assure you that in every honorable way the Government will stand by you and will do all that in its power lies to see that you suffer no wrong whatever from the Chinese or any other Power in this matter. I have sent Root a copy of this letter and shall be very glad if either you or he cares to talk to me about it. My interest of course is simply the interest of seeing American commercial interests prosper in the Orient. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. J. Pierpont Morgan, Esq., 23 Wall Street, New York, N.Y.Copy THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 19, 1905. Dear Mr. Needham: Indeed, as you know, I am not really good at any games. Perhaps in my time I came nearer to being decent as a walker, rider, and rifle shot than in any other way, but I was simply an average good man in these three respects. My success in game hunting has been due as well as I can make it out to three causes; first, common sense and good judgment; second, perseverence, which is the only way of allowing one to make good one's own blunders; third, the fact that I shot as well at game as at a target. This did not make me hit difficult shots, but it prevented my missing easy shots, which a good target shot will often do in the field. Most of my bears, for instance, were killed close up, and the shots were not difficult so long as one did not get rattled. Now of course the possession and practice of these three qualities did not make me by any means as successful a hunter as the men who in addition to possessing them were also better shots than I was, or with greater powers of endurance, or were more skilled in the detection of signs, etc. But they did enable me to kill a good quantity of game and to do it in ways that have made by observations of real value to the faunal or outdoor naturalist. Besides, I knew what I wanted, and was willing to work hard to get it.2 In short, I am not an athlete; I am simply a good, ordinary, out-of-doors man. For instance, yesterday I rowed off with my boys and some cousins and their friends and camped out over night, and rowed back this morning from our camping place some five or six miles down the Sound. I took the two smallest boys in my boat. Each of us had a light blanket to sleep in, and the boys are sufficiently deluded to believe that the chicken or beefsteak I fry in bacon fat on these expeditions has a flavor impossible elsewhere to be obtained. Now these expeditions represent just about the kind of things I do. Instead of rowing it may be riding, or chopping, or walking, or playing tennis, or shooting at a target. But it is always a pastime which any healthy middle-aged man fond of outdoors life, but not in the least an athlete, can indulge in if he chooses. I think my last sentence covers the whole case - that is, when I say “if he chooses." It has always seemed to me that in life there are two ways of achieving success, or, for the matter of that, of achieving what is commonly called greatness. One is to do that which can only be done by the man of exceptional and extraordinary abilities. Of course this means that only one man can do it, and it is a very rare kind of success or of greatness. The other is to do that which many men could do, but which as a matter of fact none of them actually does. This is the ordinary kind of success or kind of greatness. Nobody but one of the world's rare geniuses could have written the Gettysburg speech, or the second inaugural, or met as Lincoln met the awful crises of the Civil3 War. But most of us can do the ordinary things, which, however, most of us do not do. It is of course unnecessary to say that I have never won a success of any kind that did not come within this second category. Any one that chose could lead the kind of life I have led, and any one who had led that life could if he chose - and by “choosing,” I of course mean choosing to exercise the requisite industry, judgment and foresight, none of a very marked type - have raised my regiment or served in positions analogous to those of Police Commissioner, Civil Service Commissioner, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Any fairly hardy and healthy man could do what I did in hunting and ranching if he only really wished to and would take the pains and the trouble and at the same time use common sense. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Henry Beach Beedham, McClure's Magazine, 44 East 23d Street, New York, N.Y. COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., July 19th 1905. My dear Senator Penrose: I have taken up with your colleague the matter of the Civil Service Commission's charges against Assistant Treasurer Leib, because his position as former Attorney General has made him very familiar with the law. I do not think any action is required at present; but I wanted you to know what I had done. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.TELEGRAM. White House, Washington Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 24, 1905. Mr. J. J. Jusserand, French Ambassador, Wish I could see you as I have another cable from our friend, whom I need not name. I will make no request or representation until having heard from you in advance whether or not it will be acceptable. I am asked to state that the power in question wishes to meet the desires of M. Rouvier but is greatly upset at the nomination to conduct the negotiations of the ex-Governor General of Algeria, M. Revoil, who it is alleged was removed by Mr. Combes because Mr. Combes feared his warlike policy. Moreover it is earnestly requested that the Morocco conference meet in Morocco. Please treat this telegram of mine as entirely confidential and informal. If you desire you can see M. Rouvier about it and then let me know with entire frankness whether you desire me to transmit any protests or suggestions made to me or whether you prefer that I should not do so. Rest assured that I shall absolutely understand your decision either way and will act on your suggestion. And now my dear friend for Heaven's sake do not have the least apprehension of hurting my feelings. All I wish is to do what you deem wisest and safest. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*s e. Jusseran Jean Adtien Antoine Jules Aug. 24. 1905*]J[*Copy, extract [Pres., L. B. 26, p.0493]*] Confidential. Oyster Bay, N.Y. July 24 1906. Dear Cecil: I have received your letter and was of course much intersted in it. Will you give my regards to Lord Lansdowne, and tell him I have appreciated his references to me in his recent speech? Let me ask that you take especial care not to let my letters be left around. I need not say that there is nothing that I am ashamed of in them but I have felt both because of my relations with you, and and because of my view of what the relations between the United States and Great Britain should be, that it was desirable for me to write you with extreme frankness, and if through any accident any portion of these letters get out it would inevitably cause irritation and possibly pain to, for instance both the Kaiser and the Czar, with both of whom I feel sincerely friendly and whose wishes I shall always be pleased to advance if I can do so without doing injustice to other peoples - in other words, I like the Germans and like the Russians and will beglad to help either in any way that will not for example be detrimental to say the French or the Japanese. Don't you think you go a little needlessly into heroics when you say that "claims of honour must be recognized as the first interest of nations and that honour commands England to abstain from putting any pressure whatever upon Japan, to abstain from action which may eventually entail severe sacrifices on Englands part?" When I speak of bringing pressure to bear on Japan I mean just such pressure as Emperor William and the French Government have sought to bring to bear upon the Czar. It either is or ought to be unnecessary for me to state that I should put the honourable carrying out of plighted faith as above all other considerations national or personal. I most cordially approve of your position in stating that England must prevent anything like a hostile combination against Japan. As soon as this war broke out I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a combination againstagainst Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany and France did to Her in 1894, I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary on her behalf. I knew of course that your Government would act in the same way, and thought it best that I should have no consultation with your people before announcing my own purpose. But I wholly fail to understand the difference in position which makes it proper for France, the ally of Russia, to urge Russia in her own interest (that is in Russia's interest) to make peace, and which yet makes it improper for England, the ally of Japan, to urge Japan in her own interest (that is, in Japans interest) to make peace. My feeling is that it is not to Japan's real interest to spend another year of bloody and costly war in securing Eastern Siberia, which her people assure me She does not want, and then to find that She either has to keep it and get no money indemnity, or else exchange it for a money indemnity, which however large, would probably not more than pay for the extra year's expenditure and lossof life. If Japan felt that She wanted East Siberia and wanted to drive the Russians west of Lake Baikal the position would be different, and I would say that it was foolish to try for peace, but the Japanese Government have assured me most positively that this is not what they want, and that practically the only territorial cession they wish from Russia is Saghalin, to which in my judgment they are absolutely entitled. I think that Lansdowne and Balfour ought to know what however they must keep absolutely secret, namely, that I undertook this move to bring about peace negotiations only at the request in writing of Japan, made immediately after Togo s victory. Up to that time I had continually advised the Russians to make peace, on the ground that it was their interest to accept defeat rather thanto persist in turning defeat into overwhelming disaster. But I took no move toward bringing about peace negotiations until I was requested to do so by Japan, and while I purposely refused to try to find out the exact terms Japan wanted, I received their explicit assurancesthat they did not want East Siberia as a whole or the acquisition of Russian territory aside from Sagalin. I do not know what they wish about the dismantling of Vladivostock or the surrender of the various interned Russian vessels. Of course they expect to succeed to Russia's rights & possessions in Manchuria and to have Korea come within their sphere of influence. However, most of this talk as to what England ought to do is academic because I think the Japanese have probably made up their minds just about what they will accept and what they want. x x x x x x x x x Witte himself has talked like a fool since he was appointed. The only possible justification of his interviews is to be found in his hope that he may bluff the Japanese, in which he will certainly fail. The correspondent you quote says that Russia will really wish to delay and prolong the peace negotiations. This is possible but it is just as possible that she will in panic-struck fashion endeavour to hasten them. She has to my knowledge occupied both attitudeswith great intensity during the last five weeks. At one period during these five weeks the Russian Government took the view that I must not try to hurry them too much and that there was not any need of hurry, and immediately afterwards they turned a somersault and wanted an armistice and immediate action about peace and protested against the delays for which they were themselves responsible. Apparently they have cooled off again somewhat. I made an honest effort to get them an armistice, but I am forced to say that from Japan's standpoint I think that Japan was absolutely right in refusing it, and think so now more than ever after Witte's interview. It may be that there will have to be one more crushing defeat of the Russian army in Manchuria before the Russians wake up to the fact that peace is a necessity. While I most emphatically feel that it is Japan's interest to be moderate in her demands and not to insist up to the point of continuing the war upon anything which is not really vital to her interests, yet I feel even more strongly that Russia must make peace even onhard terms now, under the penalty of undergoing disaster which may almost split her Empire in sunder and which will certainly take her out of the race for leadership for half a century to come. There is one thing I am a little puzzled at, and that is why excepting on disinterested grounds The German Emperor should want Russia and Japan to make peace; he has done all he could to bring it about. Of course it may be that he fears lest a continuation of the war result in the internal break up of Russia and therefore an impetus to the German revolutionary movement. France has a very obvious motive in seeing peace made. I am not at liberty at present to tell you some funny inside experiences I had, and I regret to say am still having in connection with the Morocco business. x x x x x x Sd. Theodore Roosevelt. [*[Mr. Cecil Spring-Rice London, Eng.]*](C) Copy. TELEGRAM. WHITE HOUSE, Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 24, 1905. Baron H. Sternburg, German Ambassador. Will communicate with Jusserand, but am sure you will understand my great reluctance to interfere further America has no interest in the matter and it has only been my strong feeling for the Emperor and my anxiety for peace that have enabled me hitherto to act as the Emperor has suggested. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*25*][*Kelly, Myra [Mrs Alan MacNaughtan]*] (COPY) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 26, 1905. My dear Miss Kelly: Mrs. Roosevelt and I and most of the children know your very amusing and very pathetic accounts of East Side school children almost by heart, and I really think you must let me write and thank you for them. While I was Police Commissioner I quite often went to the Houston Street public school and was immensely interested and impressed by what I saw there. I thought there were a good many Miss Bailies there, and the work they were doing among their scholars, who were so largely Jews, was very much like what your Miss Bailey has done. If you come to Washington be sure to let me know, for both Mrs. Roosevelt and I would so like to see you. Now, a word of preaching, not to Miss Kelly but to Miss Bailey. The scrape into which Miss Bailey got by following too closely Messrs. Froebel and Pestalozzi (and these eminent men like most other human beings diluted their good work with bad work) was because of not seeing, and therefore of not telling, the plain, wholesome truth. To try to teach her pupils that there should never be any appeal to force, when they lived under conditions which meant reversion to the primitive cave man if it were not for the continually-2- exercised ability of the father of Patrick Brennan to cope with the Uncle Abys, amounted merely to the effort to give them ideals which would not work for one moment when they got outside of the school room; and I think it is an abomination to teach people ideals that will not work, because instead of understanding as they ought to that it is only false ideals which do not work, they in such cases generally jump to the conclusion that no ideals at all will work. Teach them that the wrong is not in fighting, but in fighting for a wrong cause or without full and adequate cause, and you teach them what is true and right and what they can act up to. But teach them that all fighting is wrong; that the wars of Washington and Napoleon are of the same stamp; that Lincoln and Attila are on the same ethical level; and the result is either vicious or nil. If Miss Bailey's "steady", the Doctor, would not knock down a man who had insulted her I would have a mighty poor opinion of him; but if he were brutal to the weak, or a bully, or a tyrant, I would have an even worse opinion of him. There! I suppose I have been preaching again, when I only meant to write a word of thanks and appreciation. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Miss Myra Kelly, Care of McClure's Magazine, New York, N.Y.(COPY) Personal. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 27, 1905. My dear Miss Velvin: Your letter greatly interests me, and I thank you for sending me "Wild Creatures Afield". What you write is just what I would have expected, but of course I could not be sure. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Miss Ellen Velvin, The Bailey Inn, Ridgefield, Conn. P.S. Since writing the above I have read your piece on the puma in "Wild Creatures Afield." But my dear Miss Velvin, in writing it I am sure you have been misled by reading Hudson's really absurd fables - fables which it is incomprehensible to me that any trained, scientific man could have written. What are your own personal experiences, or those that Mr. Bostock told you about, of cougars in captivity? These I regard as of great importance; but Mr. Hudson's stories are only fit for a modern Aesop, though they are very charming reading. I know pretty well about the cougar in a wild state.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 29, 1905. His Majesty, William, Emperor of Germany, Berlin. Deeply appreciate your telegram and heartily thank you for the great services you are rendering in connection with Emperor Nicholas. Have just heard from France. They insist M. Reveil has been from the first an advocate of an understanding with Germany concerning Morocco and was appointed because he knew the question fully and was very conciliatory; so that his appointment was regarded as a guarantee for an equitable and permanent settlement. They strongly object to Tangier as a bad choice, being a hotbed of intrigue, with each legation having its clientale; but evidently desire to meet your wishes, and suggest that the conference be inaugurated there but that it be continued elsewhere, as at San Sebastian in Spain or at some town in Switzerland. They do not mention the Hague, and I do not know whether this is inadvertence or whether they prefer San Sebastian or some town in Switzerland. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.Copy of letter in the President's handwriting. (Written at Oyster Bay). [*P.F.*] July 30, 1905. Dear Bridges: Will you make a correction and an insertion in the galleys I have just returned? In Chap. X, at the very end, I speak of the Elector of Saxony. I don't like coupling Tilly and Wallenstein with Gustavus Adolphus. Will you substitute for their names a sentence running about like this “would have compared better with Gustavus Adolphus in his own generation, or the Great Elector in the next generation,"? I can't be sure of the exact grammar, as I have forgotten just how the whole sentence runs. Will you add, right after this sentence, or at the end of the paragraph (before I mention Louis XVI) this sentence? “The Kings of the House of Savoy have shown that the love of hardy field sports in no way interferes with the exercise of the highest kind of governmental ability.” Here again I have to leave the exact place and wording to your discretion. Were you able to make out the additions to and insertions in I made for Chapter XI? If you are at all puzzled about either chapter pray send me out the corrected galleys to go over again. Hoping I am not troubling you too much, I am, Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. Would it not perhaps be well for me to see these two last chapters again, or at least the 11th?Outdoor pastimes of an Amer Hunter? [*Shaw L.M*] (Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 31, 1905 Personal. My dear Mr. Secretary: All right. I have written as you suggest to the Departments of Commerce and Labor, and Agriculture. I am afraid you will think I have been too free in blue-penciling your tariff speech. But while I think you are right and that the conclusion we shall come to is the one you indicate, I do not think that we are sure enough of our ground to be prepared to make the statement as completely as you do that we will "never invite increased importations of merchandise, now produced by our people, in order to increase the revenue." There are a number of Republican Senators who favor doing this very thing. I do not believe that they will be able to put their purpose into effect, but until the situation clears I do not think we had better definitively commit ourselves to it. X X X X Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. L. M. Shaw, Secretary of the Treasury.TELEGRAM. [*Sent in cipher*] [*8/1/05*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 31, 1905. Taft, Manila. Your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said. Have taken steps about Kai Kah and Wang Ta Hsieh. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official)(COPY) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 1, 1905. My dear Miss Velvin: I am greatly obliged to you. You have just given me the information I needed. I was very much puzzled by the way pumas behaved when I hunted them, for it did not seem possible that leopards or jaguars could behave in such manner and yet be the dangerous creatures they were reported. Evidently there is a real psychic difference between the cougar and other big cats, as your observations upon them in captivity show. In the wild state I personally have known young cougars, but never old cougars, to frolic and play. With great regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Miss Ellen Velvin, The Bailey Inn, Ridgefield, Conn.To Leslie M. Shaw Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 4, 1905 Personal. My dear Secretary Shaw: I think you are right about the difficulty being fundamental, but when I blue-penciled the speech I did so with that understanding. I am not prepared to say that we will lower duties to increase importations, but neither am I prepared to say that we will not. You say that harm is being done at present by my attitude, or by its construction. I think a good deal more harm would be done by prematurely taking an attitude which we may not be able to sustain. I enclose you a list of the bodies that have joined in that reciprocity meeting. Now, I think it would be an admirable thing if Congress would allow the executive department to make a difference of say twenty-five per cent. in favor of nations that treat us well as against those that do not, and of course this would mean a general lowering of all duties as regards the actions in question; so that it would do just exactly what you say ought not to be done. Senators Aldrich and Crane were two of the very men I had in mind. Both of them have spoken to me favoring a cut in duties, a-dn and have certainly spoken as if this was to be a cut which would increase importations for the purpose of increasing our revenue.To Leslie M. Shaw --- 2 I have not made up my mind and can not make up my mind until I see the leaders in Congress and find what they are going to do. But to make such a speech as that I have blue-penciled would be equivalent to announcing that I had made up my mind, and I very emphatically think it unwise to make it. When Taft was to speak before the Ohio convention he submitted me the rough draft of his speech in which he committed himself unreservedly to a big lowering of duties, exactly along the lines to which you object. I blue- penciled it. Root agrees with Taft, but I have requested him not to commit himself. Moody is inclined to agree with Taft. When there is so wide a difference among prominent members of the Cabinet I think that we must be mighty sure of our ground before we make any positive statement. I am sorry to have to take the meat out of your speech. I entirely agree with all you say as to the dangers which accompany tariff revision or any attempt at it, but as yet I am not sure whether there are not equal dangers in avoiding tariff revision. Thus both Lodge and Crane have told me that to provide for any increase of revenue without revising the tariff would in their judgment make Massachusetts democratic together with Rhode Island and Connecticut. They may be all wrong, and I hope they are; but I want to go over the entire matter very carefully with all of the Congressional leaders beforeTo Leslie M. Shaw --- 3 we decide which set of risks to take. There is only one thing I am positive about, and that is that to issue bonds to make good a deficit would be the very worst possible thing that we could do. I would a great deal rather be defeated on the grounds that we had tried to revise the tariff than for issuing bonds to make good a deficit. We never ought to have taken off all the war taxes. But Hanna, Aldrich and the others were resolute about it. McKinley had committed himself to it. It may be that a reimposition of fifty cents instead of a dollar on the beer business will enable us to raise enough revenue; but of course in such case we have to count just how much dissatisfaction will be felt among those who think the tariff ought to be revised and how much the Germans, that is, the brewers, will resent our action. The whole thing is a matter of expediency, not a matter of principle, for there is not the slightest moral difference as among the different rates of duty or as comparing the tariff and internal revenue as means far raising taxes. Therefore it seems to me peculiarly desirable that before definitely committing ourselves on something which may make or mar the republican part (and especially as in the temper of the public mind it may be that whichever way we decide we shall be very roughly criticized} we should go over the matter with extreme care and come to a definite agreement with the leaders in Congress. Sincerely yours, Hon. L. M. Shaw Secretary of the Treasury Washington, D. C. To Leslie M. Shaw --- 4 P. S. Since writing the above I have received Miss Wilson's note. I guess these remarks will have to go. I have not the heart to suggest any change! But I am not prepared to say definitely that Congress will not have to provide for an increased revenue by the tariff on increased importations. Neither am I prepared to say that it will do so. My attitude at present is merely that I do not wish to commit myself one way or the other until I find what action is necessary from the standpoint of our revenues and our industry and what form of this action is feasible, having in view the feelings of the majority. Good luck![*Shaw, L.M*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 4, 1905. Personal. My dear Secretary Shaw: I think you are right about the difficulty being fundamental, but when I blue-penciled the speech I did so with that understanding. I am not prepared to say that we will lower duties to increase importations, but neither am I prepared to say that we will not. You say that harm is being done at present by my attitude, or by its construction. I think a good deal more [error] harm would be done by prematurely taking an attitude which we may not be able to sustain. I enclose you a list of the bodies that have joined in that reciprocity meeting. Now, I think it would be an admirable thing if Congress would allow the executive department to make a difference of say twenty-five per cent. in favor of nations that treat us well as against those that do not, and of course this would mean a general lowering of all duties as regards the nations in question; so that it would do just exactly what you say ought not to be done. Senators Aldrich and Crane were two of the very men I had in mind. Both of them have spoken to me favoring a cut in duties, and have certainly spoken as if this was to be a cut which would increase importations for the purpose of increasing our revenue.-2- I have not made up my mind and can not make up my mind until I see the leaders in Congress and find what they are going to do. But to make such a speech as that I have blue-penciled would be equivalent to announcing that I had made up my mind, and I very emphatically think it unwise to make it. When Taft was to speak before the Ohio convention he submitted me the rough draft of his speech in which he committed himself unreservedly to a big lowering of duties, exactly along the lines to which you object. I blue-penciled it. Root agrees with Taft, but I have requested him not to commit himself. Moody is inclined to agree with Taft. When there is so wide a difference among prominent members of the Cabinet I think that we must be mighty sure of our ground before we make any positive statement. I am sorry to have to take the meat out of your speech. I entirely agree with all you say as to the dangers which accompany tariff revision or any attempt at it, but as yet I am not sure whether there are not at least equal dangers in avoiding tariff revision. Thus both Lodge and Crane have told me that to provide for any increase of revenue without revising the tariff would in their judgment make Massachusetts democratic together with Rhode Island and Connecticut. They may be all wrong, and I hope they are; but I want to go over the entire matter very carefully with all of the Congressional leaders before -3- we decide which set of risks to take. There is only one thing I am positive about, and that is that to issue bonds to make good a deficit would be the very worst possible thing that we could do. I would a great deal rather be defeated on the ground that we had tried to revise the tariff than for issuing bonds to make good a deficit. We never ought to have taken off all the war taxes. But Hanna, Aldrich and the others were resolute about it; and McKinley had committed himself to it. It may be that a reimposition of fifty cents instead of a dollar on the beer business will enable us to raise enough revenue; but of course in such case we have to count just how much dissatisfaction will be felt among those who think the tariff ought to be revised and how much the Germans, that is, the brewers, will resent our action, The whole thing is a matter of expediency, not a matter of principle, for there is not the slightest moral difference as among the different rates of duty or in comparing the tariff and internal revenue as means for raising taxes. Therefore it seems to me peculiarly desirable that before definitely committing ourselves on something which may make or mar the republican party (and especially as in the temper of the public mind it may be that whichever way we decide we shall be very roughly criticised) we should go over the matter with extreme care and come to a definite agreement with the leaders in Congress. Sincerely yours, Hon, L. M. Shaw, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D.C. Enclosure. [*over*] -4- P.S. Since writing the above I have received Miss Wilson's note. I guess those remarks will have to go. I have not the heart to suggest any change! But I am not prepared to say definitely that Congress will not have to provide for an increased revenue by the tariff on increased importations. Neither am I prepared to say that it will do so. My attitude at present is merely that I do not wish to commit myself one way or the other until I find what action is necessary from the standpoint of our revenues and our industry and what form of this action is feasible, having in view the feelings of the majority. Good luck!(COPY) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Personal. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 4, 1905. My dear Miss Velvin: You must not use any of my letter in which I spoke of Mr. Hudson, because that of course was purely personal. But you are welcome to use all of the last letter. I think you had better not use any of the first letter at all, and certainly no more than just the opening sentence or two, but nothing with any reference to Mr. Hudson, either direct or indirect. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Miss Ellen Velvin, The Bailey Inn, Ridgefield, Conn.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 7, 1905. Gentlemen: I have been informed that a picture of the President is being displayed in certain places in Chicago for the purpose of advertising a product of yours, and write to say that the use of the President's name or picture in any form of advertisement is very objectionable [and never authorized.] I trust on thus calling your attention to the matter that you will at once take steps to have the picture withdrawn and its further use discontinued. Please advise me if this will be done. Very truly yours, Acting Secretary to the President. The Re Leaf Company, Pittsburg, Pa.[ca. 8-7-05] [[shorthand]][*[Enc. in largest 8-7-05]*][[shorthand]] [8-8-05]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 9, 1905. My dear President Wilson: Indeed I accept with the greatest pleasure your kind invitation for lunch on the day of the West Point-Annapolis game. Pray thank Mrs. Wilson. I shall look forward to seeing you. Sincerely yours, Woodrow Wilson, LL.D., "Boxwood", Lyme, Connecticut8-18-05 26 [[shorthand]](2) [[shorthand]](3) [[shorthand]](4) [[shorthand]](5) [[shorthand]][attached to Riis 8-18-05][attached to Bacon 8-18-05] [[shorthand]]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [[shorthand]] Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 18, 1905. My dear Sir: [*[Bacon]*] Your letter has been received by the President and will be carefully considered by him. It is, however, in the President's opinion of absolutely no consequence as regards rate legislation whether the Congress begins work on November 10th or December 2d, except that it would certainly be much worse to call it in case the members of Congress were averse to its being called, as this would interfere with securing proper legislation. The President desires that you do not make this letter public, but he wishes very strongly to point out to you that it is not merely unwise but foolish to take an entirely unimportant point, such as whether Congress meets on November 10th or early in December, and insist upon it if influential Senators and Congressmen, such as for instance Speaker Cannon, are entirely against it. One of the difficulties in securing rate legislation has been the tendency of its advocates to spend their energies on unimportant points instead of concentrating on those that are important. [[shorthand]] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 18, 1905. My dear Sir: Your communication of the 15th instant has been received, and will be called to the attention of the President. Very truly yours, B. F. Barnes Acting Secretary to the President. Mr. Edward P. Bacon, Chairman, Milwaukee, Wis. [[shorthand]][*27-284*] COPY. Personal. [*cr*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 21, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: I was delighted with your letter. I shall send Choate as our representative to the Morocco Conference because I want some man with whom I can talk in closest confidence, and who really amounts to something. I was pleased that he accepted. I have only time to write you a line now to say that as soon as Madame Jusserand and you return and are able to make the trip we shall put the Sylph at your disposal and get you to come out here to lunch. I have just sent you a cable about the peace matters. Dealing with senators is at times excellent training for the temper, but upon my word dealing with these peace envoys has been an even tougher job. To be polite and sympathetic and patient in explaining for the hundredth time something perfectly obvious, when what I really want to do is to give utterance to whoops of rage and jump up and knock their heads together--well, all I can hope is that the self-repression will be ultimately helpful for my character. When they drive me too nearly mad I take refuge in Maspero and study the treaty between Rameses II and the Hittites, comparing it with Remeses' preposterous boastings over his previous victories, and feel that after all we are not so far behind the people who lived a few thousand years ago as I am sometimes tempted to think. Always yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. J. J. Jusserand, 44 Rue Hamelin, Paris, France. Copy TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 21, 1905. [*CH Pease*] Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg. Please see His Majesty personally immediately and deliver following message from me: I earnestly ask Your Majesty to believe that in what I am about to say and to advise I speak as the earnest well-wisher of Russia and give you the advice I should give were I a Russian patriot and statesman. The Japanese have as I understand it abandoned their demands for the interned ships and the limitation of the Russian naval power in the Pacific, which conditions I felt were improper for Russia to yield to. Moreover I find to my surprise and pleasure that the Japanese are willing to restore the northern half of Saghalin to Russia, Russia of course in such case to pay a substantial sum for the surrender of territory by the Japanese and for the return of Russian prisoners. It seems to me that if peace can be obtained substantially on these terms it will be both just and honorable, and that it would be a dreadful calamity to have the war continued when peace can be thus obtained. Of the twelve points which the plenipotentiaries have been discussing, on eight they have come to a substantial agreement. Two which were offensive to Russia the Japanese will, as I understand it, withdraw. The remaining two can be met by an agreement in principle that the Japanese shall restore or retrocede to2 Russia the northern half of Saghalin, while Russia of course pays an adequate sum for this retrocession and for the Russian prisoners. If this agreement can be made the question as to the exact amount can be a subject of negotiation. Let me repeat how earnestly I feel that it is for Russia's interest to conclude peace on substantially these terms. No one can foretell the result of the continuance of the war and I have no doubt that it is to Japan's advantage to conclude peace. But in my judgment it is infinitely more to the advantage of Russia. If peace is not made now and war is continued it may well be that, though the financial strain upon Japan would be severe, yet in the end Russia would be shorn of those east Siberian provinces which have been won for her by the heroism of her sons during the last three centuries. The proposed peace leaves the ancient Russian boundaries absolutely intact. The only change in territory will be that Japan will get that part of Saghalin which was hers up to thirty years ago. As Saghalin is an island it is, humanly speaking, impossible that the Russians should reconquer it in view of the disaster to their navy; and to keep the northern half of it is a guarantee for the security of Vladivostok and eastern Siberia for Russia. It seems to me that every consideration of national self interest, of military expediency and of broad humanity makes it eminently wise and right for Russia to conclude peace substantially along these lines, and it is my hope and prayer that Your Majesty may take this view. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 8-21-05 WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [[shorthand]]Copy Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 22, 1905. My dear Baron Kaneko: I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: "It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blame her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get money she will not get the money and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her case for indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin, and that she wants to keep." I think your government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Saghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by Japan as what she wants- that is, six hundred millions - should be asked or could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect, but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of the indemnity. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of the civilized world will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you will find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining East Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense amount of blood, and though you would have obtained East Siberia, you would have obtained something which you do not want, and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly[*[8.22.05]*] 2 could not give you enough money to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judgment, speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home government, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. My dear Baron Kaneko: In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor's envoys, let me add this. It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons; I, self interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty. Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it, but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion. 1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea and Manchuria; she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad; she has Saghalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations. 2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her [*[8-22-05]*] 3. show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. With profound regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[ca 8-22-05] [[shorthand]][[shorthand]][ attached to Hagard 8-22-05](COPY) TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. Howard Thompson, Hotel Wentworth, Plymouth, New Hampshire. Have received your telegram, but fail to understand why it was sent, as no question [was] has been raised by this office to which it applies in any way. B. F. Barnes, Acting Secretary to the President.[*Copy*] [*Peace File*] [*British*] Confidential. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. My dear Mr. Ambassador: In my judgment every true friend of Japan should tell it as I have already told it, that the opinion of the civilized world will not support it in continuing the war merely for the purpose of extorting money from Russia. Of the twelve points submitted by Japan to Russia their plenipotentiaries have in substance agreed about eight. Two others, which were on their face foolish, have been abandoned by the Japanese. There remain the questions of Saghalin and the indemnity. Saghalin is now practically Japanese and the Japanese would be entirely right in continuing the war of Russia refused to give it up, for this would amount simply to a foolish attempt by Russia to reconquer it. But inasmuch as Japan wishes to hold everything she has taken it is difficult to see what possible claim she has for a heavy indemnity. She announces that she does not wish east Siberia, apparently for the reason that it would be a white elephant on her hands. Yet if she continues the war all she can possibly get is east Siberia, and this after an expenditure which will probably amount to at least five or six hundred millions of dollars together with countless lives, with undoubted national exhaustion and with the feeling of the civilized world turning against her; not to speak of the possibility of reverses, which, though in my judgment not great, must yet be taken into account. It seems to -2- me that the greatest act of friendship which the friends of Japan can at this time show her is to do as I have already done, and urge her in her own interest not to follow a course which might do her great damage, and can do her no real benefit. If the Russians persist in refusing reasonable terms and make it evident to the world that the war is continued because of their own blind obstinancy and stupidity, then Japan will not be hurt but on the contrary will have general sympathy and will have to do the best that she can. But if Japan shows to the world that she is fighting simply to get money I think the effect will be bad upon her in every way, and that, moreover, there is a fair chance that in the end she will find she has lost more money, instead of getting any. I wish your people could get my views. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir Henry M. Durand, British Ambassador, Lenox, Massachusetts. TELEGRAM. Copy [*CF Peace*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 23, 1905. Myer, St. Petersburg. Make clear to his Majesty that if my suggestion is adopted then the whole question of what reasonable amount is to be paid for the retrocession of northern Saghalin and for the return of the Russian prisoners will remain a subject for further negotiations, so that the acceptance in principle of the terms I have suggested would not commit the Russian Government to any particular sum of money and above all would not in any way commit Russia to pay any amount which would be exorbitant or humiliating. Please send this supplementary cable to His Majesty at once and further explain that I of course cannot be sure Japan will act on my suggestions, but that I know she ought to, and that if Russia accedes to them I shall try my best to get Japan to accede to them also. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.Confidential [*Peace*] WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 23, 1905. My dear Boies: Thank you for showing me that editorial. The paragraph beginning about the compromise seems to me to state the case in a nutshell. In strict confidence I will tell you that I have written very strongly to both sides as to their impossible positions, and have communicated with the French, German and English governments hoping that the two former will use their influence with Russia and the latter with Japan. Of the twelve points the envoys have agreed on eight. Two the Japanese have consented to abandon. There remains the question of the indemnity with the cession of Saghalin. In my judgment, inasmuch as Japan has Saghalin it is nonsense for Russia to refuse to acknowledge this fact. On the other hand, as I have told the Japanese, I do not believe that the opinion of the civilized world will sustain them in continuing the war for the purpose of getting money; and all the more so as such a course would be a wild absurdity as they would be certain to spend more money than they could get. They cling very tenaciously to the hope of getting money, partly because of their experience with China and the great benefit accruing to them from the money they thus obtained, partly in view of the huge indemnity Germany took from France. I have pointed out that neither precedent really has application here. Germany took2 the indemnity because half of the French territory was in her hands and the unfortunate French had to redeem it. But Japan practically holds everything she has taken and there is no equivalent she can return to Russia in lieu of the great indemnity she asks. She does not want Eastern Siberia and thinks, probably rightly, that it would be a white elephant on her hands. If she continues the war for another year she will probably have spent four or five hundred million dollars, and have obtained just exactly this white elephant. This is not taking into account the possibility of any reverse, and such a possibility must always be faced in a war of this character. Therefore she would find herself, at the best, saddled with half a billion dollars of debt extra, which Russia would be wholly unable to pay, and with a territory which she does not want. I think it mere folly for her to refuse to face these facts. She should receive something substantial for the hundred thousand Russian prisoners. If she is willing to restrocede the northern half - the old Russian half - of Saghalin to Russia, she should receive something substantial in return for this. But I do not believe that she should fight for more than the amount contained in these two sums. On the other hand it is mere blind, brutal folly for the Russians to persist in the war with the strong probability that they will ultimately lose Vladivostok, if they can now make peace even at the cost of the surrender of Saghalin, which they have already lost, and of paying some reasonable sum on the lines I have indicated. Sincerely yours, Mr. William J. Boies, The Evening Post, New York.[*27-311*] Copy. [*CB*] Confidential. WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. My dear White: I was glad to get your letter and the interesting one from your boy. James had been telling me about the Fox matter. I shall end Choate to that conference. I want to keep on good terms with Germany, and if possible to prevent a rupture between Germany and France. But my sympathies have at bottom been with France and I suppose will continue to. Still I shall try to hold an even keel. I am in the last throes of trying to get the Russians and Japanese to make peace. The Russians are the worst, because they stand up with Chinese or Byzantine folly and insist, as Witte has just written me, that Russia will not admit itself vanquished - making it all I can do not to tell them some straightforward truths in uncomplimentary language. On the other hand, the Japanese have no business to continue the war merely for the sake of getting money and they will defeat their own ends if they do so. The English Government has been foolishly reluctant to advise Japan to be reasonable, and in this respect has not shown well compared to the attitude of the German and French Governments in being willing to advise Russia. I have not much hope of a favorable result, but I will do what I can. Tell Jack that was an interesting letter of his. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Henry White, The American Ambassador, Rome, Italy.TELEGRAM. (copy) White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., August 25, 1905. Ambassador Meyer, St. Petersburg, Russia. Please tell His Majesty that I dislike intruding my advice on him again, but for fear of misapprehension I venture again to have these statements mede to him. I of course would not have him act against his conscience, but I earnestly hope his conscience will guide him so as to prevent the continuance of a war when this continuance may involve Russia in a greater calamity than has ever befallen it since it first rose to power in both Europe and Asia. I see it publicly announced to-day by Count Damadorff that Russia will neither pay money nor surrender territory. I beg His Majesty to consider that such an announcement means absolutely nothing when Saghalin is already in the hands of the Japanese. If on such a theory the war is persevered in no one can foretell the result, but the military representatives of the Powers most friendly to Russia assure me that the continuance of the war will probably mean the loss not merely of Saghalin but of eastern Siberia, and if after a year of struggle this proves true then any peace which came could only come or terms which would indicate a real calamity. Most certainly I think it will be a bad thing for Japan to go on with the war, -2- but I think it will be a far worse thing for Russia. There is now a fair chance of getting peace on honorable terms, and it seems to me that it will be a dreadful thing for Russia and for all the civilized world if the chance is thrown away. My advices are that the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth have come to a substantial agreement on every point except the money question and the question of Saghalin. Let it now be announced that as regards these two points peace shall be made on the basis of the retrocession of the northern half of Saghalin to Russia on payment of a sum of redemption money by Russia, the amount of this redemption money and the amount to be paid for the Russian prisoners to be settled by further negotiations. This does not commit the Russian Government as to what sum shall be paid, leaving it open to further negotiation[s]. If it is impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an agreement on this sum they might possibly call in the advice of say some high French or German official appointed by or with the consent of Russia and some English official appointed by or with the consent of Japan and have these men then report to the negotiators their advice, which might or might not be binding upon the negotiators. This it seems to me would be an entirely honorable way of settling the difficulty. I cannot of course guarantee that Japan will agree to this proposal, but if His Majesty agrees to it I will endeavor to get the Japanese Government to do so likewise. I earnestly hope that this cable of mine can receive His Majesty's attention before the envoys meet to-morrow, and I cannot too strongly say that I –3– feel that peace now may prevent untold calamities in the future. Let me repeat that in this proposal I suggest that neither Russia nor Japan do anything but face accomplished facts and that I do not specify or attempt to specify what amount should be paid, leaving the whole question of the amount to be paid as redemption money for the northern half of Saghalin to be settled by further negotiation. I fear that if these terms are rejected it may be possible that Japan will give up any idea of making peace or of ever getting money and that she will decide to take and keep Vladivostok and Harbin and the whole Manchurian railway and this of course would mean that she would take east Siberia. Such a loss to Russia would in my judgment be a disaster of portentous size, and I earnestly desire to save Russia from such a risk. If peace is made on the terms I have mentioned Russia is left at the end of this war substantially unharmed, the national honor and interest saved, and the results of what Russians have done in Asia since the days of Ivan the Terrible unimpaired. But if peace is now rejected and if Japan decides that she will give up any idea of obtaining any redemption money or any other sum no matter how small the military situation is such that there is at least a good chance and in the estimate of most outside observers a strong probability that though Japan will have to make heavy sacrifices she will yet take Harbin, Vladivostok and east Siberia, and if this is once done the probabilities are overwhelming that she could never be dislodged. I cannot–4– too strongly state my conviction that while peace in accordance with the suggestions above outlined is earnestly to be desired from the standpoint of the whole world and from the standpoints of both contestants, yet that far above all it is chiefly to Russia's interest and perhaps to her vital interest that it should come in this way and at this time. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Copy TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 25, 1905. Meyer, St. Petersburg. My second cable cable was forwarded after the arrival of your first. Japan has now on deposit in United States about fifty million dollars of the last war loan. I do not know whether she has more. Please tell His Majesty that I dislike intruding any advice on him again, but for fear of misapprehension I venture again to have these statements made to him. I of course would not have him act against his conscience, but I earnestly hope his conscience will guide him so as to prevent the continuance of a war when this continuance may involve Russia in a greater calamity than has ever befallen it since it first rose to power in both Europe and Asia. I see it publicly announced to-day by Count Lamsdorff that Russia will neither pay money nor surrender territory. I beg His Majesty to consider that such an announcement means absolutely nothing when Saghalin is already in the hands of the Japanese. If on such a theory the war is persevered in no one can foretell the result, but the military representatives of the Powers most friendly to Russia assure me that the continuance of the war will probably mean the loss not merely of Saghalin but of eastern Siberia, and if after a year of struggle this proves true then any peace which came could only come on terms which would indicate a real calamity. Most certainly I think it will be a bad thing for Japan to go on with the war, but I think it will be a far worse thing for Russia. There is now a fair chance of getting peace on honorable 2 terms, and it seems to me that it will be a dreadful thing for Russia and for all the civilized world if the chance is thrown away. My advices are that the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth have come to a substantial agreement on every point except the money question and the question of Saghalin. Let it now be announced that as regards these two points peace shall be made on the basis of the retrocession of the northern half of Saghalin to Russia on payment of a sum of redemption money by Russia, the amount of this redemption money and the amount to be paid for the Russian prisoners to be settled by further negotiations. This does not commit the Russian Government as to what sum shall be paid, leaving it open to further negotiation. If it is impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an agreement on this sum they might possibly call in the advice of say some high French or German official appointed by or with the consent of Japan and have these men then report to the negotiators their advice, which might or might not be binding upon the negotiators. This it seems to me would be an entirely honorable way of settling the difficulty. I cannot of course guarantee that Japan will agree to this proposal, but if His Majesty agrees to it I will endeavor to get the Japanese Government to do so likewise. I earnestly hope that this cable of mine can receive His Majesty's attention before the envoys meet tomorrow, and I cannot too strongly say that I feel that peace now may prevent untold calamities in the future. Let me repeat that in this proposal I suggest that neither Russia nor Japan do anything but face accomplished facts and that I do not specify or attempt to specify what amount should be paid, leaving the whole question of the amount to be 3 paid as redemption money for the northern half of Saghalin to be settled by further negotiation. I fear that if these terms are rejected it may be possible that Japan will give up any idea of making peace or of ever getting money and that she will decide to take and keep Vladivostok and Harbin and the whole Manchurian railway and this of course would mean that she would take East Siberia. Such a loss to Russia would in my judgment be a disaster of portentous size, and I earnestly desire to save Russia from such a risk. If peace is made on the terms I have mentioned Russia is left at the end of this war substantially unharmed, the national honor and interest saved, and the result of what Russians have done in Asia since the days of Ivan the Terrible unimpaired. But if peace is now rejected and if Japan decides that she will give up any idea of obtaining any redemption money or any other sum no matter how small the military situation is such that there is at least a good chance and in the estimate of most outside observers a strong probability that though Japan will have to make heavy sacrifices she will yet take Harbin, Vladivostok and east Siberia, and if this is once done the probabilities are overwhelming that she could never be dislodged. I cannot too strongly state my conviction that while peace in accordance with the suggestions above outlined is earnestly to be desired from the standpoint of the whole world and the standpoints of both combatants, yet that far above all it is chiefly to Russia's interest and perhaps to her vital interest that it should come in this way and at this time. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. TELEGRAM. [*Peace*] [*Rush*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 26, 1905. Hon. Herbert H. D. Peirce, Third Assistant Secretary of State, Portsmouth, N.H. See Witte at once from me and put Mr. Maurice Low's statement before him, asking him if Mr. Low speaks with authority. Say if he authorizes this I shall do my best to get Komura to agree to a limit between two and three hundred millions and believe I can do so. Let there be no delay about this. It may be vitally important. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[*Roosevelt, Theo.*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 27, 1905. My dear Baron Bussche: The President asks that you be good enough to send by cable to His Majesty the Emperor the enclosed message. Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Baron H. Bussche, Charge d'Affaires, German Embassy, Lenox, Massachusetts. Enclosure.Aug 27th 1905 Mr. Bussche, Please cable His Majesty the Emperor from me as follows. Theodore Roosevelt [*Sent through Mr. Melville Stone 8-27-1905*][8-27-05] Your Majesty Peace can be obtained on the following terms. Russia to pay no indemnity whatever [and the only] and to receive back north half of Sagalhin for which it is to pay to Japan whatever amount a mixed commission may determine. This is my proposition to which [I believe Japan] the Japanese have [reluctantly] assented reluctantly and only under strong pressure from me. The plan is for2 each of the contending parties to name an equal number of members of the commission and for them themselves to name the odd member. The Japanese assert that Witte has in principle agreed that Russia should pay something to get back the north half of Saghelin and indeed he intimated to me that they might buy it back at a reasonable figure, something3 on the scale of that for which Alaska was sold to the United States. These terms which strike me as extremely moderate I have not presented in this form to the Russian Emperor. I feel that you have more influence with him that either I or any one else can have. As the situation is exceedingly strained and the relations between the plans' potentiaries critical to a degree, immediate action 4 is necessary. Can you not take the initiative by presenting these terms at once to him. [If you succeed] Your success in the matter will make the entire civilized world your debtor. This proposition virtually relegates all the unsettled issues of the war to the arbitration of a mixed commission as outlined above and I am unable to see how Russia can refuse your request if in 5 your wisdom you see fit to make it. Theodore Roosevelt.Add to this as follows, P.S. I have recently sent three cables to the Czar, as follows, each being read to and approved by Baron Kaneko before it was sent. [Insert the three cables to Meyer] The Czar has answered each by declining my suggestion, and asserting that he would neither cede any territory nor pay any indemnity under no matter what form. TELEGRAM. [*Peace*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 27, 1905. Hon. Herbert H. D. Peirce, Third Assistant Secretary of State, Hotel Wentworth, Newcastle, New Hampshire. Did you make absolutely clear to Witte that you were merely repeating what Maurice Low said was Witte's proposal, and would only have repeated it because we did not feel at liberty to refuse to take notice of so direct a statement? You had better inform Low that Witte flatly repudiated the alleged statement. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official)Confidential. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 28, 1905. Dear Baron Bussche: As Mr. Stone informs me that Mr. Takahira states that Baron Kaneko was not authorized to state that the Japanese would abide by the result of the arbitral commission suggested, I of course withdraw the message which I asked you kindly to cable his Majesty. You are welcome to inform His Majesty what steps I had proposed to take. Sincerely yours, Baron H. Bussche, Charge d'Affaires, German Embassy, Lenox, Mass.Confidential. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 28, 1905. My dear Baron Komura: I have had as you know a number of interviews with Baron Kaneko since your arrival in this country. These have always been held at his request and on the assumption that he was acting for you, this having been my understanding of what you said in our conversation when you were out here at my house and when the matter of keeping me informed of what was being done at Portsmouth arose. Moreover, he has frequently transmitted to me copies of your telegrams, evidently written to be thus shown me. For instance, such telegrams of yours were enclosed in his notes sent to me yesterday and the day before yesterday, August 26th and 27th. I have therefore assumed that I could safely accept whatever he told me as being warranted by his understanding with you. To my astonishment a telegram was received by the Associated Press from Portsmouth last night, purporting to contain statements from Minister Takahira to the effect that Baron Kaneko was not authorized to see me, and containing, at least by implication, an expression of surprise that I should have treated me as having any authorization. The manager of the Associated Press refused to allow this dispatch to go out, and I take it for granted that it was false and that Mr. Takahira had given utterance to no such expression. But in view of its receipt I retracted -2- a cable I had prepared to send His Majesty the German Emperor if Baron Kaneko approved, this cable having been prepared by men after consultation with Mr. Stone, who had himself seen Baron Kaneko as well as Baron Bussche of the German Embassy, and understood it was along the line you desired. It runs as follows: "Peace can be obtained on the following terms: Russia to pay no indemnity whatever and to receive back north half of Saghalin for which it is to pay Japan whatever amount a mixed commission may determine. This is my proposition to which the Japanese have assented reluctantly and only under strong pressure from me. The plan is for each of the contending parties to name an equal number of members of the commission and for themselves to name an odd number. The Japanese assert that Witte has in principle agreed that Russia should pay something to get back the north half of Saghalin and indeed he intimated to me that they might buy it back at a reasonable figure, something on the scale of that for which Alaska was sold to the United States. "These terms which strike me as extremely moderate I have not presented in this form to the Russian Emperor. I feel that you have more influence with him than either I or any one else can have. As the situation is exceedingly strained and the relations between the plenipotentiaries critical to a degree, immediate action is necessary. Can you not take the initiative by presenting these terms at once to him? Your success in the matter will make the entire civilized world -3- your debtor. This proposition virtually relegates all the unsettled issues of the war to the arbitration of a mixed commission as outlined above, and I am unable to see how Russia can refuse your request if in your wisdom you see fit to make it." At the end Baron Bussche stated to the Kaiser that if the Czar could be persuaded to come to these terms I would at once publicly give him the credit for what had been accomplished and try in every way to show that whatever of credit might attach to bringing the negotiation to a successful conclusion should come to him in the most public and emphatic manner. This was added at my suggestion, for I need not tell you, my dear Baron, that my sole purpose has been to try to bring about peace, and I am absolutely indifferent as to anything that is said about me in connection with the matter. But of course under these circumstances I shall not send the cable unless I am definitely assured by you that this cable has your approval. Moreover, in view of the statement credited to Minister Takahira, I do not feel that Baron Kaneko should communicate with me any longer unless I am assured by you that it is your desire that he should do so and that he speaks with authorization from you. Sincerely yours, Baron Jutaro Komura, Hotel Wentworth, Portsmouth, N.H. [cont](Copy) [*no enc.*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 28, 1905. My dear Mr. Peirce: By direction of the President I send you herewith important confidential communication for delivery to Baron Komura. Will you please secure his reply at the earliest possible moment and transmit it to the President by wire in our cipher? Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Hon. Herbert H. D. Peirce, Third Assistant Secretary of State, Hotel Wentworth, Portsmouth, N.H.(Copy) [*no enc*] Confidential. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. August 28, 1905. My dear Mr. Stone: The President requests me to send you, for your confidential information, the accompanying copy of a letter he has just written to Baron Komura, in regard to Baron Kaneko. Very truly yours, WM. LOEB, JR., Secretary to the President. Mr. Melville E. Stone, Manager, Associated Press, 195 Broadway, New York, N.Y. Enclosure.[ca 8-28-05] T. Meyer Ap Peace [[shorthand]]Confidential WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [*cr Peace*] [*Stet*] Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 29, 1905. [My dear Baron Bussche: The President would like you to cable Baron Sternburg the following two letters which he sent to the Japanese Government, for the President is very appreciative of all that His Majesty the Emperor has done in this matter and desires that he should know the communications the President sent to the Japanese Government, as he already knows what the President sent to the Czar. The two letters are as follows:] "Oyster Bay, N. Y., "August 22, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: [xxxx xxxx] "I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: " 'It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blame her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get money she will not get the money and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her case for indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin, and that she wants to keep.' 2 "I think your government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Saghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by Japan as what she wants- that is, six hundred millions- should be asked or could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect, but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of the indemnity. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of the civilized world will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you would find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining East Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense amount of blood, and though you would have obtained East Siberia, you would have obtained 3. something which you do not want, and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly could not give you enough money to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judgment, speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home government, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: "In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor's envoys, let me add this. "It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons; 1, self interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty.4 Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it; but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion. "1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea and Manchuria; she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad; she has Saghalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations. "2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. "With profound regard, sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. [*Stet*] [Baron H. Bussche, Charge d'Affaires, German Embassy, Lenox, Massachusetts.]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 29, 1905. My dear Mr. Desportes: The President would like to have you cable to Ambassador Jusserand, for the French Government, copies of the following two letters, which he sent the Japanese Government. The President is very grateful to the French Government for what it has done, and wishes it to know what steps he took with the Japanese Government. The two letters are as follows: "Oyster Bay, N.Y., "August 22, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: ["Thank you for these newspapers and letters. I am so glad that the Baroness and her daughters met my daughter.] "I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: " 'It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blame her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get mo she will not get the money, and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her ease for indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin, and that she wants to keep."2 "I think your government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Saghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by [?] as what she wants - that is, six hundred millions - should be asked or could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect, but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of [?nity]. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of the civilized world will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you would find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining East Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense amount of blood, and though you would have obtained East Siberia, you would have obtained3 something which you do not want, and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly could not give you enough money to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judgment, speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. ["I have not yet heard from the cable I sent yesterday, but am expecting to hear this evening or to-morrow. I sent copies of it to the German and French Governments, asking their cooperation in getting the Russian government to accede to the proposition.] "This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home government, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "Oyster Bay, N.Y. "August 23, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: "In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor's envoys, let me add this. "It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons; 1, self interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty.4 Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it; but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion. "1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea and Manchuria; She has doubled her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad; she has Saghalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations. "2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. "With profound regard, sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Mr. Desportes de la Fosse, [Counselor of] Charge D'Affaires, French Embassy, Newport, R.I. Confidential. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. August 29, 1905. Dear Mr. Ambassador: I send you copies of three cables I sent the Czar, and two letters I sent Baron Kaneko for transmittal to the Japanese Government. I do not want these generally shown unless I give permission, but I shall be delighted to have the King, Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne know them and perhaps you had better cable to them the two letters I sent to the Japanese Government. The cables run as follows: . "Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 21, 1905. “Meyer, American Ambassador, St. Petersburg. "Please see His Majesty personally immediately and deliver following message from me: "I earnestly ask Your Majesty to believe that in what I am about to say and to advise I speak as the earnest well-wisher of Russia and give you the advice I should give were I a Russian patriot and statesman. The Japanese have as I understand it abandoned their demands for the interned ships and the limitation of the Russian naval power in the Pacific, which conditions I felt were improper for Russia to yield to. Moreover I find to my surprise and pleasure that the Japanese are willing to restore the northern half of Saghalin to Russia, Russia of course in such case to pay a substantial sum for the surrender of territory by the Japanese and for the return of Russian prisoners. It seems to me that if peace can be obtained substantially on these terms it will be both just and honorable, and that it would be a dreadful calamity to have the war continued when peace can be thus obtained. Of the twelve points which the plenipotentiaries have been discussing, on eight they have come to a substantial agreement. Two which were offensive to Russia the Japanese will, as I understand it, withdraw. The remaining two can be met by an agreement in principle that the Japanese shall restore or retrocede to Russia the northern half of Saghalin, while Russia of course pays an adequate sum for this retrocession and for the Russian prisoners. If this agreement can be made the question as to the exact amount can be a subject of negotiation. Let me repeat how earnestly I feel that it is for Russia's interest to conclude peace on substantially these terms. No one can foretell the result of the continuance of the war2. and I have no doubt that it is to Japan's advantage to conclude peace. But in my judgment it is infinitely more to the advantage of Russia. If peace is not made now and war is continued it may well be that, though the financial strain upon Japan would be severe, yet in the end Russia would be shorn of those east Siberian provinces which have been won for her by the heroism of her sons during the last three centuries. The proposed peace leaves the ancient Russian boundaries absolutely intact. The only change in territory will be that Japan will get that part of Saghalim which was hers up to thirty years ago. As Saghalin is an island it is, humanly speaking, impossible that the Russians should reconquer it in view of the disaster to their navy; and to keep the northern half of it is a guarantee for the security of Vladivostok and eastern Siberia for Russia. It seems to me that every consideration of national self interest, of military expediency and of broad humanity makes it eminently wise and right for Russia to conclude peace substantially along these lines, and it is my hope and prayer that Your Majesty may take this view." THEODORE ROOSEVELT.” “Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. "Myer,’ St. Petersburg. “Make clear to His Majesty that if my suggestion is adopted then the whole question of what reasonable amount is to be aid for the retrocession of northern Saghalin and for the return of the Russian prisoners will remain a subject for further negotiations, so that the acceptance in principle of the terms I have suggested would not commit the Russian Government to any particular sum of money and above all would not in my way commit Russia to pay any amount which would be exorbitant or humiliating. Please send this supplementary cable to His Majesty at once and further explain that I of course cannot be sure Japan will act on my suggestions, but that I know she ought to, and that if Russia accedes to them I shall try my best to get Japan to accede to them also. THEODORE ROOSEVELT." “Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 25, 1905. “Myer, St. Petersburg. Please tell His Majesty that I dislike intruding my advice on him again, but for fear of misapprehension I venture again to have these statements made to him. I of course would not have him act against his conscience, but I earnestly hope his conscience will guide him so as to prevent the continuance of a war when this continuance may involve Russia in a greater calamity than-3- has ever befallen it since it first rose to power in both Europe and Asia. I see it publicly announced to-day by Count Lamsdorff that Russia will neither pay money nor surrender territory. I beg His Majesty to consider that such an announcement means absolutely nothing when Saghalin is already in the hands of the Japanese. If on such a theory the war is persevered in no one can foretell the result, but the military representatives of the Powers most friendly to Russia assure me that the continuance of the war will probably mean the loss not merely of Saghalin but of eastern Siberia, and if after a year of struggle this proves true then any peace which came could only come on terms which would indicate a real calamity. Most certainly I think it will be a bad thing for Japan to go on with the war, but I think it will be a far worse thing for Russia There is now a fair chance of getting peace on honorable terms, and it seems to me that it will be dreadful thing for Russia and for all the civilized world if the chance is thrown away. My advices are that the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth have come to a substantial agreement on every point except the money question and the question of Saghalin. Let it now be announced that as regards these two points peace shall be made on the basis of the retrocession of the norther half of Saghalin to Russia on payment of a sum of redemption money by Russia, the amount of this redemption money and the amount to be paid for the Russian prisoners to be settled by further negotiations. This does not commit the Russian Government he to what sum shall be paid, leaving it open to further negotiation. If it is impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an agreement on this sum they might possibly call in the advice of say some high French or German official appointed by or with the consent of Russia and some English official appointed by or with the consent of Japan and have these men then report to the negotiators. This it seems to me would be an entirely honorable way of settling the difficulty. I cannot of course guarantee that Japan will agree to this proposal, but if His majesty agrees to it I will endeavor to get the Japanese Government to do likewise. I earnestly hope that this cable of mine can receive His Majesty's attention before the envoys meet to-morrow, and I cannot too strongly say that I feel that peace now may prevent untold calamities in the future. Let me repeat that in this proposal I suggest that neither Russia nor Japan do anything but face accomplished facts and that I do not specify or attempt to specify what amount should be paid, leaving the whole question of the amount to be paid as redemption money for the northern half of Saghalin to be settled by further negotiation. I fear that if these terms are rejected it may be possible that Japan will give up any idea of making peace or of ever getting money and that she will decide to take and to keep Vladivostok and Harbin and the whole Manchurian railway and this of course would mean that she would take east Siberia. Such a loss to Russia would in my judgment be a disaster of portentous size, and I earnestly desire to save Russia from such a risk. If peace is made on the terms I have mentioned Russia is left at the end of this war substantially unharmed, the national honor and interest saved, and the results of what Russians have done in Asia since the days of Ivan the 4. Terrible unimpaired. But if peace is now rejected and if Japan decides that she will give up any idea of obtaining any redemption money or any other sum no matter how small the military situation is such that there is at least a good chance and in the estimate of most outside observers a strong probability that though Japan will have to make heavy sacrifices she will yet take Harbin, Vladivostok and east Siberia, and if this is once done the probabilities are overwhelming that she could never be dislodged. I cannot too strongly state my conviction that while peace in accordance with the suggestions above outlined is earnestly to be desired from the standpoint of the whole world and from the standpoints of both combatants, yet that far above all it is chiefly to Russia's interest and perhaps to her vital interest that it should come in this way and at this time. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.” The letters run as follows: "Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 22, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: ["Thank you for those newspapers and letters. I am so glad that the Baroness and her daughter met my daughter.] “I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: “'It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blaim her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the Island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get money she will not get the money and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her case for indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin, and that she wants to keep.' "I think your Government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Saghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by Japan as what she wants--that is, six hundred millions--should be asked or-5- could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of indemnity. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of the civilized worlfd will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you would find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining east Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense amount of blood, and though you would have obtained east Siberia, you would have obtained something which you do not want and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly could not give you enough money to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judgment, speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. "I have not yet heard from the cable I sent yesterday, but am expecting to hear this evening or to-morrow. I sent copies of it to the German and French Governments, asking their cooperation in getting the Russian Government to accede to the proposition. "This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home Government, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "Oyster Bay, N.Y., "August 23, 1905. "My dear Baron Keneko: "In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor's envoys, let me add this. "It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons: 1, self interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty. Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it; but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion. 6. "1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea and Manchuria; she has double her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalyn, the Manchurian railroad; she has Sakhalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue would probably set up more than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nation. "2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan over a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal in made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. " With profound regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT" With great regard, believe me, Sincerely yours, Sir H. M. Durand, British Ambassador, Lenox, Massechusetts. TELEGRAM. [*ackd 8/29/05*] White House, Washington. RECEIVED IN CIPHER: 4 PQ WA GI 263 Paid Govt------5:40p Portsmouth, N.H., August 29, 1905. The President: The Russian plenipotentiaries have requested me to transmit to you the following dispatch in our cipher." We have the honor to inform you that we have reached an agreement with the plenipotentiaries of Japan. To you history will award the glory of having taken the generous initiative in bringing about this conference, whose labors will now probably result in establishing a peace honorable to both sides. Witte, Rosen." Herbert H. D. Peirce. [*sent 8/29/05*] [?] Wire Peirce to transmit it this dispatch to Witte & Rosen. "I can not too strongly express my congratulations to you and to the entire civilized world upon the agreement reached between you and the plenipotentiaries of Japan and upon the [peace] fact that thereby a peace has been secured just and honorable to both sides. Theodore Roosevelt"TELEGRAM. [*Peace*] White House, Washington. To be put in cipher. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 29, 1905. Hon. H. H. D. Peirce, Third Assistant Secretary of State, Hotel Wentworth, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Tell Baron Komura that I am overjoyed at the news and that I most heartily congratulate Japan on its wisdom and magnanimity; that I do not deem it best to say anything in public at this moment for fear of causing complications, but after the treaty has been definitely signed I shall see Baron Komura and make public such statement as he approves expressing the great debt that the civilized world is under to Japan for its magnanimity in its hour of triumph. Keep this telegram absolutely secret of course. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y. August 31st 1905. My dear Senator Penrose: I thank you for your telegram of congratulation. I wish to assure you that the report you sent me about Secretary Bonaparte visiting Philadelphia is entirely without foundation. I still have under consideration with Senator Knox the matter of Leib. I most heartily wish that Leib would now resign from his office. It is evident that it is almost as difficulty for him to occupy the two positions and not make a mess of it as it would have been for Cortelyou to stay in my Cabinet while he was running the national campaign. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia.[ca 8-1905] [[shorthand]][ca 8-1905] [[shorthand]][attached to Murphy, 8-17-05][*Confidential*] Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y. September 1, 1905. Dear George: It seems to me that one of the crucial points in securing peace was what you finally did in your conversation with the Czar when you persuaded him that the southern half of Saghalin would have to be surrendered to the Japanese. Of course while I was cabling to you messages for the Czar I was also doing what I could with the Japanese Government, to whom I sent the following two letters: "Oyster Bay, N.Y., "September, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: "I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: "'It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blame her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get money she will not get the money and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her case her indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin, and that she wants to keep.' "I think your government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto2 to been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Saghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by Japan as what she wants - that is, six hundred millions - should be asked or could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect, but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of the indemnity. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of the civilized world will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you would find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining East Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense amount of blood, and though you would have obtained East Siberia, you would have obtained something which you did not want, and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly could not give you enough money to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judg3 speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. "This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home government, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 23, 1905. "My dear Baron Kaneko: In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty the Japanese Emperor's envoys, let me add this. "It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons; 1, self interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty. Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather than give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it; but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would pay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, n money, in national exhaustion. 4 "1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea and Manchuria; she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that of Russia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad; she has Saghalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations. "2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. “With profound regard, sincerely yours, “THEODORE ROOSEVELT." I am inclined to think that these two letters finally did the business. I had been telling the Japs all along that it was out of the question for them to get an indemnity of any size, and that personally I did not think they had any right to ask any indemnity at all; that it would depend purely upon the goodwill of [Japan] Russia whether they got any. I became rather doubtful whether they were telling the Mikado’s Government just what I had been saying to them, and I concluded to put it in 5 writing. Well, apparently we have carried the thing safely through, but it has not always been plain sailing. Faithfully yours, Hon. George V. L. Meyer, The American Ambassador, St. Petersburg, Russia.[*To Elihu Root*] [*[9-1-05]*] 1 My dear Mr. Secretary The Japanese Government has, as you are aware, already informally announced to our government the probability that it will be found advisable to defer the exposition [would have to be deferred] until the year 1917, the year on which will be celebrated the Fiftieth Anniversary of the accession of his Majesty [the] the Emperor; and I understand that the formal announcement will soon follow. The reasons given for deferring the Exposition are controlling, and will not only meet universal [approval] approval, but show a sound judgement which is in itself a guarantee of the success of the Exposition when it [is] is2 ultimately held. The Japanese Government find that the present date makes the time too short to permit [with] [the] time of the exposition being made what it ought to, and [shall] will be made, while the expense entailed in trying to accomplish too much in too little time would be [improperly] wastefully [great] large. Moreover there is a peculiar fitness in [asking] holding this exposition to mark the closing of [the] a half century of the reign of His Majesty the Emperor; for that half century has seen Japan stride forward to the position of a world power of the first class, with a sureness and rapidity [?]3 unexampled in all previous history. This, the first great International Exposition ever held in Asia, must be of a kind which will fully meet the requirements of [a] so great an occasion; and ample time should be taken. The people [incredibly] of the United States [regard] hold for Japan with a peculiar feeling of regard and friendship; and no other nation is more anxious than we are to help make the Exposition a success in every way. [xxxxxx] When [the] Congress reassembles, if needed [shall ask it to change the appropriation already made] any action on the part of the United States is needed to accommodate our preparation to the change in Date I [would] will bring this matter to its attention 4 [for such action among be needed if any]. The preliminary appropriation has already been made, and our commission appointed; nothing has occurred except that the date when the exposition [has] is to be held has been deferred; and this merely gives us whatever we really need a longer time in which to [make the] determine upon the scope of our plans necessary preparations [on one front] [have already appropriated until a later date themselves extended] for [and the people] the participation which Congress has already provided by law. Sincerely yours, Sept 1st.Confidential. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 2, 1905. Dear Cabot: I was very glad to get your telegram. The following are the two letters I wrote to the Japanese, which I think (although I may of course be utterly mistaken) gave the final impulse necessary to make the Mikado’s government decide for peace. You may notice that I used very effectively a quotation from your letter as the reason for my communication. “Oyster Bay, N. Y. "August 22, 1905. “My dear Baron Kaneke: "I think I ought to tell you that I hear on all sides a good deal of complaint expressed among the friends of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war for a large indemnity. A prominent member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, a strong pro-Japanese man, has just written me: "It does not seem to me as if Japan could possibly afford to continue the war merely for a money indemnity. I should not blame her if she broke off on the issue of obtaining the island of Saghalin. But if she renews the fighting merely to get money she will not get the money and she will turn sympathy from her in this country and elsewhere very rapidly. I am bound to say I do not think her taste for indemnity a good one. She holds no Russian territory except Saghalin and that she wants to keep! "I think your Government ought to understand that there will be at least a very considerable sentiment in America among men who have hitherto been favorable to the Japanese, along these lines. The willingness to retrocede the northern half of Seghalin gives a chance to get some money in addition to that which is justly due for the Russian prisoners; but I do not think that anything like the amount advanced by Japan as what she wants - that is, six hundred millions - should be asked or could possibly be obtained. You know how strongly I have advised the Russians to make peace. I equally strongly advise Japan not to continue the fight for a money indemnity. If she does, then I believe that there will be a considerable shifting of public opinion against her. I do not believe that this public opinion will have any very tangible effect, but still it should not be entirely disregarded. Moreover, I do not believe that the Japanese nation would achieve its ends if it continued the war simply on the question of the indemnity. I think that Russia will refuse to pay and that the general sentiment of thecivilized world will back her in refusing to pay the great amount asked, or anything like such an amount. Of course if she will pay, then I have nothing to say. But if she will not pay, then you would find that after making war for another year, even though you were successful in obtaining East Siberia, you would have spent four or five hundred million dollars additional to what has already been spent, you would have spilled an immense of blood, and though you would have obtained East Siberia, you would have obtained something which you do not want and Russia would be in no condition to give you any money at all. She certainly could not give you enough to make up for the extra amount you would have spent. Of course my judgment may be at fault in this matter; but this is my judgment, speaking conscientiously from the standpoint of the interest of Japan as I see it. Moreover, I feel of course that every interest of civilization and humanity forbids the continuance of this war merely for a large indemnity. "This letter is of course strictly confidential; but I should be glad to have you cable it to your home goverment, and hope you can do so. If cabled at all, it should be done at once. “Sincerely yours, “THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "Oyster Bay, N. Y., "August 23, 1905. "My dear Baron Kanake: “In supplement to what I wrote you yesterday, for the consideration of His Majesty, the Japanese Emperor’s Envoys, let me add this. “It seems to me that it is to the interest of the great Empire of Nippon now to make peace, for two reasons; 1, self-interest; 2, the interest of the world, to which she owes a certain duty. Remember, I do not speak of continuing the war rather then give up Saghalin, which I think would be right; but of continuing the war in order to get a great sum of money from Russia, which I think would be wrong. Of course you may succeed in getting it; but in my judgment even this success would be too dearly paid for; and if you failed to get the money, no additional humiliations and losses inflicted on Russia, would repay Japan for the additional expenditure in blood, in money, in national exhaustion. “1. It is Japan's interest now to close the war. She has won the control of Corea end Manchuria; she has doubled her own fleet in destroying that ofRussia; she has Port Arthur, Dalny, the Manchurian railroad; she has Saghalin. It is not worth her while to continue the war for money, when so to continue it would probably eat up more money than she could at the end get back from Russia. She will be wise now to close the war in triumph, and to take her seat as a leading member at the council table of the nations. "2. Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the wrld at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her to make peace; the nations believe in her; let her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of all that is lofty and noble; and to this appeal I hope she will not be deaf. "With profound regard, sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." I am very much pleased to have put the thing through. I am almost ashamed to say that while physically in fine trim the last three months have left me feeling rather tired, because from a variety of causes I have not had at hand to advise with the Cabinet ministers who were dealing with the subjects that were at the moment most important, and so have had to run everything myself without any intermediaries. Love to Nannie. Ever yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. H. C. Lodge, Nahant, Mass. P. S. (Senator Lodge) That you may see Meyer's part in this, I include the three cables I sent to the Czar and his answers, as follows: "Oyster Bay, N. Y. , August 21, 1905. "To Meyer, "American Ambassador, "St. Petersburg. "Please see His Majesty personally immediately and deliver following message from me: "I earnestly ask your Majesty to believe that in what I am about to say and to advise I speak as the earnest well wisher of Russia and give you the adviceI should give were I a Russian patriot and statesman. The Japanese have as I understand it abandoned their demands for the interned ships and limitation of the Russian naval power in the Pacific, which conditions I felt wore improper for Russia to yield to. Moreover I find to my surprise and pleasure that the Japanese are willing to restore the northern half of Saghalin to Russia, Russia of course in such case to pay a substantial sum for the surrender of territory by the Japanese and for the return of Russian prisoners. It seems to me that if peace can be obtained substantially on those terms it will be both just and honorable , and that it would be a dreadful calamity to have the war continued when peace can be thus obtained. Of the twelve points which the plenipotentiaries have been discussing, on eight they have come to a substantial agreement. Two which were offensive to Russia the Japanese will, as I understand it, withdraw. The remaining two can be met by an agreement in principle that the Japanese shall restore or retrocede to Russia the northern half of Saghalin, while Russia, of course, pays an adequate sum for this retrocession and for the Russian prisoners. If this agreement can be made the question as to the exact amount can be a subject of negotiation. Let me repeat how earnestly I feel that it is for Russia's interest to conclude peace on substantially these terms. No one can foretell the result of the continuance of the war and I have no doubt that it is to Japan's advantage to conclude peace. But in my judgment it is infinitely more to the advantage of Russia. If peace is not made now and war is continued it may wall be that, though the financial strain upon Japan would be severe, yet in the end Russia would be shorn of those east Siberian provinces which have been won for her by the heroism of her sons during the last three centuries. The proposed peace leaves the ancient Russian boundaries absolutely intact. The only change in territory will be that Japan will get that part of Saghalin which was hers up to thirty years ago. As Saghalin is an island it is, humanely speaking, impossible that the Russians should reconquer it in view of the disaster to their navy; and to keep the northern half of it is a guarantee for the security of Vladivostok and eastern Siberia for Russia. It seems to me that every consideration of national self interest, of military expediency and of broad humanity makes it eminently wise and right for Russia to conclude peace substantially along these lines, and it is my hope and prayer that Your Majesty may take this view. “THEODORE ROOSEVELT.""St. Petersburg, August 23 [22], 1905. "The Czar received me in Peterhof at 4 p.m. Said he would welcome peace which he believed to be honorable and lasting, but reiterates that Russia will not pay any war indemnity whatever. In that, his conscience tells him he is right and he feels sure he has the support of the nation. Appreciates that their naval arm has been cut off, but still has an army which has endurance, opposed to the Japanese army, which latter army is thousands of miles from St. Petersburg. He added, if necessary I will join the army myself and go to front. Claims that it [xxxxx] should not be forgotten that the Japanese commenced hostilities; that they now have obtained all that they went to war for and a great deal more. He is unwilling to pay a substantial sum for half of Saghalin as it would be? (would notwithstanding?) interpreted as a war indemnity differently expressed. He said I should prefer to lose territory temporarily than to humiliate the country by paying a war indemnity as though a vanquished nation. Russia is not in the position of France in 1870. The Czar told me he had received yesterday telegram from German Emperor urging peace; read me his reply in which he said peace was impossible if Japan insisted upon any war indemnity. Closeted with the Emperor two hours, at the end of which time he informed me of the terms on which he would conclude peace. Acceptance of the eight points substantially agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth, (no?) payment of war indemnity but a liberal and generous payment for care and maintenance of Russian prisoners but not such a sum as could be interpreted for a war indemnity, withdrawal of Japan’s claims for interned ships and limitation of naval power in the Pacific, Russia to possess north half of Saghalien while Japan to retain southern half (that portion which formerly belonged to Japan;. The Emperor instructed me to express his thanks and full appreciation to the President for the efforts that he has made in behalf of peace. “MEYER”. “Oyster Bay, N. Y. "August 23, 1905. "Meyer, “St. Petersburg. “Make clear to His Majesty that if my suggestion is adopted then the whole question is what reasonable amount is to be paid for the retrocession of northern Saghalin and for the return of the Russian prisoners will remain a subject for further negotiations, so that the acceptance in principle of the terms I have suggested would not commit the Russian Government to any particular sum of money and above all would not in any way commit Russia to pay any amount which would be exorbitant or humiliating Please send this supplementary cable to His Majesty at once and further explain that I of course cannot be sure Japan will act on my suggestions, but that I know she ought to, and that if Russia accedes to them I shall try my best to get Japan to accede to them also. “THEODORE ROOSEVELT, “ "St. Petersburg, August 24, 1905. "Notify President that his second cable has been forwarded to Czar. Let me know if his was sent before or after the arrival of mine. I discussed for two hours with Czar yesterday Saghelin and payment of substantial sum for north half. Tried to commit him to maximum amount he would be willing to pay. Emperor repeatedly stated that he had given his word publicly not to pay war indemnity of any kind or surrender Russian soil. It was only after I got him to acknowledge that lower half of Seghalin had been, like Port Arthur, merely temporary Russian territory, that he agreed to a division of Saghalin. I think moreover that by negotiation Russia might consent to pay land value of north half of Saghalin on same basis as Alaska was sold to us. Discussed it with Czar (after he absolutely refused to pay substantial sum) but he said how can the value be ascertained? Shies at it and fears Russians would consider any payment dishonorable. Claims he must not according to his conscience in this matter. Can you advise me of probable amount of money Japan has now on deposit in United States? "Meyer", Oyster Bay, N. Y. “August 25, 1905. “Meyer, "St. Petersburg. My second cable was forwarded after the arrival of your first. Japan has now on deposit in United States about fifty million dollars of the last war loan. I do not know whether she has more. Please tell His Majesty that I dislike intruding any advice on him again, but for fear of misapprehension I venture again to have those statements made to him. I of course would not have him act against his conscience, but I earnestly hope his conscience will guide him so as to prevent the continuance of a war when this continuance may involve Russia in a greatercalamity than has ever befallen it since it first rose to power in both Europe and Asia. I see it publicly announced to-day by Count Lamsdorff that Russia will neither pay money nor surrender territory. I beg His Majesty to consider that such an announcement means absolutely nothing when Saghalin is already in the hands of the Japanese. If on such theory the war is persevered in no one can forestall the result, but the military representatives of the powers most friendly to Russia assure me that the continuance of the war will probably mean the loss not merely of Saghalin but of eastern Siberia, and if after a year of struggle this proves true then any peace which come could only come on terms which would indicate a real calamity. Most certainly I think it will be a bad thing for Japan to go on with the war, but I think it will be a far worse thing for Russia. There is now a fair chance of getting peace on honorable terms, and it seems to me that it will be a dreadful thing for Russia and for all the civilized world if the chance is thrown away. My advices are that the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth have come to a substantial agreement on every point except the money question and the question of Saghalin. Let it now be announced that as regards these two points peace shall be made on the basis of the retrocession of the northern half of Saghalin to Russia on payment of a sum of redemption money by Russia, the amount of this redemption money and the amount to be paid for the Russian prisoners to be settled by further negotiations. This does not commit the Russian Government as to what sum shall be paid, leaving it open to further negotiations If it is impossible for Russia and Japan to come to an agreement on this sum they might possibly call in the advice of say some high French or German official appointed by or with the consent of Russia and some English official appointed by or with the consent of Japan and have these men then report to the negotiators their advice, which might or might not be binding upon the negotiators. This it seems to me would be an entirely honorable way of settling the difficulty. I cannot of course guarantee that Japan will agree to this proposal, but if His Majesty agrees to it I will so endeavor to get the Japanese Government to do so likewise. I earnestly hope that this cable of mine can receive His Majesty's attention before the envoys meet to-morrow, and I cannot too strongly say that I feel that peace now may prevent untold calamities in the future. Let me repeat that in this proposal I suggest that neither Russia nor Japan do anything but face accomplished facts and that I do not [attempt to] specify or attempt to specify what amount should be paid, leaving the whole questionof the amount to be paid as redemption money for the northern half of Saghalin to be settled by further negotiation. I fear that if these terms are rejected it may be possible that Japan will give up any idea of making peace or of ever getting money and that she will decide to take and keep Vladivostok and Harbin and the whole Manchurian railway and this of course would mean that she would take east Siberia. Such a loss to Russia would be in my judgment a disaster of portentous size, and I earnestly desire to save Russia from such a risk. If peace is made on the terms I have mentioned Russia is left at the end of this war substantially unharmed, the national honor and interest saved, and the results of what Russians have done in Asia since the days of Ivan the Terrible unimpaired. But if peace is now rejected and if Japan decides that she will give up any idea of obtaining any redemption money or any other sum no matter how small the military situation is such that there is at least a good chance and in the estimate of most outside observers a strong probability that though Japan will have to make heavy [many] sacrifices she will yet take Harbin, Vladivostok, and east Siberia, and if this is once done the probabilities are overwhelming that she could never be dislodged. I cannot too strongly state my convictions that while peace in accordance with the suggestions above outlined is earnestly to be desired from the standpoint of [from] the whole world and from the standpoint of both combatants, yet that far above all it is chiefly to Russia's interest and perhaps to her vital interest that it should come in this way and at this time. "THEODORE ROOSEVELT." "St. Petersburg, August 26, 1905. "President Roosevelt: "The following note is in answer to your cable of 24th and was received while translating your cable of 26th (25th?): " ' I have not failed to place before the Emperor copy of President's telegram of which your Excellency sent me full text. In conformity with what was said to you by my august chief during the audience of the 23d and concerning (to) the memorandum presented by you to His Majesty upon this subject the Emperor has ordered Witte to declare to the Japanese plenipotentiaries at the next meeting that His Imperial Majesty cannot in any case modify the conditions definitely decided upon and which were communicated to you in person by the Emperor to be brought to the knowledge of the President. (Signed) Lamsdorf." "I have since presented your cable of 26th to Lamsdorff, which he will forward at once to Peterhoff, though he says Czar's decision, as above stated, is final. Warned him of the danger if war is continued, of Russia losing the whole of Saghalin ( ) and eastern Siberia. They prefer to take this risk than to pay any form of indemnity. Lamsdorf believes that the Czar in taking this stand has the people behind him. "Meyer." "St. Petersburg, August 27, 1905. "President Roosevelt. "I have just received the following note from Lamsdorff: ' " 'Have not failed to bring to attention of His Majesty the communication to him from the President which your Excellency gave me yesterday. Taking all cognizance of this message, with the serious attention which it merits. His Majesty does not see the possibility of modifying his point of view on the conditions of peace which alone could be considered as acceptable for Russia. This point of view is much the better known to you as it was personally communicated and expounded to you by His Majesty with the request that the substance thereof be transmitted in a friendly message to the President." Signed "Meyer. You will see that Meyer played a most useful part in persuading the Czar to give up the south half of Saghalin, without which peace could not have been made. Meyer has amply justified his appointment. I have also received from Durand a letter running as follows: "Lenox, August 31, 1905. "Mr. President: "Sir: "I have today received your letter of the 29th August, enclosing a copy of certain messages sent to the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg and of two letters addressed to Baron Kaneko. "I am sending these papers to Lord Lansdowne who will I am sure be much obliged to you for letting him have them, and will show them to the King and Mr. Balfour. "I have also telegraphed the contents to him. "I have little doubt that these letters to Baron Kaneko turned the scale and induced the Japanese to forego their claim of indemnity, Though some of the them may not understand now they will recognize hereafter that you gave them the advice which was best for their interest, and I take this opportunity of expressing my most hearty congratulations on the wonderful success of your efforts to end the war. "Lord Lansdowne has not informed me whether he used his influence in the same direction, but he repeated to Tokyo the telegram I addressed to him on receipt of your letter of the 23d August, and it was communicated to the Japanese government who referred to it as having been considered in the final council held at the palace. "I remain, sir, "Yours very respectfully, "H. M. Durand." The message he refers to of mine was one which I sent him asking that England use her influence with Japan just as I had already been asking the German Emperor and the French Government to use their influence with Russia. The Kaiser did his level best, but neither he nor I had much effect upon the Czar, although doubtless what he did helped make the Czar cede the south half of Saghalin. The Kaiser behaved very well in this business. You doubtless saw the enthusiastic telegram he sent me on the conclusion of peace. On second thought, however, as you are at Tuckanuck you may not have seen it, so here are the telegrams of congratulation from the Kaiser, the Czar and the Mikado; "Neus Palais, August 29, 1905. "President Theodore Roosevelt: "Just read cable from Amerika announcing agreement of Peace Conference on preliminaries of peace. Am overjoyed; express most sincere congratulations at the great success due to your untireing efforts. The whole of mankind must unite and will do so in thanking you for the great boon you have given it. "William, I. R." "Peterhof, Alexandria, August 31, 1905. "President Roosevelt: "Accept my congratulations and warmest thanks for having brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclusion owing to your personal energetic efforts. My country will gratefully recognize the great part you have played in the Portsmouth Peace Conference. "Nicholas.""Tokyo, September 3, 1905. "The President: "I have received with gratification your message of congratulations conveyed through our plenipotentiaries and thank you warmly for it. To your disinterested and unremitting efforts in the interest of peace and humanity I attach the high value which is their due and assure you of my grateful appreciation of the distinguished part you have taken in the establishment of peace based upon principles essential to the permanent welfare and tranquillity of the far east. "Mutsuhito. The other day I was reading "Democracy" that novel which made a great furor among the educated incompetents and the pessimists generally about 25 years ago. It was written by Godkin, perhaps with assistance from Mrs. Henry Adams. It had a superficial and rotten cleverness, but it was essentially false, essentially mean and base, and it is amusing to read it now and see how completely events have given it the lie.COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., September 5th 1905. My dear Senator Penrose: In connection with the charges made against Mr Leib, much more serious matters have come to light than these concerning which the Civil Service Commission made its report to me. I am sorry to say that Mr Leib must send in his resignation to me. I desire it at once. He has been making temporary appointments altogether disproportionate to the number of permanent employees under him, and I regret to state that no less than three of these temporary appointments were of relatives of his - his cousin, his father-in-law, and his sister. Moreover, it appears that he its guilty of illegal conduct in connection with civil service examinations, and personally coached his sister for one of these examinations, for which act he was reproved by Secretary Shaw, and the Civil Service Commission, with the approval of the Secretary, cancelled the examination. The Secretary furthermore informed Mr Leib at the time that his conduct in giving a temporary clerk, Miss L. H. Wagner, who was also an applicant for the examination, the [xxx] keys or answers to the note and coin counting tests, in the form of pencil memoranda, to be copied by her, "was grossly improper and could not be too severely censured." The Secretary ended his letter (which was dated February 20th last) by stating that the conduct of Mr Leib about the examination in question was very unsatisfactory to the Department, and that the Department was giving him "the benefit of every doubtful consideration in2. the case in not bringing the matter to the attention of the President for his consideration and action." If the Department had brought the matter to my attention I should have been obliged to remove Mr Leib. The friction between him and the Civil Service Commission had gone steadily on in spite of the consideration then shown him by Secretary Shaw, and I am sorry to say that in my judgment it is not possible longer to retain him, and that I must therefore ask that he be told to forward his resignation forthwith. I am sorry to have to reach this conclusion. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.[*Peace File*] [MUTSUHITO] (Copy) Original in the President's hand writing. September 6, 1905. Your Majesty: Through Baron Komura I send you this letter, to express, as strongly as I can, my sense of the magnanimity, and above all of the cool-headed, far-sighted wisdom, you have shown in making peace as you did. I am certain your people will soon appreciate to the full the inestimable benefit you have thereby conferred upon the empire over which you bear sway. During the last eighteen months your generals and admirals, your soldiers and sailors, have won imperishable renown for Nippon. Their glory--your glory, and your nation's glory--will last as long as history is written, as long as mighty deeds are remembered, as long as the race of man endures. You have crowned triumphant war by a peace in which every great object for which you fought is secured; and in so doing you have given to the world a signal and most striking example of how it is possible for a victorious nation to achieve victory over others without losing command over itself. In every nation there are hot-heads who demand the impossible, who are discontented if they do not get something which, if they were allowed to try to get it, they would have to pay for at a cost altogether disproportionate to, and in excess of, its value. Had your nation listened at this time to the advice of such men, they would have led it into a continuance of the war which, no matter how damaging to Japan's opponent, would also have been necessarily of damage to Japan far beyond what could have been offset by any resulting benefit. The greatness of a people, like2. the greatness of a man, is often attested quite as clearly by moderation and wisdom in using a triumph as by the triumph itself. Many a great victory has been hopelessly marred, and its effects undone, by its arrogant and shortsighted misuse. In this crucial hour, your Majesty has shown that the people of Nippon were true alike to their ancient spirit and to the needs of the modern world; for you have shown, and through you your people have shown, that you and they possess that rare combination, the combination of the high valor and foresight which win victories, and the lofty wisdom which turns them to the best account. With the utmost admiration and respect, believe me, Very faithfully yours, To His Majesty The Emperor of Japan.(Copy) Original in the President's hand writing. THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. [*Peace File*] September 6, 1905. Your Majesty: Through Baron Kaneko I venture to send you the skin of a large bear which I shot; I beg you to accept it as a trifling token of the regard I have for you and for the great and wonderful people over which you rule. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for the distinguished courtesy you have shown to Secretary Taft and to my daughter. Let me also say how much I have enjoyed reading the translation of the poems written by Your Majesty, by Her Majesty the Empress, and by the other members of the Royal Family. I have also written you by Baron Komura. With profound respect, believe me, Always sincerely yours, To His Majesty The Emperor of Japan.[*Peace File*] (Copy) Original in the President's hand writing. September 6, 1905. To His Majesty The Emperor of Russia: My dear Emperor Nicholas: Your very courteous letter was handed me by M. Witte. I need hardly say how delighted I am at the peace that has been made. I have given M. Witte, to present to you, copies of the two letters I had sent the Japanese Government at the same time that I was cabling you. I have an abiding faith in the future of the mighty Slav empire over which you rule; and I most earnestly wish all good fortune both for you personally and for your people. With high regard, believe me, Very faithfully yours,[*[Carl Schurz]*] Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 8, 1905. My dear Mr. Schurz: I thank you for you congratulations. As to what you say about disarmament - which I suppose is the rough equivalent of “the gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the world by armed peace” - I am not clear either what can be done or what ought to be done. If I had been known as one of the conventional type of peace advocates I could have done nothing whatever in bringing about peace now, I would be powerless in the future to accomplish anything, and I would not have been able to help confer the boons upon Cuba, the Philippines, Porto Rico and Panama, brought about by our action therein. If the Japanese had not armed during the last twenty years, this would indeed be a sorrowful century for Japan. If this country had not fought the Spanish War; if we had failed to take the action we did about Panama; all mankind would have been the loser. While the Turks were butchering the Armenians the European powers kept the peace and thereby added a burden of infamy to the Nineteenth Century, for in keeping that peace a greater number of lives were lost than in any European war since the days of Napoleon, and these lives wore those of women and children ae well as of men; while the moral degradation, the brutality inflicted and endured, the aggregate of hideous wrong done, surpassed that of any war of which we have record in modern times.2 Until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance its coming on this earth. There is of course no analogy at present between international law and private or municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the former while there is for the latter. Inside our own nation the law-abiding man does not have to arm himself against the lawless simply because there is some armed force - the police, the sheriff's posse, the national guard, the regulars - which can be called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar international force to call on, an I do not as yet see how it could at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder. In a very interesting French book the other day I was reading of how the Mediterranean was freed from pirates only by the pax Britannica established by England's naval force. The hopeless and hideous bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan were stopped, and only could be stopped, when civilized persons in the shape of Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true of Burma and the Malay states, as well as Egypt, with regard to England. Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed interference of a civilized power which, relatively to its opponent, was a just and beneficent power. If England had disarmed to the point of being unable to conquer the Soudan and3 protect Egypt, so that the Mahdists had established their supremacy in northeastern Africa, the result would have been a horrible and bloody calamity to mankind. It was only the growth of the European powers in military efficiency that freed eastern Europe from the dreadful scourge of the Tartar and partially freed it from the dreadful scourge of the Turk. Unjust war is dreadful, a just war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarisms with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the calamities caused by all the wars of the Nineteenth Century would be trivial. Yet it is not easy to see [xxxxxxx] how we can by international agreement state exactly which power [xxxxxs] ceases to be free and civilized and which comes near the line of barbarism and despotism. For example, I suppose it would be very difficult to get Russia and Japan to come to a common agreement on this point; and there are at least some citizens of other nations, not to speak of their governments, whom it would also be hard to get together. This does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to make the effort. It may be that some scheme will be developed. America, fortunately, can cordially assist in such an effort for no one in his senses would suggest our disarmament, and though we should continue to perfect our small navy and our minute army, I do not think it necessary to increase the number of our ships - at any rate as things look now - nor the number of our soldiers. Of course our navy must be kept up to the highest point of efficiency, and the replacement of old and worthless vessels by first class new ones [might] may involve [xxxxxx] an increase in the personnel; but not 4 enough to interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested. But before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Carl Schurs, Bolton Landing, Lake George, N.Y. It seems to me that a general step in the increase of the war navies of the world might be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I should have to weigh matters carefully - including by the way such a matter as the Turkish army. At any rate nothing useful can be done unless with the clear recognition that we put peace second to righteousness.89 [Personal] Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 8, 1905. [*6pt*] [8pt] [10pt] [*10pt*] My dear Mr. Schurz: I thank you for your congratulations. As to what you say about disarmament - which I suppose is the rough equivalent of "the gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the world by armed peace" - I am not clear either what can be done or what ought to be done. If I had been known as one of the conventional type of peace advocates I could have done nothing whatever in bringing about peace now, I would be powerless in the future to accomplish anything, and I would not have been able to help confer the [xxx xxxxxx] booms upon Cuba, the Philippines, Porto Rico and Panama, brought about by our action therein. If the Japanese had not armed during the last twenty years, this would indeed be a sorrowful century for Japan. If this country had not fought the Spanish War; if we had failed to take the action we did about Panama; all mankind would have been the loser. While the Turks were butchering the Armenians the European powers kept the peace and thereby added a burden of infamy to the Nineteenth Century, for in keeping that peace a greater number of lives were lost than in any European war since the days of Napoleon, and these lives were those of women and children as well as men, while the moral degradation, the brutality inflicted and endured, the aggregate of hideous wrong done, surpassed that of any war which we have record in modern times. [*[9-8-05]*] 90 [*Gal. 53*] 2 Until people get it firmly fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance its coming on this earth. There is of course no analogy at present between international law and private or municipal law, because there is no sanction of force for the former while there is for the latter. Inside our own nation the law-abiding men does not have to arm himself against the lawless simply because there is some armed force - the police, the sheriff's posse, the national guard, the regulars - which can be called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar international force to call on, I do not as yet see how it could at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder. In a very interesting French book the other day I was reading of how the Mediterranean was freed from pirates only by the "pax Britannica.'" established by England's naval force. The hopeless and hideous bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan were stopped, and only could be stopped, when civilized nations in the shape of Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true of Burma and the Malay states, as well as Egypt, with regard to England. Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed interference of a civilized power which, relatively to its opponent, was a just and beneficient power. If England had disarmed to the point of being unable to conquer the Soudan and protect Egypt,91 [*[9-8-05]*] 3 so that the Mahdists had established their supremacy in northeastern Africa, the result would have been a horrible and bloody calamity to mankind. It was only the growth of the European powers in military efficiency that freed eastern Europe from the dreadful scourge of the Tartar and partially freed it from the dreadful scourge of the Turk. Unjust war is dreadful; a just war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarians with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the calamities caused by all the wars of the Nineteenth Century would be trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by international agreement state exactly which power ceases to be free and civilized and which comes near the lines of barbarism or despotism. For example, I suppose it would be very difficult to get Russia and Japan to come to a common agreement on this point; and there are at least some citizens of other nations, not to speak of their governments, whom it would also be hard to get together. "This does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to make the effort. It may be that some scheme will be developed. America, fortunately, can cordially assist in such an effort, for no one in his senses would suggest our disarmament; and though we should continue to perfect our small navy and our minute army, I do not think it necessary to increase the number of our ships at any rate as things look now - nor the number of our soldiers. Of course our navy must be kept up to the highest point of efficiency, and the replacing of old and worthless vessels by first class new ones may involve an increase in personnel; but not [*[9-8-05]*] 92 4 enough to interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested. But before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I would have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented. Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. Carl Schurz, Bolton Landing. [*6 pt*] Lake George, N.Y. It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the [man] war navies of the world might be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I should have to weigh matters carefully - including by the way such a matter as the Turkish army. At any rate, nothing useful can be done unless with the clear Legislation that we subject to the past peace as much to purpose said [?][*[ca Sept 8,1905]*] Takahira [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]][*Chinese Emperor*] TELEGRAM. [*CF*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 9, 1905. [*[KUAN HESU]*] His Majesty, The Emperor of China. I share Your Majesty's feelings of deep satisfaction at the results of the negotiations between Japan and Russia whereby the war between two great nations is brought to an honorable close and the integrity of the Chinese Empire preserved, assuring to the Manchurian provinces the blessing of peace and the benefits of untrammeled intercourse with the world. Such a result is of incalculable benefit to the world in general and to the peoples of the east in particular. In the name of my countrymen I thank you for your congratulations. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official). [*Roosevelt. Theo.*] Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 11, 1905. My dear Reid: I thank you for your very interesting letter. I think you were right in not giving out that interview. I have had just the same difficulty myself. I wanted to speak in the strongest terms of how well the Japanese had behaved and have been hampered by my unwillingness to offend the Russians. The Kaiser stood by me like a trump. I did not get much direct assistance from the English government, but I did get indirect assistance for I learned that they forwarded to Japan my note to Durand, and I think that the signing of the Anglo-Japanese treaty made Japan feel comparatively safe as to the future. While it was even more to Russia's interest than to Japan's to make peace, yet it was also absolutely to Japan’s interest. For her to continue the war for an indemnity, with the practical certainty of spending two dollars to get one and a likelihood of not even getting the one, would have been even greater folly than wickedness. I was amused at what you told me as to the remarks of the British Ambassador to Paris, Sir Francis Bertie, in saying that the terms were very hard on Japan and would not be very well received there, and would tend to make the United States and me generally very unpopular in Japan.2 and would have commercial and political results, and so forth. Some [of] of the English officials as well as some influential British merchants in the East have taken this tone and have encouraged the Japanese to demand the impossible. I do not know whether an attitude like that of Sir Francis is due to downright stupidity or the mere desire to see Russia worried and exhausted, no matter how great the damage to Japan. At any rate it was a shortsighted view, alike from the standpoint of Japan and from the standpoint of England. The Japanese government - that is, the group of socalled elder statesmen as well as the Mikado - are sincerely grateful to me, and as you know, every step I took was only after previous consultation with them; save that I all along told them that they could not possibly get an indemnity unless Russia was sufficiently panic-stricken to give it. That the people may visit upon me and upon American some portion of the discontent which ought to be visited upon themselves, and upon their own leaders for misleading them as to what they might obtain, is possible. In international matters I am no great believer in the long-continued effects of gratitude. The United States must rely in the last resort upon its own preparedness and resolution, and not upon the goodwill of any outside nation. I think England has a more sincere feeling of friendliness for us than has any other power; but even this English friendliness would be a broken reed if we leaned on it, unless we were entirely able in addition to fight for our own hand. No matter how great our forces, we could of course make trouble for ourselves3 if we behaved wrongly. But merely to be harmless would not save us from aggression. If we keep our navy at a high standard of efficiency and at the same time are just and courteous in our dealings with foreign nations, we will be able to remain on good terms with Japan and Germany and with all the foreign powers. As for Tokio, I have no right to expect that in the long run its policy will be on a higher level than the policy of St. Petersburg, of Paris or of London. I read the little skit you sent. Of course it is the kind of thing that has often been done. Nevertheless, the man is right in painting some of the dangers which threaten not merely the empire of Great Britain but all occidental civilization. There are some unpleasant resemblances between the occidental civilization of the present day - that is the civilization of America and Australia no less than of the European nations west of Russia - and the Hellenistic civilization of the centuries succeeding the death of Alexander, no less than the civilization of the Roman world during the first century or two of the empire. There are great differences also, however; and moreover, the evils pointed out in the pamphlet as bearing away in Great Britain and Australia flourish to an even greater extent in France, to an only less extent in Germany and Scandinavia and to quite as great an extent here, although here they are hardly as bad in their effects because we have a whole continent to work on and draw an immense mass of immigrants from abroad. The decline in the birth rate I should put as the chief cause as well as the chief symptom of what is evil in the nations I have mentioned; but 4 we must not forget that it has not declined in Italy and but little if at all in Spain, and yet the conditions are quite as unsatisfactory in the former and much more so in the latter country. The general softening of fibre, the selfishness, the luxury, the relaxation of standards, the growth of a spirit such as that of the anti-imperialism - all these are among the unpleasant symptoms I complain of which can not but give us concern for the future. But there are plenty of good symptoms too, and after all none of us can read the future and our duty is simple. Let us stand valiantly for what is decent and right; let us strive hard, and take with unshaken front whatever comes, whether it be good or ill. Then the fates must decide what the fortune shall be. Give my warm regards to Mrs. Reid. Sincerely yours, Hon. Whitelaw Reid, The American Ambassador, London, England. Personal WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 11, 1905. My dear Strachey: I thank you for your very nice letter. Now do remember that you and Mrs. Strachey must come over and stay with us at the White House. As you can imagine, I had my hands full during the close of the Portsmouth conference when it became evident that there would be a deadlock unless active measures were taken. It was one of those curious cases where it was for the real interest of each side to make peace even though the other side got just a trifle more than it was entitled to. Russia's giving up of the southern half of Saghalin was entirely genuine. I only got it through repeated personal interviews of Meyer with the Czar, when he could not only read him my letters and telegrams but insist upon his understanding them, instead of allowing him to repeat some formula which Lamsdorff or one of the grand dukes had told him. It was only through the Czar himself that we finally got it conceded to Japan. This, with what the Japanese had actually obtained in Corea and Manchuria, represented the essentials which the Japanese had to have. I had all along felt that they were very foolish to try to get a dollar of indemnity if it meant a continuance of the war. As I think I wrote you, I can understand their continuing the war at no matter what cost of national exhaustion if they felt it was vital to drive Russia out of2 East Asia and permanently take possession of East Siberia. But I found that they did not really want East Siberia; that they were beginning to feel the heavy financial drain of the war; and that the leading soldiers no less than the leading statesmen realized that as they got further away from the coast their difficulties would increase, and that to take Harbin and Vladivostok might well mean to incur greater losses and run greater hazards than had been incurred in taking Port Arthur and Mukden. The northern half of Saghalin they had not, as a matter of fact, I found, reduced to possession, and did not really want, provided they could get the fishery rights. The only difficulty came from their having, as I think unwisely, allowed the Japanese people as a whole to indulge in utterly extravagant anticipations as to what could be obtained until they really thought they could get as much as if their armies occupied Moscow. When the crisis came they showed wisdom, courtesy and self-restraint in a way that put them at a great disadvantage when compared with their Russian competitors. Purely for your own eye I enclose copies of two dispatched I sent Baron Kaneko, to be transferred to the Tokio government, at the crisis of the negotiations. As you know, I am not in the least a peace-at-any-price man, and I have the heartiest scorn for those people to be found in both our countries who, whether from folly, from selfishness, from shortsightedness, or from sheer cowardice, rail at the manly virtues and fail to understand that righteousness is to be put before peace even when, as sometimes happens, 3 righteousness means war. But I have grown to have an increasing horror for pointless, and of course still more for unjust war. A continuance of this struggle was of course utterly pointless from every standpoint, and meant hideous slaughter of gallant men to no purpose aside from the waste and exhaustion of the peoples involved. I rejoiced, as you did, at the peace. Now I hope that Russia will move, no matter how sluggishly and haltingly, forward on the path of self-government. Of course she is cursed almost as much by her reformers as by her oppressors. Tolstoi's last article really did not rise to the dignity of drivel, and people whose purpose is mere aimless destruction can not be anything but a curse. If the peace negotiations give Witte, no matter how undeservedly, prominence in his own country, good will have come; for although his frank rejection of ethical considerations is to me appalling, still he does see that Russia can not take a great place in the Twentieth Century if she adheres to the spirit and the methods of Ivan the Terrible. As for Japan, all I can do to help her will be done. It may be that we shall have trouble with her, and the attacks by the Tokio mob on foreigners and Christians have an ominous side and tend to reconcile me to her failure to get a great sum of money and to her being left face to face with Russia in Siberia, especially as the Anglo-Japanese alliance really guarantees her against any offensive return by Russia. But for all that and in spire of my realization that she may show herself at 4 times as unpleasant a neighbor as all European and American powers have at times shown themselves to be, I yet admire and believe in the Japs and feel that their advent int the circle of great civilized powers is a good thing. If we of America keep our navy at a high point of efficiency and at the same time treat the Japs with real courtesy and friendliness, we shall have no trouble with them- nor yet with any of the powers of continental Europe! (I regard all danger of any trouble between the United States and Great Britain as over, I think forever.) This is only another way of saying that every free people should strive to combine ability to defend its own rights with hearty regard for the rights of others. Sincerely yours, Mr. J. St. Loe Strachey, Newlands Corner, Merrow Downs, Guildford, England.Personal [*not corrected*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 12, 1905. My dear Sir George: Well, the peace conference is over. I am of course very glad I went into the thing, but it cost me a rather harrassing although a very interesting three months. I am bound to say that the Japs have impressed me most favorably, not only these three months but during the four years I have been President. They have always told me the truth. They are a very secretive people, and I speedily learned that I must never read into anything they said one word more than was actually down in black and white; but so far whenever they have actually committed themselves I have been able to count absolutely on their doing what they said they would. Moreover, they know their own minds and all act together; whereas the Russians all pulled against one another, rarely knew their own minds, lied so to others that they finally got into the dangerous position of lying to themselves, and showed a most unhealthy and widespread corruption and selfishness. I think Japan has something within itself which will be good for civilization in general. If she is treated fairly and yet not cringed to, I believe she will play her part honorably and well in the world’s work of the Twentieth Century. Most certainly we have a good deal to learn from her, although we also have something to teach her, especially as to the proper treatment of women, which seems to me to be the chief Japanese lack.2. In these negotiations the Japanese made but one mistake. Their whole demand for an indemnity was really a bluff. From the beginning I had told them, and I told them even more emphatically at the end, that they could not get one dollar unless Russia chose to give it in pure panic. But they were trading on the chance of the existence of this panic, and so the Japanese Government succeeded in raising the expectations of the people to a degree which caused the bitterest disappointment in the end. This disappointment was not warranted by the facts, for the Japanese retained literally everything they had got hold of in Corea, in Manchuria end in Saghalin, and have made themselves a formidable naval power as an incident to the destruction of the Russian navy. I do most earnestly hope that Russia will now take some steps, no matter how short, along the road of self-government and orderly liberty. I frankly admire the Russian people and I wish them well. Moreover, I have never been able to make myself afraid of them, because it has always seemed to me that a despotism resting upon a corrupt and to a large extent an incapable bureaucracy could not in the long run be dangerous to a virile free people. The average man who speaks English can out-work, out-[?]ster, out-think and out-fight the average Russian; and this will be true until the average Russian grows to have more liberty , more self-respect and more intelligence than at present. I suppose Witte is the best man that Russia could have at the head of her affairs at present, and probably too good a man for the grand dukes to be willing to stand him. He interested me. I can not say 3. that I liked him for I thought his bragging and bluster not only foolish but shockingly vulgar when compared with the gentlemanly self-respecting self-restraint of the Japanese. Moreover, he struck me as a very selfish man, totally without high ideals. He calmly mentioned to me, for instance, that it was Russia's interest to keep Turkey in power; that he believed Turkey would last a long time because it would be a very bad thing for Russia to have the Bulgarians, for instance, substituted for the Turks for the very reason that they might give a wholesome, reputable government and thereby build up a great Slav state to the south. He added cynically that such a consummation might be good for sentimental reasons, but that sentiment did not count in practical politics. In as much as I personally think that practical politics are a mere sordid business unless they rest on a basis of honestly disinterested sentiment (though of course I appreciate to the full that with this disinterested sentiment there must also go intelligent self-interest) I could not help feeling much contempt for the excellent Mr. Witte. I do not in the least believe that it is necessary to be base or selfish in order to be efficient; and to you, my dear Sir George, I can say without being suspected of spread-eagleism that I can never sufficiently thank my good fortune in having the lives and principles of Washington and Lincoln as the standard toward which one should struggle. Witte is curiously frank and very emphatic in his statement of the need of a thorough reform in Russia. He put it upon the perfectly simple ground that in the Twentieth Century Russia could not hope to move 4 forward to the tremendous position which she firmly believed she would ultimately reach unless she met Twentieth century conditions. He spoke of having been in Columbia University Library where the librarian told him that all their books by Russians were written by Russian anarchists, He said with a laugh that they ought to offset them by all the government publications, and that if they struck an exact middle between the two they would then be just right! He spoke with utter impatience of the reactionaries in Russia, and in speaking of Dostoffsky - if that is the way you spell hie name; I mean the author of “Crime and Punishment" - he expressed the same horror for his having been sent to Siberia that one of us would feel. I also sympathize with him in his complaint about the hopeless nature of many of the Russian reformers, headed by Tolstoi. These reformers, and preeminently Tolstoi, lack sanity, and it is very difficult to do decent reform work or any other kind of work if for sanity we substitute a condition of mere morbid hysteria. Witte also expressed his views about religious freedom and freedom of conscience in a way that would commend hearty support from you or me. I earnestly hope to get a little alleviation of the condition of the Jews out of this peace conference, as what you might call a by-product. Your letter about John Hay interested me very much. I think he will be missed more and more instead of less and less as time goes on by all who knew him. I know that that will be true of me and of his successor, Root - who, by the way, is the very man whom he would have liked to succeed him. I am sorry there is no chance of your coming over here, for I do not know when I can get to England. I had been hoping that after my term as President was over Mrs. Roosevelt and I could go abroad, and of 6 course we may be able to; but we certainly can not go if there is going to be any fuss made over us and if we are to be treated as public characters. In the first place we could not afford it. If we were allowed to travel quietly and in our own way, just exactly like any other tourists, and not to see any one but an occasional person whom we would want to see whether I had been President or not (for your misfortunes, I fear you would have to come within this category), we could have a lovely time and I should like to go completely around the world. But if I had to pay formal and official visits and be entertained at big functions by the Kaiser, the Mikado and other rulers, and if I had to be continually meeting people, it would in the first place destroy all our pleasure on the trip, and in the next place it would entail a way of living and of travel impossible for people of moderate means, with half a dozen children who have reached the most expensive stage of their education? Do you remember the picture in Punch, one of Leach’s pictures, where the nervous rider, much afraid of his horse, says to the little boy, “Don’t take off your hat, please,” and the little boy responds, “I weren’t going to"? Well, my alarm may be quite as unwarranted as that of Leach’s rider, but unless I am sure that it is I guess I shall have to stay in our own country at least for three or four years, after which I shall be as unknown as any human being could desire. Meanwhile, you can hardly imagine how much I wish you could be over here and be our guest at the White House. If you can not come I shall hope to see one or more of your sons sometime during the next three and a half years. Faithfully yours, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland, England.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 13, 1905 My dear sir: The President is in receipt of your favor of the 13th instant, and thanks you and through you the members of your organization for the courtesy extended to him, which he appreciates. Very truly yours, (Signed) Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. C I Bolles, Secretary, 41 Cortlandt Street, New York.COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., PERSONAL September 13th 1905. My dear Senator Penrose: Having waited a week and not heard from you, I asked for Mr. Leib's resignation. I shall of course give ample opportunity for a hearing, and will direct that the resignation be withdrawn pending the hearing which you have requested. I return to Washington about the 1st of October, and it will probably require a few days for me to settle down into my work. Then may I ask that you and Congressman Patterson come on with the statements that you may have to make? I ought to say, my dear Senator, however, that it is very difficult for me to believe that you can upset the evidence. Mind you, I am not concerned primarily with the charges made by the Civil Service Commission, but with what appears in the letter of rebuke to Leib by Secretary Shaw, and in the facts as to his appointments of relatives. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose Philadelphia, Pa.[*Cannon, J G*] WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 18, 1905. My dear Mr. Speaker: The German government is very anxious that we should send some one to Berlin to negotiate with them and see if we can not come to an agreement about the tariff relations of the two countries. As you know, our present agreement with Germany comes to an end next spring, and if it is not renewed, and if no substitute arrangement is made, a tariff war may happen in consequence. My experiences in endeavoring to secure commercial arrangements with other countries in the past have not been very encouraging, any more than were Mr. McKinley's experiences; but I do feel if we have tariff troubles with Germany we ought at least to make it clear that we have exhausted every effort to avert them; and besides, if we send over a really good man, a man of tact and judgment who will not sacrifice our interests, but on the other hand will make a genuine effort to meet the wishes of the German government so far as they can properly be met, it is quite possible we would be able to stave off a rupture. Certainly it is worth trying for. After Congress has met it will be hard for me to get all the facts you should have, to put before you. The Germans are very anxious that the negotiations should take place over there. In such matters I think it is always well to yield what is not an essential; and it seems to me that if we sent over a man this October - or two men if you thought it better - I would have something definite to lay before you in December. I wish you would give2 me an immediate answer on this point. I have been in consultation with Secretary Shaw and Senators Allison and Aldrich about it. Whom would you suggest for the man or men to send over? The impossible ideal is some one like Dingley, who understands either German or French; but I do not suppose there is one chance in a million that we can get an expert who can speak German or French and so we will have to send over with him a first class intelligent interpreter. Do make me a suggestion as soon as possible. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. J. G. Cannon, Danville, Illinois. The above letter has been sent also to Representatives Payne and Dalzell.Confidential [*Not corrected*] [*Schurz*] WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N. Y. September 18, 1905. My dear Mr. Schurz: I am in receipt of your letter of the 14th instant. I think that the question of disarmament is one that I can legitimately request The Hague Conference to consider, and unless there is very good reason to the contrary, which I can not now see, I shall do so. But there has been a comic development in the case of that Hague Conference which I think in view of your letter I ought to communicate to you, but which I must ask you for the present to keep confidential. The other day Baron Rosen came to see me with a message from the Czar, announcing in effect that he intended at once to call The Hague Conference and was sure I would cooperate with him! The good Baron was a little embarrassed when he presented the paper and beat about the bush for some minutes, so that I finally interrupted him and said that we might as well speak frankly and that I supposed this meant that the Czar wished to appear as taking the initiative in the matter. The Baron looked very much relieved and said "Yes, this was exactly what he meant." I told him that I was delighted; that I had not the slightest wish to take the initiative, but I did very much wish that the conference would be called; and that I should back the Czar up in every way in trying to secure it. There is of course an element of pure comedy about the [*Schurz*]2 Czar's action. In the first place, as you probably recollect, last year I invited all the nations to take part in a second conference and received from all of them acceptances, though in half the cases the acceptances were conditioned upon its not taking effect until the Russian- Japanese war had ended. Hay felt that this was all we could do, and that as provided in the first Hague agreement the council at The Hague should now take the initiative about the conference. On thinking it over I became convinced that the council never would act and that I should have to jog the memory of the nations whom I had addressed. Of course I am delighted to have the Czar jog them instead, for his action will undoubtedly have a greater effect upon Germany and France than mine would, and I shall back him up in every way. But isn’t it funny that a great ruler, or for the matter of that, a grown man, should under these circumstances want solemnly to make believe that he is himself calling the conference? However, the important point is that it should be called, and his attitude is a matter merely for good-humored amusement among ourselves. In the second place there is a rather grim irony in the Czar, whose government was really responsible for the devastating war which has occurred since the last Hague Conference, and whose country is now in the throes of what we hope will not be a social or political revolution but what undoubtedly ought to be an enormous social and political change in the direction of freedom - that this man should now take the lead in a proposition looking toward world peace. 3 But mankind at large does not have a very strong sense of humor, and it will probably be but little affected by these considerations. On the other hand it [will] would be very much affected by anything looking like a squabble between myself and the Czar as to who should have the credit of calling the conference, and in my judgment there could be no justification for my answering Rosen otherwise than as I did; that is, telling him that I should be delighted that the Czar should have the credit of taking the initiative and that I should heartily support him. Moreover, it may well be that if I had done as I otherwise should have done and started to get the conference together myself, I would have aroused many jealousies for the very reason that I have [had] been instrumental in bringing about peace between Russia and Japan, and that there would be a feeling that I was posing too much as a professional peacemaker. So I think it is all right from every standpoint. Sincerely yours, Hon. Carl Schurz, Bolton Landing, Lake George, N.Y.[*Loomis, Francie Butler*] [*rewritten 9/27/05*] WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 2(3)1, 1905. My dear Mr. Loomis: In answer to your letter of September 25th I desire to state, in the broadest and most emphatic manner, that the statement you quote as appearing in certain newspapers, and especially in certain New York newspapers, as to the supposed [grave] differences of opinion between myself and the late secretary of State, Mr. Hay, [concerning you and] in respect to the action taken by me [on the report of Secretary Taft concerning the charges of] regarding Mr. Bowen in connection with the charges against you is [against you, one] not merely [wholly] without foundation in fact but [are] is the direct reverse of the truth. You were appointed Assistant Secretary of State upon Mr. Hay's suggestion and request. He never spoke to me about you save with respect and [with] cordial appreciation of the services you were rendering, and he expressed to me very great regret [of the fact] that you were going to leave the service, and stated that he had hoped that you would stay in as long as he did and that he would find it difficult to get any one in your place whom he would like as much. [*tr*] [*2*] Mr Hay [he] expressed himself very freely on the occasion of his last visit to Washington, including the last occasion when I ever saw him alive, as regards the action taken by me on the report of Mr Taft concerning the charges made by Mr. Bowen against you. Not only did he express himself-2- self about Mr. Bowen to me in the language you quote him as having used at about the same time to you in speaking of Mr. Bowen, but he also condemned Mr. Bowen in much stronger terms than those which you quote him as having used, and dwelt particularly upon the fact of what he called the treachery and disloyalty of Mr. Bowen to the Government and to him (Mr. Hay), repeating again and again that most of the charges Mr. Bowen made were really not charges against you at all but against himself (Mr. Hay), and that Mr. Bowen of course knew this. Moreover, Mr. Hay used about Mr. Bowen stronger language of condemnation than I have ever heard him use about any other man who had served under him. But this was not all. Mr. Hay [went on to do] then did what he very rarely indeed did. He [and] expressed his strong dissent from the action I had taken in endorsing Mr. Taft's report as regards even the [very] mild censure of you which it contained, stating that he disagreed with both Mr. Taft and myself on this point and felt that you were in no way whatever censurable and that the only action that had been called for was the dismissal of Mr. Bowen and the announcement of your entire vindication. Very truly yours, Hon. Francis B. Loomis, Department of State, Washington, D.C.[*[Attached to La Farge 9-12-05]*] [*[Ca. 9-05]*] [[Shorthand]] [*[Ca. 9-05]*][*[Attached to La Farge 9-12-05]*]WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 5, 1905. Copy of personal memorandum of the President this day sent to Assistant Secretary Bacon: "Dear Bob: Unless the Secretary has real reasons to keep you between 4 & 6, I guess I'll make it a "command" for tennis between those hours! T.R."COPY. Personal. The White House, Washington ,D.C., October 7, 1905. My dear Sir George: Just a line to thank you for your delightful letter and for the book. I enjoyed all the pieces in the latter, and particularly those which you yourself indicated as being the ones I would like most. Above all I enjoyed the "Greek War" with its translation into modern terms, so to speak, of exactly what a Greek war between two little cities was. I was very much touched by your beautiful tribute to our own soldiers of the Civil war. It may interest you to know that I have on my personal staff in the White House the grandson of Grant, the son of Sheridan, and grand-nephew of Lee - Captain Fitzhugh Lee. After January 1st my Chief of Staff will be Lieutenant General Bates, the son of a member of Lincoln's Cabinet. I am not quite sure that I agree even with your carefully guarded statement as to your liking to have lived in Greece in the Classic age. The proviso you put in includes a great deal! We should have to get rid not only of our present conception of morality, but of what have come to be our ordinary instincts of humanity. In order to tolerate even the best and simplest of the society of that day; and we should have to lose entirely the beautiful love of husband and wife, with all that it has so incalculably meant2. for the home. What a strange thing it is that those wonderful Greeks, so brilliant that I suppose Galton is right in placing the average Athenian in point of intellect as far above the average civilized man of our countries as the latter is above the upper-class barbarian, yet lacked the self-restraint and political common sense necessary to enable them to hold their own against any strong aggressive power. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland, England. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route. October 18, 1905. Personal. Dear Cabot: That is a very nice article, and I wish you would thank Barnard for me. Root has written you in full about the New Foundland situation. I have left instructions that in my absence the Navy Department is to take his orders at any moment about sending a ship. In great haste, Ever yours, Hon. H. C. Lodge, Nahant, Massachusetts. TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. October 19, 1905. Hon. D. C. Heyward, Governor of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C. I thank you for your most cordial telegram. I remember with keen pleasure my visit to South Carolina three years ago and only regret that lack of time forbids my again visiting your great State on this trip. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Charge to the President's private account) The White House, Washington, DC)THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 20, 1905. My dear Governor Heyward: Let me personally thank you again and through you your old historic State for your presence as Governor of South Carolina at Atlanta to-day. I deeply appreciate your coming to greet me. My only regret is that on this trip, owing to necessity of trying to include all the States I have not hitherto visited as President, I was not able to stop over in Carolina; but I was glad I had the chance of saying a word to the citizens of Spartansburg. With all good wishes for you and for the commonwealth over which you preside, believe me, Sincerely yours, Hon. D. C. Heyward, Governor of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C. Are we not to see you at Washington this winter?THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. En route, October 23, 1905. My dear Mr. Middleton: Mr. Colman has handed me that pamphlet, and I wish to thank you for it. It is a sermon which naturally appeals me to very deeply. With great regards and renewed thanks, believe me, Sincerely yours, Mr. F. L. Middleten, 1003 F Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Birmingham, Alabama, October 24, 1905. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. My dear Friends: I want to thank you for the flowers, and thank Admiral Togo, the cat, too! Your friend, Mr. Ed. Frank, Mr. Izora Callen, Clanton, Ala.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 24, 1905. My dear Mr. Mayo: I was greatly pleased with your telegram, and I thank you heartily for your courtesy, which I assure you I appreciate. Sincerely yours, John PO. Mayo, Esp., Columbus, Miss.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Birmingham, Albama, October 24, 1905. Gentlemen: I would like, if it possible for you to do so, to express through you my appreciation to the people of the town of Clanton and especially to the school children who came out to greet me. I should so liked to have stayed with you a little while and have said a few words to you, and nothing but the imperative necessity of keeping to my schedule prevented me doing so. With hearty appreciation. believe me, Sincerely yours, Mr. L. H. Reynolds, Mr. W. A. Collier, Clanton, Alabama.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 24, 1905. My dear Governor: Will you permit me to send you just a line of appreciation for what I hope I may call your very manly and patriotic speech? Much though I appreciate it from my own personal standpoint, I appreciate it still more because of what it means to the country that we both love. With high regard, Sincerely yours, Hon. G. D. Shands, Oxford, Miss.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 25, 1905. Personal. My dear Mr. Copeland: I have your letter of the 21st and enclosures. I should be quite unfit to be President if I did not welcome an editorial frankly and honestly expressing a frank and honest difference of opinion; and your editorials and letter merely heighten the feeling I already had about you, my dear fellow. But it seems to me that a common carrier occupies a very different position form any other individual or corporation. In great haste, Faithfully yours, Mr. Guild A. Copeland, The Daily Advertiser, Boston, Massachusetts.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 25, 1905. Personal. The beautiful flowers came; and I saw Colonel Tucker. Surely you must know how pleased I feel at such a kind, and of course totally unexpected, remembrance of me. By the way, you may possibly see in the newspapers an account of my speech. Governor Jefferson Davis in introducing me dragged into his speech, doubtless for some political purpose of his own, what was practically an apology for lynching, and I answered him I think with courtesy, but with as straightforward plainness as I knew how; and while he was speaking and while I was answering him I was thinking of the hero of your lynching story, which as I think you know made a very deep impression upon me. If you have not seen the speech when it is published in a volume I shall send it to you. Alice FrenchWith regards and thanks, Sincerely yours, Miss Alice French, Davenport, Iowa.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 25, 1905. Ladies: Permit me as an honorary member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen - an honor which I cherish with peculiar pride - to thank you for the beautiful flowers you sent me to-day. No gift could have pleased me more. With hearty appreciation, believe me, Sincerely yours, To the Ladies of the Locomotive Firemens [Engineers] Association of Little Rock, Little Rock, Arkansas.Personal THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. En route, October 25, 1905. My dear President Wheeler: These are interesting articles, and I thank you for sending them to me. I am not in the least discouraged by Taft's report. Do you still feel that Lane is thoroughly fit from the standpoint of efficiency and impartiality for that Interstate Commerce Commission place? I am inclined to appoint him; but I want to be dead sure I am right. Is he closely connected with the Southern Pacific Railway people? Sincerely yours, Preside t Benjamin I. Wheeler, University of California, Berkeley, California.Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D.C., November 1, 1905. Sir: The President directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter running as follows: "Colonel Mann's compliments to the President, and requests the honor of acceptance of the work 'FADS AND FANCIES', for representation in which the President was pleased to give a photograph to Mrs. Hampton some three years ago, and which is but just completed. The volume is sent today by Adams Express. "October the thirtieth, "Nineteen hundred and five." and to say that as Mrs. Hampton has already publicly stated, the President did not give any photograph to her for publication in the work in question, and that he knew nothing of the book, or of the fact that Mrs. Hampton wished the photograph for use therein. Under the circumstances the President can not accept the book, and it is accordingly returned to you herewith. Yours truly, WM. LOEB, Jr., Secretary to the President. Colonel William D'A. Mann, Editor, Town Topics, 452 Fifth Avenue, New York.[Attachment to Bonaparte 11-20-05] [11-20-05] Phoned 11/20/05 [[shorthand]]Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, November 23, 1905. My dear Senator Platt: A number of well known Republicans in New York have been to me to say that they do not feel that Olcott - not for personal reasons but for others which I need not go over in this letter - is the proper man at this time to put forward for Chairman of the Republican county organization. I have told them all that I was not trying to dictate who should be chairman, or to interfere in any way save to express my opinion as a good citizen that whoever was chosen should be a man of the highest character and reputation and should possess the necessary independence to make it certain that he would try to conduct the affirs of the Republican organization in New York City on a high plane of efficiency and integrity. Of course what is needed is the right type of man. It does not matter so much what particular man it is. It does not seem to me to be of the slightest consequence whether the particular man is Olcott or Parsons or Cohen or Frank Brainard or Sheffield - or any other men of the type. Of course I should under no circumstances try to dictate which particular individual of this type should be chosen. I think that any man whom the really decent Republicans, who have the welfare of the party at heart, feel should be put forward, ought to be heartily supported. It is an affair which they should settle themselves. If, for instance, it is true (what according to the information I have received appears to be true) that Olcott can not receive the support of these men, then as a matter of course it would be utterly foolish to press him and could only result in damage, As you know, I have believed very strongly that the only healthy way of treating the Republican party is to treat it in practice as in theory every one would say it should be treated; that is, as capable of self-government. In New York County, for instance, all that we Republicans who do not live there can with wisdom and propriety do is to give such assistance as can not be confounded with dictation to the men within the county who stand for what is best in the practices and traditions of the party. Not only should we be careful not to try to dictate, but not to seem to try to dictate. It is of course eminently proper both to feel and to show our keen interest All this is exactly on the line of our conversation of the other night; but I write it to you because in view of things that have appeared in the papers I think that my position should be made clear. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. T. C. Platt, 49 Broadway, New York.[attached to TR draft to Barnes 11-24-05]THE WHITE HOUSE Hon. William Barnes, Jr., Hotel Manhattan, New York, N.Y. Confidential [*Not sent - telegram sent instead*] [ Confidential THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. November 24, 1905. My dear Mr. Barnes: I enclose you a copy of a letter I have just sent to Senator Platt. It seems to me that it has been most unwise to give the impression that this was a Platt-Quigg versus Odell fight, and that we were insisting upon Olcott. The proper ground to take is that those interested from outside New York in having a decent organization of the Republican party inside of New York County, are not trying to dictate but are of course keenly interested in and have great sympathy with any movement to secure at the head of the County Committee a man of the highest character and reputation - such a man as Olcott, Parsons, Job Hedges, Otto Bannard, Judge Cohen, Sheffield, or any other man of that type. If Olcott's candidacy is distasteful to a considerable element he should not be pushed. If Parsons' candidacy is distasteful to a considerable element he should not be pushed. Every effort should be made to subordinate all personal preference and to avoid turning the contest into one of mere factionalism, but to turn in and support any really good man who will be honest, efficient and independent - any man in whom the public will have confidence. The best section of the Republican party will not take the slightest interest in a contest supposed to be merely between two personal factions. If it is made to appear that it is merely a personal fight between Roosevelt and Odell or Platt and Odell, they][2 will regard it as simply a factional struggle and can with justice point out that no one of the three of us lives in New York. The last thing I want to do is to do anything that will make it seem that I am under the impression that I have been elected boss and not President. As you know, I have long thought that one of the most unhealthy features of our New York politics has been the way in which men elected to one position usurped the duties of other positions, so that, for instance, it has become customary for the Chairman of the State Committee (possibly with the assistance of one or two other men) to settle the speakership without any real regard to the feeling of the legislators. The legislators should elect their own speaker themselves. Similarly, the New York County Republicans should elect their own chairman; and in showing the proper sympathy and interest in any movement for decency I wish most particularly not to be made to appear as showing this sympathy and interest in a spirit of dictatorship. My own view is that I and other Republicans not living in New York who take a genuine interest in the betterment of the New York Republican organization there, can best do it by consulting with and backing up men of the stamp of those whom I have mentioned above - men like Edmund Wetmore, Harry Taft, and any number of others whom I could mention. Let them take the lead and settle what they want done, and then let any assistance that can properly be rendered to them be rendered freely in the way of sympathy and interest, at least by those of us who are outside. Keep the letter to Senator Platt confidential, of course. Sincerely yours, Hon. William Barnes, Jr., Hotel Manhattan, New York. (Enclosure)][for attachment see 11-23-05](Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [Dec]November 25, 1905. My dear Mr. Harriman: Although your letter was marked "Personal" I have taken the liberty of placing it before Root, in whose discretion I know you have entire confidence. He ought to know what you say. Whenever you can get on here let me know, and I shall get you to come to lunch or dinner, when we can talk at length over those Eastern matters. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. December 1, 1905. Hon. J. Van Vechten Olcott, 27 William Street, New York, N.Y. Copy letter dated November twenty-seventh follows: "Olcott came on to see me today, and Root and I have had a long talk with him. Olcott, through no fault of his own, has been put in a very difficult position. He came forward to make the fight under the impression, not that I had said (as I actually did say) that he or you or Cohen or any other man of the type if brought forward by the right people would be all right, but that I felt that he was the only available man. It is of course as untrue to say that if elected he would be under the domination of Senator Platt and Mr. Quigg because he is supported by them as to say that you would be under the domination of Governor Odell and Mr. Halpin because you have been supported by them. But both statements will be believed by many honest people if something is not done to counteract them. You have doubtless seen that the papers now speak of your candidacy and of what seems to be your probable victory as 'Odell's triumph over Platt.' Very good people from up the State [have seen me to express their bitter chagrin at what they regarded as your surrender to Mr. Odell, and as to its very bad effect upon the move for decency in the New York organization. These good people from up the county] take the exact view about your candidacy under its present auspices that equally good people in the city take of the candidacy of Mr. Olcott under the auspices of Senator Platt and Mr. Quigg. Under the right conditions I would feel very strongly that either your candidacy-2- or that of Olcott would represent a most effective blow against bossism and corrupt machine rule and would be entitled to the support of all decent republicans in New York. But to have you running as the Odell candidate, you election only rendered possible by the support of Odell and Halpin, with Olcott running as the Platt candidate and receiving his main strength from the Platt and Quigg forces, would mean that the contest was one of mere factionalism, in which it would be very difficult to detect a principle; and the outcome in either case would be unfortunate. I think you would probably win, although I do not think it certain. If youdid win there are a few people, including very good people who are our friends, who would regard it as your victory but the great bulk of the people would regard it as Odell's and would consider you simply as an instrument in his hands, just as the great bulk of the people would consider Mr. Olcott an instrument in Mr. Platt's hands. I am sure that neither feeling would be true and that either you or Olcott would act independently and fairly as chairman of the county committee; but I do not think that either of you would ever be able to get over the effects of a victory won in such a manner, and I would not regard a victory so won by either of you as possessing much significance from the standpoint of the regeneration of the party in New York. Root and I have advised Olcott accordingly to withdraw, if you will make some statement to the effect that you, if elected chairman of the republican county committee, will regard yourself as the representative neither of Mr. Odell nor of Mr. Platt; as owing fealty to no machine and no boss; as recognizing no factional discriminations of any kind within the republican party; but-3- as standing in an absolutely independent position, resolved to conduct so far as it in your power lies the affairs of the party upon the highest plane of cleanliness and uprightness, of entire independence of any kind of dictation, and with an eye single to making the party so far as your power extends subserve the best interests of the people, because you are convinced that only in this way can you be of service to the party itself. I think you ought also to add explicitly that no support that may be given you will create any obligation, express or implied, on your part, as to the support you give any man for leadership in the republican party in the State, because you are beholden to no man, and in casting whatever influence you may possess one way or the other when the question of leadership in the State comes up you will be guided solely by your views as to the best interests of the party. I am sure that if Olcott withdraws he will be actuated only by a sincere belief that he is doing what the best interests of the republican party demand. Like you, he only entered into this contest under the firm conviction that it was his duty to try to help the party out of the slough of despond into which it had fallen. Like you, he felt he was undertaking a difficult and probably thankless task simply from a sense of fealty to duty. I believe that if you take the steps outlined above, which Root and I feel you ought to take, Mr. Olcott will withdraw in your favor, and under those circumstances the campaign is changed from a faction fight between the apparent representatives of two bosses (for, however unjustly, this is the way in which the bulk of the party regard the present situation) into the unanimous selection of a clean, straight, independent man, supported because he is known to be beholden to no bosses, under obligation to no machine, and able to set with a view solely to what his convictions dictate as to the best interests of the republican party." WM. Loeb, Jr. Secretary. (President's private acct.)[*Buller*] Copy WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 3, 1905. Dear Murray: Good! You will stay the night of the 5th with us. Then bring your little daughter on some time in the spring. I had already (before your letter was written) myself written for all the testimony about McClelland, and have received a letter from Hughes this morning sending part of it and promising to send the rest. I will act just as soon as I have the testimony before me. Always yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. President Nicholas Murray Butler, Columbia University, New York.[[shorthand]] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 8, 1905. My dear Mrs. Storer: Secretary Taft has just shown me your letter of November 26th, this letter evidently being intended for me as much as for him. On inquiry of Mrs. Roosevelt I find that she had received a letter to me, which is probably the one to which you refer in your letter to Mr. Taft; but she tells me she treated this letter as she sometimes has treated other letters that you have sent her to deliver to me, and knowing that the receipt of them would merely make me angry did not give them to me. Your letter to Mr. Taft and the letters to Cardinal Merry del Val and Archbishop Keene (of the answers to which you enclose copies), and your letter to the Princess Alexandrine (the answer to which you also enclose a copy), are all letters which it is inexcusable for you to have written, in your position as the wife of an American Ambassador. In the first place, I wish it to be explicitly understood that though since I have been President I have been approached at different times by prelates of your Church and even by laymen in your Church with requests that I express a preference for the appointment of some person as Cardinal, I have always positively and unequivocally refused to ask for the appointment of any man as-2- Cardinal; and it would have been a gross impropriety for me to have made any such request. To Archbishop Keene, to Mgr. O'Connell and one or two other men who have approached me on behalf of Archbishop Ireland, I have said that I should be delighted to see Archbishop Ireland made a Cardinal, but that I could no more try to exercise pressure to have him made a Cardinal than pressure to get the Archbishop of Canterbury to do something in connection with one of the Episcopal Bishops here. Other persons have spoken to me, saying that they hoped that two American Cardinals--for instant, Ireland and Farley--would be appointed, one in the East and one in the West. I have answered that I have a great regard for both men and would be delighted to see them made Cardinals, just as there are Episcopal clergymen and Methodist clergymen, whom I know, whom I would be delighted to see made Bishops; but I would no more interfere in one case than I would in the other. It is a matter of settled and traditional policy of this Government not to interfere as you desire me to interfere, and as you have been interfering, under any possible circumstances. Your letters not only convey a totally wrong impression of my attitude; but they are such as you have no business whatever to write, in view of the position of your husband in the diplomatic service. The letter of Cardinal Merry del Val to you of November 23rd is a stinging rebuke to you and should be of itself enough to show to you how exceedingly unwise and improper your action-3- in writing to him was. I am very indignant that the wife of an Ambassador in the United States' service should have written such a letter, should have given the impression undoubtedly conveyed by that letter, and should have incurred such a rebuke. You do not seem to realize that it is out of the question for me knowingly to permit the wife of one of our diplomats to engage in what are in effect ecclesiastical intrigues to influence the Vatican. I hear continually of your having written one man or the other about such matters. I find that you were alluded to by foreign members of the diplomatic body in Washington, Paris and Berlin as the "Ambassadress to Rome." As you know, I was unofficially informed on behalf both of Berlin and of Paris that because of these actions of yours it would not be agreeable to them to have Bellamy come as Ambassador to either place. Information of this kind has been repeatedly brought to Secretary Root. I have consulted him and Secretary Bonaparte, who is a member of your Church, as to this last letter of yours. Root's feeling about the case is stronger than I care to put into words. Suffice it to say that, Bellamy rate, Bellamy should not be sent as Special Ambassador to Spain under any circumstances, having in view what you have done. But I must go a little further than this. You and Bellamy must understand that so long as Bellamy continues in the diplomatic service-4- of the United States you must refrain from writing or speaking on any of these matters affecting what is simply church policy to any one, and above all to any one connected with the Vatican. If you cannot make up your minds absolutely to alter your conduct in this regard and to refuse from henceforth ever to write or speak to any one as you have been writing and speaking in this Cardinal's matter, then Bellamy cannot with propriety continue to remain Ambassador of the United States. Very truly yours, Mrs. Bellamy Storer, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria. The White House, Washington, December 11, 1905. My dear Mrs. Storer: Secretary Taft has just shown me your letter of November 26th, this letter evidently being intended for me as much as for him. On inquiry of Mrs. Roosevelt I find that she had received from you a letter to me, which is probably the one to which you refer in your letter to Mr. Taft; but she tells me she treated this letter as she sometimes has treated other letters that you have sent her to deliver to me, when she has known that the receipt of them would merely make me indignant, and puzzle me as to what action I ought to take about Bellamy's remaining in the service; that is, she did not give it to me. Your direct or implied complaints of and reflections upon my own personal conduct give me no concern; but I am very gravely concerned at the mischievous effect your letters must have in misrepresenting the position of the United States Government, and by the far reaching governmental scandal your indiscretion may at any time cause. I have now seen your letter to me sent through Mrs. Roosevelt. In it you actually propose that I (as in your letter to Taft you propose that he) should authorize you to go to Rome to take part in what I must call an ecclesiastical intrigue, and to drag the United States Government into it. Such a proposal is simply astounding. You say that Cardinal Merry del Val has stated that I have “requested that two Archbishops,” one of them Archbishop Farley, be made Cardinals. All you had to say was that such a statement was a deliberate untruth, because you knew that I had refused to make such a request even for Ireland. You say in your letter to me, "You can trust me really." How can you say this, when you write to Taft a letter which if by accident published would absolutely misrepresent, in the most mischievous manner, both me and the American Government? You have no more right to meddle in these matters than Mrs. Reid would have to meddle in the Ritualist controversy, or Mrs. Tower to try to take charge of the relations of Germany to American Lutherans. Your letter to Mr. Taft and the letters to Cardinal Merry del Val and Archbishop Keane (of the answers to which you enclose copies), and your letter to the Princess Alexandrine (of the answer to which also enclose a copy),[*[12-11-05]*] 2 are all letters which it is utterly improper for you to have written, in your position as the wife of an American Ambassador, and show a continued course of conduct on your part which is intolerable if your husband is to remain in the diplomatic service. In the first place, I wish it to be explicitly understood that though since I have been President I have been approached at different times by prelates of your Church and even by laymen of your Church with requests that I ask of the Vatican, or express a preference for, the appointment of some person as cardinal, I have always positively and unequivocally refused directly or indirectly thus to ask for the appointment of any man as Cardinal; and it would have been a gross impropriety for me to have made any such request, while it is an outrage to represent me as having, in any shape, made it. To Archbishop Keane, to Mgr. O'Connell and to other men who have approached me on behalf of Archbishop Ireland, I have said that I had a very high regard for the Archbishop, and that I should be delighted to see him made a Cardinal, but that I could no more try to exercise pressure to have him made a Cardinal, than pressure to get the Archbishop of Canterbury to establish an Archbishopric in America. Other persons have spoken to me, saying that Ireland could not be made a Cardinal, unless another Cardinal was made in the eastern states, and that they hoped that two American Cardinals (usually mentioning Ireland and Farley) would be appointed, one in the East and one in the West. I always answered that I had a great regard for both men and would be delighted to see them made Cardinals, just as there were Episcopal clergymen and Methodist clergymen whom I would be delighted to, see made Bishops; but that I would no more interfere in one case than I would in the other. It is a matter of settled and traditional policy of this Government not to interfere, as you desire me to interfere, and as you have yourself been trying to interfere, under any possible circumstances. Your letters not only convey a totally wrong impression of my attitude; but they are such as you have no business whatever to write, in view of the position of your husband in the diplomatic services. The letter of Cardinal Merry del Val to you of November 23rd is a rebuke to you, expressing plainly his belief that you have been unwarrantably officious in matters with which you have properly no concern. It should of itself be enough to show to you how exceedingly unwise and improper your action in writing to him was. I am indignant that the wife of an Ambassador[12-11-05] 3 in the United states service should have written such a letter, should have given the impression undoubtedly conveyed by that letter, and should have incurred such a rebuke. You do not seem to realize that it is out of the question for me knowingly to permit the wife of one our diplomats to engage in ecclesiastical intrigues to influence the Vatican. For the last couple of years I have continually been hearing of your having written one man or the other about such matters. I find that you are alluded to by foreign members of the diplomatic body in Washington, Paris, and Berlin as the "American Ambassadress to Rome." I was unofficially informed on behalf of both Berlin and of Paris that because of these actions of yours it would not be agreeable to them to have Bellamy come as Ambassador to either place. Information of this kind has been repeatedly brought to Secretary Root. I have consulted him and Secretary Bonaparte, who is a member of your Church, as to this last letter of yours. Root's feelings about the case is stronger than I care to put into words; Bonaparte's feelings is exactly my own. Suffice it to say that in any event it will probably be impossible to send Bellamy as Special Ambassador to Spain, having in view what you have done. But I must go a little further than this. You and Bellamy must understand that so long as Bellamy continues in the diplomatic service of the United States you must refrain from writing or speaking in the way you have been doing on any of these matters, affecting what are simply the personal politics of church policy, to any one, and above all to any one connected to the Vatican. If you cannot make up your mind absolutely to alter your conduct in this regard, while your husband is in the diplomatic service, to refrain absolutely from taking any further part in any matter of ecclesiastical politics at the Vatican, and to refuse to write or speak to any one (whether laymen or ecclesiastics, at home or abroad) as you have been writing and speaking in this Cardinal's hat matter, then Bellamy cannot with propriety continue to remain Ambassador of the United States. I must ask you to give me this positive promise in writing, if Bellamy is to continue in the service; and if you even unintentionally violate it I shall have to ask for Bellamy's resignation; for I can no longer afford to have the chance of scandal being brought on the entire American diplomatic service, and on the[*[12-11-05]*] American Government itself, by such indiscreet and ill advised action as yours has been. Yours very truly, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mrs. Bellamy Storer, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria. P. S. Since writing the above I have looked up my correspondence with you and Bellamy and I find that I have expressed myself not merely once but again and again about this matter in terms which it was simply impossible for you to misunderstand. For instance, on December 19, 1903, I wrote to Bellamy saying that Mgr. O'Connell asked me to write something on behalf of Archbishop Ireland, and continuing: "I told him of course that I could not interfere in such a matter, as it was none of my business who was made Cardinal; that personally I had a very strong friendship and admiration for the Archbishop, and that individually it would please me greatly to see him made Cardinal, just as it pleased me when Dr. Satterlee was made Bishop of Washington; but that I could no more interfere in one case than in the other - in short, that my feeling for the Archbishop was due to my respect for him as a useful and honorable man - just such a feeling I had had for Phillips Brooks and for many other clergymen of various denominations; but that I could not as President in any way try to help any clergyman of any denomination to high rank in that denomination." On December 27, 1903, I again wrote to Bellamy enclosing an article which showed that he had been talking about my interest in Archbishop Ireland, and stating that such conduct on his part had been mischievous, and I continued as follows: "I have the heartiest admiration for Archbishop Ireland. I should be delighted to see him made Cardinal, just as I was delighted to see Lawrence made the Episcopal Bishop of Massachusetts; just as I have been delighted at various Methodist friends of mine who have been made Bishop. But as President, it is none of my business to interfere for or against the advancement of any man in any church; and as it is impossible to differentiate what I say in my individual capacity from what I say as President - at least in the popular mind, and apparently also in the Roman mind - I must request you not to quote me in any way or shape hereafter." On December 30th, by which time I had found out that Bellamy had written what I considered an entirely improper letter to Senator Hanna about the dismissal of Hurst, I again wrote him and this time included the following paragraphs:[*[12-11-95]*] 5. "I know, my dear Bellamy, that you have not intended to do anything disloyal or improper, but surely on thinking over the matter you will see that there would be but one possible construction to be put upon such a letter from you. Think of the effect if your letter were made public! "Let me repeat to you that, in reference to matters affecting the Catholic Church, events have conclusively shown that while you are Ambassador you must keep absolutely clear of any deed or word in Rome or elsewhere which would seem to differentiate your position from that of other Ambassadors. The mere fact of the report in the newspapers about your calling at the Vatican has had a very unfortunate effect. I dare say you did not call; you may merely have seen some Cardinal privately; but the unpleasant talk over the affair emphasizes the need of extreme circumspection while you are in your present position. While I am President and you are Ambassador neither of us in his public relations is to act as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile; and we have to be careful, not merely to do what is right, but so to carry ourselves as to show that we are doing what is right. I shall ask you not to quote me to any person in any shape or way in connection with any affair of the Catholic church, and yourself not to take action of any kind which will give ground for the belief that you as an American Ambassador are striving to interfere in the affairs of the church." Surely these three letters of mine should have been enough warning to both Bellamy and you. Apparently you have quoted isolated sentences from my letters to convince some people that I am doing just exactly what I again and again in writing stated explicitly that I would not and could not do. This being so, I must ask you to return to me all of my letters in which I have spoken on any of these ecclesiastical subjects. If I were in a private position I should not have the last objection to your keeping them. But as I have apparently been totally unable, even by the language I have quoted above as used in my letters to Bellamy two years ago, to make you understand my position as President in these matters, I feel that my letters should be returned to me. Again sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[*Rewritten*] THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. December 14, 1905. Sir: I have received your letter of December 13th. The facts therein set forth prove in conclusive fashion that you were absolutely right in the position you have all along taken both as regards the proceedings against the company implicated itself and as regards the further proceeding proposed against the officers of the company, including Mr. Paul Morton, recently a member of my Cabinet. In my letter of June 12th last, in reply to yours of June 5th in which you advised the course which has actually been taken and which has been so signally justified by the event, I wrote you [as follows:] that in my judgment as in your own you would have been wholly without justification in forwarding individually against its officers of its company as there was not a particle of evidence against them. I added that:- ["I have received and carefully considered your letters of the 31st ultime and 3rd instant. I entirely agree with your conclusions. In my opinion you would be wholly without justification in proceeding individually against the officers of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway for contempt when neither the Interstate Commerce Commission nor the special counsel you have employed have developed a single fact of any kind beyond the holding of their offices tending to implicate any one of those officers.] "One of the officers, Mr. Morton, is a member of my Cabinet. This fact is not allowed to shield him, nor on the other hand is it to be allowed to cause him to be singled out, or the officers with whom he is associated to be singled out, for attack." ["You advised me to direct the submission of the printed evidence taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission (the only evidence before the special counsel) to Judge Philips, who had issued the injunction, to see whether on this published evidence, in which there is not a syllable directly bearing on Mr. Morton or any one of his colleagues in the management of the read, action could be taken against any one of them personally. I did not take this advice for two reasons. First: if it were not for Mr. Morton's being in my Cabinet, neither you nor I would dream of following such a course in this Instance; and we could not follow it save on condition of also following it in the] 2 I directed you to proceed against its company, and of course to proceed against any individual official if any destin[???] was produced about Star he had been personally guilty exacted by act or command; it acting that agreed with its doubt you had expressed as to whether there was good ground for proceeding [???] against its [????????] but that's I also agreed with you that we should try to obtain the judgment of the court on that question. As to whether the [its] injunction was sufficient and stated, therefore, the way any ground of action whatever [case of the Harvester Company in all similar cases - in my judgment, would put us in a wholly untenable position. Second: I have received from Mr. Morton a letter, of which I enclose you a copy, together with a copy of my reply. In it you will see that Mr. Morton not only states in the most unequivocal manner that he had no knowledge whatever of the unlawful practice complained of, but also shows by the quotation of documents issued under his direction, that all such unlawful practices were specifically forbidden by him, and that the attention of his subordinates was repeatedly called to the necessity of complying with the law in this respect. When there is thus not one shadow of testimony against him, and when whatever evidence has been submitted shows explicitly that he is not guilty, it seems to me that there is no warrant whatever for our proceeding against him. * * * * * "If you at any time get legal evidence of any such wilful and deliberate violation by any officer of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe or of any other railroad running west of Chicago, of the injunction in the Colorado fuel case, of of the injunction in the International Harvester Company case, you will of course proceed as you have already proceeded in the Chicago beef-packing cases. But at present not only has there been no such evidence produced, but there has been no attempt to produce such evidence; and as regards Mr. Morton, there is seemingly conclusive testimony to the contrary. "In both this Colorado fuel case and in the International Harvester case I direct that proceedings for contempt against the companies be taken by the Government. Whether, as the cases develop, proceedings against individual officers become necessary must depend in each instance upon whether testimony is obtained showing that such individual officer has either by act of connivance been personally guilty in the matter. If there are any railroads guilty of the practices which we have enjoined other railroads from following, but which have not themselves been enjoined, proceedings should be begun to put them under similar restraint. "You have expressed your doubt as to whether the injunction granted in in sufficiently explicit terms to cover either the case of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe or the similar case of the International Harvester Company. I agree, however, with your feeling that even though there is such doubt, an effort should be made to obtain the judgment of the court on the question."] The result [in this case] shows that you were entirely right in your doubt whether the injunction was sufficient to cover the case. I [call your special attention [????????] to] am much pleased with the remarks quoted by you in which Judge Philips speaks of the attacks made on Mr. Paul Morton. [and his associate, Mr. Ripley.] Your original advice to me was to direct that 3 the [only] evidence before the special counsel who had advised action against these and other officials individually, should be submitted to Judge Philips, who had issued the injunction, to see whether action could be taken against any of them personally. I refused to take this action. [for the reasons I gave, which are quoted above] Judge Philips (who had before him all the evidence which was before the special counsel.) in his decision exactly covers the point which would have been raised if I had followed your advice. He says (I condense the statement you have yourself given above): "This instance has attracted considerable public attention because of the sensational association of the names of * * * Paul Morton * * * then Vice President of the defendant company, with the transaction. The record in the case, however, * * * [including the] evidence taken before the Interstate Commerce Commission fails to furnish any foundation for imputing to those gentlemen any personal responsibility for the alleged violation of the Interstate Commerce Law." The decision of the court, therefore, is not only that you were absolutely right in the advice you gave me, but furthermore, and explicitly that there was no possible ground for action against Mr. Morton. No action or addition to that which you proposed could properly have been taken. [The course actually taken was was absolutely proper; and as the decision of the court, and the opinion of the Judge above quoted, show that to base [was the only one which could with propriety have been taken, and to have] taken the course and proposed by the special counsel [would followed any other] would have been a flagrant outrage on justice. Sincerely yours, Hon. William H. Moody, Attorney General.[December 15, 1905] 3 decisions of the court, and the opinion of the Judge above quoted, show that to have taken the course proposed by the special counsel would have been [a flagrant outrage on justice] unjust. Sincerely yours, Hon. William H. Moody, Attorney General. 53[1905] 1 In addition to the commendation already made public from the German Foreign office, the German ambassador has also conveyed to the American Government the assurance of the Emperor that there has never been [on his part] any change in his [the] attitude of [the German Emperor President] towards Mr Hill, and in [their] his cordial willingness to welcome [him] Mr Hill to Berlin. [Their] [His] The Emperor's favorable opinion of Mr. Hill was communicated to the Washington Administration last November and [their] his attitude has never changed since. Apparently some remarks in a casual communication have2 been [misunderstood and] distorted by gossip [so changed in repetitions as] [to convey having become] and exagerated by rumor [the subject of gossip] [have] so as to give[n] a totally erroneous impression of the whole matter. The two governments have never shared this misunderstanding; the [attitude] design of the [American government] president and Secretary of [State?] in choosing Mr. Hill was to choose the man who of all the men in the diplomatic service was best fitted for this [very] particular post: a post [? to] [some other] of the first order in honor and responsibility, and [for] to which3 therefore it was deemed well to send a [trained] skilled Diplomat, a student, a speaker, an authority on International lawyer, [of a] a learned a German scholar, [who had served as] [whose relations with this leader were] who had served with signal success as Assistant Secretary of State under John Hay and as [the] foreign minister in two accreditations [and the Emperor] [German authorities have throughout] [has throughout shown [that] [this] his cordial [appreciation of] pleasure [at the prospect of] in receiving [having] this type of representative American diplomat.] this is, and has always been fully appreciated by the Emperor personally, and in Germany at large.[*[To Wilhelm II ?]*][*Davenport*] (Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 1, 1906. My dear Mr. Davenport: Anything you want I should like me to do any how, and when it comes to dealing with Arabian horses I would take you up with double zeal. Is the enclosed letter from the Secretary of State all right? If not, make what changes you wish and I will have them put in. You can use this letter too with any of our representatives. With all good luck, Faithfully yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. Homer Davenport, The Evening Mail, New York, N.Y. Enclosure.(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. January 15, 1906. My dear Eddie: Your letter of the 13th instant, with enclosure, has been received. The President thinks that is first class. He is much obliged to you for the way you have handled the matter. Bery truly yours, (Signed) Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. George E. Graham, Proctor's Twenty-third Street Theatre, New York, N.Y.January 24, 1906. My dear Mr. Jerome: The inference to be drawn from certain of your queries yesterday in connection with the [?] libel suit is that you had in your possession some letter written on behalf of me, and possibly some corrected proof sent by Mr. Loeb giving material for a publication about me in "Fads and Fancies." I have made public to-day the only correspondence authorized by me on the subject. Mr. Loeb has hunted through his letter-books and can not find that he ever wrote anything to anyone connected with Town Topics or "Fads and Fancies" on the subject--he certainly never did it wittingly. Will you tell me if you have any such letter or document, and if so, what it is and the date? I have always regarded Town Topics with more abhorrence than any other publication of which I have knowledge. I have never opened a copy of it and have never allowed a copy in the house; and of course have never knowingly permitted any photograph or article to be furnished on my behalf to any publication connected with Town Topics. Mrs. Wade Hampton, the daughter-in-law of General Wade Hampton, came to [?] two years ago with a letter from the General, who was [is] an old friend of mine. She asked me for an autographed photograph, which I gladly gave her. As she explained in a public statement last summer, I did not know what publication the photo-[*[1-26-06]*] 2 graph was intended for. When Colonel Mann last summer stated that this photograph had been given to her for the purpose of publication in "Fads and Fancies", I immediately denied it and the denial was corroborated by Mrs. Hampton. Mrs. Hampton then wrote me saying that she hoped I had not been annoyed, but that she hoped I would authorize the use of the photograph, to which I answered as follows: "Oyster Bay, N.Y., "July 29, 1905. "My dear Mrs. Hampton: "You need not feel badly at all about causing me any annoyance, for your explanation of the matter was as frank and straightforward as to put the whole thing right and I have not felt it necessary for me to say anything more. I have no power to prevent people writing about me whatever they choose, and there are hundreds of photographs of mine of all kinds which can be obtained everywhere and which appear in every sort of publication. It must be distinctly understood, however, that I of course give no authorization for either picture or article, and in this particular case I would very much prefer if nothing whatever about me appeared, and hope nothing will appear. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT. I have made public to-day the following letter: "The White House "Washington, November 1, 1905. "Sir: "The President directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter running as follows: "Colonel Mann's compliments to the President, and requests the honor of acceptance of the work FADS AND FANCIES, for representation in which the President was pleased to give a photograph to Mrs. Hampton some three years ago, and which is but just completed. The volume is sent today by Adams Express. "October the thirteenth, "Nineteen hundred and five." and to say that as Mrs. Hampton has already publicly stated, the President did not give any photograph to her for publication in the work in question, and that he knew nothing of the book, or of the fact that Mrs. Hampton wished the photograph for use therein. Under the circumstances the President can not accept the book, and it is[1-26-06] accordingly returned to you herewith. "Yours truly, "WM. LOEB, JR., "Secretary to the President. "Colonel William D'A. Mann, "Editor, Town Topics, "452 Fifth Avenue, "New York. Sincerely yours, Hon. William Travers Jerome, District Attorney, New York.3 accordingly returned to you herewith. "Yours truly, "WM. LOEB, JR., "Secretary to the President. "Colonel William D'A. Mann, "Editor, Town Topics, "452 Fifth Avenue, "New York." Sincerely yours, Hon. William Travers Jerome, District Attorney, New York.January 27, 1906. My dear Mr. Jerome: This morning I saw your published statement which contains the information I asked for in my letter of yesterday. Mr. Loeb at once looked up the Oyster Bay files and found the letter of Judge Deuel to him and his answer in the month of September, 1903. It appears from this that Judge Deuel wrote him asking him to correct the proof of the article for "Fads and Fancies" and requesting him to send him certain photographs, using the expression: "sometime since the President consented through Mrs. Hampton and gave a signed photograph for that purpose." This sentence naturally gave Mr. Loeb the impression that I had agreed to the publication in question and that he was merely carrying out my wishes. The statement in the sentence, however, was a falsehood. Mrs. Hampton, who obtained the photograph from me, has publicly stated that I did not know for what purpose my photograph was to be used, and that I had no knowledge whatever that it was for my publication connected directly or indirectly with Town Topics. Moreover, in her letter to me of July 28th last she says: "At the time of the interview I did try so hard to explain to you the purpose for which I desired your photograph, but you really would not let me. I know it was because of your confidence in me through the letter of introduction from my father-in-law, General Wade Hampton, that I would make no improper use of it."[*[1-27-06]*] 2 It was in answer to this that I wrote the letter to her of which I embodied a copy in my letter to you of yesterday. This letter was published widely in the press at the time, which was between two and three months before "Fads and Fancies" came out, so that everyone connected with that publication knew before it was published that I had repudiated any authorization for the use of my name or the article about me therein. Mr. Loeb never informed me of his correspondence with Judge Deuel, or that he had sent any photographs or corrected any manuscript or furnished any manuscript for him, his letter being as regards this matter one of the routine types for of course he has written hundreds of letters furnishing photographs and sketches or correcting sketches for publication. I wish to reiterate that until the middle of last summer I had no knowledge that either my photograph or an article about me was to appear in "Fads and Fancies", and of course no knowledge that anyone connected with me had furnished such photograph or such information, and that as soon as it was alleged that such was the case I without the delay of a night repudiated all knowledge of, or consent to, the transaction; that this repudiation was first made in the form of a statement to the press and then in the form of a letter to Mrs. Hampton which was widely published on or about August 1st last; and that, when about three months later, on November 1st, Colonel Mann sent me a presentation copy of the book in question, I immediately returned it to him, stating my[*[1-27-06]*] 3 reasons for so doing as contained in the copy of letter I embodied in my letter to you of yesterday. Sincerely yours, Hon. William Travers Jerome[l], District Attorney, New York.[ca Jan 19 06] Mrs. Morris [[shorthand]] THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, February 5, 1906. Private. W.C. Bristol, Esq., U.S. Attorney, Portland, Oregon. Sir:- I have to-day withdrawn your nomination to the Senate to be United States Attorney for the District of Oregon. The reason is obvious because of your letter dated June 4, 1902, and addressed to Mr. E.T.C. Stevens, President of the Coo s Bay Land & Investment Company. I have read the original of that letter. In it you suggest, relative to a purchase of real estate from that company by clients of your own, that in view of the high price set by the company upon the property, and of the many things that you might say or do which would have considerable bearing upon the ultimate result, you are deserving of a substantial reward from Mr. Stevens and his associates for your connection with the transaction. While you formally recognize in this letter you ought not to act for two different interests at the same time, you ask Mr. Stevens to let you know what sum his company would be willing to allow you in case the deal goes through.W.C.B., 2. A recent letter from Mr. L.H. Maxwell, who was secretary of the Coos Bay Company at that time, to Senator Fulton says that while the company regarded your proposition as a "hold-up," and were indignant over it, they did agree to pay you $500, provided the deal was consummated, and that you were so notified; that the company was anxious to make the sale because the price was considered good, and that it was believed that unless some compensation was allowed to you, you would use your influence with your clients to hinder the sale as indicated in your letter, and therefore the company decided it was best to submit to your demand. It appears that the sale fell through and therefore the $500 was never paid to you; but it would seem[s] to be clear from the letter that you were attorney for the vendees in that matter, and had never been the representative of the Coos Bay Land & Investment Company at that or any other time. [The only possible conclusion from these facts is that you are unfit to be United States Attorney, and I have therefore withdrawn your nomination. But] In order that there may be no mistake, and that you may have an opportunity to explain the matter, if there is any explanation, [is possible] you are hereby instructed to report to me direct on the subject by mail and at once. I enclose copies of the two letters referred to above.COPY February 12, 1906. Personal My dear Lord Grey: I shall send up an officer to receive that portrait; and I cannot sufficiently thank you for your thoughtful and generous gift. The announcement shall be made by Mr. Choate at the time and place that you suggest. I shall then formally thank you for your great and thoughtful courtesy. Meanwhile let me say privately how much I appreciate not only what you have done but the spirit in which you have done it and the way in which the manner of doing it adds to the generosity of the gift itself. I shall have placed on the portrait - which shall of course be kept in the White House, as you desire - the circumstances of its taking and return. With heartiest regard, Sincerely yours, (signed) THEODORE ROSEVELT Earl Grey, Government House, Ottawa, Canada. [*Letter press copy book 31 p.227*](Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. February 18, 1906. My dear Mr. Harriman: I was sorry not to be able to make an appointment with you but of course I was up to my ears immediately after the wedding, and on Sunday I have to make a rule to see no one except in altogether exceptional cases in the evening, and you are leaving on the four o'clock train. It was a pretty wedding, was it not? Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. E. H. Harriman, 120 Broadway, New York, N.Y.Copy THE WHITE HOUSE Washington, February 19, 1906. Sir: In reply to your letter of the 16th instant the President directs me to state to you that he had the Superintendent of Police of the District of Columbia, Major Sylvester, make a careful investigation of the circumstances connected with the arrest of Mrs. Morris for disorderly conduct at the Executive Office, and the Superintendent submitted to the President all the affidavits of the persons whom he had examined. The President carefully went over Major Sylvester's report and the affidavits, and also personally saw Major Sylvester and some of the persons making the affidavits. He came to the conclusion that the arrest was justified, and that the force used in making the arrest was caused by the resistance offered by Mrs. Morris to the officers in the discharge of their duty, and was no greater than was necessary to make the arrest effective. Under those circumstances the President does not consider that the officers are properly subject to blame. He was also satisfied that the kindest thing that could be done to Mrs. Morris and her kinsfolk was to refrain from giving any additional publicity to the circumstances surrounding the case. Yours truly, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President, Dr. Minor Morris, The New Willard, Washington, D. C.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. February 19, 1906. Wood, Manila. Do not intend [to] disturb you before [the] date you mention unless [the state of] your health appears to demand [a] change. ROOSEVELT. (Official)[[shorthand]] W. C. Bristol Feb. 1906COPY Written out by hand. March 13, 1906. My dear Lord Grey: It will be a great pleasure to see Lady Grey, your daughter and yourself at the White House. I shall ask you for the night of April 3rd, and shall expect you all in time for dinner. Do you intend to send the picture to our American Ambassador at London? If so I shall notify him. Looking forward to receiving you, I am Sincerely yours, (signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Earl Grey, Government House, Ottawa, Canada P150 Letterpress copy book 32[*Taft*] THE WHITE HOUSE, March 15, 1906. Confidential. Dear Will: I received your letter and afterwards had a half-hour's talk with your dear wife. Judging from one phrase of your letter I think I have been in error as to your feeling. You say that it is your decided personal preference to continue your present work. This I had not understood. On the contrary I gathered that what you really wanted to do was to go on the bench, and that my urging was in the line of your inclination, but in a matter in which you were in doubt as to your duty. What you say in your letter and what your dear wife says alter the case. My dear Will, it is predominantly a matter in which no other man can take the responsibility of deciding for you what it is right and best for you to do. Nobody could decide for me whether I should go to the war or stay as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Nobody could decide for me whether I should accept the Vice Presidency, or try to continue as Governor. Nobody could decide for Garfield whether he should go on as Commissioner of Corporations or become a District Judge; or for Root, whether he should decline the Governorship, or the following year accept the Secretaryship of State. In each case it is the man himself who is to lead[*3-15-06*] 2 his life after having decided one way or the other. No one can lead that life for him; and neither he nor any one else can afford to have any one else make the decision for him; because the vital factor in the decision must be the equation of the man himself. As far as I am personally concerned I could not put myself in your place because I am not a lawyer and would under no circumstances, even if I had been trained for a lawyer, have any leaning toward the bench; so in your case I should as a matter of course accept the three years' of service in the War Department, dealing with the Panama and Philippine question, and then abide the fall of the dice as to whether I became President, or continued in public life in some less conspicuous position, or went back to the practice of the law- but mind you I would not for a moment contemplate leaving Ohio, for after fifty a man does not as a rule do well if he leaves his native State, at least foran older State. But I appreciate as every thoughtful man must the immense importance of the part to be played by the Supreme Court in the next twenty-five years. I do not at all like the social conditions at present. The dull, purblind folly of the very rich men; their greed and arrogance, and the way in which they have unduly prospered by the help of the ablest lawyers, and too often through the weakness or shortsightedness of the judges or by their unfortunate possession of meticulous minds; these facts, and the corruption in business and politics, have tended to produce a very unhealthy condition of excitement andirritation in the popular mind, which shows itself in part in the enormous increase in the socialistic[*[3-15-06]*] 3 propaganda. Nething affective, because nothing at once honest and intelligent, is being done to combat the great amount of evil which, mined with a little good, a little truth, is contained in the outpourings of the Cosmopolitan, of McClure's, of Collier's, of Tom Lawson, of David Graham Phillips, of Upton Sinclair. Some of these are socialists; some of them merely lurid sensationalists; but they are all building up a revolutionary feeling which will most probably take the form of a political campaign. Then we may have to do, too late or almost too late, what had to be done in the silver campaign when in one summer we had to convince a great many good people that what they had been laboriously taught fer several years previous was untrue. In the free silver campaign one most unhealthy feature of the situation was that in their panic the conservative forces selected as their real champion Hanna, a man with many goad qualities, but who embodied in himself more than any ether big man, all the forces of coarse corruption that had been so prominent in our industrial and political life; and the respectable people either gave to him or approved of the giving to him ef a colossal bribery fund. As it happens, I think that in that campaign for the most part the funds were honestly used as a means of convincing people; but the obligations Hanna incurred and the way in which the fund was raised were most unfortunate. I earnestly hope that if any similar contest of a more important kind has to be waged in the future that the friends of conservatism and order will [3-15-06] 4 make their fight under different kinds of leaders and by different methods. Under such circumstances you would be the best possible leader, and with your leadership we could rest assured that only good methods would prevail. In such contest you could do very much if you were on the bench; you could do very much if you were in active political life outside. I think you could do most as President; but you could do very much as Chief Justice; and you could do less, but still very much, either as Senator or as Associate Justice. Where you can fight best I cannot say, for you know what your soul turns to better than I can. As I see the situation it is this. There are strong arguments against your taking this justiceship. In the first place my belief is that of all the men that have appeared so far you are the man who is most likely to receive the Republican Presidential nomination and who is, I think, the best man to receive it; and under whom we would have most chance to succeed. It may well be that Root would be at least as good as a President as either you or I; but he does not touch the people at as many points as you and I touch them. He would probably not be as good a candidate as I was, or as you would be; It is not a light thing to cast aside the chance of the Presidency; even though of course it is a chance, however good a one. It would be a very foolish thing for you to get it into your thoughts, so that your sweet and fine nature would be warped and you would become[3-15-06] 5 bitter and sour as Henry Clay and Tom Reed became; and thank Heaven this is absolutely impossible. But it is well to remember that the shadow of the Presidency falls on no man twice, save in the most exceptional circumstances. The good you could do is four or eight years as the head of the Nation would be incalculable. Furthermore, casting aside the question of the Presidency, if you do not go on the bench you have years of vital, important service in connection with the Panama canal and the Philippines, not to speak of the regular army itself, and the certainty, if not on the bench, that is the future you will be one of the great leaders for right in the tremenduous contests that are sure to arise through the play of the half hidden farces now in blind revolt, against not only what is bad but against much that is good, and against much that is inevitable, is the present industrial system. Finally, there is a chance that you might well take a position on the bench some time during the next three years through a vacancy occurring; although I do not think very much of this argument, because the reasons which I consider weighty as against your taking the present vacancy would obtain just as much at any time within the next two years; and after the Presidential nomination, if you were not nominated, though they would not obtain to the same degree they would still obtain partially, when of course your chance of being put upon the bench might be much smaller. Moreover, the[3-15-06] 6 chance of your obtaining the Chief Justiceship would of course be lessened, for it might be, although it probably would not be, the case, that I might find some big man like Root or Knox who would consent to take the present vacancy if he knew that the Chief Justiceship was open but who would not take it if he knew that the appointment was foreclosed; and under such circumstances I would not feel that I had the right to foreclose it. I do not regard this argument as important because I do not believe that the big men I have in mind would now go on the bench in any event; but it is an argument that must be considered. In other words the fact must be faced that it is possible, although improbable, that not to go on the bench now means your definitely keeping off it; although I do not myself have any serious doubt that even if the opportunity did not come for me to put you on the bench it would come under some subsequent President. The chief arguments in favor of your accepting the position are: first and infinitely foremost, the fact that it does give you, humanly speaking, the opportunity for a quarter of a century to do a great work as Justice of the greatest court in Christendom (a court which now sadly needs great men) on questions which seem likely vitally and fundamentally to affect the social, industrial and political structure of our commonwealth. A small secondary point is that it would increase your chance of being Chief Justice, making it certain that [3-15-06] 7 you would be such if the vacancy occurred during my term. But as I have said, I do not attach any importance to this point because it might be if you did not go on now that if the vacancy did occur in my term I could appoint you anyhow (and indeed probably would, save in such an event as I speak of above); while I feel that the probabilities would also favor my Republican successor of mine appointing you to the position if he get the chance. Now, my dear Will, there is the situation as I see it. It is a hard choice to make, and you yourself have to make it. You have two alternatives before you, each with uncertain possibilities, and you can not be sure that whichever you take you will not afterwards feel that it would have been better if you had taken the other. But whichever you take I know that you will render great and durable service to the Nation for many years to come, and I feel that you should decide in accordance with the promptings of your own liking, of your own belief as to where you can render the services which most appeals to you, as well as that wish you feel is most beneficial to the Nation. No one can with wisdom advise you. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War, 1603 K Street.[*[March 19, 1906]*] My dear Mr. Reid: The National Civic Federation has brought about the formation of a Committee of twenty-one representative men to undertake the investigation of and report upon the subject of Municipal Ownership, both in the United States and abroad. This Committee, I am informed, is composed of men representing all shades of opinion on this question, and many different callings. They are equipped with a staff of experts to assist in their investigations. A portion of the Committee has, during the last few months, I am advised, accomplished its work throughout the United States and the majority of its members are about to embark, on the 22nd of this month to visit Europe. The matter of Governmental interest in public utilities, whether Municipal, State or National, has become a subject for serious considerations with us. The work of the Commission, I am satisfied, will be of exceptional value in the discussion of this subject, which is sure to become general at an early day. It is therefore, important that this Government should do everything in its power to assist in the gathering of such important statistical matter as this Commission is about to undertake, and I therefore [trust] hope that you will do [everything] all in your power to further their researches and to secure for them [whatever] the facilities [you possibly can] they need. The names of the committees are as follows Sincerely yoursCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATION. Melville E. Ingalls, (Big Four Railroad, Cincinnati.) W. D. Mahon (President, Ass'n Street Railway Employees, Detroit, Mich.) Frank J. Goodnow, (Columbia University, New York.) Walton Clark, (Third V. P. U. G. I. Co. Philadelphia, Pa.) Edward W. Bemis, (Superintendent Water Works, Cleveland, O.) John H. Gray, (Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.) Timothy Healy, (President Int. Brotherhood Stationary Firemen, N. Y.) Wm. J. Clark, (Foreign Manager, Gen. Electric Co. New York City.) Frank Parsons, (President, National Public Ownership League, Boston.) John R. Commons, (University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.) J. W. Sullivan, (Editor, Clothing Trades Bulletin, New York.) F. J. McNulty, (President, Int. Brotherhood Electrical Workers, Washington, D. C.) Albert E. Winchester, (General Superintendent City of South Norwalk Electric Works, So. Norwalk, Ct) Charles L. Edgar, (President, Edison Electric & Illuminating Co. Boston, Mass.) Milo R. Maltbie, (Franchise Expert, and Former Editor Municipal Affairs, New York City.) Edward A. Moffett, (Editor "Bricklayer & Mason, Indianapolis, Ind.)COPY March 19, 1906. My dear Mr. Ambassador: Eartl Gray will send you the picture of Franklin which he is so handsomely restoring to this country to be hung in the White House, Will you arrange to have it shipped thither? Mrs. Roosevelt has just read me aloud your very interesting last letter. In a few days I shall write you at length about this Morocco business. Sincerely yours, (signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Whitelaw Reid, The American Ambassador, London, England. Setter Press Copy book 32 page 242COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C. March 29th 1906. My dear Senator Penrose: It has been alleged top me that D. G. Watkins, now an assistant cashier at the Custom House, was to be recommended to me for Naval Officer of the Port of Philadelphia. I enclose a copy of a paper signed by him. I would not want to appoint such a man to any office. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, United States Senate.COPY Extract of letter to President Roosevelt from the Hon. Whitelaw Reid. AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON 29th March 1906. P.S. -- Since dictating the above, the services have told me that the day before my return from Paris a picture came from the Earl Grey, from Howick in Northumberland, address to you in my care at Dorchester House; and on going to the Embassy to-day I found your letter of March 19th, advising me about it. I will see that the picture is in good shape for transmission, and will have it put in the hands of our United States Dispatch Agent, who will furnish I think the safest channel for forwarding. I shall be delighted to get the details you are good enough to promise about the Morocco business. (signed) W. R. To The President, White House, Washington, D.C. U.S.A.COPY Extract of letter to President Roosevelt from the Hon. Whitelaw Reid.[*Guild, Curtis - Jr.*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. April 2, 1906. Private. Dear Curtis: Before formally answering your letter about that petition I [will] must write you a private word to say that it is such utter nonsense that I am really surprised any of you men in government office should have signed it. It is the kind of petition that I receive not merely by the score but by the hundred - now to interfere on behalf of the Armenians in Turkey; now to interfere on behalf of the Jews in Russia; now to interfere on behalf of the Negroes in Portuguese South Africa; and now to interfere on behalf of the Negroes in the Congo Free State. At the present moment the professional hysteria crowd have taken up the Congo Free State. Very worthy people of limited knowledge and hysterical habit of mind are continually producing these petitions. Six months ago the condition of the Jews in Russia attracted most of the attention of these people. At the moment it is the Congo Free State. Six months hence it may be the Armenians. If I had absolute power and if this country were prepared to embark on a long career of disinterested violence on behalf of all sufferers outside its limits, I should gladly go into these various cases; though even then I should have to take them up one at a time, as to comply at once with all the requests of all the enthusiasts would mean immediate war with considerabl[e]y-2- over half the globe. But, of course, [as] no one contemplates our going to war [on] over any of these matters, and [so] there is not the slightest obligation on the Nation to interfere as regards any one of them, and [as] we have not the slightest right to interfere under any form of law, and [as] there is no more call upon us to interfere in the Congo than [as] for instance to interfere as I am requested at intervals to do on behalf of the French inhabitants of Lorraine, or the Polish inhabitants of Prussia and Russia, or the inhabitants of North Schleswig[ Holstein] against Germany, or of the Finns and Livonians against Russia, or of [some of] the [British subjects] Irish as against Great Britain, or of the Protestant natives in Madagascar against France - as I am asked to interfere in all these cases, and have no right to interfere in any, it is a little difficult to construct a theory upon which I should take action in one particular case and in none of the others. Finally, and most important, the proposition really - although not intentionally - is one that this Government should put itself into the ridiculous position of making a fuss which it does not intend to back up. In such cases I do not intend to take an action against a weak power which I am not equally ready to take against a strong power if the facts justify it; and this means that as nothing could persuade our country to go to war on any of these points the proposition is that I shall merely bluster and then after having aggrevated-3- gravated the sufferings of the people in whose behalf these hysterical [people] individuals ask me to interfere, I shall back down. This is just precisely what these well-meaning people who sign these petitions are asking me to do when they thus specifically demand that the United States Government shall begin the career of an international [the] Meddlesome Mattie. The proposition is a mischievous piece of silliness. Sincerely yours, Hon. Curtis Guild, Jr., Governor of Massachusetts, Boston, Massachusetts.9-12-06 [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]][attached to draft TR to Wilson 4-12-06][*Copy*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. April 20, 1906. My dear Senator Carter: Replying to your note of the 20th instant in connection with the proposed inquiry by the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads into the matter of my nomination to be Postmaster of Washington: (1) I was born at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, December 3, 1868. My father was born in the State of New York, my mother in the State of Maine. Their ancestors, back to [the] a time preceding the Revolution, were natives of either New York or Massachusetts. My father was temporarily engaged in business in Nova Scotia at the time of my birth, and my parents remained there until I was about seven years old, when they returned to the United States, going to New Jersey, where my father lived until the time of death in 1891. My parents never at any time relinquished their American citizenship, nor took the slightest step in that direction. (2) My present legal residence is in the State of New jersey, and that has been my legal residence ever since I was old enough to vote. I desire to add that I have had no other ties in New Jersey since 1892, when the surviving members of my family removed to Washington, where they now reside. (3) Mrs. Minor Morris called at the Executive Office on January 4, 1906, at about one o'clock and asked to be allowed to see the President. At the time Secretary Loeb was engaged with the President, and I saw her.2 Upon inquiry as to the nature of her business she stated with considerable reluctance that her husband had been unjustly dismissed from a branch of the War Department; that she did not propose to have anything to do with the Secretary of War concerning it; but that she wanted the President to take it up and see that justice was done. She was informed that the President could not give personal attention to such a matter and that the decision of the Secretary of War would be final. She insisted that she must see the President, and when told that that was out of the question she asserted in boisterous manner that she would not be prevented from seeing him and that she would remain where she was for a month if need be unless she saw him sooner. She was allowed to remain for some moments. When I returned to the reception room shortly after, I found her pacing excitedly up and down the room, and informed her as quietly as possible that she could not see the President and that it would be useless for her to remain longer. She replied in a loud voice that she would see him and that she would stay there until she did. She was then advised to drop the matter and to go away quietly. This in still louder terms she refused to do. She was then told that she must either leave the office at once voluntarily or it would be necessary to have her put out of the building. At this she shrieked at the top of her voice “I will not be put out," rushed to a chair, threw herself into it and shouted: “Don't you have any hands laid on me; I am going to stay here until I see the President.” Mrs. Morris’ piercing shrieks were heard throughout the building and it became necessary in the interest of order to have her removed. She was accordingly taken in charge3 by a police officer who had witnessed the whole affair. He asked her to go with him quietly. She refused, and told him that if she was removed she would have to be dragged every step of the way. Before applying force the officer asked her three times to leave the office quietly. She shrieked her refusal to each request and was then led from the room. She struggled violently with two officers (all the way from the office building to the eastern entrance of the White House). As soon as she was outside of the office building she threw herself on the ground and it became necessary to carry her. The above facts with the exception of the part in parentheses came under my personal observation. They were made public by the Executive Office in my name on the next morning, together with the following statements based on the first reports of the police officers who took part in the affair: "The officers repeatedly asked her to stand up and walk quietly with them so that they would not have to use force, but she refused to do so and defied them in shrieks that were heard throughout the White House. She was finally removed to police headquarters where she was charged with disorderly conduct. After her arrest she produced an envelope addressed to the President which she asked to have delivered to him. The envelope was found to contain a lengthy poem, on the subject of insomnia, which she said was her own composition. She stated to the officers that she had not slept for seven nights past. There is no truth whatever in the statement made by many of the papers that a negro4 laid hold of Mrs. Morris and assisted in carrying her. One of the colored messengers of the office followed the policemen and gathered up such small articles as were dropped in the woman's struggles; but there was no other foundation whatever for the statement." It will be noticed that the last two sentences are somewhat at variance with statements made later by Officers Frech and Murphy to Major Sylvester and recently submitted to your committee through Senator Burrows. These officers explained to me afterwards that their attention had been so fully occupied by Mrs. Morris herself at the time that they had had little if any opportunity for accurate observation of any other features of the matter. (4) In causing Mrs. Morris' removal from the Executive office I acted under general instructions. I know you will appreciate the difficulty of stating specifically the substance of the instructions and by whom issued when I say that the reception and disposition of callers has been part of my duties for four or five years, and that during that time cases of eccentricity, dementia and insanity of various degrees had been encountered by me almost every day among the callers at the Executive Office. My general instructions were necessarily made up from innumerable experiences, and countless directions given from time to time by the two Secretaries to the President under whom I have served in such capacity. Very truly yours, B. F. Barnes Hon. Thomas H. Carter, Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, United States Senate.[Platt] The White House, Washington. Apr. 23rd, 1906. My dear Senator Platt: I am happy to be able to tell you that I find that Lieutenant- Commander Dougherty has an excellent record in the service; has had, as I am informed, very little shore duty; possesses not only the professional ability but the knowledge of languages essential to doing the best work as a naval attache; and, finally, also possesses the independent means, the lack of which, unfortunately, oftens renders it inadvisable, from the standpoint of the man himself, to appoint to such a position an officer who would otherwise be eminently fit for it. Accordingly, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, I have directed the Lieutenant- Commander's assignment as Naval Attache at the United States Embassy at Tokio. Sincerely yours, (Sgd) Theodore Roosevelt. Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate. in re [John Allen] Doughtery.(Copy) WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. April 25, 1906. Dear Cabot: You and Nannie may be amused at the entirely Japanese touch in this letter from Baron Kaneko; and I think you will like the excellent common sense in the copy of Andrew D. White's letter to Gilder which I also send you. Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H. C. Lodge, United States Senate.221 April 26, 1906. My dear Judge Gary: I wish the papers had given more prominence to what I said as to the murder part of my speech. But oh, my dear sir, I utterly and radically disagree with you in what you say about large fortunes. I wish it were in my power to devise some scheme to make it increasingly difficult to heap them up beyond a certain amount. As the difficulties in the way of such a scheme are very great, let us at least prevent [during life] their being bequeathed after death or given (during life) to any one man in excessive amount. You and my other capitalist friends, on one side, shy off at what I say against them. Have you soon the frantic articles against me by Debs and the socialists of the bomb-throwing persuasion, on the[4-26-06] other side, because of what I said in my speech in reference to those who, in effect, advocate murder? Sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt Hon. E. W. Gary, Empire Building, New York.COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., April 18th, 1906. My dear Senator Penrose: I see the Judiciary Committee have reported Wickersham. It seems to me from all I can learn that I must keep Wickersham on even if the Senate does not vote on him. I rather gather that this is your view now. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, United States Senate.Absolutely private and confidential. [*[28]*] April [?], 1906. My dear Reid: Now you are about to receive a quarte-volume from me and I hope it will not daunt you. But there has been so much that is amusing and interesting, and indeed so much that has been of importance, in the queer negotiations wherein I have been the medium between France and Germany during the past year that it is possibly worth your while to know of them a little in detail. On March 6th, 1905, Sternburg came to me with a message from the Kaiser to ask me to join with the Kaiser in informing the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform his government, and that if he would do so we would stand behind him for the open door and would support him in any opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is to France) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Morocco. On the following day he submitted to me a memorandum to the same effect, stating that the Emperor regarded France and Spain as "a political unity", who wished to divide up Morocco between themselves and debar her markets to the rest of the world, and that if Spain should occupy Tangiers and France the Hinterland they would be able to dominate the roads to the Near and Far East. I answered this by stating that I did not see my way clear to interfere in the matter, for I did not think that our interests were sufficiently great, but expressed my friendliness to Germany generally and my expectation and belief that her policy was one for peace. I had some further interviews with Speck, and on April 5th he wrote me again. This time he maintained that England and France were[*[4-28-06]*] -2- allies; that he must insist upon a conference of the powers to settle the fate of Morocco. In this memorandum he (the Emperor) stated that Germany asked for no gains in Morocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for equal rights to all nations there. He then added, in Speck's words: "Besides this she is bound to think of her national dignity. This makes it necessary for her to point out to France that her national interests cannot be disposed of without asking her for her consent and cooperation. "Since 35 years Germany has been obliged to keep an armed defensive towards France. As soon as France discovers that Germany meekly submits to her bullying, we feel sure that she will become more aggressive in other quarters and we do not consider a demand for a revision of the Treaty of Frankfort to be far off." The Emperor evidently felt safe in the position of defiance to France, which he had already adopted, because as he (Speck) said: "According to the information which the Emperor has received he feels sure that England's aid to France in the matter will not go beyond a 'diplomatic support'. This, he hopes, will keep France isolated, and, with or without a conference, he expects that the status quo in Morocco can be peacefully improved and, above all, the rights of all foreigners safeguarded there." On April 12th Speck wrote me again, saying that the Italian Government had informed the Emperor of [her] their sympathy with his position, and of [her] their conviction that France would "only continue her aggressive policy in Morocco, aimed at all non-French interests, if she feels sure that England will stand by her and eventually show herself ready to back her up by force of arms." To this the Emperor added that he believed that the attitude of England would de-[*[4-28-06]*] -3- upon the attitude of the United States, and asked us to tell England that we thought that there should be a conference. On April 25th he wrote me again, saying that the Emperor would be most grateful to me if I would intimate to England that I would like to see her and Germany in harmony in their dealings with Morocco. On May 13th he sent me another memorandum, insisting that there must be a general conference and complaining of England for opposing this conference, and stating that the latter would only drop her opposition if I would give her a hint to do so. The Emperor also in this memorandum stated, with a distinct note of self-righteousness, that he had refused invitations from France to come to an agreement with her alone, because he was disinterestedly championing the cause of the world at large, He then used these words: "The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he should discover that he should receive no support from the interested treaty powers in connection with the open door and the conference, he would be forced to think of Germany alone. Only then - and not before - he would have to choose between the possibility of war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war." During the rest of this letter Speck describes the Emperor's indignation with the King of England and with the British Government, and expresses the Emperor's belief that France, England and Russia possibly with the cooperation of Japan were aiming at the partition of China. This last supposition seemed to me more lunacy, if it was put forward with sincerity. The scale features of the memorandum, considering the closeness[*[4-28-06]*] -4- of Germany's relations with Russia at the outset of the Russo-Japanese war, was that the Emperor complained that France, ignoring all the laws of nations, had offered the Russian fleet a safe retreat in the harbors of Indo-China, and had provided that fleet with means to prepare its attack, which nation might result in a turn of the war in favor of Russia. The Emperor added: "On the other hand the Emperor feels [that] that England will drop this or any other plan, if she finds out in time that it would be opposed by America. "The violent renewal of the anti-German movement in England seems to be caused by Germany's attempt to balk any coalition of Powers directed against China after the conclusion of peace." On May 29th the Emperor stated that both England and France had offered to give Germany a sphere of interest in Morocco if she would accept it and let the question remain quiet, but that the Emperor had refused, stating that he was for the maintenance "of the status quo and for the open door and for equal treatment of all nations where rights were established by treaties." (It will be seen later on how comically the Emperor tried to go back on this proposition.) Two days later Speck sent me another memorandum from the Emperor, stating that he regarded the Morocco question not as an isolated question, but as one which might develop into a starting point for a new grouping of the powers. He again, in this memorandum, threatened a war with France, using the following language: "If England is successful in causing the refusal of France to join in a conference to settle the Morocco question, Germany will have to choose between war with France or between an understanding with France with regard to Morocco, which repeatedly has been sought for by[*[4-28-06]*] -5- France. Such an understanding, the Emperor believes, is to form the basis of a new grouping of European powers to which he is strongly opposed, being most anxious to maintain in the future his attitude, especially with regard to the Far East, as already explained to you. Everything he thins depends on the attitude you many consider fit to take towards a conference of the treaty powers to settle the Morocco question. England is the only power which opposes such a conference, though it seems sure she will drop her objections in case you should participate in the conference." The day after I received yet another letter from Speck, showing that the United States had signed the convention of Madrid with reference to Morocco, in 1880. Meanwhile my own attitude can be best gathered by the following two letters which I sent while on my bear hunt, one to Taft, who was then acting as Secretary of State in Hay's absence, and the other to Speck: "Confidential Dictated by the President in Camp, East Divide Creek, Colorado. Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Dear Will: I thin you are keeping the lid on in great shape! Apparently the Santo Domingo pot is not bubbling much at present, but we have troubles enough elsewhere. The Kaiser's pipe dream this week takes the form of Morocco. Speck has written me an urgent appeal to sound the British Government and find out whether they instead to back up France in gobbling Morocco. I have told him to see you and lay the matter definitely before you. There was one part of the Kaiser's letter which he asked me to treat as strictly[*[4-28-06*]] -6- confidential, and I do not know whether Speck will tell you about it or not. In any event, my theory is that if Sir Mortimer, or O'Byrne (or whatever the First Secretary's name is) is in any rational mood and you think the nice but somewhat fat-witted British intellect will stand it, that you tell them just about what I am going to write. I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter. At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England. I am very clear in my belief that England utterly over-estimates, as well as misestimates, Germany's singleness of purpose, by attributing to the German Foreign Office the kind of power of continuity of aim which it had from '64 to '71. I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. But I have to leave a large discretion in your hands in this matter, for if we find that it will make the English suspicious - that is, will make them think we are acting as[*[4-28-06]*] -7- decoy ducks for Germany - why we shall have to drop the business. Fortunately, you and I play the diplomatic game exactly alike, and I should advise your being absolutely frank with both Speck and the British people along the lines I have indicated, unless you have counter suggestions to make. Remember, however, that both parties are very suspicious. You remember the King's message to me though Harry White and his earnest warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to us - an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon. Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT, L. P. S. If you deem it wise to see the British Ambassador at all, do be careful to explain to him that we are taking sides neither with France nor Germany, but that we would like to convey Germany's request for information to England, and that we are acting in thus conveying it simply from a desire to make things as comfortable between England and Germany as possible. x x x x x" "Dictated by the President in camp, East Divide Creek, Colorado. Personal Glenwood Springs, Colorado, April 20, 1905. Dear Speck: Your letter containing the Emperor's communication about Morocco is[*[4-28-06]*] -8- the first thing that has made me wish I was not off on a hunt, for I hardly know how to arrange out here what the Emperor requests. As I told you before, I dislike taking a position in any matter like this unless I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in entangling our Government in the matter. You do not have to be told by me that I am already working in the most cordial agreement with the Emperor about China and the Japanese-Russian war, while I have matters of my own in Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Panama to which I must give attention and from which I do not feel it right to be diverted; but I have told Taft substantially what you have said in your letter excepting the portion about the communication from the Italian Government which the Emperor requested me to treat as purely confidential. Will you take this letter at once to Secretary Taft, show it to him, and tell him exactly how far you want us to go in sounding the British Government. Meanwhile I shall write him, quoting the proposal of the Emperor as to our sounding the British Government and shall suggest his finding out from Sir Mortimer what the British Government's views in the matter are. I do not think I should go any further than this at present. I am sorry I am not in Washington, for I should at once see the British Ambassador myself and let you know just how things stood. Thank Admiral von Tirpitz for the very interesting memorandum of the Navy. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT Per W. L. Jr. Baron H. Sternburg, German Ambassador, Washington, D. C.[*[4-28-06]*] -9- At the and of May I came back to Washington, and found Jusserand and Speck both greatly concerned lest there should be a war between France and Germany. Both of them were sincerely anxious to avert such a possibility, and each thought that his own Government ought to make concessions to avoid the war. Speck, I firmly believe, did not approve of the action his Government was taking, but of course was obliged loyally to back up its position. Jusserand, on the other hand, sympathized absolutely with the general French indignation with Germany, but felt that it was better to yield so far as the conference was concerned, if it could be done honorably, rather than have a war. I saw Sir Mortimer on the matter, but could get very little out of him. He was bitter about Germany, and so far as he represented the British Government it would appear they were anxious to see Germany humiliated by France's refusal to enter a conference, and that they were quite willing to face the possibility of war under such circumstances. I did not think this showed much valor on their part, although from their point of view it was sagacious, as of course in such a war, where the British and French fleets would be united, the German fleet could have done absolutely nothing, while on land, where Germany was so powerful, it would be France alone that would stand and would have to stand, the brunt of the battle, I desired to do anything I legitimately could for France, because I like France, and I thought her in this instance to be in the right, but I did not intend to take any position which I would not be willing at all costs to maintain. On June 5th you telegraphed from London that Lansdowne had asked for an indication of my views on the Morocco situation, and stated that he[*[4-28-06]*] -10- regarded the proposal of joint action of the powers represented in Morocco as unfortunate, and as possibly planned to embarrass France. About the same time White cabled from Rome that the Italian Government evidently feared the conference was inevitable unless France was able otherwise to justify Germany's susceptibilities, but that the British Ambassador felt sure that there would be no conference. I suppose I need hardly say that the English, French and Italian representatives all strenuously denied the statements as to the propositions which Germany said their nations had made to her as regards her sphere of interest in Morocco, etc. I did not regard the various matters in which there was this contradiction as important; partly because I had not at any time credited the three powers named with having made the several propositions they were alleged by the German Government to have made. On June 11th, the Kaiser, through Speck, sent as another memorandum, running as follows: "June 11, 1905. "MEMORANDOM - (Morocco) "Mr. Rouvier* had indirectly informed the German Charge d'Affaires in Paris that England has made a formal offer to France to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with England which would be directed against Germany. At present the leading statesmen of France are opposed to such an alliance, because the majority of the members of the French Government still hope to come to a satisfactory agreement with Germany. But * who has shown himself distinctly friendly to Germany and has been opposing Mr. Delcaset.[*[4-28-06]*] -11- it was emphasized, the time had arrived for Germany to make up her mind with regard to Morocco, otherwise France would be forced to place herself in closer touch with England. "Indirectly Germany has been given to understand that the French Government is desirous of giving her a portion of Morocco under the name of a "sphere of interest", France apportioning the greater part of Morocco to herself. Such an offer Germany now can not accept, as it was through the council of Germany that the Sultan of Morocco placed himself on the ground of the conference of Madrid. Hence Germany is pledged by honor to stand by the Sultan. - 'Here, says the Emperor, is a curious case:-we may be forced into war not because we have not been grabbing after peoples land, but because we refuse to take it." "My people are sure that England would now back France by force of arms in a war against Germany, not on account of Morocco, but on account of Germany's policy in the Far East. The combined naval forces of England and France would undoubtedly smash the German navy and give England, France, Japan and Russia a more free hand in the Far East, and Russia might try to cede a portion of China to Japan as a war indemnity, instead of parting with the island of Sachalion. The previous destruction of the German navy undoubtedly would be welcomed by these Powers. "As regards a conference to be held in Morocco, the British Government Russia has lately been using the Morocco question as a means to bring Russia, France & Germany together; undoubtedly for her policy in the Far East.[*[4-28-06]*] -12- has asked for time to consider the question. The Emperor feels sure that if you could give a hint now in London and in Paris that, all things put together, you would consider a conference as the most satisfactory means to bring the Morocco question to a peaceful solution, you would render the peace of the world another great service, without encountering any risk. - In case you should not feel inclined to take this step the Emperor believes that your influence could prevent England from joining a France-German war, started by the aggressive policy of France in Morocco. "As to the present attitude in France towards the Morocco question a marked change is noticeable since the retirement of Mr. Delcasse. Voices are now heard which consider a conference not only as the most legal, but also as the safest way to clear a situation which has been created by the reckless statesmanship of Mr. Delcasse." It really did look as if there might be a war, and I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a real calamity to civilization; and in the next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace between Russia and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might result in what would literally be a world-conflagration; and finally for the sake of France. Accordingly, I took active hold of the matter with both Speck and Jusserand, and after a series of communications with the French Government, through Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up. Jusserand repeated to his government substantially just what I said. I told him that as chief of state I could not let America do anything quixotic, but[*[4-28-06]*] -13 that I had a real sentiment for France, that I would not advise her to do anything humiliating or disgraceful; but that it was eminently wise to avoid a war if it could be done by adapting a course which would save the Emperor's self-esteem; that for each purpose it was wise to help him save his face. I urged upon the French Government, is the first place, the great danger of war to them, and the fact that British assistance could avail them very, very little in the event of such a war, because France France would [of course ? maybe divided] be in danger of invasion by land; and in the next place, I pointed out that if there were a conference of the powers France would [be] have every reason to believe that the conference would not sanction any unjust attach by Germany upon French interests, and that if all powers, or practically all the powers, in the conference took an attitude favorable to France on such a point it would make it wellnigh impossible for Germany to assail her. I explained that I would not accept the invitation of the conference unless France was willing and that if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany wihich seemed to me unjust and unfair. At last, the French Government informed me through Jasserand that it would agree to the conference. At this time I was having numerous interviews with both Jusserand and Speck. With Speck I was on close terms; with Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever met, and whose country was in the right on this issue, I was on even closer terms. On the 23d of June he received from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs a despatch running in part as follows: *Au cours de ses dorniers entretions eves vous, le President Roosevelt a ? que, si injusti que sorait, de la part de l"Allemagne, une[*[4-28-06]*] -14- declaration de guerre dans les circonstances présantes, ell êtait possible, qu'il fallait l'èviter, user de conciliation et que, parmi les concessions que nous pourrions faire, uno Conférence serait sans douts un meindre mal, "Eh commmiquent [to the] au Président metre riponse á la note allemonde, veutilles lui dire que ce sont sos réflexions, sen censeile qui l'est inspirte. Nous aviens d’abord pestd qu'il suffirait de dissiper les erreurs repanduss au sujet de notre nation an Merce et de Montrer qu’elle no menace auewn intéret, Nous avons été plus loin et nous sous sommes mentrés prote a nous rallier, au besoin, á 1'idle d'une Conférence, malgré les séricuses objections qu'elle souléya, “Mais rion n'est vane prouver encore que, meme sur cos bases, un accord peurrait e'Stahlir. Il est jusqu’l présent impossible de déterminer avec cortitude le but inuidiat de l'Allomagne. Sen Ambassadour nous aft firme que, pour elle, il n'y a dams tout cela ‘qu'une question de ferms et d'étiquette’, qu’il s'agit soulemmt de comnaitre le droit des Puisenees signataires de la Convention de Madrid, qu’il euffirait, pour le consaerer, d'un régime transitoire d'une tris courte durte et qu’ensuite ia France reprendrait la réalisation de son programe. Mais, en restreigneant ainsi la portée de l'action allemande, le Prince Radelin se défend de faire, au nom de son Gouvernement, amusume propesition autre que celle d'une Conference; le reste n'est, dit-il, qu'une deducation qu'il tire lui~meme de la mature des choses et il évite de faire commaitre l'attitude que le Gouvernmant allemend prendre devant 1a Conférones,[*4-28-06*] -15- En meme temps, l'Empereur nous fait dire à Paris que toutes les forces de l'Allemagne sont derrière le Sultan du Maroc, et il tient vis àvvis de nous à Washington, à Rome et à Madrid le langage le plus menageant. "M. Roosevelt pout conjurer ce danger. Dites lui que l’ Autoritè exceptionnelle qui s'attache à son conseils et qu'il doit, non pas soulement à ses fonctions, mais à son caractère, à son esprit de dècision et de justice, à sa claire intelligence des intèrets les plus élevèe, le qualifie au plus haut degré pour intervenir on favour du maintien de la paix. En s'addessant à lui avec insistence l'Empereur l'a mis en mesure de prendre l’initiative que nous attandons de son amitiè." On the 25th of June he sent a despatch to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, running in part as follows: “Je suis revenue, cette nuit, auprès du Prèsident Roosevelt, sur les raisons d'une intervention pressants de sa part on vue d'èviter la rupture dont l' Allemagne parait vouloir nous menacer. Je me suis servi, pour le mettre au courant de la situation, des indications contenues dans vos deux tèlègrammes. “Mas instances ont recu l'accueil le plus favorable. Le Prèsident m'a dèclarè qu'il aurait ce soir avec le Baron Sternburg un entration du ton le plus grave, dans lequal il insisterait, d'abord sur ce que l'Empereur se doit à lui-meme et sur ce à quel l'oblige le souci de son renom devant l'histoire; nul ne saurait, ni comprendre ni pardonner desermais, les guerres engagèes pour des motifs frivoles. Il insistera sur le succés trés réal remportè par la diplomatie allemande et sur notre adhésion à son projet de Conférence dans des conditions sur le détail desqualles il est impossible de ne pas s'entendre. Il fers, d'autre[*4-28-06*] -16- part, allusion aux risques à encourir; car, m'a répètè le Prèsident, ce que je vous ai dit de l'opinion de nos experts sur votre armèe n'est pas invoqué par moi simplement pour les besoins de la cause; c'est bien là ca qu'ils pensent d'elle et une victoire allemande n’est aucunement assurès. Il parlera enfin des appuis, redoutables pour l'Allemagne, qui, sans nul doute ne nous feraient pas dèfaut. 'Je youdrais etre sur que mes paroles serant efficaces, a ajoutè W. Roosevelt; je ne is suis malheureusement pas; mais, on tout cas, vous pouves etre assuré qu‘alles serent aussi energiques que possible en favour d'una entente amiable et que je ne nègligerai rien de ca qui me paraitre peuvoir y servir.’ “J'ai fait part au Président des sentiments que Votre Excellance m'avait chargè de lui exprimer. Il n'a pas voulu me laisser achevor, d distant que co cu'il faisait ètait trop naturel pour mèriter aucun remerciement. J'ai ajoutés la tèlègramme que j'ai recu de M. le Président du Conseil marquait beaucoup de gratitude, mais pas la moindre surprise. "Voila, a reparti le Président, le vrai compliment qui me fait plaisir." On June 18th, Speck wrote to me, saying that the Emperor greatly appreciated the change which was noticed in the policy of France since the action I had taken as regards the Morocco question, adding, “Your diplomatic activity with regard to France, the Emperor says, has been the greatest blessing to the peace of the world." I wrote to Speck the following three letters, all of which I showed to Jusserand before I sent them, as I did not wish there to be any suspicion of double dealing on my part; and Jusserand is a man of such excellent judgement, so sound and cool-minded, and of so high a standard of personal and professional [*[4-28-06]*] -17- honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed, it was only because both Jusserand and Sternburg were such excellent men, that I wasnenabled to do anything at all in so difficult and delicate a matter. I could only have acted with men I was sure of. With such a tricky creature as the Russian, Cassini, for instance, I could have done absolutely nothing; and little or nothing with amiable Sir Mortimer. My three letters were as follows: "Personal White House, "Washington, June 20, 1905. "Dear S[?]k: "Pray thank His Majesty and say that if I have been of any use in keeping the peace I am of course more than glad. I shall be in Massachusetts for the next two days, but will see you Friday or Saturday. "Sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT. " "Baron H. Sternburg, "The German Ambassador, "Deer Park, Maryland." "White House "Washington, June, 23, 1905. "My dear Mr. Ambassador: "I hope to see you at nine Sunday evening. Meanwhile, pray communicate to his Majesty that in accordance with the suggestion I made to Ambassador Jusserand in pursuance of the letter you sent me, the French Government informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that is has ceased its opposition to a conference of the powers on Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be arranged between Germanyand France.[*[4-28-06]*] -18- "Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French Government to the holding of this conference. I had not believed that the Emperor would be able to secure this assent and to bring about this conference, from which undoubtedly a peaceful solution of all the troubles will come. I need not say to you that I consider such peaceful solution as vitally necessary to the welfare of the world at this time, and in view of its having been secured by the Emperor's success in obtaining this conference, I wish again to express my hearty congratulations. It is a diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude. Faithfully yours, Theodore Roosevelt. Baron H. Sternburg, The German Ambassador." "White House, Washington. June 25, 1905. "My dear Mr. Ambassador: I have received from M. Jusserand the following extract from a telegram sent to him by M. Nouvier: "You reported to me your conversation with President Roosevelt who asked you to inform us that, according to his view, much prudence should be used in present circumstances, and that we ought to consider the idea of a conference as a concession we might make . . Be so good as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have received from us due consideration and have caused us to take the resolution we have just adopted. We had first thought that, in order to remove the erroneous impressions held about our action in Morocco, it would be enough to show that it threatens no interests whatsoever. But now we have gone further,[*[4-28-06]*] -19- and have declared that we are ready to accept a conference, in spite of the serious reasons we had to entertain objections against such a project.' "I shall ask, Mr. Ambassador, that in forwarding this information to His Majesty you explain that it is of course confidential. "I need hardly tell you how glad I was to secure this information from the French Ambassador. As you know, I was at first extremely reluctant to do anything in the matter which might savor of officious interference on my part; and I finally determined to present the case to the French Government only because I wished to do anything I properly could do which the Emperor asked, and of course also because I felt the extreme importance of doing anything possible to maintain the peace of the world. As you know, I made up my mind to speak to France rather than England, because it seemed to me that it would be useless to speak to England; for I felt that if a war were to break out, whatever might happen to France, England would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case I did not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight with England, and instead I made a very earnest request of France that she should do as the Emperor desired and agree to hold the conference. The French Government have now done just what at HIs Majesty's request I urged should be done . Now in turn I most earnestly and with all respect urge that His Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this yielding to his wishes by France. I trust that the Emperor understands that I would not for any consideration advise him to do anything that would be against the interest or the honor either of himself or of his people any more than I would counsel such an action[*[4-28-06]*] -20- as regards my own country; and I say conscientiously that I am advising just the conduct that I would myself take under like circumstances; and I venture to give the advice at all only because, as I took the action I did on the Emperor's request, it seems but right that in reporting the effect of this action I should give my own views thereon. I say with all possible emphasis that I regard this yielding by France, this concession by her which she had said she could not make and which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany but a triumph. You know that I am not merely a sincere admirer and well-wisher of Germany, but also of his Majesty. I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and that it is not only of the utmost importance for his own people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired. I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is. With high regard, Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, German Ambassador.[*4-28-06*] [*21*] [*21*] There was, however, much higgling as to exactly what should be discussed at the conference, and both Jusserand and Speck came to me to say that they were still on the verge of seeing the negotiations broken off. Finally I made a pencil memorandum as follows: "The two Governments consent to go to the conference with no program, and to discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power." I gave a copy of this memorandum to Jusserand and the memorandu itself to Speck, and after they had transmitted it to their respective governments, I received the assent of both governments to the proposition. I explained to both that I did not care to appear in the matter, and that no publicity whatever would be given by me, or by any of our representatives, to what I had done, and I thought it far better that it should take the shape of an agreement freely entered into by themselves. You may remember that not a hint of any kind got out throughout the whole of last summer as to my taking any part in this Morocco business. Jusserand forwarded my memorandum in a despatch to his home government of June 28th, which ran in part as follows: "J'ai rappele les graves motifs que nous avions pour ecarter touts idee d'une Conference sans un programme prealable, ou du moins sans une entants indiquant ce a quai nous pouvions nous attendre et nous garantissant, en particulier, que des engagements internationaux solennels, et depuis longtemps connus de tous ne seraient pas remis en question. On ne peut nous domander de renier notre signature. Avec un souverain du temperament de Guillaume II, qui vient de donner, par les textes memes dont il a muni le President, des preuves si inquietantes de son manque de moderation et meme d'exactitude, nous sommes plus particulierement tenus a la prudence qu'avec aucun autre. C'est a la suite de ces remarques que le President a pris sur sa table un morceau de papier at a charche quelque formule pouvant etre acceptee par les deux pays et qui respecterait a la fois l'orgueil de Guillaume II et nos droits. Je reproduis si-apres le texte de cette formule, qui a pu, d'ailleurs, subir quelque legere modification avant d'etre transmiss, mais dont le sens general sera surement demeure le meme: "The two Governments consent to go to the Conference with no program and to discuss there all questions in[*4-28-06*] [*22*] regard to Morocco, save, of course, where either is in honour bound by a previous agreement to another power." Le President n'a nuille pretention que es nuit la une fornule parfaite et inmiable nais il espere qu'elle pourrait pout etre un terrain d'entente et it l'a fait, en consequence, soumetire au Kaiser par le Baron de Sternburg dans l'aprse midi de Dimanchi. Il est certain que la portes d'un tel accord serait de metire on dehors de la discussion les avantages que nous nous somes assures sopres de divers pays strangers. Car nous no les avone obtenus ue par le moyen de concessions correspondantes, faites a leur profit, des maintenant irrevocables, et que nous sommes tenus d'honnour de mointenir. L'acceptation d'uno formule de es genre serait dons, moins le met, la realisation du programme souhaite par nous." On June 28th I received the fo0llowing letter from Speck: "Deer Park, Md. June 28, 1905. "Dear Mr. President, I have just received a telegram from Berlin which expresses highest satisfaction and gratitude with regard to the latest step you undertook in the interest of the Morocco conference. "The telegram repeats a wire from the German Ambassador at Paris who says that Rouvier is having a most difficult time. Delcasat's followers are trying hard to force him to accept Delcasat's colonial program, and England is making a frantic effort to prevent the acceptance of the invitation to the conferences by the council of ministers which meets to-day. The Ambassador expresses that Rouvier's backing will be strong enough to pull him through. The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case during the coming conferences differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical. "In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives. "Believe me, Mr. President, Yours most sincerely, Sternburg. To the President of the United States of America, Sagamore Hill."[*[4-28-06]*] [*(23-24)*] It was a couple of days after this that I received from both governments the information that they had agreed on substantially the plan outlined in my memorandum. On July 11th I received a letter from Jusserand, running in part as follows: "I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the one we had considered and the acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris show that your beneficent influence at this grave juncture is deeply and gratefully felt. They confirm also what I guessed was the case, that is that there was a point where more yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible great events." A fortnight afterwards the Kaiser got uneasy again, and for sometime insisted upon the conference being held in Morocco, and upon Reveil not being sent by France as a delegate. Again I had to do some cabling to both the French and Gorman Governments, but finally the Kaiser's objections were removed. I had urged Jusserand not to let his people boast or be disagreeable and try to humiliate the Kaiser in connection with the conference, because the important point was for then to get the kernel of the nut, and they did not have to consider the shell. On August 9th Jusserand wrote me, expressing [?] thanks of his Government for what I had done; the German Foreign office [?] me by cable [?] this, trouble ceased as far as I was concerned, until the confer- [?] Algeciras. Soon after the conference opened I began to have a [?] visits from Speck and from Jusserand. Jusserand generally [?] [?] verbally. Speck submitted them in writing. Loyal [?] Government, both Root and I became convinced that down [?] brave Little gentlemen did not really believe Germany [?] The attitude of France, as represented by the [?] seemed to be more reasonable; but I was [?] I could not directly through Jusserand, who [?] It would have been a good thing[4-28-06] 25 if I could have kept in touch with England through Durand. But Root and I, and for the matter of that Jusserand and Speck also, have absolutely given up any effort to work with Durand at all. He seems to have a brain of about eight-guinea-pig-power. Why, under Heaven the English keep him here I do not know! If they do not care for an Ambassador, then abolish the embassy; but it is useless to have a worthy creature of mutton-suet consistency like the good sir Mortimer. Germany ought to impress us with the fact that all the other powers but England were in her favor. We heard, however, both from Russia and Italy, that they thought the German position was wrong, and were anxious that we should do something to prevent Germany from obtaining a sphere of influences in Morocco. We became convinced that Austria was a more cat's paw for Ger- many, and that Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco, which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to desire. She first endeavored to secure a part for herself, and then a separate part, nominally for Holland of Switzerland, which so wore convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland, become in effect German. The French said they would not yield on those points, and, as you know, it looked as if the conferences would come to nothing, and that there would then be the possibility of trouble between France and Germany. Our views was that the interacts of France and and Spain in Morocco were far greater than those of other powers. Finally we took the matter up by correspondence with Germany, as failure, Jusserand being kept informed of what we were doing:[*[4-28-06]*] -26- "No.333. "Department of State, Washington, February 19, 1906. “Excellency: “The President has been keeping in mind the suggestion of your memorandum of January 29th that the United States should propose “to intrust the Sultan of Morocco with the organization of the police forces within his Domains and to allow him certain funds, and to establish an international control with regard to the management of these funds, and the carrying out of the whole plan." “Our advices from Algeciras indicate that the time has been reached when such a proposal should be made, if at all, and also that to be effective it should now be somewhat more specific in regard to the nature of the international control. "If it is acceptable to Germany, the President will make [a] the proposal suggested with the following details, which should, perhaps, be called modifications, but which he does not consider to interfere with the accomplishment of the end Germany had in view in securing the conference. He will propose: "1. That the organization and maintenance of police force in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors. "2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for some small preference claimed by France, which he considers immaterial). "3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assisting in managment and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and non-commissioner officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their Legations. “That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers report[*[4-28-06]*] -27- annually to the government of Morocco, and to the government of Italy, the Mediterranean Power, which shall have the right of inspection and verication, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the information of the Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., to be deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance. "4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain, and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade, equal treatment and opportunity in competition for public works and concessions. "The foregoing draft has been carefully framed with reference to the existing situation in Algeciras, so as to give it a form which would make concessions from the French position as easy as possible, and the President thinks that it conserves the principle of the open door without unduly recognizing the claims which rest upon proximity and preponderance of [?] trade interests. He thinks it is fair, and earnestly hopes that it may receive the Emperor's approval. "Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. ELIHU ROOT. "His Excellency Baron Speck von Sternburg, etc., etc., etc." "Imperial German Embassy, Washington, February 22, 1906. "Dear Mr. President: "The Emperor has requested me to express to you his hearty thanks for your offer to mediate in the Morocco question. He especially appreciates that you[*[4-28-06]*] -28- will only act as mediator in agreement with him. “He fully agrees with your views on points 1, 2 and 4 and considers it a sound idea that the funds for the maintenance of the police-forces should be paid out of the State Bank of Morocco, to be founded, and that all Powers can eqally participate in this bank. ‘The question of granting to France a slight preference he thinks [may be] might be discussed. "According to point 3, only French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers are to be selected. This proposal covers in the main the last French proposal. “Though the Emperor felt unable te accept this proposal it has been subjected to another close examination as soon as your offer of mediation had been received. But this has not been able to convince him that a settlement on such lines could be considered in harmony with the principle accepted by the conference that all powers are to receive equal [XXXXXX] treatment. *"According to the proposal the French and Spanish officers shall not be freely chosen by the Sultan, but be named by their respective legations, They are to be placed in charge of the drill, the discipline and the pay of the police-forces of Morocco, and they are also to participate in their administration and control. This would place the police forces entirely into their hands, and the police organization would be tantamount to a Franco-Spanish double mandate and mean a monopoly of these two countries, which would heavily curtail the political and the economic positions of the other nations. "The Emperor is of the opinion that the Sultan should be permitted a free choice among the other nations. This would certainly not exclude such modifications which should be considered as practical. For instance it might be4-28-06 -29- possible to allow the sultan to choose the officers among those [notions] which are participating in the new state bank, hence have greater interests in Morocco. It could be further stipulated, in case France should fear that under the present conditions the Sultan might favor German officers, that at least four different nationalities should be taken into consideration in an equal manner. Ultimately, so as to acknowledge the special rights of France in Morocco, the Sultan might place the police in control in Tangiers, and perhaps in some other port, entirely in the hands of French Officers. In all the other ports officers of various nations would cooperate. "As to the uniformity of the whole of the police force it would not seem difficult to establish a uniformity in organization and armament by issuing regulations. "In cases it should be possible to widen your proposal for mediation according to the above suggestions, Germany would gladly negotiate on this new basis and the Emperor would be highly gratified if you should be pleased to further offer your mediation. "Believe me, Mr. President, Yours most sincerely, Sternburg. "To the President of the United States of America, Washington, D.C." March 7, 1906. "No. 343. (L) "Excellency: "May I ask you to transmit to the German Emperor a message from the President which is as follows: "I have given most earnest thought to Your Majesty's comments on the suggestion contained in Mr. Root's letter of February 19th, but I cannot[*[4-28-06]*] bring myself to feel that I ought to ask France to make further concessions than the arrangement suggested in that letter would require. This being so, I would gladly drop the subject in which our traditional policy of abstention from the political affairs of Europe forbids the United States to take sides. I feel, however, that the events which led to the Conference at Algeciras forbid me to omit any effort within my power to promote a settlement of differences. "By the request of Germany I urged France to consent to the Conference, giving her very strong assurances of my belief that a decision would be rushed, consistent with an impartial view of what is most fair and most practical. The nature, the strength and the justification of these assurances may be realized by referring to the Terms of Baron Sternburg's letter to me of June 18, 1905, which said: "The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, during the coming Conferences, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and most practical. "In doing this, he wants to prove that the assistance which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives." "Under these circumstances, I feel bound to state to Your Majesty that I think the arrangement indicated in the above mentioned letter of February 19th is a reasonable one, and most earnestly to urge Your Majesty to accept it. I do not know whether France would accept it or not, I think she ought to do so. I do not think that she ought to be expected to go further. If that[*[4-28-06]*] -31- arrangement is made, the Conference will have resulted in an abandonment by France of her claim to the right of control in Morocco answerable only to the two Powers with whom she had made treaties and without responsibility to the rest of the world, and she will have accepted jointly with Spain a mandate from all the Powers, under responsibility [from] to all of them for the maintenance of equal rights and opportunities. And the due observance of these obligations will be safeguarded by having vested in another representative of all the Powers a right to have in their behalf full and complete reports of the performance of the trust, with the further right of verification and inspection. "I feel that if this arrangement be made, Germany will have accomplished the declared object for her intervention in the affirs of Morocco and for the Conference. I feel such arrangement would be in very fact the evidence of the triumph of Germen diplomacy in this matter. Looking at the subject as I do, from this standpoint of an observer friendly to both parties and having no possible interest in the result, except [in] the interest of peace, I see grave reasons to apprehend that if the Conference should fail because of Germany’s insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure of concession described in this proposed arrangement, the general opinion of Europe and America would be unfavorable, and Germany would lose that increase of credit end moral power that the making of this arrangement would secure to her, and might be held responsible, probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of affairs in Europe. “As a rule parties to a past controversy looking back can see that they[*[4-28-06]*] -32- have ascribed undue importance to matters of difference which were really unimportant. A disinterested spectator is often able to take such a view at the time. I believe that I am taking such a view; that if the suggested arrangement can be made none of the matters which Germany will not have secured by that are of any real importance to her, and I most sincerely hope that Your Majesty may take this view and throw upon France the responsibility for rejecting, if it is to be rejected, the suggested arrangement." "Accept, Excellency the renewed assurances of my highest consideration, ELIHU ROOT. "His Excellency Baron Speck von Sternburg, etc., etc., etc.," "Imperial German Embassy, Washington, D.C. March 13, 1906. "Mr. President: "The Emperor's answer to your letter transmitted by me on the 7th instant is as follows: "Mr. President: " ' I thank you for your repeated kind endeavors to bring about a solution, satisfactory to all concerned, of the Morocco question. I highly appreciate [that] it that notwithstanding all difficulties you have cooperated in solving the differences. As to the information [that] of my ambassador, mentioned by you, I can only assure you, Mr. President, that I am gladly willing to take your advice as a basis of an understanding. In this sense your proposition contained in Mr. Root's letter of the 19th ultimo, has been earnestly considered at once. In principle I consented to it, provided that it be given a[*[4-28-06]*] -33- form to meet the international side of the question. "I have also given to your recent statements in all points my fullest attention and entirely agree with you that a mandate given by the Conference to France and Spain differs in a judicial sense essentially from any action on the part of France based solely on special agreements with England and Spain. Such a mandate would give to France a certain monopoly in Morocco which would prejudice the economical equality of the other nations, if no sufficient international counterpoise were created. This idea has been recognized in your proposal of mediation, and doubt could only prevail as to the question whether the regulations of control, proposed by you, would give an entirely sufficient guarantee from an international point. In this respect I think the idea has been developed in a proposal of mediation brought forward by Austria-Hungary, This proposal almost covers yours. I have therefore caused my representatives at Algeciras to be instructed to consent in principle to the proposition of Austria-Hungary, and I am inclined to believe that a satisfactory end of the Conference would be secured, if you, Mr, President, would likewise give your consent to that proposition which seems to me to be an acceptable development of your proposal. (Signed) William" "The Austrian proposal has been accepted by the representatives of all other powers, including Sir E. Nicholson, the British representative, on account of its distinct international character, as a basis for a definite understanding at the Conference. As this basis has now been reached it would seem a pity to cause further postponement by a new proposal. The support of Austria's mediation in Algeciras and Paris would in the eyes of the Emperor[*[4-28-06]*] -34- appear as the most speedy way to affect a solution of the Morocco question. "I may add that on March 11th the German representative at Algeciras was informed by all his colleagues, including the British and American, that after the far going concessions made by Germany during the sessions of last Saturday the French opposition could not be justified. In this sense they have spoken to Mr. Revoil. "I have the honor to be, Mr. President, "Yours most sincerely, "Sternburg." (Received from German Ambassador March 14, 1906.) "Giving way beyond the Austrian proposals would gravely endanger the open door. The opposition lies with the mighty French banking interests which [the] are aiming at a monopolisation of the resources of Morocco." "Department of State, Washington, March 17, 1906. "No. 347. "Excellency: "It may be useful for me to re-state in writing the answer of the United States, already given to you orally, to the questions which you have asked regarding our course upon the proposal made by Austria on the 8th instant in the Algeciras Conference. "We do not approve that proposal. We regard it as an essential departure from the principal declared by Germany and adhered to by the United States, that all commercial nations are entitled to have the door of equal commercial opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to that principle that no[*4-28-06*] -35- on power ought to acquire such a control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the belief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that territory as her own, to the exclusion of others. "This view of international right was interposed against the claim of France to organize the police in Moroccan ports through the agency of her officers alone. France has yielded to this view of international right to the extent of offering to become, jointly with Spain, the mandatory of all the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining order and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of them. It was further proposed that an officer of a third power, acting in behalf of all the powers, should have the right of general inspection for the purpose of keeping the powers advised whether their agents, France and Spain, were observing the limits and performing the duties of their agency. This arrangement seemed to us to accomplish the desired purpose. It seemed with two mandatories jointly charged, no individual claim of possession or control was likely to grow up; that, with the constant reminder of the general right involved in the inspectorship, the duties of the agency were not likely to be forgotten and it seemed that the proximity of France and Spain to Morocco, and their special interest in having order maintained in that territory, made it reasonable that they should be selected as the mandatories rather than any other powers. “The Austrian proposal offers an alternative to the arrangement which I have described. It is that the eight Moroccan ports shall be distributed; that in four the police shall be organized by the French; in three the police shall be organized by the Spanish; and that in the eighth port [thy] the police shall be organized by the Swiss or Dutch. This seems to us to provide for a[*[4-28-06]*] -36- potential partition of the territory in violation of the principle upon which we have agreed with Germany. From our point of view all the reasons which existed against leaving to France the control of all the ports exists against leaving to France the control of some, to Spain the control of some, and to Switzerland, either in its own interest or in the interests of any other powers, the control of one. The very fact of division of the ports implies the existence of a special right on the part of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respectively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and opportunity on the part of all other powers. And the nations to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete control. We do not care whether the Inspector, if there shall be one, is Italian or Swiss. We do not care whether he reports to his own Government, or to the Corps Diplomatique in Tangier, or communicates the information he obtains to the powers in any other way. We do not consider that the distribution of ports to separate single powers is wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose of both Germany and the United States. If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement. "We have not, however, any such substantial interest in Morocco as to lead us to take that course. Our chief wish is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of the controversy which brought the Conference together. Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever arrangement the European powers, represented at Algeciras, agree upon. If the agreement is upon the Austrian proposal, or upon any modification of it which includes the[*[4-28-06)*] -37- principle of distribution of ports, we shall regret what we deem to be the failure of the true principle to which we have given our adherences. We still hope that there may be no such result. "Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. ELIHU ROOT. "His Excellency Baron Speck von Sternburg, etc., etc., etc." "Hotel Cambridge, New York, March 19, 1906. "Dear Mr. President: "I have the honor to inform you of the contents of a telegram, just received, which is the answer to my telegram, forwarded after the conversation I had with you on the situation at Algeciras. - "Sincere regret is expressed that the attitude of Germany should have [lead] led to certain misunderstandings. The Kaiser has suggested the conference [?] so as to find a peaceful way to solve the question of Morocco. "He appreciates the fundamental idea of your proposal: - cooperation of French and Spanish officers to be about equally divided in each of the ports. "He would readily join in any proposal at the conference which would contain this mixed system and an inspector general to which France has agreed to in principle. "Germany abstains from entering into details, so as to prevent that these should obscure the main points. The telegram concludes in saying that the immediate removal of all misunderstandings is far more important to Germany than the whole Morocco affair. "Believe me, Mr. President, most Sincerely yours, "STERNBURG."[*[4-28-06]*] -38- I call your attention to the last paragraph in this telegram of March 19th. I had previously informed [Speck ?], in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in rejecting our proposals and a breakup ensued, I should feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith; but that if the Emperor would yield to what seemed to me our very fair proposals, I should not publish any of the correspondence, and would endeavor in every way to give Germany full credit for what was done; and with that in view would take an early opportunity to have him (Speck) bring a delegation of German war veterans to see me, so that I might make a public statement in praise of the emperor's position and expressive of my appreciation thereof, and of my hope that the relations between France and Germany would become steadily more friendly. Two or three days after the Emperor sent his cable saying he had yielded to our request, Speck called upon me to say that the Emperor very earnestly desired that I would make much public utterance. Accordingly I arranged for him to bring the German veterans around, and I made them the following speech, which I had previously gone over not only with Speck but with Jusserand: "I welcome you here, my fellow-Americans; for among the many strains that go to make up our composite race stock in this country, no strain has given us better Americans than those who are of German birth or blood. It is our peculiar pride as a nation that in this republic we have measurably realized the ideal under which good citizens have no discrimination as between creed and creed, birthplace and birthplace, provided only that whatever the man's parentage may have been, whatever the way in which he worships[*[4-28-06]*] -39- his Creator, he strives in good faith to do his duty by himself and by his fellow man, and to show his unflinching loyalty to our common country. In addition to this greeting you my fellow-Americans of German birth, I wish also to greet the German citizens present, the members of the German army, belonging to the reserve of that army, and to welcome them here, especially, Mr. Ambassador, as they are brought here, by you, yourself an old soldier, who have endeared yourself to the American people by your hearty friendship for this country. "The reverence a man preserves for his native land, so far from standing in the way of his loving and doing his full duty by the land of his adoption, should help him toward the love and the performance of this duty. If a man is a good son he is apt to make a good husband; and the quality that makes a man reverence the country of his birth is apt to be the quality that makes him a good citizen in the country of his adoption. "The ties that unite Germany and the United States are many and close, and it must be a prime object of our statesmanship to knit the two nations ever closer together. In no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and for Germany's exalted ruler, Emperor William, than here in America. "It is not our of place in closing for me to say a word of congratulation both to the German people and the German Emperor upon the work that has been accomplished in the Alecines convention which has just closed, a conference held chiefly because of the initiative of Germany. It was not a conference in which we Americans as a nation had much concern, save that it is always our concern to see justice obtain everywhere, and, so fat as we properly[4- 28-06] -60- can, to work for the cause of international peace and good will. In its outcome this conference has added to the likelihood of the betterment of condition in Morocco itself, has secured equitable dealing as [?] the foreign powers who have commercial relations with Morocco, and has diminished the chance of friction between these powers. In particular it may bot be out of place for me to say that I hope and believe that the conference has resulted and will result in rendering continually more friendly the relations between the mighty empire of Germany and the mighty republic of France; for it is my hope and wish, as it must be the hope and wish of every sincere wellwisher of humankind, that these friendly relations may not only continue unbroken but may ever grow in strength." I have since received from Jusserand and Speck, both, the very cordial thanks of the French and German Governments. McCormick has just sent a note running as follows: "I have the honor to inform you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred immediately on my entering his room, at his diplomatic reception on Wednesday, to the cablegram which he had sent to M. Jusserand instructing the letter to express the high appreciation of the French Government of the signal aid rendered by President Roosevelt in arriving at a just solution of the differences between France and Germany with reference to Morocco-- "Ni vainqueus ni vaineu'." There, this is a hideously long communication! I shall send a copy of is both To Meyer and to White, and shall show it to Roet, but to me one else. None of the documents are to be published in the Blue Book; and I need hardly say that it is to be considered as of the most strictly confidential character[4-28-06] 41 I have just received our letter of April 19th. The correspondent of the London Morning Post is on English Jew named Maurice Low. He is an underhanded follow who has been blackballed in the Metropolitan Club here, who dislikes American generally and hates me in particular. No attention whatever need be paid to him, No know nothing whatever, and would misstep reset anything he did know. He is a liar of bad character. As a matter of fact, when in return for his sable of congratulations I thanked the German Emperor after the pence negotiation at Portsmouth came to an end, I did it exactly as I sent thanks to the King and various other sovereigns in return for their similar cables. As far as I remember the German Emperor was the only one who published my answering cable. It is true, however, that I thanked much more warmly than I did the others, because the German Emperor was the only outsider who helped me at all in the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan. I had to keep a tight rein over him; but still he did render some help. As regards the Algeciras business, you know from what I have written in this letter just how I felt. White says that Nicholson at Algeciras did excellently. I was having very in innate negotiations with Germany and France through Sternberg and Jusserand here; and if Durand had been worth anything I think that England might have helped as a little. But as I have tirely incompetent for any work of delicasy and importance, or at least has shows himself to be on for the past year. Root, Jusserand, and Strasburg all three have precisely the same opinion that I have of him, and not one of them dream of talking over anything with him save as you might recapitulate it to an ordinary dispatch agent.[*[4-28-06]*] -42- I am greatly obliged to you for having arranged to present. Mrs. Shonts and her daughters. In their case it is a matter of importance. Perhaps I have myself failed to realize the incredible pressure upon you, and I shall never again send you any request at all unless it is of really very great importance, as it was in this case - for the Panama business has been on ticklish ground, and I have been anxious that there should be no kind of friction. I shall explain to you the details when we met. I have a hearty although somewhat [?] contempt for the Americans who wish to be presented at Court. Thank heavens, when Mrs. Roosevelt and I were in London and the then Minister, Mr. Phelps, asked if we did not want to be presented we refused. We never were presented at any Court in Europe. As you see from the above letter, I take just the same view of the Emperor's dispatch to Vienna that is taken in England. Oh Lord, what a difference it would make if Spring-Rise were here as Ambassador! With regards to Mrs. Reid, Sincerely yours, Hon. Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador, London, England. [*absolutely personal and*] Confidential THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. April 21, 1906. [*[sent 4-28-06]*] My dear Reid: Now you are about to receive quarto-volume from me and I hope it will not daunt you. But there has been so much that is amusing and interesting, and indeed so much that has been of importance, in the queer negotiations wherein I have been the medium between France and Germany during the past year that it is possibly worth your while to know of them a little in detail. On March 6th, 1905, Sternburg came to me with a message from the Kaiser to ask me to join with the Kaiser in informing the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform his government, and that if he would do so we would stand behind him for the open door and would support him in any opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is to France) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Morocco. On the following day he submitted to me a memorandum to the same effect, stating that the Emperor regarded France and Spain as "a political unity", who wished to divide up Morocco between themselves and debar her markets to the rest of the world, and that if Spain should occupy Tangiers and France the Hinterland they would be able to dominate the roads to the Near and to the Far East. I answered [the] this by stating that I did not see my way clear to interfere in the matter, for I did not think that our interests were sufficiently great, but expressed my friendliness to Germany generally and my expectation & belief that her policy was one for peace. I had some [*other*] further interviews with Speck, and on April 5th he wrote to-2- me again. This time he maintained that England and France wore allies; that he must insist upon a conference of the powers to settle the fate of Morocco. In this memorandum he (the Emperor) stated that Germany asked for no gains in Morocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for equal rights to all nations there. He then added, in Speck's words: "Besides this she is bound to think of her national dignity. This makes it necessary for her to point out to France that her national interests can not be disposed of without asking her for her consent and cooperation. "Since 35 years Germany has been obliged to keep an armed defensive towards France. As soon as France discovers that Germany meekly submits to her bullying, we feel sure that she will become more aggressive in other quarters and we do not consider a demand for a revision of the Treaty of Frankfort to be far off." The Emperor evidently felt safe in the position of defiance to France, which he had already adopted, because as he (Speck) said: "According to the information which the Emperor has received he feels sure that England's aid to France in the matter will not go beyond a 'diplomatic support'. (No IP) "This, he hopes, will keep France isolated, and, with or without a conference, he expects that the status quo in Morocco can be peacefully improved and, above all, the rights of all foreigners safeguarded there." On April 13th Speck wrote me again, saying that the Italian Government had infomed [him] the Emperor of her sympathy with his position, and of her conviction that France would "only continue her aggressive policy in Morocco, aimed at all non-French interests, if she feels sure that England will stand by her and eventually shows herself ready to back her up by force of arms." To this-3- the Emperor added that he believed that the attitude,of England would depend upon the attitude of the United States, and asked us to tell England that we thought there should be a conference. [And] On April 25th he wrote me again, saying that the Emperor would be most grateful to me if I would intimate to England that I would like to see her and Germany in harmony in their dealings with Morocco. On May 13th he sent me another memorandum, insisting that there must be a general conference and complaining of England for opposing this conference, and stating that the latter would only drop [its] her opposition if I would give [them] her a hint to do so. The Emperor also in this memorandum stated, with a distinct note of self-righteousness, that he had refused invitations from France to come to an agreement with her alone, because he was disinterestedly championing the cause of the world at large. He then used these words: "The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he should discover that he should receive no support from the interested treaty powers in connection with the open door and the conference, he would be forced to think of Germany alone. Only then - and not before - he would have to choose between the possibility of a war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war." During the rest of this letter Speck describes the Emperor's indignation with the King of England and with the British Government, and [expresses his] expressed the Emperor's belief that France, England and Russia possibly with the cooperation of Japan were aiming at the partition of China. This last supposition seemed to me mere lunacy, if it was put forward with sincerity. The comic feature of the memorandum, considering the closeness of Germany's-4- relations with Russia at the outset of the Russo-Japanese war, was that the Emperor complained [trusted] that France, ignoring all the laws of nations, had offered the Russian fleet a safe retreat in the harbors of Indo-China, and had provided that fleet with means to prepare its attack, which action might result in a turn of the war in favor of Russia. The Emperor added: "On the other hand the Emperor feels sure that England will drop this or any other plan, if she finds out in time that it would be opposed by America. " The violent renewal of the anti-German movement in England seems to be caused by Germany's attempt to balk any coalition of Powers directed against China after the conclusion of peace." On may 29th the Emperor stated that both England and France had offered to give Germany a sphere of interest in Morocco 1f she would accept it and let the question remain quiet, but that the Emperor had refused, stating that he was for the maintenance "of the status quo and for the open door and for equal treatment of all nations whose rights were established by treaties." (It will be seen later on how comically the Emperor tried to go back on this proposition.) Two days later Speck sent another memorandum from the Emperor, stating that he regarded the Morocco question not as an isolated question, but as one which might develop into a starting point for a new grouping of the powers. He again, in this memorandum, threatened a war with France, using the following language: "If England is successful in causing the refusal of France to join in a conference to settle the Morocco question, Germany will have to choose between war with France or between an understanding with France with regard to Morocco, which repeatedly has been sought for byPages 5-6-7 & 8 not rewritten-9- At the end of May I came back to Washington, and found Jusserand and Speck both greatly concerned lest there should be a war between France and Germany. Both of them were sincerely anxious to avert such a possibility, and each though that his own Government ought to make concessions to avoid the war. Speck, I firmly believe, did not approve of the action his Government was taking, but of course was obliged loyally to back up its position. Jusserand, on the other hand, sympathized absolutely with the general French indignation with Germany, but felt that it was better to yield so far as the conference was concerned, if it could be done honorably, rather than have a war. I saw Sir Mortimer on the matter, but could get very little out of him. He was bitter about Germany, and so far as he represented the British Government it would appear that they were anxious to see Germany humiliated by France's refusal to enter a conference, and that they were quite willing to [force] face the possibility of war under such circumstances. I did not think this showed much valor on their part, although from their point of view it was sagacious, as of course in such a war, where the British and French fleets would be united, the German fleet could have done absolutely nothing; while on land, where Germany was so powerful, it would be France['s aims] alone that would stand, and would have to stand, the brunt of the battle. I desired to do anything I legitimately could for France; because I like France, and I thought her in this instance to be in its right; but I did not intend to take any position which I would not be willing at all costs to maintain. On June 5th you telegraphed from London that Lansdowne had asked for an indication of my views on the Morocco situation, and stated that he regarded the proposal of joint action of the powers represented in Morocco as unfortunate, and as possibly planned to embarrass France. About the same time White cabled from Rome that the Italian Government evidently feared-10- the conference was inevitable unless France was able otherwise to pacify Germany's susceptibilities, but that the British Ambassador felt sure that there would be no conference. I suppose I need hardly say that the English, French and Italian representatives all strenuously denied the statements [and] as to the propositions which Germany said their nation had made to her as regards [the] her sphere of interest in Morocco, etc. I did not regard the various matters in which there was this contradiction as important; partly because I had not at any time credited the three powers named with having made the several propositions that they were [supposed ] alleged by the German government to have made. On June 11th, the Kaiser, through Speck, sent me another memorandum, running as follows: "June 11, 1905. MEMORANDUM MOROCCO Mr. Rouvier * has indirectly informed the German Charge d'Affaires in Paris that England has made a formal offer to France to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with England which would be directed against Germany. At present the leading statesmen of France are opposed to such an alliance, because the majority of the members of the French Government still hope to come to a satisfactory agreement with Germany. But, * who has shown himself distinctly friendly to Germany and has been opposing Mr. Delcasse.Page 11 - not rewritten-12- has asked for time to consider the question. The Emperor feels sure that if you could give a hint now in London and in Paris that, all things put together, you would consider a conference as the most satisfactory means to bring the Morocco question to a peaceful solution, you would render the peace of the world another great service, without encountering any risk. - In case you should not feel inclined to take this step the Emperor believes that your influence could prevent England from joining a Franco-German war, started by the aggressive policy of France in Morocco. As to the present attitude in France towards the Morocco question a marked change is noticeable since the retirement of Mr. Delcasse. Voices are now heard which consider a conference not only as the most legal, but also as the safest way to clear a situation which has been created by the reckless statesmanship of Mr. Delcasse." It really did look as if there might be a war, and I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a real calamity to [the] civilization; and in the next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace between Russia and Japan, [and] I felt that a new conflict might result in what would literally, be a world-conflagration, and finally for the sake of France; [ ] Accordingly, I took active[ly] hold of the matter[s] with both Speck and Jusserand, and after a series of communications with the French Government, through Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up. Jusserand repeated to his [government?] substantially just what I said, I told him that as chief of state I could not let America do anything [?], but that I had me a real sentiment for France; that I would not advise her to do anything humiliating a disgraceful; but that it was [?] wise to avoid a war of if could be done by adjusting a course which would save the Emperor's self-esteem; that for such purpose it was [ ] wise to help him save his face. I urged upon the French Government, in the first place, the great danger of war to them, and the fact that British assistance could avail them very, very little in the event of such a war, because France would of course at once be invaded by land; and in the next place, I pointed out that if there were a conference-13- [*A*] of the powers [that] France [e]would have every reason to believe that the conference would not sanction any unjust attack by Germany upon French interests, and that if all the powers, or practically all the powers, [of] in the conference took an attitude favorable to France on such a point it would make it wellnigh impossible for [France to go to war.] Germany to assail her. I explained that I would not accept the invitation of the conference unless France was willing, and that if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and unfair. [In answer to the statement that France could] At last, the French Government informed me though [not abandon the engagement she had made with England, I suggested that this] Jusserand that it would agree to the conference. At the time I was having nerverous interactions with both Jusserand and Meale. [Wi?] Meale & was on close terms; with Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever excluded met, and whose conley was in the right on this want, I was[Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à Monsieur L'Ambassadeur de France aux Etate Unis. Paris 23 Juin 1905] [*on even closer terms. On the 23d of June he received from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs a despatch running in part as follows,*] "Au cours de ses derniers entretiens avec vous, le Président Roosevelt a conclu que, si injuste que serait, de la part de l' Allemagne une déclaration de guerre dans les circonstances présentes, elle était possible, qu'il fallait l' eviter, user de conciliation et que, parmi les concessions que nous pourrions faire, une Conférence serait sans doute un moindre mal. En communiquant au Président notre réponse à la note allemande, veuillez lui dire que ce sont ses réflexions, ses conseils qui l'ont inspirée. Nous avions d’abord pensé qu'il suffirait de dissiper les erreurs répandues au sujet de notre action au Maroc et de montrer qu'elle ne menace aucun intérét. Nous avons été plus loin et nous nous sommes montrés préts à nous rallier, au besoin, à l'idée d'une Conférence malgré les sérieuses objections qu'elle soulève. Mais rien n'est venu prouver encore que, méme sur ces bases, un accord pourrait s'établir. Il est jusqu'à présent impossible de déterminer avec certitude le but immédiat de l'Allemagne. Son Ambassadeur nous affirme que, pour elle, il n'y a dans tout cela “qu'une question de forme et d'étiquette", qu'il s'agit seulement de connaitre le droit des Puissances signataires de la Convention de Madrid, qu'il suffirait, pour le consacrer, d'un régime transitoire d'une très courte durée et qu'ensuite la France reprendrait la réalisation[*13B*] tion de son programme. Mais, en restreignant ainsi la portée de l'action allemande, le Prince Radolin se défend de faire, au nom de son Gouvernement, aucune proposition autre que celle d'une Conférence; le reste n'est, dit-il, qu'une déduction qu'il tire lui-même de la nature des choses et il évite de faire connaitre l'attitude que le Gouvernement allemand prendra devant la Conférence. En même temps, l'Empereur nous fait dire à Paris que toutes les forces de l'Allemagne sont derrière le Sultan du Maroc, et il tient vis à vis de nous à Washington, à Rome et à Madrid le langage le plus menaçant. M. Roosevelt peut conjurer ce danger. Dites lui que l’Autorité exceptionnelle qui s'attache à ses conseils et qu'il doit non pas seulement à ses fonctions, mais à son caractère, à son esprit de décision et de justice, à la claire intelligence des intérêts les plus élevés, le qualifie au plus haut degré pour intervenir en faveur du maintien de la paix. En s'adressant à lui avec insistance l'Empereur l'a mis en mesure de prendre l'initiative que nous attendons de son amitié./. "[*13,C*] [25 Juin 1905] [*Extrait*] [*On the 25th of June he sent a [letter] despatch to the French Minister of Foreign affairs running in part as follows:-*] [*"*] Je suis revenu, cette nuit, auprès du Président Roosevelt, sur les raisons d'une intervention pressante de sa part en vue d’éviter la rupture dont l'Allemagne parait vouloir nous menacer. Je me suis servi, pour le mettre au courant de la situation, des indications contenues dans vos deux télégrammes. Mes instances ont reçu l'accueil le plus favorable. Le Président m'a déclaré qu'il aurait ce soir avec le Baron Sternburg un entretien du ton le plus grave, dans lequel il insisterait, d'abord sur ce que l'Empereur se doit à lui-même et sur ce à quoi l'oblige le souci de son renom devant l'histoire; nul ne saurait, ni comprendre ni pardonner désormais, les guerres engagées pour des motifs frivoles. Il insistera sur le succès très réel remporte par la diplomatie allemande et sur notre adhésion à son projet de Conférence dans des conditions sur le détail desquelles il est impossible de ne pas s'entendre. Il fera, d'autre part, allusion aux risques à encourir; car, m'a répété le Président, ce que je vous ai dit de l'opinion de nos experts sur votre armée n'est pas invoque par moi simplement pour les besoins de la cause; c'est bien là ce qu'ils pensent d'elle et une victoire allemande n'est aucunement assurée. Il parlera enfin des appuis, redoutablespour l'Allemagne, qui, sans nul doute ne nous feraient pas défaut. "Je voudrais être sur que mes paroles seront efficaces, a ajouté M. Roosevelt; je ne le suis malheureusement pas; mais, en tout cas, vous pouvez être assure qu'elles seront aussi énergiques que possible en faveur d'une entente amiable et que je ne négligerai rien de ce qui me paraîtra pouvoir y servir". J'ai fait part au Président des sentiments que Votre Excellence m'avait charge de lui exprimer. Il n'a pas voulu me laisser achever, disant que ce qu'il faisait était trop naturel pour mériter aucun remerciement. J'ai ajouté: le télégramme que j'ai reçu de M. le Président du Conseil marquait beaucoup de gratitude, mais pas le moindre surprise. "Voilà, a reparti le Président, le vrai compliment qui me fait plaisir"."[*14*] On June 18th, Speck wrote to me, saying that the Emperor greatly appreciated the change which was noticed in the policy of France since the action I had taken as regards the Morocco question, adding "Your diplomatic activity with regard to France, the Emperor says, has been the greatest blessing to the peace of the world." I wrote to Speck the following three letters, all of which I showed to Jusserand before I sent them, as I did not wish there to be any suspicion of double dealing on my part and Jusserand is a man of such excellent judgement; so sound and cool headed, and of so high a [stan] standard of personal and professional honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed, [unless] it was only because both Jusserand and Sternberg [had] [been] were such excellent men, that I was enabled to do any thing at all in so difficult and delicate a matter & I could only have acted with men I was sure of. With such a tricky creature as the Russian Cassini for instance I could have done absolutely nothing; and little or nothing with [such] [hard, strong] [an] amiable [master] [smart] [creature as] [for good] Sir Mortimer. ¶My three letters were as follows; "Personal White House, Washington. June 20, 1905. Dear Speck: Pray thank His Majesty and say that if I have been of any use in keeping the peace I am of course more than glad. I shall be in Massachusetts for the next two days, but will see you Friday or Saturday. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Baron H. Sternburg, The German Ambassador, Deer Park, Maryland. "White House, Washington. June 23, 1905. "My dear Mr. Ambassador: I hope to see you at nine Sunday evening. Meanwhile, pray communicate to His Majesty that in accordance with the suggestion I made to Ambassadors Jusserand in pursuance of the letter you sent me, the French Government informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that it has ceased its opposition to a conference of the powers on Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program of the conference would he needed in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be arranged between Germany and France.Pages 15-16 & 17 - not rewritten[*18,A*] [be dropped explicitly from the matters which were to be disposed of at the conference.] There was however with niggling as to exactly what should be discussed at the conference; and both Jusserand and Speck came to me to say they were still on the [?] of [?] the recognition [?] I made a pencil memorandum, [proposing that the conference should be held and that at it all questions should be discussed save the question as to what France had bound herself to England to do] as follows: " The two Governments consent to go to the conference with no program, and to discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power." [do as regards] I gave a copy of this memorandum to Jusserand and the memorandum itself to Speck, and after they had transmitted it to their respective governments, I received the assent of both governments to the proposition. I explained to both that I did not care to appear in the matter, end that no publicity whatever would be given by me, or by any of our representatives, to what I had done, and I thought it far better that it should take the shape of an agreement freely entered into by themselves. You may remember that not a hint of any kind got out throughout the whole of last summer as to my taking any part in this Morocco business.[L'Ambassadeur de la République Française aux Etats-Unis à Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, Paris] [*Extrait*] [26 Juin 1905] ¶ Jusserard fowarded my memorandum in a despatch to his hom government of June 28th which ran in part as follows:- "J'ai rappelé les graves motifs que nous avions pour écarter toute idée d'une Conférence sans un programme préalable, ou du moins sens une entente indiquant ce à quoi nous pouvions nous attendre et nous garantissant, en particulier, que des engagements internationaux solennels, et depuis longtemps connus de tous ne seraient pas remis en question. On ne peut nous demander de renier notre signature. Avec un souverain du tempérament de Guillaume II, qui vient de donner, par les textes mêmes dont il a muni le Président, des preuves si inquiétantes de son manque de modération et même d'exactitude, nous sommes plus particulièrement tenus a la prudence qu'avec aucun autre. C'est a la suite de ces remarques que le Président a pris sur sa table un morceau de papier et a cherche quelque formule pouvant être acceptée par les deux pays et qui respecterait à la fois l'orgueil de Guillaume II et nos droits. Je reproduis ci-après le texte de cette formule, qui a pu, d'ailleurs, subir quelque légère modification avant d’être transmise, mais dont le sens général sera surement demeuré le même: "The two Governments consent to go to the Conference with no program and to discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of course, where either is in honourbound by a previous agreement to another power". Le Président n'a nulle prétention que ce soit là une formule parfaite et immuable; mais il espère qu'elle pourrait peut être offrir un terrain d'entente et il l'a fait , en conséquence, soumettre au Kaiser par le Baron de Sternburg dans l'après midi de Dimanche. Il est certain que la portée d'un tel accord serait de mettre en dehors de la discussion les avantages que nous nous sommes assurés auprès de divers pays ètrangers. Car nous ne les avons obtenus que par le moyen de concessions correspondantes, faites à leur profit, dès maintenant irrévocables, et que nous sommes tenus d'honneur de maintenir. L'acceptation d'une formule de ce genre serait donc, moins le mot, la réalisation du programme souhaité par nous."-18-B [There were some further hitches and I was kept in constant conference with both powers, for France higgled as much as Germany.] On June 28th I received the following letter from Speck: "Deer Park, Md. Jun 28, 1905 'Dear Mr. President: I just received a telegram form Berlin which expresses highest satisfaction and gratitude with regard to the latest step you undertook in the interest of the Morocco conference. "The telegram repeats a wire from the German Ambassador at Paris who says that Rouvier is having a most difficult time. Delcasses's followers are trying hard to force him to accept Decasse's colonial program, and England is making a frantic effort to prevent the acceptance of the invitation to the conference by the council of ministers which meets to-day. The Ambassador expresses hope that Rouvier's backing will be strong enough to pull him through. The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical. "In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives. Believe me, Mr. President Your most sincerely Sternburg. To the President of the United States of America, Sagamore Hill." It was a couple of days after this that I received from both governments the information that they had agreed on substantially the plan outlined in my memorandum. -19- On July 11th I received a letter from Jusserand, running in part as follows: "I leave greatly conforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the one we had considered and the acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris show that your beneficent influence at this grave juncture is deeply and gratefully felt. They confirm also what I guessed was the case, that is that there was a point where more yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible greatest events." A fortnight afterwards the Kaiser got uneasy again, and for sometime insisted upon the conference being held in Morocco, and upon Revoil not being sent by France as a delegate. Again I had to do some cabling to both the French and German Governments, but finally the Kaiser's objections were removed. I had urged Jusserand not to let his people boast or be disagreeable and try to humiliate the Kaiser in connection with the conference, because the important point was for them to get the kernel of the nut, and they did have to consider the shell. On August 9th Jusserand wrote me, expressing the thanks of his Government for what I had done; the German Foreign office thanked me by cable. After this, trouble ceased as far as I was concerned, until the conference met at Algeciras. Soon after the conference opened I began to have a succession of visits from Speck and from Jusserand. Jusserand generally gave me his messages verbally. Speck submitted them in writing. Loyal though Speck was to his Government, both Root and I became convinced that down in his heart [he] the honest, brave little gentleman did not really believe Germany was acting as she should-20- act. the attitude of France, as represented by the French representatives at Algeciras, seemed to be more reasonable; but I was entirely sure of France only when I could act directly through Jusserand, who rang true under any and all circumstances. It would have been a good thing if I could have kept in touch with England through Durand. [I wish I could have gotten better at England's attitude through Durand.] But Root and I, and for the matter of that Jusserand and Speck also, have absolutely given up any effort to work with Durand at all. He seems to have a brain of about eight-guinea-pig-power. Why, under Heaven the English keep him here I do not know! If they do not care for an Ambassador, then abolish the embassy; but it is useless to have a worthy creature of mutton-suet consistency like the good Sir Mortimer. Germany sought to impress us with the fact that all the other powers but England were in her favor. We heard, however, both from Russia and Italy, they they thought the German[y] position was wrong, and were anxious that we should do something to prevent Germany from obtaining a sphere of influence in Morocco. We became convinced that Austira was a mere cat's paw for Germany, and that Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco, which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to desire. She first endeavored to secure a port for herself, and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzerland, which we were convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland, become in effect German. The French said they would not yield on these points, and, as you know, it looked as if the conference would come to nothing, and that there would then be the possibility of trouble between France and Germany. Our view was that the interests of France and Spain in Morocco were far greater than those of other powers. Finally we took the matter up by correspondence with Germany, as follows, Jusserand being kept informed of what we were doing:Pages 21 - to 32 - inclusive not rewritten-33- I call your attention to the last paragraph in this telegram of March 19th. I had previously informed Speck, in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in rejecting our proposals and a break-up would, I should feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith; but that if the Emperor would yield to them, what seemed to me as very fair proposals, I should not publish any of the correspondence [we had had], and would endeavor in ever way to give Germany full credit for what was done; and with that in view would take an early opportunity to have him (Speck) bring a delegation of German war veterans to see me, so that I might make a public statement in praise of the Emperor's position and expressive of my appreciation thereof, and of my hope that the relations between France and Germany would become steadily more friendly. Two or three days after the Emperor had sent his cable saying he had yielded to our request, Speck called upon me to say that the Emperor very earnestly desired that I would make such public utterance. Accordingly I arranged for him to bring the German veterans around, and I made them the following speech, which I had previously gone over not only with Speck but with Jusserand: "I welcome you here, my fellow-Americans; for among the many strains that go to make up our composite race stock in this country, no strain has given us better Americans than those who are of German birth or blood. It is our peculiar pride as a Nation that in this republic we have measurably realized the ideal under which good citizens know no discrimination as between creed and creed, birthplace and birthplace, provided only that whatever the man's parentage may have been, whatever the way in which he worships his Creator, he strives in good faith to do his duty by himself and by his fellow men, and to show his unflinching loyalty to our common country. In addition to thus greeting you my fellow-Americans of German birth, I wish also to greet the Ger--34- man citizens present, the members of the German army, belonging to the reserve of that army, and to welcome them here, especially, Mr. Ambassador, as they are brought here, by you, yourself an old soldier, who have endeared yourself to the American people by your hearty friendship for this country. The reverence a man preserves for his native land, so far from standing in the way of his loving and doing his full duty by the land of his adoption, should help him toward this love and the performance of this duty. If a man is a good son he is apt to make a good husband; and the quality that makes a man reverence the country of his birth is apt to be the quality that makes him a good citizen in the country of his adoption. The ties that unite Germany and the United States are many and close, and it must be a prime object of our statesmanship to knit the two nations ever closer together. In no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and for Germany's exalted ruler, Emperor William, than here in America. It is not out of place in closing for me to say a word of congratulation both to the German people and the German Emperor upon the work that has been accomplished in the Algeciras convention which has just closed, a conference held chiefly because of the initiative of Germany. It was not a conference in which we Americans as a nation had much concern, save that it is always our concern to see justice obtain everywhere, and, so far as we properly can, to work for the cause of international peace and good will. In its outcome this conference has added to the likelihood of the betterment of conditions in Morocco itself, has secured equitable dealing as among the foreign Powers who have commercial relations with Morocco, and has diminished-35- the chance of friction between these Powers. In particular it may not be out of place for me to say that I hope and believe that the conference has resulted and will result in rendering continually more friendly the relations between the mighty empire of Germany and the might republic of France; for it is my hope and wish, as it must be the hope and wish of every sincere wellwisher of humankind, that these friendly relations may not only continue unbroken but may ever grow in strength." I have since received from Jusserand and Speck, the very cordial thanks to the French and German Governments. McCormick has just sent a not running as follows: "I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred immediately on my entering his room, at his diplomatic reception on Wednesday, to the cablegram which he had sent to M. Jusserand instructing the latter to express the high appreciation of the French Government of the signal aid rendered by President Roosevelt in arriving at a just solution of the differences between France and Germany with reference to Morocco -- "Ni vainqueur ni vaincu." ["His excellency added that this was another evidence of the unique place which the United States under President Roosevelt had attained, and of the great and benign role which "our sister Republic" could continue to play, with a Chief Magistrate who commanded the respect and confidence of the world at large, and begged that I confirm his cablegram to M. Jusserand with the additional expression of this sentiment."] There, this is a hideously long communication! I shall send [the sub-] a copy of it-36- [stance] both to Meyer and to White [Root] and shall show it to Root, but to no one else. None of the documents [have been] are to be published in the Blue Book; and I need hardly say that it is to be considered as of the most strictly confidential character. [*insert at end of p 38*] With regards to Mrs. Reid, Sincerely yours, Hon. Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador, London, England.37 I have just received your letter of April 18th. The correspondent of the London Morning Post is an English Jew named Maurice Low. He is an underhanded fellow who has been blackballed in the Metropolitan Club here, who dislikes America generally and hates me in particular. No attention whatever need be paid to him. He knows nothing whatever [about what he is talking,] and would misrepresent, [what he does] he did know. [Of course] As a matter of fact, when in return for his cable of congratulations I thanked the German Emperor after the peace negotiations at Portsmouth came to an end, I did it exactly as I sent thanks to the King and various other [potentates] sovereigns in return for their similar cables. As far as I remember the German Emperor was the only one who published my answering cable. It is true, however, that I thanked him much more warmly than I did the others, because the German Emperor was the only [man] outsider who helped me at all in the peace negotiations between Russia and Japan. I had to keep a tight rein over him; but still he did render some help. As regards the Algeciras business, you know from what I have written in this letter just how I felt. White says that Nicholson at Algeciras did excellently. I was having very intimate negotiations with Germany and France through Sternburg and Jusserand here; and if Durand had been worth anything I think that England might have helped me a little. But as I have said above, Durand, though a high-minded, honest fellow, is simply entirely incompetent for any work of delicacy and importance, or at least has shown himself to be so for the past year. Root, Jusserand and Sternburg all three have precisely the same opinion that I have of him, and not one of them dreams of talking over anything with him save as you might recapitulate it to an ordinary dispatch agent.38 I am greatly obliged to your for [what you] having arranged to present for Mrs. Shonts and her daughters. In their case it is a matter of importance. Perhaps I have myself failed to realize the incredible pressure upon you, and I shall never again send you any request at all unless it is of really very great importance, as it was in this case - for the Panama business has been on ticklish ground, and I have been anxious that there should be no kind of friction. I shall explain to you the details when we meet. I have a hearty although somewhat amused contempt for the Americans who wish to be presented at Court. Thank heavens when Mrs. Roosevelt and I were [abroad] in London and the then Minister, Mr. Phelps, asked if we did not want to be presented we refused. We never were presented at any Court in Europe. As you see from the above letter, I take just a the same view of the Emperor's dispatch to Vienna that is taken in England. Oh Lord, what a difference it would make if Spring-Rice were here as Ambassador!4-28-06 Taft [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]][attached to TR to Taft 4-28-06]The White House, Washington. April 28, 1906. My dear Mr. Secretary: Through you and on behalf of the American people I desire to express my hearty appreciation of what has been done by the army, especially by the [General Staff, the Quartermaster, Commissary and Medical Departments and] various staff corps in Washington and by the officers and enlisted men upon the actual ground, who with such prompt and quiet efficiency met the demands made upon them by the frightful catastrophe which has befallen San Francisco and the neighborhood round about. The excellent organization, the training and the discipline and courage so characteristic of our little army have enabled it on this occasion to add one more feat to the long record of similar feats of loyal devotion which have distinguished it alike in peace and war. Nor has the character of the work which it has just done been new to the army. The destitute and homeless after the confligration at Chicago, the stricken people of the flooded Mississippi valley on more than one occasion, sufferers from the flood at Johnstown and from the hurricane in Puerto Rico, those of Galveston when destruction fell upon that city, the stranded and starving miners of Alaska - all these could testify as could many others among our citizens [and some without our own limits, as for instance the people of Mt. Pelee,] to the way in which our army meets on the instant any demand made upon it. In this instance that admirably disinterested and effi--2- cient body, the American National Red Cross Association, together with the Civil authorities of both State and City, at once called upon our army to take charge of [the] sanitation, to provide and furnish food and to supervise the medical care of three hundred thousand homeless people, while at the same time it was firmly but [gently] considerately [keeping] maintaining order. The army met these demands in noble fashion and with an efficiency which justified to the full its equipment in men and means. It has furnished a new proof of its right to claim the affectionate regard & respect of our people. A special meed of thanks is due Brigadier General Funston, who on his own responsibility met the crisis in such soldierly fashion. Sincerely yours, Hon. Wm. H. Taft, Secretary of War.Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 4, 1906. Dear Oom John: Of course I liked the article very, very much. I do not usually care a rap about what people write concerning me; but I particularly appreciate this article, and I shall always keep it for my children. You see, Oom John, I regard you as a permanent asset of American life. Your writings will last, just as those of White of Selborne will last; and while it is not a matter of much concern to any of us what is said of us after death, yet I like to think that my grandchildren and great-grandchildren, if there be any, will read the more than kindly words you have written about me. You may have noticed, by the way, that this winter I am doing my best to make good what you have said about my attitude about the big trusts and about all those moneyed men who make of their money simply a symbol of greed.-2- I have just come in from walking around the White House grounds with Mrs. Roosevelt, and have been wishing heartily you were with us to tell us what the various warberlers were. Unfortunately, I haven't a natural history book with me at the moment. Most of the warblers were up in the tops of the trees and I could not get a good glimpse of them; but there was one with chestnut cheeks, with bright yellow behind the cheeks and a yellow breast thickly streaked with black, which has puzzled me. Doubtless it is a very common kind which has for the moment slipped my memory. I saw the blackburnian, and the summer yellowbird, and the black-throated green. Affectionately yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. John Burroughs, Esq., West Park, N. Y.Copy THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 5, 1906. Dear OoM John: That warbler I wrote you about yesterday was the Cape May warbler. As soon as I got hold of an ornithological book I identified it. I do not think I ever saw one before, for it is a rather rare bird - at least on Long Island, where most of my bird knowledge was picked up. It was a male, in the brilliant spring plumage; and the orange, brown cheeks, the brilliant yellow sides of the neck just behind the cheeks, and the brilliant yellow under parts with thick black streaks on the breast, made the bird unmistakable. It was in a little pine, and I examined it very closely with the glasses but could not see much of its back. Have you found it a common bird? Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. John Burroughs, Esq., West Park, N. Y.[*Allison*] [*Rewritten 5-14-06*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON May 13, 1906. My dear Senator Allison: As Senator Tillman brought in your name in connection with mine in the statement he made [in effect] concerning our relations to the rate bill last Saturday it is perhaps due to you that I should write you on the matter. After the rate bill was reported from the committee, and after by vote of the committee Mr. Tillman had been put in charge of it, many Senators and many outsiders came to see me with reference to it. [*Among others I was asked to see extenuator Chandler as representing Messrs. Bailey and Tilleman. *] [It was stated to me that while] [and not feel willing to see among others & was asked to see and honor they but would have into me to see Mr. Tillman as their representative Mr. Tilman who was in charge of the bill.] Ex-Senator Chandler as representing Mr. Tillman, [was] who was in charge of the bill. I stated in response that I was of course entirely willing to see [Messrs. Bailey and Mr. Tillman personally or to see Mr. Chandler or anyone else who[m] [they desired to have speak for them.] could speak for him, and I accordingly directed my secretary to make an appointment for Mr. Chandler to see me pursuant today was what he2 with whom I had my extended conferences on the subject. To all I stated that the Hepburn bill was in its essence entirely satisfactory to me. [The theory of the Hepburn bill as regards] review by the courts was that [we] it should expressly or implicitly recognize this right of review - that is the jurisdiction of the court - but should not attempt to define it they [[?] was] [This was the idea of the Interstate Commerce Commission] being the courts to [?] [and of the Attorney General when they were consulted about drawing] the limits of [?] their own jurisdictions this was the idea of [up the Hepburn bill; our theory being that the Interstate Commerce] of the Attorney General [when he was [?] to about] [Commission was to be the administrative board which was to fin the maximum] [drawing up the Hepburn bill] his belief being that [rate, this rate to stand as though passed by Congress until or unless] thereby we avoided all danger of the bill being declared [less the court in its review of the subject reversed it, other because] unconstitutional [?] because of the attempt to confer [the Commission had exceeded its authority or because the constitutional] [?] too much or too little jurisdiction or the courts. [rights of the carrier were violated.] I also repeatedly stated that while it was entirely satisfactory to me simply to leave the Hepburn bill in sustance as it was; that is with the recognition of the jurisdiction of the courts but without any attempt to define that jurisdiction; yet that I was entirely willing that there should be a definition, provided that this definition did not seek to grant a broad review, but explicitly narrowed it to the two subjects which as a matter of fact I believed that the courts would alone consider in case there was no [any] attempt to [*stet*] define the limits of their review; that is, would limit it to the question as to whether the Commission had acted ultra vires and as to whether any man's constitutional rights had been impaired. I stated -3- that if the question of defining or limiting the review was brought up at all I personally felt that this was the way in which it should be limited or defined. At different times at least a score of tentative amendments were either prepared [either] by the Attorney General at the request of Senators or submitted to me by [either the Attorney General] or Senators. [and amendments] [thereon suggested by me.] As to many of these amendments (including [any other??] the substance of the so-called Long, Overman, Bacon and Moore amendment [and the substance of the amendment] [spoken of by Mr Gilman)] I stated that [day next] I should be entirely satisfied to have them in the bill; or to others I [should be], suggested modifications [that] which would make them not [infact??] [?], as to none did I ever say, either to Mr. Chandler or to any one else, that I should insist upon having them in the bill as a condition of my approving it. [In the case of some of these proposed amendments] [their preparation or any change in them was made with the distinct] [understanding that we were trying to carry out the ideas of the] [man suggesting the amendment or the change, but [?] we did not [?]] [[?] commit ourselves to the change or the amendment. In most of] [them, however, we stated that the amendment should be in substance satisfactory] [to us if it proved that a sufficient number of the Senators] [and of the members of the House could agree to it. There were probably] [a dozen papers coming in this last category which were drawn up by the] [Attorney General or submitted to me for suggestions, some of which I] [occasionally penciled in.] [In no case was it ever stated either by the] [Attorney General or by [?] that my given amendment or given [?]] [was the only amendment or the only scheme to which I would consent.] On the contrary, I was always most careful to state that I was not [concerned] [with the phraseology at all, and that I most certainly was not] trying to dictate any particular program of action[,]. [but that I would]-4- [consider as entirely satisfactory any action which should in substance keep the Hepburn bill, or which if there was any amendment seeking to define and limit the jurisdiction of the court would limit it [*or define it*] substantially [*?*] as provided in what was called the Long amendment. I also stated that I should be glad to see some such amendment as the Overman amendment adopted. I also stated that I should personally be glad to see some such amendment as the Spooner amendment adopted. But as regards these I found that most of the Senators and Congressmen with whom I consulted disagreed with me, as did the majority of the Interstate Commerce Commissions.] In no case, either in the case of Mr. Chandler or in the case of any one else, was there the slightest opportunity for any honest misconception of my attitude or any belief that I had [pledged myself specifically to one and only one amendment or set of amendments.] [said that I would [?] after having any particular amendment or set of amendments put into [?]] [*pledged myself specifically to one and only one amendment or set of amendments, or that I would not be satisfied with any amendment which preserved [?] the essential features of the Hepburn bill or it came from the [?]*] You will doubtless recall that in the course of the several visits that you personally made we discussed a number of these proposed amendments, trying to find out [to] for which one there could be [secured] obtained sufficient body of assent to secure [*its passage*] and the passage of the rate bill. To almost every amendment proposed by any one I found that there were other excellent men who objected, or who at least wished to change it, and I finally became convinced that it was impossible for Senators with advantage to use me as the intermediary [of] in coming to an agreement with their colleagues, especially when they only communicated with me I told you that - while I should prefer a long and [?] amendment, yet [?] your amendment, the Talton amendment, was entirely satisfactry. Your amendment through another intermediary, and I earnestly suggested to all to [if them] [with] whom I spoke that they should communicate with you, whose purposes and mine were identical. Shortly does not in the slightest degree [?] or [?] the [?] bill. [H?] expresses about the friends of the [?] have always asserted was [in?] by the terms of the bill [?] a letter of [?] [?] [?] which [?] [?] [?] [?] -5- through another intermediary, and I earnestly suggested to all [of them] to [with] whom I spoke that they should communicate with you, whose purposes and mine were identical. Shortly after this you [*in company with Senator Cullom*] called upon me with the amendment drawn up by Senator Fulton, which is the amendment now commonly known as the Allison amendment. I told you that [the amendment would be entirely satisfactory to me, though I not stating at the [?]*] while I should prefer the [?] and Overman amendments, yet that your amendment, the Fulton amendment, was entirely satisfactory. Your amendmentCA 5-14-1906 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON In view of the remarks which Senator Tillman states that Mr Charles repeated as having been by me in those conversations it is necessary for me to say thatFiel - C.F. - "Chandler - Tillman incident, May, 1906" (Cross ref. under Tillman")[?] I made no criticisms of any Senators to Mr Chandler, though I discussed fully with him the various amendments proposed by different Senators. [Senator] Mr Chandler, [however, expressed to] was free in his criticisms of various Senators; [but he was most] among others, he [?][especially condemnatory of] condemned Senator Bailey, stating that Senator Tillmann and he, Mr. Clawler, were both very suspicious of Mr Bailey, and were watching him closely to see that he did nothing wrong.Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 14, 1906. Dear Oom John: Yes, I liked your piece in the Cosmopolitan very much. It seemed to me sane and beautiful. I do wish you could have been down on one or two walks, or rather strolls, I have recently taken, and also could be with me when Mrs. Roosevelt and I walk around the White House grounds. I have a pair of field glasses and have been trying to obey Emerson's injunction; and I have come to the conclusion that he did not know what he was talking about when he praised naming the birds without a gun. I do not mean that one should use the gun indiscriminately; but there are some birds, those that are rare and shy, warblers that keep to the very tops of the trees, or those that lie in jungley places, that can not be made out by the aid of field glasses, or at least I cannot make them out. Now and then a warbler will-2- come into full view as that Cape May warbler did and I will be able to examine it with complete satisfaction; but often after listening for a half hour to a fine, wiry little song, and occasionally catching a glimpse of a small, agile bird fluttering behind a spray of leaves, it will fly off without my having the slightest idea what it is; and the dull-colored females cannot be told apart at all. If species are common of course after awhile one might find out what they are. Always, yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. John Burroughs, West Park, N. Y.[*Curtis*] [*C. F.*] (Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 19, 1906. My dear Mr. Curtis: I have looked up the Gore Canyon matter as follows: Mr. Loeb received a letter from Mr. Philip B. Stewart, of Colorado Springs, Colorado, dated May 22, 1905, as follows: "There is a matter of great import to this state for which I wish to bespeak any proper aid the President can give. Briefly, Mr. David H. Moffatt and associates are building a railroad to develop Northwest Colorado, a territory of immense coal fields and an area of ten thousand square miles suitable to stock, crops and recreation. This road goes through to Salt Lake City, a distance of five hundred miles and calls for about twenty-five millions of dollars. About six millions have already been expended. "After the enterprise was under full swing the Reclamation Bureau of the Government withdrew Gore Canyon on the surveyed route of the road, and the Government proposes to here build a great dam and by the water so held to irrigate lands in California and Arizona, twelve hundred miles distant. "Gore Canyon is necessary for a feasible exit from the high range where this road crosses the Continental Divide. "The Union Pacific on the north, The Denver and Rio Grande, representing the Goulds' interests on the south, have thrown every possible obstacle in the way of this construction. "At the present time the Century Light and Power Company, a stool pigeon for larger interests is and has been for some months active through its agents in Washington in instigating litigation by the Government against the right-of-way of this projected railroad. This Power Company desires or professes to desire to utilize the water from this reservoir to create power for commercial purposes and to deal with the Government on that basis, returning the water to its natural channel for subsequent use in irrigation. "I presume the irrigation project is sound and important, but Colorado feels that her great wealth in a section larger than Vermont, in which is more coal than in the State of Pennsylvania, should not be bottled up by a use of her own lands and waters to enrich communities twelve hundred miles away.-2- "Colorado capital against the determined opposition of two great systems of roads, with their selfish financial backing, has been staked to develop this territory. The promoters believed their title to this route to be valid, as it was against all save the National Government. It is at least questionable whether any irrigation scheme is more important to the country than the development contingent on the successful completion of this five hundred miles of railroad. "Excepting the interests of competitive railroads, every citizen of this state is profoundly interested in the successful completion of Mr. Moffatt's project, and no service of greater consequence to this state can possibly be rendered by the National Government than to give this enterprise every opportunity to be completed. I most earnestly hope that the question may receive the broadest and most liberal consideration and not be jeopardized by the naturally professionally interested experts of the Interior Department." Mr. Stewart impressed me much, for he is a man of rigid probity, [and] upon whose judgment I can [implicitly] depend. While in Colorado a great many people had already spoken to [exhibited] me of their anxiety to get the railroad through and have the section of Colorado in question developed at an early a date as possible. At about the same time the following telegrams were received from Senator Teller and the three Colorado Congressmen: "The published report that the government will build a reservoir at Gore Canon, Colo. is injurious to the interests of Colorado and not required by any interest local or national. I desire to enter my earnest protest against it as a waste of the irrigation fund for that purpose. H. M. TELLER." "Almost unanimous Colorado sentiment favors use Gore Canon by Denver North Western Ry., and that use for irrigation project should be subordinate thereto. Earnestly request Department will consider and protect local interests of very great importance to State's development. F. E. BROOKS."-3- "The people of First Congressional District regard building of North Western Railroad of vital importance to their welfare and do not believe building of Gore Canyon Dam will benefit them, but will obstruct building of railroad. As their representative respectfully and earnestly object to the preparation of site for reservoir purposes. ROBT. W. BONYNGE." "If irrigation project at Gore Canyon Colorado will seriously interfere with Moffat railroad through that country it ought to be carefully considered. The railroad is of incalculable value to northwestern Colorado especially I beg of the department not to impede the progress of that country. H. M. HOGG." I looked into the matter, with which I had no particular familiarity, and found that the Reclamation Service had considered the advisability of building a reservoir at Gore Canyon in order to develop the lands along the lower Colorado River, but had not taken, and had not the money to take, any steps toward building the reservoir. The lands in and around the Canyon had accordingly been withdrawn to be held for an indefinite period for reservoir purposes; but this had been done subsequent to an application by the Denver, Northwestern and Pacific Railway Company for a right-of-way over these same lands, and also subsequently an application by the New Century Light and Power Company for the right to use the river's flow for power purposes. The report of Mr. Grunsky, consulting engineer, under date of September 22d, 1905, mentions that charges had been made that the Reclamation Service was attempting to obstruct railroad construction in the interest of rival roads; this is alluded to in Mr. Stewart's letter; but of course it is a matter about which I do know and can know nothing. The railroad made its application for the right-of way on January-4- 3, 1903. Its contention was that subsequent withdrawal of these lands while the unapproved application of the railway company's right-of-way wassstill pending was not a sufficient reason for the denial of the railroad' company's application. It started to construct its railroad. During the summer of 1905 the litigation went on, the Government having applied for an injunction to prevent the railroad from thus being built through the proposed reservoir site. In an opinion rendered September 5, 1905, by Judge Hallett of the United States District Court of Colorado the contention of the railway was sustained and the case was decided against the Government, the Judge holding, among other things, substantially as follows: "That it is not claimed that the Gore Canyon site for the reservation has been selected by the Secretary of the Interior, or even that he has considered in any precise form the subject of its selection; that the only step taken has been the withdrawal of public lands; that this withdrawal was upon the recommendation of employees of the Reclamation Service; that there is only a small area of land in the valley of the Grand River in Colorado which can be irrigated from Grand River, and that no reservoir is needed for these lands; that in Utah there are no such lands, although the officers of the Reclamation Service are of the opinion that there are such lands which may be irrigated from Colorado River; that the reports of surveys for the Department of the Interior are to the effect that any scheme for taking out water for lands in Utah is impracticable; that the large tracts in Arizona and California have not been ascertained in any such way as required under the Reclamation Act; that these lands only are the lands which would be supplied from the reservoir if built; that, from that appears in the record, it is plain that a great deal of work, occupying much time, is yet to be done, as to the lands in California and Arizona. Whether they may be better irrigated from works in that locality in the lower course of the Colorado River, is a problem which is yet unsolved; that there is much reason to believe that Colorado River below the Grand Canyon, and below the Black Canyon of that river, is sufficient in quantity for irrigating all of the lands that can be irrigated from it in California and Arizona; that Salton Sea is-5- filling at a great rate; that the cost prohibits the use of storage schemes, – such as $1,000,000 for Kremmling reservoir, and like amounts for reservoirs on Green River, another tributary of Colorado River; that the proceeding in regard to this reservoir is no more than tentative, – it is experimental; it is in a stage of inquiry; that the withdrawal from entry of the public lands was a wise measure – this prevents settlement upon the land – nothing more; that "probably in a case in which the facts are obvious and clear, and in which the selection of a good site for a reservoir or for other works is reasonably to be expected the Government may proceed to prevent any encumbrance upon the site so selected;" that the court does not believe that the decisions assert that under the circumstances disclosed a right-of-way secured many years ago by a railroad company may be transmitted to another company after so long a time – conveyed by assignment or deed; that the railroad company is, and has been, for some time back, engaged in the construction of its railroad in the basin of the reservoir and immediately in front of Gore Canyon, and this, according to the opinion of the Supreme Court, in Jamestown, and Southern R.R. CO. vs. Jones, (176 U.S. 125) is a sufficient location of the line. If that were not true, the railroad company has filed its profile of its road under the terms of the act of 1875, and it was decided by the Department of the Interior to be a good filing; that even though the map was not approved 'there was no reason for withholding approval other than a desire to aid in the reservation of this site for a reservoir, and that was no reason at all.' " When this decision by the Court had been rendered the question was whether the Government should appeal to the higher court or not. The Department of Justice informed me orally that there was no likelihood of securing a reversal of the opinion of the court below. Under such circumstances, to continue the suit simply meant obstructing the building of the railroad and the opening of the country to no purpose; and with the irritation added to by the fact that while the railroad was to aid in the development of Colorado the reservoir which the Reclamation Service hoped to build was to store the waters of-6- Colorado for use in Arizona and southern California and not for use in Colorado. In the Reclamation service I am obliged to move carefully because of the interstate jealousies over the distribution of waters, and I do not like to take action which may seem to be against the interest of one State, or to sacrifice such interest to the interest of another state unless the action is clearly demanded. In the case at issue, the Gore Canyon case, such action would have been absolutely unwarranted. The California Senators were very anxious that the reservoir should be established, and in view of an inquiry from Senator Flint on the subject, Consulting Engineer Grunsky in a letter of January 17, 1906, stated: "The immediate approval of a project or of a series of projects with Kremmling Reservoir as one of the features is out of the question on account of the nonavailability of funds. The Reclamation fund is practically all allotted." The Director of the Reclamation Service in his letter of May 7, 1906, stated: "As the reclamation fund has now been allotted to such an extent that funds would not be available at once for the acquisition of the railroad right of way in such manner, it is evident that any further utilization of this site must be postponed for a number of years." In other words, It would have been utterly inexcusable to hold up the railroad from being built through the Gore Canyon on the ground that we wanted it for a reservoir site, when there were no funds in sight with which this reservoir site could be built; so that for an indefinite period covering an unknown number of years the-7- Canyon would simply have been unoccupied either by a railroad or by a reservoir. It therefore appears in the first place that the decision of Judge Hollett, a Judge whose integrity has never been questioned, showed that we had no right to prevent the railroad from building; and in the second place the condition of the reclamation funds showed that if we had the right it would have been inexpedient and improper to exercise it, because under no circumstance could the reservoir have been even begun until an indefinite time had elapsed. On December 5,1905, the Attorney General advised the Department of the Interior that the suite had been dismissed without prejudice and that no further proceedings were contemplated. I personally went over all this matter, took cognizance of or directed the action. On November 3d Mr. Stewart wrote no mentioning that he had not a dollar's interest in the railroad or any ulterior or indirect interest, except possibly an unconscious bias in favor of his own State and her development. Any other decision then that which I reached in this case would not only have been an outrage, but an exceedingly foolish outrage. Please treat this letter as private so far as Mr. Stewart's remarks concerning rival or hostile corporations are concerned; but the rest of the letter you can use as you choose, save that of course it is not to be directly quoted. Sincerely yours, Mr. William K. Curtis, Home Life Building, Washington, D.C.[*calendared file P.P.F. T-R-*] Copy Personal THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 23, 1906. My dear Senator Beveridge: Will you glance at the enclosed clipping from the Evening Star? It contains of course just what must not be said about your speech. Can't you make it understood that I have not seen your speech and am of course not in any way responsible for it and that it has simply the significance that attaches to the speech of a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations who has been in close agreement with the President's policy; or (if you prefer to put it that way) who, together with the President and the other Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has for the last four and a half years followed substantially the same policy? Of course what is necessary is that there shall not be any impression conveyed that you are the spokesman of the administration, or that your utterances have any official weight as representing the administration, save from the standpoint of our general sympathy and friendship. It was because of this that Root felt so strongly that neither of us ought to see your speech in advance - a feeling with which, when he had presented the case fully to me, I thoroughly agreed. Secretary Wilson tells me that your bill about the meat inspection is all right. I have not yet had the chance to look over it. It is impossible for me to give any idea as to when I shall send in my message transmitting the report. It may be that I shall want to make certain further investigations. I may wish to send in a brief preliminary message. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. Albert Jeremiah Beveridge, United States Senate. [*[no enclosures]*][*[T: P. Shonts]*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. May 24, 1906. Sir: I have read your very interesting letter, together with the letters of Mr. Stearns which accompany it. It seems to me that you have established conclusively the fact that there is not the slightest ground for apprehension as to the effect of earthquakes upon the dams of the proposed lock canal at Panama. I take this opportunity to express my hearty and unqualified agreement with the proposition contained in the latter part of your letter, namely, that the construction of the lock canal on the plan recommended by the Commission and by Commissioner Stevens is imperatively demanded by the needs of the situation. The ship canal proposed means, if built, an indefinite increase in cost, an indefinite increase in the time to be taken, an indefinite increase in the risk to be run; and, if successful, it means a comparatively narrow and tortuous canal, [not a sea level canal at all but a lock canal] with a lock of the most undesirable type - a canal on which the largest ships would not be able to [carry the largest ships] pass one another, and which could not be enlarged as readily as the proposed lock canal. If the so-called sea-level canal is ordered by Congress it should be distinctly understood that in all probability it will be built not for this generation but for the next2 generation; for it will probably take two or three times as long to build, and it will be at at least double the cost. The men who are to do the job, who are to be responsible for its success or failure and to gain credit or be discredited accordingly, are a unit in favor of the lock canal. Mr. Stevens, the Chief Engineer, is in a better position to judge than any other man in the world, and is more interested than any other engineer in making an accurate forecast as to the probabilities. If he is to be retained the canal should be built as he suggests, as you suggest, as the Secretary of War suggests, as all those who are responsible for the work join in suggesting. I may point out that to change the purpose of the present act and now to start building the proposed sea-level canal means not merely indefinite delay in the future, but immediate delay in beginning the work. Different plans will have to be formulated and a different type of contract than any contemplated will have to be made; and either all the men now in responsible positions will have to be changed or they will be set to undertake a work in which they do not believe. [It would be a calamity] In my judgment it would be a mistake of national importance at this time to embark on building a sea-level canal on the plan recommended; and I believe that to adopt such a plan means an indefinite delay in and perhaps the abandonment of the entire work. Sincerely yours, Hon. T. P. Shonts, Chairman, Isthmian Canal Commission, Washington, D.C.THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 6, 1906. My dear Mr. Curtis: Under date of June 5th there appeared in your letter a statement as to the Gore Canyon matter which, in view of the knowledge you had on the subject from my letter on May 19th, I am bound to say was a deliberate perversion of the truth. I need hardly point out that merely to give certain statements which convey a totally wrong impression is itself a perversion of the truth; but when you speak of this as a gift on my part you do not suppress the truth; you deliberately state what is false. It was the decision of the United States court which forbade our preventing the building of the railroad; and the reclamation service had stated that it had no funds and will not have any funds for an indefinite number of years to come with which the reser-reservoir could be constructed, even if the decision of the court were different from what it actually was. Very truly, William E. Curtis, Esq., Home Life Building, Washington, D.C.THE WHITE HOUSE Wiliam E. Curtis, Esq., Home Life Building Washington, D.C.(Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 14, 1906. My dear Ed: I call your attention to the accompanying clipping for to-day's New York Herald. As you know, the President always regretted the effort to make his former home a club at all. He always stated that he would much prefer that nothing of the kind should be attempted, and declined positively directly or indirectly to take any share or interest in the matter, further than thus to express his regret. On several occasions people have inquired of the President or myself as to the advisability of their becoming either members or officers of the club or as to their taking an interest in it, and they have invariably been informed that the President would prefer that this club should not be formed and that it would be far better if the project was abandoned. The President of courserealizes that he has no power to do more than express this wish; but he does very earnestly hope that the club will be abandoned or its name changed. The President will be glad to have you show this letter to Mr. Begg. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. G. E. Graham, 1011 Flatiron Building, New York. Enclosure. Roosevelt Home Club GrahamTHE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. June 17, 1906. My dear Senator Platt: I have your letter of the 15th instant. I am not yet prepared to announce my decision about Mr. Hough, but I must emphatically dissent from your statements that "it ought to suffice for me to simply say that I prefer Young to Hough"; and furthermore that the appointment would "be recognized as an affront to the senior Senator from the State of New York;" and furthermore from your statement running as follows: "You and I disagreed some years ago upon a previous judicial appointment in this District. Any fair-minded lawyer, or observer, if he were honest, would tell you to-day that the appointment which was made was a mistake from the standpoint of superior administration." As to this last statement, I presume you refer to Judge Holt; and I take issue absolutely with you. I have taken particular pains to inquire from all the members of the bar whose opinion I regard as most worthy of attention, and it is practically unanimous that Holt is an exceptionally fine Judge and head and shoulders above every other man whom at that time it was possible to obtain for the position. In the next place, as to the "affront" to you; I do not understand how you can make such a statement. It is my business to nominate or refuse to nominate, and yourself, together with your colleagues', to confirm or refuse to confirm. Of course the common sense way is to-2- confer together and try to come to an agreement. It is just exactly what I have been doing in this matter. If we both do our duty then each will endeavor to obtain a man for the position who is the best man under the circumstances that can be obtained, and neither of us will insist upon any man for merely personal reasons if there is good ground against him, nor upon any man who is not the best man for the position. This is precisely the course I have followed in reference to Holt, in reference to Stimson, and that I am now following in reference to the Judge about to be appointed. I never saw Hough until the other day. I have not the slightest interest in his appointment, save from the standpoint of the bench and of the public. As you do not indicate any possible objection to him, save that you insist upon having someone else, I must decline to consider that there will be any affront to you involved in appointing him. Finally, I am sorry to my I must emphatically disagree with you and disagree with your statement that it ought to suffice me to have you simply say that you prefer Young to Hough. You add that "both men are admittedly qualified for the position." Here you say that Hough is qualified for the position, but insist that your preference for Young should be enough to settle the matter. I cannot consider such a proposition. I have not considered my own individual preference and I cannot consider yours. Neither of us is entitled to have his personal preference considered, and it is the duty of both of us to disregard our individual preferences and take the man who will be most acceptable to the public and the bar, who will be most likely to do his work well and-3- faithfully, showing exact justice to corporation and labor union, rich man and poor man, and to the man who is neither a member of a corporation or a labor union, and [or] is neither rich nor poor. There is a very strong sentiment among the members of the bar that Manhattan and not Westchester should receive the appointment, almost all the court business being from Manhattan. I shall look carefully through the qualifications of Young, of Hough and of any other man who suggests himself to me, but I cannot afford to let it be supposed that an appointment to the bench is to depend upon the mere personal preference of a Senator any more than of the President. Indeed the initiative in such cases as this must properly lie with the President, not the Senator. Sincerely yours, Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate. [New York, N.Y.]THE WHITE HOUSE, \WASHINGTON. June 18, 1906. My dear Senator Platt: Your letter of the 18th renders it necessary for me to add one more word to the matter. Mr. Loeb ensures me that there is no truth in the statement that he has been writing to Mr. Young's friends that "we must do something to save Mr. Parsons' face," and if he had so written it would have been without any authority from me. As a matter of fact, personally Mr. Loeb has strongly favored the appointment of the two men you have been recommended to me, first Chatfield and then Young. Of course I have been desirous in all these matters to please Parsons, but I have been much more desirous to please you. If the facts permitted me to think that Young was the better man to appoint, I should have been even more pleased than if they forced me to feel that Hough was the better man to appoint, because I would rather for many reasons have the man whom I thought to be the best man one whom you recommended than one whom any Congressman recommended. I am perfectly well aware that your judgement in this matter will carry more weight than that of any other Senator; but I wish it to be understood empathetically and categorically that I have not considered Mr. Parsons, and cannot consider him, or yourself, or any one else, to the extent of putting his or their or your feelings above the matter of getting the best and most competent man as-2- judge for this position. Let me report that it is absurd to suppose that I am trying to humiliate you, and that it would not only be absurd but wicked to make the citizens of New York and the bar of New York feel that no man had any chance for an appointment to a judgeship unless he should be selected as a matter of favoritism and personal pride, whether by you or by me. I am not considering your preference or my own, and still less Parsons'. I am considering and intend to consider primarily the question as to who would make the best judge. Sincerely yours, Hon. T. C. Platt, United States Senate.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. June 25, 1906. HIS MAJESTY, THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN, TOKYO. I am glad to send to Your Majesty over the American cable, which has just been completed between Guam and Japan, and thus unites our two countries across the Pacific, a message sincere good will, and the assurance of the earnest wishes of the Government and people of the United States for the welfare and prosperity of Your Majesty and Your Majesty's empire. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Sent from State).;*Allison*] [*Not sent*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. June 26, 1906. My dear Senator Allison: [The Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the Indian Bureau advise against the signature of the bill providing for the distribution of the annuities of the Sac and Fox Indians. It would not be possible for me to sign this bill in view of these protests, and it has come up so late that there is now no chance of my having Mr. Hitchcock and Mr. Leupp heard of the bill. I have seen Mr. Cousins and requested him to withdraw the bill, as of course I am reluctant to veto it and I will have to do so if it is not withdrawn. If withdrawn, it can come up the first thing in December, and I will then go personally over the matter with you, Mr. Cousins, Secretary Hitchcock and Mr. Leupp, and do whatever I can to get it in a shape that will be satisfactory both to the Indian Bureau and to the Iowa delega-][tion. On a full hearing of both the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, with you and Mr. Cousins and any other friends of the bill, it might be that I should decide to overrule the Cabinet officer and the Chief of the Bureau, whose expert knowledge in this case is presumed to be greatest; but I should not be willing to do so without a full conference, which at this stage of the session it is impossible to give. Sincerely yours, Hon. William B. Allison, United States Senate.]COPY THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D.C., June 26th 1906. My dear Senator: I am very doubtful whether we could with propriety employ a battleship for such a purpose. The employment of ships to carry the body of Paul Jones across the water was proper because he was the first great naval officer of the American service. But I should very much doubt whether the request of Mr Kenkle could properly be complied with. I shall take it up with the Secretary of the Navy, and if I find he thinks it can be complied with, I shall let you know; but I fear such will not be the case. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, United States Senate.Copy of a cablegram received at the Embassy July 7th, 1906. American Embassy, London. [*[REID W]*] You are at liberty to inform the Grocers' Federation that under the new law we can, and will, guarantee the fitness in all respects of canned meat bearing the Government stamp. If any trouble arises therewith, protest can be made, not merely to sellers of goods, but to the United States Government itself. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*see Reid Whitelaw 7/12/06*][*Hapgood *] Personal The White House, Washington [*Rewritten *] Oyster Bay, N.Y. July 14, 1906 Sir: [*In your last letter you reiterate a general statement made upon all responsibility of informants whose names you decline to give. As to this I have nothing to add to what I said in my last letter *]. Upon my word [I hardly know how to answer your last letter.] You close by stating that you regard me as "of larger worth to the country than any President since the death of Lincoln," and yet you begin by reiterating your belief that I am untruthful. If [*it was not for *] you had not put] [in] your closing statement, I certainly should not discuss the opening one with you and I am in grave doubt whether I ought to discuss it now. I do so at all because you justify yourself by reference to one specific case. As to what you say about newspaper correspondents and public men whose names you do not give having the belief you express, all I can say in answer is that any man is of course utterly helpless against a charge made anonymously, or repeated by someone who says he will not give the names of his informants. Some office-seekers, some public men making requests which cannot be granted, and some newspapermen are, as I well know, entirely capable of asserting that any men in responsible position have said things or made promises which he truthfully denies having said or made. Sometimes these assertions are made up out of the whole cloth, and sometimes they represent an honest difference of memory. I take it for granted that these assertions have been made about me, because I know they have been and are continually made about the best men in public life, during the past2 year [*winter*], for instance, I have had them made to me again and again about Root, Taft, Moody, [*and the late *] John Hay - all of them men of a peculiarly nice sense of honor. I had Mr. Loeb write to you about the statement which you say that you in substance made, because I was anxious to find out what newspaper men were responsible for having in their turn made it to you. The newspaper men I have seen most of in Washington are Paine, Hood and Bailey of the Associated Press, Colahan of the Sun, Hazard of the Scripps-McRae, Cal O'Laughlin of the Chicago Tribune, O'Brien and Williams of the Boston Transcript, Walker of the Boston Herald, Lowry of the Evening Post, Jermane of the Minneapolis Journal, Curtis of the Chicago Record-Herald, and Hill of the New York Tribune; I think this approximately covers the list. I could add to it Needham. I should be surprised if any of these men corroborated your statement; but if they did, I would like to know it and have a talk with them face to face. There are, however, plenty of other newspaper men whom I should deem quite capable of making such a statement. For instance, the former correspondent of the New York Times showed me a letter from one of the editors of that paper in which he was in effect ordered to make his news items in reference to me conform to the editorial policy of the paper - this being before the Presidential election; while last winter the correspondent of the New York Herald, who had been an old acquaintance and I am almost tempted to say (using the words loosely) an old friend while I was Governor in Albany, notified me through Mr. Loeb that he would not come around any longer to get information, because he had been instructed by the proprietor of the paper "to pound the administration," and that therefore he would be no longer able to use any3 [information as to the real facts.] [So much by way of preliminary.] But you do give [produce] [Now as to the] one specific instance [you produce] in support of your position. You say that "a newspaper friend told me he had seen a letter from you bearing on the Folk-Walbridge campaign. Mr. Robert Collier wrote to you about it and you put in writing an emphatic denial that you had written or authorized any letter bearing on that contest. By prompt communication with Mr. Albert Shaw, I received such confirmation that you were compelled to admit (by letter) the truth of the story which two days before you had denied. We have never printed the facts which I have just narrated." This statement of yours is untrue. The [facts] letters to [The facts completely contradict the very statement of yours, and it] which you refer flatly contradict the very statement you base upon them; and it is literally astounding that you should make [it] such a statement in view of the correspondence, which you either have, or ought to have, before you. On October 19th Mr. Robert J. Collier wrote me asking these three, and only these three, questions: "Have you authorized anyone to write a letter specifically stating that you consider Walbridge a better man than Folk? "Has your attitude toward Folk changed in any way? "Have you repudiated, or authorized anyone else to repudiate for you, the utterances of William Allen White on this subject?" Mr. Collier added that he would hold any answer of mine in the strictest confidence, which gives a certain touch of comedy to your closing remark quoted above as to your never having printed the facts. The questions were specific; they against as to whether I had written "any letter"; but as to a letter I had made a certain statement, or changed a certain attitude in his two subsequent letters from which I shall quote Mr. Collier also requested me to treat what he had to say as confidential, and I quote them to you simply because you are quoting my equally confidential tial letters to him which these letters of his answered. In answer to Mr. Collier, on October 20th I wrote him a letter of which I enclose you a copy. I stated that I did not know what the utterances of William Allen White were and so had neither confirmed nor repudiated them, and that he had no authority whatever to speak for me. I need not further consider the William Allen White part of the business, as that was not again raised. Accordingly, there remain the two questions asked about Folk, which were simply and solely whether I had authorized any one to write a letter specifically stating that I considered Walbridge a better man than Folk, and whether my attitude toward Folk had changed in any way. My answer, of course, refers to these two questions. It runs - as you will see by turning to the copy of it I enclose - in part, as follows: "I have written no one and stated to no one that I considered Walbridge a better man than Folk. * * * I have taken no public position in the matter whatever. * * * The talk about my having changed my attitude toward Mr. Folk is as arrant nonsense as to say that Mr. Folk has changed his attitude toward me. You are a practical man, and you do not expect Mr. Folk, while the Democratic candidate for Governor of Missouri, to be supporting me, the Republican candidate for President. Such action would be folly on his part, and folly on the part of any man who expected it of him. It would be much greater folly to expect a Republican President to support Mr. Folk while Mr. Folk is thus running on a Democratic ticket and supporting the Democratic candidate for President. * * * "No man has the slightest warrant in quoting me in this Folk matter, and of course, as a Republican President, it is to be assumed that * * * my support of the Republican ticket in each State is to be taken for granted. * * * " No interpretation of what I thus said can be honest, of course, unless it assumes that when I speak of "this Folk matter" I refer to the specific question asked in the letter I was answering, and that was,5 whether I considered Walbridge a better man than Folk, and whether my attitude toward Folk had changed. Two days after, in answer to a letter of Mr. Collier's speaking of a statement in Dr. Shaw's letter, which Dr, Shaw had sent and which I had never seen, I wrote anent my conversation with Dr, Shaw, that I had said to him - "That I as a Republican President and Republican Presidential candidate was to be assumed to be for, and was for, the Republican ticket in each State, and that it was nonsense to suppose I could take any other position. I never said anything about the comparative merits of Mr. Folk and Mr. Walbridge as individuals, and I do not for a moment believe that Dr, Shaw has said that I said anything about their comparative merits, or has stated that I regarded Walbridge as a better man than Folk, or vice versa." I send you a copy of this letter of October 22d also. Read it through and you will see that there is not one particle of truth in your statement which I have quoted above to the effect that in the first letter I wrote an emphatic denial of a certain story, and that in the second letter I was compelled admit the truth of the story which two days before I had denied. [This statement is simply untrue.] My statements in the two letters were exactly the same, as the above quotations show. If you had taken the trouble to find out the facts you would have known that its untruth would have been instantly exposed, I acquit you of the intention deliberately to misstate the facts; but I can only do so on condition of ascribing to you a most inaccurate habit of mind, or else a most slipshod habit of expression. But this is not all, by any means. At first it appeared that there was a conflict of memory between Dr. Shaw and myself as to what I had told him he could say in reference to the Missouri situation, 6 and I wrote to Mr. Akins, the Chairman of the State Committee in Missouri, as well as to Dr. Shaw, requesting the withdrawal of Dr. Shaw's letter (which I had never seen); and repudiating one expression he was said to have used. Dr. Shaw, however, came on to see me and we found that our memories were really in entire accord. On October 31st he wrote out to Missouri a letter, a copy of which I enclose and which in part runs as follows: "I wish to write to you regarding the letter sent by me to you some weeks ago, in which I expressed the President's hearty sympathy with the Republican cause in Missouri, with his authorization. The letter, as you understood, was meant to be entirely confidential and was in answer to a letter from you in which you explained that it was being constantly asserted in the anti-Republican newspapers of Missouri that the President was this year favorable to the success of the Democratic State ticket. * * * He told me that although he did not have much personal knowledge, he had received through various gentlemen the highest assurances regarding Mr. Walbridge, and that there was no reason why he should not have the same earnest wish for Republican success in Missouri that he had for Republican success in other States and that he might fairly expect Republicans to have in all the States for the success of the national ticket. * * * "The President never dreamt of saying that Mr. Walbridge was a better man than Mr. Folk, because he would not think of instituting a personal comparison of that sort where his ignorance did not permit him to frame a judgment. * * * I request that the former letter be regarded as one not to be further used in my way however confidential * * *” By glancing at the above you will see that Dr. Shaw's statement of my position toward the election in Missouri was precisely like the statement I made to Mr. Collier in the letter of October 20th, which statement, so far from denying, I reiterated in my letter to Mr. Collier of October 22d. In November 3d, Mr. Collier, writing to me in reference to the articles by a Mr. Adams which had appeared in Collier's Weekly, and which I shall speak of later, expressed himself as follows:8 Mr. Norman Hapgood and I, that they had received word of the existence of this letter, but from other sources. We discussed it at some length and the outcome of the talk was that a letter was sent to President Roosevelt (asking) if he had authorized any person to represent him as opposing you, or as considering 'Mr. Walbridge a better man than Mr. Folk'. The reply received to-day was as near a categorical denial as Mr. Roosevelt is ever likely to permit himself. To-day Mr. Collier wrote another letter to the President suggesting that to establish the fact of the letter being a forgery it might be well to elicit denial from Mr. Shaw. then the telegram was sent you. This letter will enlighten you as to the raison d'etre of the telegram. If Mr. Roosevelt has been playing that kind of politics it will cost him the respect and confidence of thousands of his best supporters, and if the fact s can be made to appear, Collier's will make use of them editorially. But it must be very soon. Hence the call on you for any possible way of tracing that letter. "We all think here that the letter is genuine. At any rate, I can see no way out for Mr. Roosevelt other than to declare the letter a forgery or to repudiate Shaw, who, I happen to know, has been his emissary in a confidential capacity in other states. This will serve to show you Collier's interest in the matter. "My own interest arises partly in a desire to see the truth come out and partly because I firmly believe that the clearing up of the muddle would result in a wave of popular sympathy for you as against the President. In your own state, you do not need that; outside it would be of value - how greatly you can better estimate than I. "You will, of course, regard my part in this as entirely confidential." I call your attention to the fact that in this letter of Adams the one point he insists upon is a supposed statement on my part, which he puts in quotation makes that I "considered Mr. Walbridge a better man than Mr. Folk:" [the] a statement which I never made; and which Dr. Grave, as about quoted stated that I never made. Adams shows in this letter that he was [simply] in an intrigue [in an intrigue] having for its object the use of Collier's Weekly to damage me in the lection that he denied to damage me [?] of [?]. In one of Mr. Colliers' letters to me, which is undated, but which I received the very end of October,1904, he wrote as follows: " Adams had just finished a tour of the 'doubtful States' for the Weekly when I found him (Wednesday morning the 19th) detailing some of his experiences to Hapgood, among them two which Adams regarded as particularly damaging to you - one concerning your alleged relations with the Addicks faction in Delaware, the other involving the use of Dr. Shaw's letter in Missouri. Hapgood was all for writing a9 leading editorial which would have had for its keynote your treachery to a cause you had always stood for. It was then I intervened. I said I did not believe you had authorized Dr. Shaw to write such a letter, * * * and that I believed you would be willing to answer frankly if I put the question directly to you. * * * Hapgood urged strongly that we should make such use of the facts as would create a wave of moral indignation against you and in favor of Folk on the eve of the election, and it was only at my earnest request that he abstained from such a course. "* * * he (Adams) had volunteered the information about the Shaw letter * * * simply as a help for Hapgood. I think however that he wrote both to Folk and Steffens on his own account." [*Let us *] repeat that inasmuch as these two letters of Mr. Collier to me were absolutely confidential, I should not feel at liberty to quote them to you were it not for the fact that you quote my two equally confidential letters to Mr. Collier (or rather, misquote them) in your statement which I have given above; and actually, add a sentence in which you apparently make a merit of Collier's not having published the facts contained in these two letters. Adams' letter to Folk itself, together with what Mr. Collier says, shows this his (Adams’) purpose was, at the very end of the campaign, when it was too late for such a false statement to be effectively answered to use Collier's Weekly for an attack upon me which was intended to cause “a wave of moral indignation" against me and alienate thousands of voters in the doubtful States from me; this attack to be based upon a slanderous lie. You desired to help Adams carry out this purpose. The letters I have quoted above, including especially Dr. Shaw's letter, show that Adams (and you if you had joined with him) in carrying out this purpose intended to rely upon what you must now know to be false statements and untruths. In short, you and he would have been doing (and he, as regards Delaware, (and through Collier’s Weekly as an instrument, actually did, just what just what was done by those people who cost Garfield the electoral vote of California by circulating the forged Morey letter at his expense just before election. Such action on the part of Adams stamps him as being morally of not higher grade than any [???] public official, or a swindling businessman.10 Now, in closing, in view of what you say as to your never having printed these facts, I wish it distinctly understood that I do not care a rap whether you print them or not. This letter and the correspondence I enclose speak for themselves and call for no further explanations of any kind from me. I should request you to obtain the permission of Mr. Collier before printing any of this correspondence, of course, and I feel it would be more honorable to print it well in advance of the Congressional, or indeed any other, elections. These considerations, however, do not affect me personally. I should feel on seeing these letters in print merely the reluctance that any gentleman feels at seeing what he has said in the freedom of a private letter put into type; but my objection to having these letters put into type is very much less than my objection to having it supposed for one moment that I am afraid of having them appear in print because of any reasons personal to myself. Yours truly, Mr. Norman Hapgood, Highcourt, Windsor, Vermont. Enclosures[*Draft of letter for State Dept to send.*] DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington. July (14,) 1906. Sir: In reply to your letter of June 23rd I am directed by the President to write you as follows: On December 11, 1905, the President wrote you on a matter of grave importance involving your retention in the service, a letter which called for an immediate answer. If you chose not to answer it the only proper course open to you, consistent with the demands alike of personal and official propriety, was Immediately to resign your position as Ambassador. You however left the letter unanswered, and indeed without even any acknowledgment of its receipt. After waiting about two months without receiving an answer the President -- because of his desire to treat you with the utmost consideration -- instead of removing you, wrote you again, on February 3, 1906. This second letter you also left unanswered and without any acknowledgment of Its receipt. After waiting a month, on March 5, 1906, the following telegram was sent you: "Storer, "American Ambassador, "Vienna, "You have not answered my letter of December eleventh, although I supplemented it by another letter of February third. I do not know whether this is because you do not wish to remain2 in the Diplomatic service or are unwilling to comply with the requirements which I have stated. In either event I request your resignation as Ambassador. “Theodore Roosevelt.” In this telegram you were merely requested to resign; a further act of consideration on the part of the administration. In view of your failure to answer either of the letters referred to above it was your clear duty, unless you expected the Department to believe that you intended to leave this telegram likewise unanswered, to acknowledge it by cable. You did not thus acknowledge it. After waiting two weeks without receiving any answer, by which time three [and] months and a half had elapsed without any answer from you to the original letter, six weeks without any answer from you to the second letter, and a fortnight without any answer from you to the telegram, you were notified by cable of your removal. This for the first time drew an answer from you by cable, and immediately afterwards your leter of resignation was received, As you had already been removed and your successor’s nomination sent to the Senate, no further action about you was possible; even if, which was not the case, it had been desired by the Department or the administration to take such further action. Yours truly, Hon. Bellamy Storer, Care Morgan, Harjes & Co,, Paris, France.[ca 7-17-06] [[shorthand]]COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., July 20th 1906. PERSONAL Dear Senator: I saw the gentleman you asked me to see. As regards the particular matter about which I was to speak to him, he answered only that he was not prepared as yet definitely to take any position. He was very pleasant and cordial about you personally, Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.[*original written to Wilbur F. Wakeman*] Oyster Bay, N. Y. July 25, 1906. Hon. James S. Sherman, Chairman, Republican National Congressional Committee, P.O. Box 2063, N.Y. Dear Mr. Sherman: I have your letter of the 24th instant and enclosures. I send my dollar. I think it an admirable plan, and I congratulate you upon the success that bids fair to attend the movement. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.[ca 7-27-06] [[shorthand]][*[Attached to Leng. 7-27-06]*][*Henry Howard Amory St. Brookline. Mass. Eastern Yacht Club. German American Races*] Oyster Bay, N.Y., July 28, 1906. [*C*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [*rewritten*] [My dear Mr. Howard: I have your letter of the 27th. Really, you make me regret that I ever accepted your kind invitation to have any connection with the races at all. I did so with misgivings, and it is a warning to me never again to get into a similar position. [I do not think you understand how utterly different the position of a President is from that of any sovereign, because of the simple fact that the President has to do at least ten times the amount of work - not to mention other considerations.] My position is not one of show, it is one of hard work. I could not possibly accept the invitation you so kindly tender me. There are fifty other invitations which I have had to refuse, which I would have to accept first - all of them having been declined on the ground that I was not accepting any invitations this summer. Let me re-] [*This pg. only*]Oyster Bay, New York, July 30,1906. My dear Mr.Secretary:- In regard to the Naval Review to take place at Oyster Bay September the 3rd. I would like to have all the vessels of the Navy, in commission on this coast, assemble here on that date and participate in the Review if possible. Although some of the newly commissioned battleships and armored cruisers are awaiting installation of intermediate batteries they should participate, if practicable, battery or no battery. Also the Destroyer Flotilla and the Torpedo Boat Flotilla. Arrangements might be made for the second and third class cruisers, some of which are now on a cruise with the Midshipmen, to participate in the Review. My idea is to assemble a large and very formidable fleet, and hope it can be arranged. Very truly yours, Hon.Charles J.Bonaparte, Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.COPY. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 1, 1906. Gentlemen: The grease from the three skins of the bears the President shot in Colorado a year ago last spring has come through the lining onto the floors. Could you remedy this trouble if the skins were shipped to you? Please advise me at your very early convenience, and believe me, Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Messrs. C. C. Guenther's Sons, 186 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.COPY. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 4, 1906. My dear Sir: Your letter of the 2nd instant has been received, and I thank you in the President's behalf for your thoughtfulness in writing. On the first of October the President will be glad to have you send someone here to go over all the skins. The President is not satisfied with the way some of the skins of the black bear he shot in Colorado last year were cured. He would like you particularly to look at these. Very truly yours, Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. Mr. W. W. Hart, 451 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y. P.S. Have your man present this letter to Noah Seaman, the Superintendent at Sagamore Hill, as his credential.[*Recopy of enclose*] [*Copy sent Robt. Bridges 8/6/06*] [*[cir Aug. 1906]*] Sunset on the Marsh. Apollo drives his bitted stallions down Far o'er the golden path across the waves, Which rise and fall in ceaseless undulation, From where the shore juts, with its pebbly points Thrust forward to encroach [On Neptune's vast domain] Upon the Sound's dark waters, The vesper wind, with soft and soothing touch, Lisps thro’ the reed-beds in the level marsh, Thro’ which the shining, winding creeks Trace strange, symbolic figures; And now the glorious, burnished road has gone - Melted into the emerald of the water. [The glowing disk sinks slowly out of sight,] Slow sinks the burning splendor, And naught is left of all Sun-God's glory But the [pink touches] dim wonder of the afterglow And the green clouds of dreamland. Jacob Van Vechten.Miles, H. E. Confidential THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 11, 1906. My dear Mr. Miles: You must understand that this letter is purely confidential, because I am commenting upon the possible action of a co-ordinate branch of the Government. I do not intend to take any stand upon the tariff at this time which will promise specific action unless I am certain that the lower House can and will take it. I quite agree with you that in the next Presidential campaign there should be a definite statement of the party's position; but there could be no worse misfortune of the prosperity of the country, as well as the Republican party, than to demand in the Congressional campaign this fall a promise which either could not be kept, or could be kept only at the cost of disrupting the Republican party and upsetting the prosperity of the country. Let me say most emphatically that I feel that the grievance of those who desire tariff revision are much less real than they think. Taken as a whole the country has never been as well off as now, and undoubtedly, in order to make changes which I should approve in the tariff it will be necessary to check this prosperity and cause a shorter or longer period of adversity while the readjustment of business conditions is taking place. I believe that there should have been a revision of the tariff2 by Congress immediately after my election - less, I confess, because of the need of revision than of the advisability of meeting public sentiment. But the great majority of the Republican Congressmen, representing therein the overwhelming sentiment of their constituents, did not feel that it was possible for them to come to any agreement. Now, if I were both House of Congress as well as the President I think I should act at once along the line of the report of the executive committee which you enclose; but I do not believe that it would be possible for Congress to so act at its short session, and I think it at least very doubtful whether it is possible to undertake any revision of the tariff at the long session of the Congress now to be elected, inasmuch as the year before a Presidential election is the very worst possible year in which to undertake such a job. I do not wish to commit myself definitely on this, and I desire this to be kept for your own information only. Remember always that I am speaking not of what I personally could or would do if I had absolute power, but of what probably can be done and what probably should be done by Congress under the conditions. I do not think the hesitancy in Congress' acting is due in the least to sensitiveness toward wealth, corporations or monopolies, but to the fact that the constituents of the Congressmen honestly disagree, and any tariff measure must contain an immense amount of give and take. For instance, I would like free lumber of every kind; but I do not believe you could get Maine and perhaps not Minnesota or Michigan or washington to consent to any such proposition. I would like free hides; but I do3 not believe that you would get the people of the farming districts, especially west of the Mississippi, to consent to this--at any rate not unless there was a very big cutting in the tariff elsewhere. Understand me again, when I say I would like free hides and free lumber I merely mean that these would represent ideals of my own; but how much in the give and take of an actual tariff bill I could realize either ideal, I have not the slightest idea and I do not believe that anyone else has. Sincerely yours, Mr. H.E. Miles, Chairman, Executive Committee, National Association of Agricultural Implement Manufacturers, Racine, Wisconsin.Japan, Emperor Written out by hand. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 11, 1906. To His Majesty, The Emperor of Japan.. Great and Good Friend: Permit me most warmly to thank Your [Imp] Majesty for the more than kind letter I have just received from you in reference to the contributions of the American Red Cross Society in aid of the famine-stricken people of your northeastern provinces. Since then your people have in even quicker and more striking fashion shown their abundant generosity and sympathy in the action they took for relieving the sufferers in San Francisco; and this action was taken not merely with such generosity, but with such tact and judgment, as to make it doubly welcome. It is my earnest wish to see the American people stand well with all civilized powers, and among all these civilized powers there is none with which I am more anxious that it should be on terms of hearty goodwill than with your great Empire. Again expressing to you my sense of obligation, and with the best wishes for your continued wellbeing and the prosperity of your great Nation, believe me, Ever your sincere friend, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Copy Personal THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 11, 1906. My dear White: I have your letter of the 8th. Personally I wish very much that you would write exactly that article. For me to say what I think, which is that it is an insult to the people to suppose that we have not got men who can carry on my work, might look a little like what our southern friends call "biggity". You have exactly expressed my ideas. Of course I am not going to try to nominate any man. Personally you know how highly I think of Secretary Taft, but I am not going to take a hand in his nomination, for it is none of my business. I am sure Kansas would like him. He would be an ideal President. He is the kind of broad-gauge American that Kansas ought to like. But I do not believe that for any consideration he would consent to be "mighty keerful": It is not his style. I think he and Kansas speak the same language--the American language-- the language which perhaps is spoken best in some districts of the West, but which is familiar to all good Americans in every part of our country. No, don't send me any more of those Leavenworth Times articles. I am delighted to have you send anything to me that you think worth while that attacks me, but it makes me redhot to see how people persecute Wood. I enclose Taft's letter on the subject. Get on to see me at Washington in October. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Mr. W. A. White, Editor, The Gazette, Emporia, Kansas.THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Private Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 14, 1906. My dear Senator: I have your letter of the 9th instant. It does not seem to me that there is any real analogy between the tariff agitation and the slavery agitation. One was a great moral issue and the other is not a moral issue at all. It is a mere matter of expediency. We have to have a tariff. Everybody admits that, for I do not suppose there are any men, aside from pure cranks, who now think we could have absolute free trade. Every tariff, whether high or low, is absolutely certain to contain some inequalities, some schedules that give relatively more protection than are afforded by other schedules, or which are in other ways imperfect. No tariff ever has been made or ever will be made which could not with advantage be changed on certain points; and of course as the years elapse the mere growth and change in the industrial situation tend to increase the number of such cases. On the other hand, it is probably true that[any tariff, good or bad, if persisted in for a number of years, would be better than the very best imaginable tariffs if continually changed. It therefore becomes a mere question of expediency as to when the point has been reached at which the undoubted individual injury, the stoppage of prosperity, the business uneasiness, and all the rest which will be caused by a change in the tariff, are offset by the desirability of changing certain schedules. Personally I do not believe there is any real suffering because of the tariff at present - that is, any suffering which amounts to anything; but I do believe there is a growing unrest about it, and politically this comes to the same thing, or at least will come to the same thing in time. I could say nothing definitely until I find through the different members of Congress, who in these matters represent very faithfully their constituent[s], exactly what chance there is for action. Please keep this letter absolutely confidential. With regard, believe me, Faithfully yours, Hon. W.D. Washburn, Minneapolis, Minnesota.]COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., august 16th 1906. PERSONAL My dear Senator Penrose: Your request about the Abbeville, South Carolina, Post Office case puts me in considerable of a quandary. Mr Cortelyou feels very strongly about that case, and I dislike very much interfering with him. On the other hand, the South Carolina Senators and Congressmen have certainly established no claim whatever to recognition by this Administration. I wish much that you would write direct to Mr Cortelyou. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boies Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.Personal. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y, August 18, 1906, My dear Trevelyan: It seems to me that the last sessions of the national legislatures alike of Great Britain, France and the United States have possessed peculiar interest. I have followed the work of your Parliament with entire sympathy on most points; although there are of course two or three matters as to which I do not know enough to express any opinion. I was really greatly impressed and pleased with Clemenceau's speech in answer to the socialist Jaures when the latter attacked Clemenceau for preserving order at the time of the riotous demonstration by the working men. Clemenceau must be a very able man, and the program he sketched out as that which his party should undertake in economic matters is substantially the program to which I should like to see the American people committed, Here we are greatly hampered in dealing with industrial questions affecting combinations of capital and combinations of labor both with reference to one another and with reference to the general public, by the peculiarities of our Federal Constitution. It is most important that so far as possible these matters should be entrusted to the general Government; and we made astounding progress during the last session-2- of Congress along the lines of this desirable policy by greatly increasing the power of the federal authorities to deal with interstate commerce, both in connection with the railroads, in connection with the meat-packing industry, and in connection with pure food. We also got a very good employers' liability law passed, not to speak of the work of the Panama canal and other matters. I have now been five years President. It is about time for the swinging of the pendulum. I should not be in the least surprised to see the Congressional elections go against us; but whether this happens or not, it will remain true that during these five years we have accomplished a great quantity of substantive work of an important kind. Indeed, I can hardly recall any other five years since the reconstruction days succeeding the Civil War during which as much important work has been done. I do not think that this has been undertaken in the least in a demogogic spirit. We have tried, and I think succeeded, in making it evident that while we intended to do all we could in the way of giving the widest social and economic opportunity to the wage worker and to the poor man, and while we intended to supervise and control the business use of wealth so that it should not be used in an unethical or unsocialistic spirit, yet that we intended fearlessly to put down anything in the -3- nature of mob violence, and that we set our faces like Flint against the preachers who appeal to or incite the dark and evil passions of men's minds. I shall hope later to get action taken along the lines of the graduated income tax and the graduated inheritance tax. Just at present we have been obliged to make it evident that we will not submit to the tyranny of the trades union any more than we will submit to the tyranny of the corporation. Of the absolute propriety of this general course from the standpoint of the nation and of the good that it will ultimately do I am certain. But of course, as inevitably happens any period of construction legislation, we tend to alienate the extremists of both sides. There are great numbers of radicals who think we have not gone far enough, and a great number of reactionaries who think we have not gone altogether too far, and we array against ourselves both the sordid beneficiaries of the evils we assail and the wild-eyed agitators who tend to indiscriminate assault on everything good and bad alike. This is of course not an experience in any way peculiar to out contest. It is the kind of combination that always appears in every contest. The consolation is that even though the alliance is temporarily effective, it is never able wholly to undo all the good work that has been done. -4- In your last letter you spoke very bitterly of Balfour. Would you mind writing me exactly what it is about him that makes you feel so bitterly? With very many of the policies with which Mr. Balfour has been identified I have not the slightest sympathy; but I had not supposed he was a man who excited much active hostility. I am interested of course in The Hague conference. On the one hand I am anxious that we shall do something effective toward the substitution of other agents than war for settling disputes between nations. On the other hand, I feel very strongly that if we try to go too far - if we try to do that the preposterous apostles of peace of the type of ex-Secretary of State Foster and, I am sorry to say, Congress Burton in this country would desire, we should put ourselves in the position of having the free peoples rendered helpless in the face of the various military despotisms and barbarisms of the world. For example, if we can come to an agreement to stop the genera; increase of the navies of the world, I shall be very glad. But I do not feel that England and the United States should impair the efficiency of their navies if it is permitted to other Powers, which may some day be hostile to them, to go on building up and increasing their military strength. I shall inflict upon you a copy of my letter on behalf of the Republican candidates for Congress which I send herewith. Believe me, with warm regards, Very sincerely yours, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, England. Chile. Pres. TELEGRAM. PLAIN. The White House, Washington. STATE DEPARTMENT, August 19, 1906. 12:04 p.m. Exmo, Presidente de Chile, Santiago. In the name of the people of the United States I offer tribute of sorrow and sympathy to their affiliated brethren of Chile be reason of the awful disaster that has befallen Valparaiso. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. -Fd-[*Aug 24th 1906 *] [*[Pinchot] *] [*Rewritten Aug 23. 06 *] [*To the Chief of the Forestry Bureau My dear Mr. Pinchot; *] Through you let me extend my heartiest congratulations [*the *] and good wishes to those [?] to forward the cause of reclamation and [?][?] Operations under the Reclamation Act, which I signed on June 17, 1902, have been carried on energetically during the four years since that date. The Reclamation Service, consisting of over 400 skilled engineers and experts in various lines, has been organized, and it is now handling the work with rapidity and effectiveness. Construction is [now] already well advanced on 23 great enterprises in the arid States and Territories. [Already] Over 1,000,000 acres of land have been laid out for irrigation, and of these 200,000 acres are now under ditch; 800 miles of canals and ditches and 30,000 feet of tunnel have been completed; and 16,000,000 cubic yards of earth and 3,000,000 cubic yards of rock have been moved, [3,000,000 feet, B.M., of lumber have been sawed in the forest reserves adjacent to the reclamation work and 8,000,000 feet of lumber have been purchased.] Detailed topographic surveys have been extended over 10,000 squares miles of country within which the reclamation work is located, and 20,000 miles of level lines have been run. Three hundred buildings, including offices and sleeping quarters for workmen, have been erected by the Reclamation Service, and about an equal number by the contractors. Over 10,000 men and about 5,000 horses are at present employed. The period of general surveys and examinations for projects is past. Effort is now concentrated on getting the water upon a sufficient area of irrigable land in each project to put it on a revenue-producing basis. To bring all the projects to this point will require upwards of $40,000,000, which amount, it is es--2- timated, will be available from the receipts from the disposal of public lands for the years 1901-1908. We may well congratulate ourselves upon the rapid progress already made, and rejoice that the infancy of the work has been safely passed. But we must not forget that there are dangers and difficulties still ahead, and that only unbroken vigilance, efficiency, integrity, and good sense will suffice to prevent disaster. There is now no question as to where the work shall be done, how it shall be done, or the precise way in which the expenditures shall be made. All that is settled. There remains, however, the critical question of how best to utilize the reclaimed lands by putting them into the hands of actual cultivators and home-makers, who will return the original outlay in annual instalments paid back into the reclamation fund, the question of seeing that the lands are used for [?], and not for purposes of speculation, or for the building up of large fortunes. This question is by no means simple. It is easy to make plans and spend money. During the time when the Government is making a great investment like this, the men in charge are praised and the rapid progress is commended. But when the time comes for the Government to demand the refund of the investment under the terms of the law, then the law itself will be put to the test, and the quality of its administration will appear. The pressing danger just now springs from the desire of nearly every man to get and hold as much land as he can whether he can handle it profitably or not, and whether or not it is for the interest of the community that he should have it. The prosperity of the present irrigated areas came from the subdivision of the land and the consequent intensive cultivation. With an adequate supply of water, a-3- farm of five acres in some parts of the arid West, or of 40 acres elsewhere, is as large as may be successfully tilled by one family. When, therefore, a man attempts to hold 160 acres of land completely irrigated by Government works, he is preventing others from acquiring a home, and is actually keeping down the population of his State. [The present danger is that, in the general desire to hold areas longer than can be cultivated by the individual, there will be a tendency to neglect thorough cultivation, frequent failures, and a demand that the Government favor this community or that because of the impossibility of making the payments required by law.] Speculation in lands reclaimed by the Government must be checked at whatever cost. The object of the Reclamation Act is not to make money, but to make homes. Therefore, the requirement of the Reclamation Act that the size of the farm unit shall be limited in each region to the area which will comfortably support one family must be enforced in letter and in spirit. This does not mean that the farm unit should be sufficient for the present family with its future grown children and grand-children, but rather that during the 10 years of payment the area assigned for each family shall be sufficient to support it. When once the farms have been fully tilled by freeholders, little danger of land monopoly wild remain. This great meeting of practical irrigators should give particular attention to this problem and others of the same kind. You should, and I doubt not that you will, give your effectual support to the officers of the Government in making the Reclamation law successful -4- in all respects, and particularly in getting back the original investment, so that the money may be used again and again in the completion of other projects and thus in the general extension of prosperity in the West. Until it has been proved that this great investment of $40,000,000. in irrigation made by the Government will be returning to the Treasury, it is useless to expect that the people of the country will consider direct appropriations for the work. Let us give the Reclamation Service a chance to utilize the present investment a second time before discussing such increase. I look forward with great confidence to the result. By the side of the Reclamation Service there has grown up another Service of not less interest and value to you of the West. This is the Forest Service, which was created when the charge of the forest reserves was transferred from the Interior Department to the Department of Agriculture. The forest policy of the Administration, which the Forest Service is engaged in carrying out, is based, as I have often said, on the vigorous purpose to make every resource of the forest reserves contribute in the highest degree to the permanent prosperity of the people who depend upon them. If ever the time should come when the western forests are destroyed, there will disappear with them the prosperity of the stockman, the miner, the lumberman and the railroads, and, most important of all, the small ranchman who cultivates his own land. I know that you are with me in the intention to preserve the timber, the water, and the grass by using them fully, but wisely-5- ly and conservatively. We propose to do this through the freest and most cordial cooperation between the Government and every man who is in sympathy with this policy, the wisdom of which no man who knows the facts can for a moment doubt. It is now less than two years since the Forest Service was established. It had a great task before it,- to create or reorganize the Service on a hundred forest reserves and to ascertain and meet the very different local conditions and local needs all over the West. This task is not finished, and of course it could not have been finished in so short a time. But the work has been carried forward with energy and intelligence, and enough has been done to show how our forest policy is working out. The result of first importance to you as irrigators is this: The Forest Service has proved that forest fires can be controlled, by controlling them. Only one-tenth of one per cent, of the area of the forest reserves was burned over in 1905. This achievement was due both to the Forest Service and to the effective assistance of settlers and others in and near the reserves. Everything the Government has ever spent upon its forest work is a small price to pay for the knowledge that the streams which make your prosperity can be and are being freed from the ever-present threat of forest fires. The long standing and formerly bitter differences between the stockmen and the forest officers are nearly all settled. Those which remain are in process of settlement. Hearty cooperation exists almost everywhere between the officers of the Forest Service-6- and the local associations of stockmen, who are appointing advisory committees which are systematically consulted by the Forest Service on all questions in which they are concerned. This most satisfactory condition of mutual help will be as welcome to you as it is to the Administration and to the stockmen. To the stockmen it means more, and more certain, grass; to you, because of the better protection and wiser use of the range, it means steadier streamflow and more water. The sales of forest reserve timber to settlers, miners, lumbermen and other users are increasing very rapidly, and in that way also the reserves are successfully meeting a growing need. Lands in the forest reserves that are more valuable for agriculture than for forest purposes are being opened to settlement and entry as fast as their agricultural character can be ascertained. There is therefore no longer [the least] excuse for saying that the reserves retard the legitimate settlement and development of the country. On the contrary, they promote and sustain that development, and they will do so in no way more powerfully than through their direct contributions to the schools and roads. Ten per cent. of all the money received from the forest reserves goes to the States for the use of the counties in which the reserves goes to the States for the use of the counties in which the reserves lie, to be used for schools and roads. The amount of this contribution is nearly $70,000. for the first year. It will grow steadily larger, and will form a certain and permanent source of income, which would not have been the case with the taxes whose place it takes.-7- Finally, a body of intelligent, practical, well-trained men, [of high grade] citizens of the West, is being built up,-men in whose hands the public interests, including your own, are and will be safe. All these results are good; but they have not been achieved by the Forest Service alone. On the contrary, they represent also the needs and suggestions of the people of the whole West. They embody constant changes and adjustments to meet these suggestions and needs. The forest policy of the Government in the West has now become what the West desired it to be. It is a national policy, wider than the boundaries of any State, and larger than the interests of any single industry. Of course it cannot give any set of men exactly what they would choose. Undoubtedly the irrigator would often like to have less stock on his watersheds, while the stockman wants more. The lumberman would like to cut more timber; the settler and the miner would often like him to cut less. The county authorities want to see more money coming in for schools and roads, while the lumberman and stockman object to the rise in value of timber and grass, But the interests of the people as a whole are, I repeat, safe in the hands of the Forest Service, By keeping the public forests in the public hands our forest policy substitutes the good of the whole people for the profits of the privileged few. With that result none will quarrel except the men who are losing the chance of personal profit at the public expense. Our Western forest policy is formed upon the best public sentiment of -8- the whole West. It proposes to create new reserves wherever forest lands still vacant are found in the public domain, and to give the reserves already made the highest possible usefulness to all the people [*We shall soon] [Men going to carry it out because the West is behind it, and because so far it has made good.] So far as [?] our promise to the people is good and [?] it has all been made good and I have faith that this policy will be carried to a careful completion, because I believe that the people of the West are behind it *].Personal and unofficial. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON Oyster Bay, N.Y., August 1906 My dear Mr. Adee: I am in receipt of your letter of the 30th enclosing copy of the Collier-Gullon agreement, for which accept thanks. Please destroy the discarded proclamation; or at least cut from it the President's signature. I wired you to-day that Mr. Bacon would be a No.1 Park Avenue, New York City, and that I had advised him as to invitation to the Mayflower. I have a fellow-feeling for you in your "solitary grandeur" - provided there was more solitude! I like plenty of work, in solitude. Some of our callers are awfully distracting. The White House mail me copies of all telegrams and repeat the important ones by wire. With warm regards, believe me, Faithfully yours, Hon. Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. Personal THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 4, 1906. Dear Cabot: I know how strongly Moody felt about [*Judge Horace Harmon*] Lurton. I did not know how you felt. I think you both are entirely in error. I say this frankly because I know you want me to talk frankly. Nothing has been so strongly borne in on me concerning lawyers on the bench as that the nominal politics of the man has nothing to do with his actions on the bench. His real politics are all-important. From his antecedents, Holmes should have been an ideal man on the bench. As a matter of fact he has been a bitter disappointment, not because of any one decision but because of his general attitude. In Lurton's case, Taft and Day, his two former associates, are very desirous of having him on. He is right on the negro question; he is right on the power of the Federal Government; he is right on the insular business; he is right about corporations; and he is right about labor. On every question that would come before the bench he has so far shown himself to be in much closer touch with the policies in which you and I believe than even White, because he has been right about corporations, where He is really a better Republican than Brewer or Holmes. White has been wrong. I have grown to feel most emphatically that the Supreme Court is a matter of too great importance for me to pay heed to where a man comes from. While I have not clearly formulated this plan of which I am about to speak, I am tentatively taking into account the2 fast that if I appoint Lurton I may later be able to appoint Moody; then saying it is true that this is making two appointments from Massachusetts; but I have shown already in my appointment of a Tennessean and an ex-Confederate soldier, nominally a Democrat, that I pay heed only to the real needs of the Court, and I am doing the same thing in this case." I have not definitely made up my mind, but the above represents my present intention. I drew a sigh of relief after reading Bryan's speech. I think he has helped us immensely. Down at bottom Bryan is a cheap soul. He felt that he had to take an attitude that would show that he was really a great deal more radical than I was. He did it. Now he has been inclined to hedge about it, which will merely give an added impression of weakness. Yes; my attitude has been vindicated. Ever yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. H.C. Lodge, U.S.S., Nahant, Massachusetts.TELEGRAM. [*t*] [*91 paid & sent *] [* + A [?] R 635 P *] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y. September 8, 1906. Hon. Charles J. Bonaparte, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C. It seems advisable to send two war vessels to Cuba, one to Havana and one to Cienfuegos to protect American interests. What vessels should be sent and how soon can you send them? Immediate action necessary. (Official.) THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM JWH x In Ra losecop The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 8, 1906. Admiral Converse, Acting Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D.C. The President directs that the Des Moines and Tacoma proceed as soon as possible [they can.] If necessary can add other vessels later. WM. LOEB, JR. Secretary Go (Official)TELEGRAM. [*+*] [*118 Pd Govt*] [*1WH-Jm 437 PM ne*] The White House, Washington. [*Oyster Bay*] September 9, 1906. Rear Admiral Converse Acting Secretary of the Navy. [*Washn*] 62374 70416 19130 27683 Do not send those vessels until Mr. Bacon has consulted with 72845 37024 70416 61530 you, as it may be feasible to send one or two of[on] the vessels at Santo Domingo, which if feasible would be better for the reasons Mr. Bacon will 1950 give. Mr. Bacon is here but leaves today for Washington [this afternoon]. 19150 Wm. Loeb, Jr., Secretary to the President. (Official) .Private THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 9, 1906. My dear Sir George: I was very sorry to learn from your letter of the death of your sister. Pray accept my deep sympathy. I am ashamed to have been the cause of making you write a long letter at such a time. But I want to thank you for giving me the first clear idea I have had as to the reason why so many Englishmen [t] whose judgment I respect distrust Balfour. To me, levity and cynicism in a public man seem well-nigh as objectionable as corruption itself. The man who regards politics merely as a game is but one degree less noxious to his country than the man who attempts to make something out of public life for his own personal advantage. [??]inter I re-read [??] Phineas Finn series of Trollope's novels, and it seemed to me that they, perhaps unconsciously, gave a rather startingly clear exposition of the reasons why a government of well-educated gentlemen, of good social standing, some of them rich and none if them in actual poverty, but [none] few of them having any real convictions or feeling deeply upon subjects vital to the welfare of the country, may be at bottom as objectionable as, altho superficially [even] much more agreeable then, a body of demagogs or corruptionists, [How heartily] Every sober-minded public man who takes his responsibilities seriously must heartily agree with Gladstone and Peel in their abhor- rence of a policy which, for the sake of temporary political advantage, lightheartedly abandons the effort to make outgo average less than income. This year, thank Heaven, I got thru with twenty-eight millions to the good, which just balances up for the preceding year. For my five years I am well ahead, and would be still further ahead if we had not paid fifty millions for the Panama canal out of our annual income instead of issuing bonds, which, considering that it is a permanent investment, I should have preferred to do. I am a good deal concerned as to the practical method of putting a stop to the expense incident to the increase of armaments. I should bitterly regret seeing England or America left at the mercy of any great military despotism, or unable to check any military barbarism. I have no sympathy with those who fear to fight in a just cause, and who are not willing to prepare so that they can at need fight effesctively. But neither have I any sympathy with those who would lightly undergo the chance of war in a spirit of mere frivolity, or of mere truculence, and I hate to see budgets of civilized nations burdened with constantly increasing cost because they vie with one another in the matter of armaments. I recognize the great difficulty of coming to an agreement as to their limitations, but it does seem to me that it would be possible to come to some agreement as to the size of ships. If we could agree that hereafter no battleship of say over fifteen thousand tons should be built, I do not believe that it would result in any more battleships being built than if the limit were not agreed to, and the3 result would be a great diminution in expense, At the moment I am concerned in foreign matters over two things - Newfoundland and Cuba. The difficulty in Newfoundland is one to which both the British Empire and the United States are specially liable - the fact that one is a federal republic and the other a federal empire, and that therefore the central government is at times sure to be greatly worried by the actions of some local government in international affairs. When the Italians were lynched at New Orleans, for instance, this Government found itself responsible to the Italian Government for what had been done by citizens whom it could in no way control. We finally paid as a matter of grace a large sum to the Italian Government, which was the proper thing to do; and I am, as a matter of principle, sorry to say that the lynching had a most healthy effect in a local situation which was becoming unendurable. But the affair illustrated the difficulty in which this Government might at any time find itself because of an outrage committed by some one State as regards a foreign power. So it is in regard to the Newfoundland matter. The Newfoundland Legislature has past acts as regards out fishermen which practically nullify the treaty advantages conferred upon them by the British Government. I have far too keen a sense of our own limitations as a national government to fail to recognize similar limitations in Great Britain; but I am really at my wits’ end how to combine showing this consideration with at the same time not abandoning the interests of our fishermen. In Cuba, what I have dreamed has come to pass in the shape of a revolt or revolution. We of course kept everything straight and decent 4 in the island while we were running the government, and for the four years that it has been independent the push that we gave enabled them to go on along the same path. Now a revolution has broken out, and not only do I dread the loss of life and property, but I dread the creation of a revolutionary habit, and the creation of a class of people who take to disturbance and destruction as an exciting and pleasant business, steadily, altho intermittently, to be followed. In confidence I tell you that I have just been notified by the Cuban Government that they intend to ask us forcibly to intervene in the course of this week, and I have sent them a most emphatic protest against their doing so, with a statement that I am not prepared to say what I will do if the request is made. On the one hand we can not permanently see Cuba a prey to misrule and anarchy; on the other hand I loathe the thought of assuming any control over the island such as we have over Porto Rico and the Philippines. We emphatically do not want it; and the nothing but direst need could persuade us to take it, once that we did so we should firmly convince [both] most nations that really we had been intriguing to put ourselves in possession of it. As a matter of fact, what I have been ardently hoping for has been not that we should have to reduce Cuba to the position of the Philippines, but that the Philippines would make such progress that we could put them in the position of Cuba. All this is of course for your private eye and represents merely the fact that I have to blow off steam by making a wail to somebody! 5 I guess I can work it out all right somehow, but I do not yet quite see how. Don't you like Murray's translation of the "Electra"? It was sent me two or three days ago, and it reminded me somewhat of Fitzgerald's [translation] paraphrase of the "Agamemnon," which I re-read in consequence. Sincerely yours, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland, England.TELEGRAM. [*30WH G Ra 1055P*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 12, 1906. Bacon, Acting Secretary State, Washington. 42258 44349 31182 62389 12077 Hurry instructions to Navy Department to send at once additional 63088 41026 39250 48425 55367 ships to Havana and to get as many marines on them as possible. We 46553 37856 48425 41026 33905 55367 should have a large force of marines in Havana at the earliest possible 49960 63088 23633 moment on any vessels able to carry them. Cable Steinhart that the ships 49049 58194 62433 63088 48425 message has been received that we will send ships and marines as 55372 56946 14592 soon as possible for the protection of American citizens and [American] life 38564 36648 property. Come here on Friday without fail and see that Assistant Secretary Newberry or Secretary Bonaparte comes at the same time. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official) [*195*] TELEGRAM. [*1WH G Ra 1035P*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 12, 1906. Bonaparte, Secretary of the Navy, Washington. Communicate with Assistant Secretary of State Bacon and get ready 62008 39234 57916 ships to be sent to Havana at the earliest possible moment and especially 63088 62490 41026 33905 49960 38375 get as many maries as possible down to Havana as soon as can be as there 39233 48425 55367 33481 41026 64168 19678 seems grave likelihood of danger to American citizens there. Notify 39700 47387 29758 14578 51658 me at the earliest moment how many marines will be in Havana and in 48678 — 33905 49960 48425 19962 41026 how short a time. 63132 67614 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*176 Govt*]THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 12, 1906 My dear Senor Quesada: [G. de Quesada] In this crisis in the affairs of the [independent] Republic of Cuba I write you, not merely because you are the Minister of Cuba accredited to this Government, but because you and I were intimately drawn together at the time when the United States intervened in the affairs of Cuba with the result of making her an independent nation. You know how sincere my affectionate admiration and regard for Cuba are. You [also] know that I never have done and never shall do anything in reference to Cuba save with such sincere regard for her welfare. You also know the pride I felt because it came to me as President to withdraw the American troops from the Island of Cuba and officially to proclaim her independence and to wish her Godspeed in her career as a free republic. I [wish] desire now thru thru you to say a word of solemn warning to your people, whose earnest well-wisher I am. For seven years Cuba has been in a condition of profound peace and of steadily growing prosperity. For four years this peace and prosperity have obtained under her own independent government. Her peace, prosperity and independence now menaced; for of all possible evils that can befall Cuba the worst is the evil of anarchy into-2- which [preceeded] civil war and revolutionary disturbances will assuredly throw her. [It is not my part to say anything as to the rights of the present controversy. I most earnestly hope that in same way or shape how I do not at [?] [?] function as secret, determine - peace will be forthwith restored.] Whoever is responsible for armed revolt and outrage, whoever is responsible in any way for the condition of affairs that now obtains, is an enemy of Cuba; and doubly heavy is the responsibility of the man who, affecting to be the especial champion of Cuban independence, takes any step which will jeopardize that independence. For there is just one way in which Cuban independence can be jeoparded, and that is for the Cuban people to show their inability to continue in their path of peaceful and orderly progress. This nation asks nothing of Cuba, save that it shall continue to develop as it has developed during these past seven years; that it shall know and practice the orderly liberty which will assuredly bring an ever increasing measure of peace and prosperity to the beautiful Queen of the Antilles. [The only possible way in which the United States can ever] our intervention [be induced to interfere] in Cuban [matters will be] affairs will only come if Cuba herself has doubts[by showing that Cuba] [? [?] [?] fallen into the[revolutionary] insurrection habit, and that she lacks the self sufficient-company toward peaceful self-government, and that her contending factions ([whether inspired by reckless personal ambition or by the [?] debt holders)] have plunged the country into anarchy. I solemnly adjure all Cuban patriots to band together, to sink[minor]all differences and personal ambitions, and to remember that the only way that they can pre-serve the independence of their republic is to prevent the necessity of outside interference, by rescuing it from the [long] anarchy of civil war [an anarchy which in the end is absolutely certain to result not merely in the loss of the Island's prosperity, but probably in the loss of her independence. This country will see that Cuba never loses her independence from invasion of a foreign power; but only the wisdom and farsighted portion of Cuba's own sons can avail to prevent leading her independence because of the misused of her sons.] I earnestly hope that this word of adjuration of mine, given in the name of the American people, the staunchest friends and well-wishers of Cuba that there are in all the world, will be taken as it is meant, will be considered seriously, and will be acted upon; and if so acted upon Cuba's permanent independence, her permanent [greatness] success as a republic are assured. [This [?] in the affairs of Cuba with the [?] but it will [?] With all regard, believe me, my dear Mr. Miriater,][I shall send at once to the Havanna some special representative of this [?] who will endeavor to render such aid as he can towards these ends. Meanwhile I have communicated to the Government in Havana, and to the press in Havana for the information of all the people of Cuba [whom it may concern,] the contents of this letter]TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. Oyster Nay, N.Y., September 13, 1906. Bacon, Acting Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. President says to send a supplemental cable to his last one directing Sleeper to have all the troops that cannot be kept in the legation reembarked on the ship. Let the newspaper men know that the troops have been landed simply to protect the lives and property of American citizens; that some of them will be kept as a guard at legation; and balance will be immediately reembarked on the ship. WM. LOEB, JR. Secretary. (Official)TELEGRAM. [*1WH G Ra 1050P*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 13, 1906. Bacon, Acting Secretary State, Washington. The President directs that following cable be sent to Sleeper: "You had no business to direct the landing of those troops without 22679 32172 46515 68416 specific authority from here. They are not to be employed in keeping 64513 18678 51517 34588 general order without our authority. Notify me immediately if they 39038 52772 18747 67269 cannot be taken to the American Legation with the field pieces and be 66599 14591 37224 51511 kept there. Scrupulous care is to be taken to avoid bloodshed. 18944 21647 Remember that unless you are directed otherwise from here the forces 69348 32177 37903 are only to be used to protect American life and property, 69894 56938 14592 “THEODORE ROOSEVELT” Please expedite the transmittal of this cable in every possible way. WM. LOEB, JR. Secretary. [*191*] (Official)[*Rewritten*] THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 14, 1906. . My dear Sir: In view of the cables which have been received making it evident that President Palma intends to resign at the earliest opportunity and that the Vice President and Cabinet seem resolved to avoid taking upon themselves the responsibilities of government, [and the possibility at least that no quorum of the Cuban Legislature will assemble under lawful authority] and in view of the repeated requests of President Palma for the landing of troops and intervention, it is evident that we must act at once in such a way as to protect American interests [in] by fulfilling American obligations to Cuba. Moreover, under the circumstances it is also evident that the ordinary type of diplomatic communication would in this case accomplish no good purpose. The situation in the Island seems to be one of impending chaos with no real responsible head, and the enclosed letter to Minister Quesada which will be communicated to our Charge d'Affaires at Havana for transmission to President Palma end for publication in the Cuban press seems to offer the best way of communicating not TELEGRAM. [*1CO G cp 855pm*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 13, 1906. Root, Lima. Delighted to hear from you. Of course in view of what you say I shall = [*70487 71477 61662 62869*] = not expect you to go to SanFrancisco, so come direct back to NewYork [*36014 you 39435 61456 so 25643 32164 19114 51204*] especially as in my judgment you will have to make one great speech on = [*45815 41277 48158 52491 39712 64552*] your return and that can be made in New York; whereas if you landed [*60263 67042 47936 in 51204 71666 72850 46514*] at San Francisco you would have to speak scores of times crossing the = [*AT 61456 41307 64474 61809 of 67719 29460*] continent. Taft and Bacon are going to Havana now. I am exceedingly [*27874 39456 35691*] sorry you were not home to go there. [*64233 72845 71353 41840 To 67165*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*66 D Hans*]COPY OYSTER BAY, N.Y., September 20th 1906. Dear Senator Penrose: Good for you! I congratulate you on what you tell me about Mitchell. I have taken the liberty of sending your letter to Cannon, who I know will be greatly pleased. I had a most satisfactory talk with Knox. Make him speak in the campaign. Sincerely yours, (Signed) THEODORE ROOSEVELT Hon. Boise Penrose, Philadelphia, Pa.TELEGRAM. [*2NY-Cg 213 Pm ne*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 10, 1906. Hon. William H. Taft, Havana, Cuba. Is it possible to institute investigation to see what Americans, if any [*55377 44318 45088 62215 014621 15337*] have been furnishing funds to the revolutionists? [*20306 38803 38761-67791 60394*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*18*] (Official)TELEGRAM. [*Sent*] [*12 25 am 22d*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 21, 1906. Taft, Havana. I approve entirely your plan. I suggest, however, that if you have to land troops in Havana you will avoid the use of the word intervention and simply state that they are landed to save life and property in Havana. In view of what you say it is manifestly impossible for us to try to sustain Palma, and I doubt if it will be wise to try to keep him temporarily in office. As I understand your plan it is in substance to tell the insurgents and the moderates alike that they must put in some acceptable man or men to continue the government temporarily and take steps to remedy the wrong committed at the last election, these steps including a new election. I do not see how the insurgent chiefs can object to this, and if they do it seems to me they put themselves out of the pale. In any event I authorize you to use your discretion, if you have to act so quickly that you cannot communicate with me, and in such case you can of course count upon my absolutely standing by you; but equally of course I desire if possible that you communicate with me before taking such final steps as will irrevocably commit us to intervention. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM. [*2NY Gi ms 535P*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 22, 1906. Taft, Havana. Much pleased with your telegram. Of course if the continuance of Palma [*54187 66816 . 29175 if 27913 Palma*] can be secured I think it would be best; but I am afraid you will find [*62093 67336 20002 21204 but 13209 37342*] difficulties in the way. [*32027 71117*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*20 Govt*] TELEGRAM. [*OK*] [*152 Govt*] [*Ins Ne Gi ns 311p*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 22, 1906. Taft, Havana. I repeat my entire approval of your proposal. Put in some [*42330 59304 my 35125 15930 56787 . 57332 some*] temporary executive and then carry out the plan of action you [*66878 35873 67129 23632 54731 of 11927 you*] outline in your cable including the resignation of half the = [*52978 in 22996 43242 59874 40793 62350*] = senate and half the house, the restoration of the municipal officers [*and 40793 42103 60042 the 50394 52336*] improperly removed and a new election under new electoral law. [*42971 59200 14805 51187 34367 68949 51187 34371 46682 .*] The moderates must accede to these terms because they would [*The 49886 11074 67794 66969 20133 72418*] fall like a house of cards and without an effort if we turned [*36703 47365 a 42086 of 23508 and 72286 34230 42473 68666*] against them. As for the insurgents have it understood that you = [*13376 . 16987 the 44453 45310 69079*] will land troops at once in order to protect life and property [*72122 46513 68416 18017 52784 56938 47335*] in Havana or any other city if they approach nearer than you [*in 41026 52708 24998 42468 15880 50782 67023 72845*] think they ought to. But if they object to the terms you offer [*67329 52930 . 22724 67263 51864 66975 72845 54307*] I would not offhand send an ultimatum that unless they accede [*72428 offhand send an 68780 67100 11077*] within five days the United States will forcibly intervene. [*72278 37429 30003 69306 72053 37905 44791 .*]-2- I would suggest that before sending the ultimatum we invite [*72427 65755 67041 20520 62437 68783 we 45111*] counter proposals from them. It is not only important to try [*29057 56788 38654 . 45313 52508 42802 to 86502*] to get them to come to an agreeement but it is important [*39256 25663 67772 13600 but 42813*] from the standpoint of public sentiment here that we shall [*38652 64762 of 62509 41636 67102 62865*] make it plain that we are exhausting every effort to come [*48141 it 54799 67102 are 35937 34231 25663*] to an agreeement before we intervene. [*to 13624 20559 44791x*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*44 108 152*]COPY. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 24, 1906. My dear Sir: Referring to Secretary Loeb's letter of August 4th about sending a man here to look over the skins in the President's house, the President requests me to send you the three bear skins which he got while on his hunt last spring, to be put in proper shape. It has been found on examination that the other skins and heads do not need attention at this time. The skins are being sent to you by Long Island express. Please return them to Oyster Bay. Very truly yours, M. C. Latta, Acting Secretary To the President. Mr. W. W. Hart, 451 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y.TELEGRAM. [*1WH-Fd 932p Ne*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 24, 1906. [* [T H NEWBERRY?] *] Acting Secretary Navy, Washington, D.C. Have received from Taft following message: "As a matter of precaution Bacon and I think you should [*16928 48556 55576 - 42331 67329 63314*] send at once as many more vessels convenient men to protect property." [*62389 48363 70416 28221 48952 56939 56736*] Please send as many additional vessels with as many marines aboard as is [*54807 as 48360 12077 70416 72226 as 48360 48425 10688 as is*] possible. Let me know how many you can send. Of course I do not wish [*55367 46184 48364 72858 62362 x 29175 I 72195*] to interrupt squadron practise of battleships unless absolutely necessary. [*44775 64688 55523 of 19457=63088 69343 50814 x*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*195*] (Official)TELEGRAM. [*1NY G. rr 226P*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 24, 1906. Taft, Havana. Would it not be well to arrange for Combs, Merry or Dudley to come at once [*72488 16603 25663*] to Cuba to take charge of matters? Otherwise whom would you leave in Cuba when = [*29518 24329 71968 72568 29516 71585*] you have to go? I do not think that Morgan has sized up to the situation. [*39434 67331 63832 69611 63796*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official) [*37[5]*] (Official)TELEGRAM. [*1WH Gi = Jn 940A*] [*940A*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 25, 1906. [* [R S Oliver?] *] Acting Secretary of War, Washington, D.C. Confidential. Please make all preparations immediately for the starting of the = [*26872 48141 13796 55803 42608 64782 37396*] first expedition of troops to Cuba. [*36123 68416 29518*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*63 Govt.*] TELEGRAM. White House, Washington. [*OK 1 Co - Xa 220P ne*] Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 25, 1906. Taft, Havana. I have been thinking over your telegram. If we are forced to [*20311 67350 53017 66866 . 42474 37884*] intervene by obstinacy of Palma and Moderates, then it is well worth [*44791 by 52058 of 53278 and 49886 then 45311 71269 72401*] while considering whether our intervention should not be aimed at them; [*71823 27409 71680 52940 44803 63227 be 13703 67120 ;*] that is, whether we should not notify them that we will take possession = [*67076 71697 63227 57658 67120 67102 66575*] of the ports, establish a temporary government, and notify the insurgents [*55353 55156 35411 a 66878 39538 and 51658 the 44453*] that if they will at once lay down arms we will agree to a new [*67072 67294 18017 46736 16503 71176 13491 51188*] election and to the other conditions upon which you have already [*34367 67769 52891 26714 41098 14109*] agreed with them. What do you think of this? [*13566 72251 . 71432 think 52281.*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*68*] (Official)TELEGRAM. [*1 Va- 11 am ne*] [*ok*] [*335 Gment.*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 25, 1906. Taft, Havana. Am of course greatly concerned at news. If it is the obstinacy of [*Am 29175 39793 26504 at 51214 . 42451 the 52058 of*] Palma and the Moderates which is the cause of the trouble I greatly fear = [*53278 67109 49886 71755 23815 52278 68422 I 39793 36981*] that the mobilization of troops would merely strengthen them in their [*the 49856 of 68416 72418 merely 65240 67120 in 67117*] course. Instead of my cabling direct to Palma I authorize you to sign [*29166 . 44290 my 23003 32165 53278 18762 you 63598*] for me and if in your judgment wise deliver the following [telegram]:([?]) [*37761 42431 45875 72189 30849*] " "President Palma. [*57639 55923 53278*] I most earnestly ask that you sacrifice your own feelings on = [*I 50225 33930 17272 72845 61127 53149 37113 52477*] = the alter of your country's good and yield to Mr. Taft's request by [*14168 52286 29122 S 39482 and 72836 to 49804 Taft's 59688 by*] continuing in the Presidency a sufficient length of time to in his [*27992 43036 55922 a 65715 47022 67706 43029*] judgment inaugurate the new temporary government under which the = [*45815 43088 the 51187 66878 39538 68978*] arrangements for peace can be carried out. I sent Mr. Taft and [*16687 for 53841 can 23605. I 62470 49804 Taft 14804*] Mr. Bacon to Cuba on receipt of your repeated telegrams stating that [*49804 19150 29518 58152 72803 59310 66819 64898*] you would resign; that this decision was irrevocable, and that you [*72571 59866 ; 67098 30269 was 45220 14804 67107*] [*114*]-2- could no longer carry on the Government. It is evident that under [*28838 47644 23631 on 39570. 35582*] existing circumstances your government cannot stand, and that to [*35981 72863 39538 23305 64756 67042*] attempt to maintain it or to dictate your own terms about the new [*18154 48068 it 52737 31930 53149 66969 10748 51187*] government merely means disaster and perhaps ruin for Cuba. [*39538 49007 48725 32304 53992 60819 for 29514 .*] Under you for four years Cuba has been an independent republic. [*68948 42845 for 38288 72797 29514 20292 an 43443 59648.*] I adjure you for the sake of your own fair fame not so to conduct [*I 12300 72845 61250 53149 36680 36735 64032 26757*] yourself that the responsibility if such there be for the death of [*72893 67094 60003 if 65659 67155 be 37793 30068*] the republic can be put at your door. I pray that you will act [*52278 59648 19678 57327 at 72863 33390. I 55548 67107 11895*] so that it shall appear that you at least have sacrificed yourself [*64038 62870 15431 67107 at 48628 41027 61136 72893*] for your country and that when you leave office you leave your [*72873 29122 67042 71585 46839 52325 72845 46839 72863*] country still free. You are then not responsible if further [*29122 65065 38422. 72845 16265 60022 if 38808*] disaster should unhappily overtake Cuba. You will have done your [*32305 63163 69249 overtake 29516. 41277 33330 your*] part as a gentlemen and a patriot if you act in this matter on the [*53526 16933 39075 14805 53773 42478 act 67392 48555 52477*] suggestion of Mr. Taft and I most earnestly beg you to do so. [*65768 49804 Taft 42331 50025 33930 20580 72845 33153 so.*] "Theodore Roosevelt." [*57639*] I also authorize you to vary the phraseology of the above if [*14135 18458 40148 the 54481 52278 10775*] [*140*]-3- you think it important. On the other hand point out to the [*67338 42813 . 40824 57927 67791*] insurgent chiefs that this is their last chance; that additional [*44450 24493 67098 48256 last 24168 ; that 12077*] warships are coming; that the army is being mobilized, and that if= [*70935 25694 ; 67094 16513 20784 49858 67042*] we are obliged to intervene in Cuba now and act against the [*42474 51963 44791 29516 51691 and 11845 13371*] insurgents, that no matter what destruction they may temporarily [*44453 67083 48574 what 31668 67282 66877*] cause and no matter how much delay there may be, the ultimate putting = [*23789 & 48574 42147 30773 67205 the 68778*] down of the insurrection is an absolute certainty and that if this is [*57346 52278 44457 45239 10915 24079 67042 67392*] done they will forever stand as the authors of the destruction of [*33357 67294 37990 64756 19075 18804 52278 31668*] the republic, as the people who when Cuba was free and independent [*52278 59648 17675 53927 71913 when 29514 70997 38425 43443*] by their own wicked act reduced her to a condition of dependence. [*by 53146 72019 11845 58542 41623 67770 26686 31264 .*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*G P 1229P 8*]TELEGRAM. [*OK*] [*275 pd Govt*] [*1Va - Ri 1050 Pm ne*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 25, 1906. Taft, Havana. I do not understand how conditions have changed so completely. It = [*I 69023 how 26707 24254 so 26280 .*] seems to me that the thing to do is to land the troops and temporarily [*62245 67094 67321 33153 45259 46507 the 68416 and 66877*] assume the functions of the government, but to say nothing about suppressing [*17835 38753 52278 39538 22799 61670 about 66014*] the insurrection; and on the contrary to have an agreement with the [*44450 and 28062 67779 an 13624 72249*] insurrecto leaders to the effect that we are merely taking Palma's place to = [*44460 46756 34184 71142 49007 66616 53278 s 54627*] do what they had said would be entirely satisfactory to them in their conversation [*33153 71463 had 61183 19992 35126 61597 67120 43037 28312*] with you. It seems to me that under the Platt Amendment it is at = [*72256 . 62245 that 68971 54757 14536 45311*] least doubtful whether the resignation of the regular government would not [*18008 33450 71693 59875 the 58810 39538 72501*] amount to substituting the hitherto insurrectionary party as the government [*14675 65541 the 41774 44460 53670 17075 39538*] de facto. At any rate I am inclined to think that unless you have reason to = [*30505 . 57798 43170 [67346] 67100 41098 57978*] the contrary of which I am ignorant, it would be better to proceed with the [*67791 28057 71707 14437 42490 20002 21278 56374 72249*] insurrectos along the exact lines that you have proposed, simply notifying [*44462 14096 the 35628 47454 67107 have 56816 63696 51660*] them that as Palma will not act we will appoint some man to act in his place [*67120 that as 53278 11897 71176 15644 some 48234 11894 43029 54627*]TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. 2 until the plan you have sketched out and to which they have agreed can be put [*69549 54731 41098 63841 52950 67769 67304 13580 19678 57327*] thru. I am certain that we wish not merely to act but to make it conclusively [*67517. 14437 24034 we 72193 not 49007 11894 but 48158 it 26608*] appear that we do act with the most evident good faith in our effort to keep [*15431 67102 do 11845 72249 most 35577 39488 43032 34229 46036*] an independent Cuban government and to exhaust all possible means of effecting [*an 43443 29519 39538 67769 35933 all 55367 48746 34207*] this purpose before we go into the business of armed intervention and face the [*67386 57264 20559 go 44888 22679 of 16475 44803 and 36567 the*] destruction of property and the harrassing warfare that would necessarily follow. [*31668 of 56736 67109 harrassing 70951 72445 50808 37670.*] I do not understand why this plan I speak of is not feasible now unless the insurgents [*I 69023 72008 54719 I 64472 of 37027 51691 69343 the 44453*] have changed their attitude from what it was forty-eight hours ago when, as you [*24254 67117 18306 38659 71006 38162 42085 13467 71489 17123*] [*Taft #3 *] telegraphed me, they acceded to your proposals. I do not believe we should, [*66842 48678 they 11086 to 56802 . I 20936 63304*] simply because Palma has turned sulky and will not act like a patriot, put ourselves [*63696 because 53278 40964 68666 sulky 72055 11845 47365 a 53773 52327 52945*] in the place of his unpopular government and face all the likelihood of a [*54640 his 69423 39538 and 36567 13812 47387 52258*] long drawn out and very destructive guerrilla warfare. Certainly I do not think [*47617 33534 52950 70394 31669 40169. 24068 I 67331*] this should be done unless we can make it clear that the insurrectos will not act [*this 19890 33330 69347 48144 it 25139 the 44462 11897*] reasonably. As I say, there may be reasons that I do not know why what I now suggest [*58039. 17005 61662 67205 58044 67071 46170 71985 71438 51691 65755*] is not feasible, but if so I wish you [would] to cable me. [*37027 but 64022 I 72209 22990 me*] THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 26, 1906. Hon. J.B. Foraker, Cincinnati, Ohio. Your communication will have my most careful consideration. I shall act only as I feel compelled to do in accordance with my oath of office for the protection of the persons and property of the United States and to carry out the law of the land. Let me for your private information only explain that there is not the slightest intention and never has been of acting against the established government, but only as acting in view of the established government's abdicating its powers. I sent Bacon and Taft down to Cuba only on receipt of the statement from President Palma that he intended to resign and that neither the Vice President nor the members of his cabinet would consent to go on with the government and therefore that chaos would come. I should be derelict to my duty if chaos came and I hesitated to land troops to protect our interests and fulfil our obligations. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. (Official)TELEGRAM. [*OK*] [2?] [*128*] [*361 Gant*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 26, 1906. Taft, Havana. [Have] just received your telegram of to-day. [Am] 58218 66816 immensely pleased with it 42673 54819 it and am delighted with the way you are handling 14435 30880 72249 71115 16315 40836 situation. You are doing just 63796 16315 33238 45875 what I hoped would be done. Remember, however, 71438 41973 72473 59130 that we are certain to be 67102 24028 67775 violently attacked in Congress not only by most of 70561 18098 27092 52512 by 50236 our open political 52542 54997 opponents but by republicans who have special 52607 22703 59655 71930 64484 cause to be jealous of either = 23789 67775 45664 34324 = you or me and we should leave them as or 48678 71137 63163 46839 67120 as little room for attack as possible. 47514 60609 for 18097 as 55367 Avoid the use of the word intervention in any 18929 the 69851 the 72331 44803 43027 proclamation or paper of 56437 or 53312 of yours and if possible place the landing of our 72886 and 55376 54627 the 56515 52273 [troops] sailors and marines 61214 and 48425 on grounds of conservation of American interests on 39955 of conservation of 14584 emphasizing the temporary 34574 the 66878 character of the landing and the hope that our 24291 52278 56515 and 41964 our keeping sailors, 46043 61214 marines or troops in the Island will be but for a 48425 or 68416 in 45267 19962 22712 a short time until a 67682 69549 a permanent government has been formed. This 54039 39538 20292 38085 This as I say is important not 17005 say 42809 merely for the sake of the Cubans but for the sake 40014 61250 the 2952, but 61250 of meeting our opponents 48886 our 52607 [*(RED BOOK now)*] [*112*] -2- at home of whom I suppose Foraker will be chief. at 33495 41629 I 51752 - 56780 19963 Please consider whether - - - it would not be well at first to limit as far as possible 16827 - 15408 37957 14603 43906 the places where = - 43427 56366 = we have to establish garrisons. I want to make it - have 28425 31341 I 55667 - - evident beyond possibility 28548 17830 43905 of doubt that we take no step we are not of 26884 52603 - - 51000 55897 absolutely forced to by the 10313 30512 18795 situation and therefore I should like to 50075 - - 33900 - 37928 avoid taking possession in = 15982 - 43886 = appearance of the entire Island if that is possible. 13449 41621 28202 36499 34132 is 43906 Of course I understand 41603 33900 54175 that it may not be possible to avoid this. Of course if that 38870 43906 15982 this 41603 - it becomes necessary 16971 40535 to answer any statement of Palma's and the 13209 - 50891 42452os 12926 Moderates point out the fact 39724 43637 29443 that you and Bacon only went down there 52607 - - 41812 56021 26939 there when they had requested us to intervene 56289 - 47385 54832 36052 by force of arms and after Palma had notified 30493 - 14226 - - 42452a - 41067 us that he would resign 54832 - 33179 47515 and that neither the Vice President nor the other 67042 51017 56007 51476 52891 members of the Cabinet 48912 22984 would go on with the government so that we 72418 39427 72249 39538 64038 were brought face to face with the 71321 brought 36567 36569 72249 Island being left in absolute chaos with no 45265 being left in 10915 24282 72243 government at all and all 39538 17991 17991 of this by the act of Palma and his government 52281 22884 11854 53278 41761 39538 before a single step had been = 20523 63757 step had 66579 = taken by us. I sympathize most heartily with your by us I 66406 most 41498 72257 abhorrence 10578 of the insurrectionary spirit and appreciate keenly 52278 44460 64607 and 15777 46019 the evil necessarily done the 35610 50808 33330 by the recognition of the insurrectionary [spirit] 22884 58316 52278 44460 party into which we are 53661 44893 71142 forced, but this evil is not in the slightest 37876 22795 35610 45250 43036 slightest degree due to any act of ours. On the contrary it 30757 33621 any 11854 52944 28062 is evident that only your going to Havana 35582 72863 39452 41026 prevented that 56146 city and all of Cuba from [going] falling 29514 36712 immediately into the possession of the 44888 55953 revolutionists. We have not caused the evil; we 60394 41107 23836 35610 have simply dealt with it 41097 30055 72240 in the wisest possible manner under conditions as 43036 they have actually been. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.112 112 128 352TELEGRAM. [*147*] [*NY 402Pm (find sheet) Ne*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 26, 1906. Taft, Havana. Have been thinking over your last telegram in 20306 67350 over 72863 last 66772 connection with your previous 27178 72863 56168 telegrams and letter. It is undoubtedly a very 66819 and 47077 45311 69143 70392 evil thing that the revolutionists 35610 67321 67094 60394 should be encouraged and the dreadful example 63198 34676 67109 33540 35678 afforded the island of success in 13171 45268 65590 in remedying wrongs by violence and treason to the 59129 72694 by 70559 and 68200 67791 government. If the Palma government 39538 42464 53278 39538 had shown any real capacity for self-defense had 63352 any 57943 23417 for 62322 and ability to sustain itself and = and 10601 66160 itself 14805 = a sincere purpose to remedy the wrongs of which 63743 purpose 59127 the 72694 of 71819 your telegrams show that they have = 66819 show 67097 20306 = been guilty, I should have been inclined to stand guilty 20423 43173 stand by them [to] no matter to what extent, 22586 [to] 48574 36385 including armed intervention. But as things actually including 16475 44803 22697 things actually are we do not have the chance are 33155 have the chance of following any such course. Before you and of following 65663 29166 20565 and Bacon went down we had been notified 19150 71299 20275 51648 that Palma would resign, that the Vice President that 53278 would 59866 67094 56008 and Cabinet would refuse to go on and 22973 would 58695 39427 with the government, and now you inform me that 72249 39538 51692 you 43810 this is their definite intention; 67098 45256 definite 44548 in other words, that they absolutely decline either in other words 67097 10916 30372 either to endeavor to remedy the 34759 59127 the wrongs they have done or to so much as lift a 72694 41096 done 52737 64037 as 47343 a hand in their own defense or make = 40819 in 53146 30589 or an effort to sedure the stability of their 34235 62087 the 64711 52279 government or the overthrow of the 39538 52734 53104 52278[*175*] 2 insurrectionists. Under such circumstances, as the 44462 24936 as least of two very serious 46835 of two 62566 evils it seems to me that we must simply put 35611 62245 that 71171 simply 57327 ourselves for the time being in Palma's 52945 37793 time 20740 53278s place, land a sufficient force to insure order, place 46507 a 65715 37856 to 44445 52772 and notify the insurgents that we and 51658 the 44453 67102 will carry thru the program in which you and will 23631 67537 56568 - 71818 they are agreed, keeping control simply 67264 - 13566 46043 28128 - until this program can be carried thru. I do not 69549 - 56568 19678 23602 67517 33131 have much hope that with the - - 41933 - 72249 example before them of such success in an - 20553 65668 65590 43026 insurrection the people who grow discontented 44457 53935 - 39968 32397 with the new government will refrain from 72249 39538 58668 insurrection and disturbance 44457 and 33009 some time in the future, but there is a slight - 67609 43036 38841 67200 - - chance and in my opinion we should 24168 43022 52585 63304 give them this chance. Then if the new 39299 - 24168 - 42464 new government sooner or later falls to pieces 39538 64201 36713 to 54511 under the stress of another insurrection, not only 68971 - - - - 44457 52512 will our duty be clearer but the - 33800 be 25153 22785 (100) conception by our people and by the people - - 53933 22838 53935 of other nations of our duty will be 52883 nations of 33800 19962 clearer, and we will have removed all chance of any - - 71176 - 59200 - 24168 52259 honest people thinking we have 41097 failed to do our best to establish peace and 36654 - - 21204 35412 53841 and order in the island without depriving 52772 in 45267 - 31366 it of its independence. It seems to me that by - 52267 43439 62245 following this course, that is by = 37683 29166 67076 by avoiding any threat or warning to the insurrectos 18959 any 67476 or 70971 67791 44462 unless they refuse to carry out 69346 58695 23682 the agreement which they have already made, we 13648 67304 47931 shall put ourselves in a strong position 62897 57327 52945 43023 55307 [*196*] [*(Red Book)*] in case any of the insurgents refuse to carry out the 23671 any 52278 44453 46574 to 19368 agreement. From what 11937 56143 you say it is possible the insurrectos will not act 57349 say 43913 the 35765 56801 act together, and in such case it = 53189 - 19389 would be an advantage to us to have a portion of 16812 an 11271 53183 - - 43792 them with us in case a struggle - 56932 19384 a 51217 should have to come. I feel therefore that in 32977 20741 I 29813 52579 ordering troops to land or issuing 42025 53682 37319 or 36527 any proclamation in my name, which of course I 44742 34553 - - 41603 I hereby authorize you to do, you 33346 15876 you to do you should base your action upon the ground that 49752 - - 10788 31957 that organized government had disappeared 42043 31694 had 26009 and that order must be kept, and should avoid 52562 42000 40197 kept 49753 15973 issuing an ultimatum to the insurrectos 36527 53957 53177 35765 or the use of phraseology saying that they 41965 54839 of 43285 48696 52599 are in revolt against the United = 14017 47953 - 54424 = States until you have seen whether they will not 54653 32861 - - - 56801 in good faith carry out the agreement in 31667 19368 11937 they have already made with you, you 32859 - - 56935 comma 57349 on your part carrying out so much of the = 42625 19371 - - - - = agreement as you had intended (100) to have 11937 14739 had 35825 to have Palma carry out. Of course there may be 42452a 19368 23502 there 16612 circumstances known to you which make this circumstances 37171 53187 which 38528 this plan of mine futile, and I am giving my 43460 of 39354 31199 12863 am 31581 my views with the understanding that they come 55402 52629 54191 52599 20728 from a man at a distance, who does not 31015 man 15398 26560 who 26762 know the [views] facts as you do on the ground. If know 29461 14739 do 31950 possible cable me fully; but if 43911 18918 me fully 18657 the crisis comes and has to be met I hereby 23705 20745 and has 53155 39195 I 33346 authorize you to do whatever in your 15876 - - - 56210 34580 discretion you deem best. I cannot understand 26197 you 24607 best I 54177 how our legation should have been how our 37670 17158 so completely in the dark as to give us no so 21272 52620 52620 as 31556 54832 no inkling of what was coming, the minister 35452 of 56196 coming the 39371going off on a holiday to Europe on the very 31645 off 41761 - - 28468 41783 - eve of the outbreak, when as now appears - 41621 42149 - - - - many outsiders months ago saw that trouble was - - - - 48684 that 53688 was impending. I am concerned at what = 34263 21456 - - = you say about Squiers, and if such rumors are on 56207 - - - 12864 - 48229 - - foot I do not see how we can appoint 30330 26711 - - 55906 13586 him to any ministership. I hope an effort will be 33400 53153 33561 27472 38406 made to trace the rumor 53297 - 48214 down. 26939 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*Finished sending 617 Pm*] [*573 Gant*] [* 55 196 147 175 ------- 573*] [*OK*] [*201 Gen*] TELEGRAM. [*IVA Gi = Ri 120 am*] The White House, Washington. [*V....*] Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 26, 1906. Taft, Havana. Your second cable of today has been received. 58194 Things are certainly kaleidoscopic and I must trust to your judgment on the ground 42357 68465 72879 45815 39949 how to meet each successive - - 48883 - 65629 change as it occurs. Let me repeat that if possible 24193 17013 52231 47069 59304 - 55376 you base any action in landing - - 11942 - 46515 a force and taking possession of the government or - 37856 - 55355 - 39570 - restoring order upon the need 60054 52772 69661 50898 of protecting American interests, and avoid so long - 56941 14589 - 18929 47633 as it is possible the use of 55381 - 69851 the word intervention or the use of terms that will - 72339 44803 - - 69851 66969 67104 imply that the rebels are in = - 67094 58089 - = the position of an insurrection against me. This I 55300 - 44458 13347 no - advise primarily with a view = 12877 56200 70496 = to complications here, and of course it is always - 26306 - - 29175 45311 - subject to the needs of the situation = 65399 - 50930 - 63798 = being such as to require us to risk any political - 65670 59753 60533 54997 trouble here in order to 68422 - 52784 do our duty in Cuba. I think you understand thoroly - 33800 29516 67336 - 69016 67435 what I mean, however, which = 71438 48687 - 71755 = is to do anything that is necessary no matter how 33153 - - 50827 48574 - strong the course, but to try to = 65300 29128 - 68506 33153 = do it in as gentle a way as possible, and to try to - - - 39074 - 71115 - 55367 - 68506 use terms which will be as = 69838 66969 71807 = little as possible of a challenge to opposition. 17020 55367 52258 24137 - 52666 But the main thing after all is 22785 - 67321 13241 - [*146*]Telegram. [*use Red Book*] The White House, Washington. 2 to bring about a satisfactory result in Cuba to 18405 a 48633 47706 in 23785 and with this in view I am willing 12982 this 55392 33903 56838 of course to incur any criticism and run any risk. 23502 to 34883 any 23726 and run any 48070 On Friday morning I sail on the Mayflower 48425 41783 38862=30233 at eleven o'clock, and will be at 27586 o'clock and 56780 in Buzzards Bay at the target practice at eight o'clock in - - 15432 Saturday, leaving Buzzards Bay at two o'clock Saturday afternoon and being back here at eleven 17420 o'clock. If possible shape your action so that it will not be 43911 49605 your 10788 - - 46547 necessary to cable me while to 18918 - - I am at sea, altho I shall have wireless 33903 at 48864 - 32956 - telegraphy. If however you [have] think - the situation so critical that I ought not to leave, wire 50077 so 23711 - - 42119 37603 - me tomorrow (Thursday) - - - afternoon and I will abandon the trip. - - 56766 10065 the 53664 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*102*]TELEGRAM. [*[?]*] The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 27, 1906 Taft, Havana. As there is a wireless machine on Mayflower can be reached at any time Friday, Saturday or Sunday, so I shall go to see the target practice, THEODORE ROOSEVELT (Official)COPY. THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 28, 1906. My dear Sir: I have called your letter of the 27th instant to the President's attention and he requests me to say that he would like to have you send a man out some day next week to look over the heads and skins at Sagamore Hill. Please have your man present this letter to Noah Seaman, the Superintendent at Sagamore Hill, as his credential. Very truly yours, M.C.Latta Acting Secretary to the President. Mr. William W. Hart, 451 Seventh Avenue, New York.[*M. C. LATTA?*] TELEGRAM. [*X*] The White House, Washington. [*103 Collect Gant.*] 1 PK K GI Mayflower, at sea, by wireless via New Port, R. I. Sept. 28. [06] Executive Office: Cable Taft as follows: "All right land forces and issue proclamation as suggested - - 46507 37892 45288 56437 - - in my name, but if possible emphasize fact that you are 50515 50587 - - - 34571 - - - - landing only at Palma's request and because there 46515 - - 53278s 59688 - - - is no Government left so that it is imperative - 39561 - - - - - 42717 to establish one and to land forces to protect 35412 - - - 46507 37892 56939 life and property, also tell that the Government you 47335 - - - 39570 form is only provisional and temporary until Cubans can 38053 - - 57102 - 66878 - 29521 - form one for themselves. I suppose you will get insurgents 38053 67127 - - - - - 44453 to disperse by telling them you will carry out substantially 32761 - - - - 23634 the agreement to which they once before assented. 13648 17560 Roosevelt.[*Copy for Confirmation [9-29-06?] S.29-1*] U. S. NAVY WIRELESS TELEGRAPH SERVICE Form No. 91 Cape Cod Station. Received from U S S Mayflower at Sea Date Sept. 29 Time 511 a.m.[p.m.] Operator W Code W T. the following message: [?] to Latta Executive Office, Oyster Bay N. Y. Cable Taft as follows. [?] telegrams received am much pleased earnestly hope that Cuban parties can be persuaded themselves to agree on provisional government of some kind that will ensure peace. I hear well of Menocal ask Funston about him. Make moderates understand that if they force it intervention will be known they are responsible. I approve the form of proclamation you suggest if we must establish provisional Government. Of course you can [?] force any truce no matter what government is inaugurated if you think situation requires it and I suggest from what you say that such will be the case but I earnestly hope you can persuade the parties themselves to agree on a temporary provisional Government which if necessary we can supervise until the elections you have planned can be held. Sig. Roosevelt Transmitted above message to Oyster Bay, New York Date Sept 29 Time 600 a.m. [p.m.] Operator Sy Code West [?] 4-508 50,000—Req. 1813-9-30-05-80. (OTHER SIDE FOR INSTRUCTIONS.)INSTRUCTIONS. Use this form for all official messages. State after Code, the method of transmission, i. e., whether by telephone, signal, letter, wire telegraphy, wireless telegraphy, etc. File original of all messages sent and a copy of all messages received. 4---508TELEGRAM. [*371*] [*IVa - K 1249 Am [?]*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 28, 1906. Taft, Havana. Your telegram of September 27th received. It is very 32022 difficult for me from 37761 - here to understand exactly the needs of the - 69035 - - 50930 52278 situation and therefore why one course - - - - - 29166 is better than another. My offhand judgment is 21287 - - 50507 - 45816 - that it would be better to follow - 20002 - 37677 your first impulse and agree to the formation of a - - 43006 - 13491 - 38083 - - provisional government under a 39566 [the] provisional president in spite of its not being 57102 55923 64619 - - - constitutional. Upon my word 27538 - - - I do not see that with Cuba in the position it is we 33131 - - - 29514 55300 - - - need bother - 21998 our heads much about the exact way in which - 41433 - - - 35628 - - 71792 the Cubans [have or do not have] observe 29521 52028 or do not observe so much of their own constitution - 52030 - - - - - 27525 as does not concern us. Certainly the as 26497 us - - constitution will come to an end if President Palma 27525 25665 to 34715 if 55923 53278 resigns and leaves his office 59889 46896 his 52325 while there is not a quorum of Congress to accept - - - - - 57635 27100 11173 his resignation. Neither do I his 59872 - - - understand why the fact that the government is not 69016 71985 36605 39538 is within the Constitution, as you 72280 27533 - - say, would alter our control of the situation for - - 14170 - 28136 - - pacification. I think it = 53218 - - would be a misfortune for us to undertake to form a 72442 a 49659 - - 69090 - - - provisional government if 39566 - there was a fair chance of obtaining peace by - - - - 24168 - 52110 53841 allowing the Cubans themselves to 13973 - 29521 - - form their own provisional government. - 53146 39566 [*166*][*165*] 2 Remember that we have to do not only what is best 59130 41097 21204 for the island, but for 45267 what we can get public sentiment in this country to 39235 62509 29134 support, and there 65968 will be very grave dissatisfaction here with our 39700 32862 72246 intervention unless 44803 69347 = we can show clearly that we have exhausted every 41097 35935 method by which it is 49085 by 71756 possible to obtain peace and the perpetuation of the 55367 52091 53841 54104 government with 39570 some show of order prior to our taking control 56249 66616 28128 ourselves. (Red Book) You say that 52945 525978 the underground agreements will be detrimental 11939 25694 under the proposed 45074 provisional Cuban government. From your 45310 23787 31694 telegrams I gather that there are hardly any excepting undesirable people to 32704 - 28660 54239 42931 appoint to office 13588 - 44662 and of course as soon as we intervene there will not - - - - - 14720 36048 52763 be left any Cuban 37652 - 23787 Republic which can receive detriment. I feel very 47336 25693 strongly that any 13376 provisional government which offers any 39566 - 41661 13376 reasonable chance of securing 46056 19719 - 49037 peace should be tried and any scheme for such a 42861 - - 53642 13376 48760 30413 - provisional government 39566 encouraged before we take control of the 27834 52174 22759 government ourselves. 31694 I do not think that we should take such control 52603 - 52174 22755 except as [a] the last resort 37362 47587 and after every other expedient for securing 28527 28994 49037 pacification has been attempted 42403 155473 and I do not care in the least for the/30418 fact/29431* that such/52596 an agreement/11932 is not constitutional,/22261 while I feel that the/53507 republic/47336 has suffered/51529 such detriment/28693 already that it would be exceedingly/28643 difficult/35837 for any underground agreement/11932 to cause it further/31197 detriment./25693 THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TELEGRAM. [*383*] [*INS [?] 139 P*] White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N. Y., September 28, 1906. Taft, Havana: As you say, matters change like a kaleidoscope, so any advice from me is 48595 24193 47365 12820 38638 apt to be just several hours late. From this distance I do not see that two 16028 62194 revolutions would be in any way more objectionable than one and as far as 60400 51925 36777 our attitude before the people of the United States is concerned it would make 18306 69305 48162 our position even better, for if we [were] have to intervene I shall not object to 55303 41097 44796 62869 51864 any additional proof that the intervention was inevitable. If it were possible to 56705 44803 43634 71314 55367 tide over affairs for two or three days until I could be back in Washington I 67586 13017 69549 19717 71072 should be glad. This is of course not essential. I am about to leave on the 19899 Mayflower for the battleship target practise, but can be reached constantly thru the wireless telegraph. It seems to me that if might be well under the 62245 24937 circumstances to land an ample garrison of marines for Havana, probably to take possession 46512 38968 48425 41026 55354 of Moro Castle. I suppose this could be done with Palma's full consent. 237380 33335 72226 532785 27227 [*143*][*Red book*] [*210*] 2 As far as possible, however, avoid the use of the word intervention, and if this 29593 43906 --- 15973 -- --- 41621 57002 36059 -- - -- is not possible and we have to name our own provisional government, - -- 43906 -- 55910 40364 42137 42293 45310 31694 then emphasize --- 27733 the fact that our action is only temporary and that we are landing troops 29443 -- 42137 10788 - --- 52437 12925 55882 37322 53682 to secure a pacification and set the Cuban government going again. Do not, 49015 - 42403 --- -- -- 23787 31694 31645 --- 26700 however, make any promise as to the withdrawal of the troops and I need not --- 38524 -- 44942 14710 56941 41621 53682 12853 40593 say make every effort to get the parties to come to some agreement by which -- 38528 27473 - --- -- 42704 20731 --- 11927 18806 a government shall be put in, which nominally at any rate shall not be 31694 16672 -- -- --- 40927 45916 16687 appointed by 13596 -- us. If we have to put down the insurrection it will of course take many 54832 - 55910 45503 26939 -- 35760 -- -- 41603 --- 39860 months and a large force and the people of this country will need to be convinced 12792 -- 30491 12926 23475 -- --- 53155 22953 that -- there was no alternative to our action and that we [have] had exhausted 52757 -- 12390 - 42137 10788 12925 -- -- 28855 every resource --- 47595 in our power in trying to get the Cubans to come to any kind of peaceable - 42293 43986 - 53745 - -- -- 23790 - 20731 -- 37101 - 42863 agreement and they will not care a rap whether such agreement was or was 11927 12941 56801 19294 - -- 56389 --- 11927 -- - -- not -- in accordance with the Cuban constitution. I should not be at all sorry to have 10546 -- 23787 22248 16726 - -- 50413 - ---- the foreign consuls act as to intervention of their governments as you state -- 30556 22341 -- -- - 36059 -- --- 31734 -- -- --- that -- they will, because it would make our course even clearer and give us even -- -- ---- -- ---- --- 42293 23498 --- 20354 -- -- 54832 -- more 39899 complete justification. As a mere suggestion consider what I have said about 21261 36953 -- - --- 51581 ---- 56165 48412 --- landing 37322 forces on the ground that the danger of chaos and convulsion is so great as 30514 31956 --- -- 24031 19802 -- 22981 - - 31839 - to - render such a step necessary while at the same time continuing your efforts to get - 50995 40535 - 53068 22637 - 27480 - - the representatives of the two parties to come to some agreement even tho we 47263 41621 42700 20731 11927 - - 55871 should ourselves have to superintend the carrying out of such an agreement. - 42139 - 51667 19371 51499 11927 THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [*30*] [*[9-29-06?*] TELEGRAM. 19 Collect Govt 1030p White House, Washington. 1Pk Ho uss mayflower via Pk Newport RI 29 Gen J F Bell War Dept Wash Make preparations to send six thousand troops to Cuba immediately. RooseveltTELEGRAM The White House, Washington. 1 DA NE M 139 Paid Govt 4 33 PM Providestown Mass Sept 29 [*[06]*] M. C. Latta, Executive Office, Oyster Bay [*Quote*] Cable Taft as follows: Your cable containing Palma’s proposed message received. [*53218s 56816 49045*] You have done all in your power to get Cubans to establish their = [*33339 55479 29521 35412 53146*] own government. You can do nothing but establish provisional = [*51571 39566*] government. As you suggest, I approve your proclamation with [* - - - - - - 56437*] insertion of statement that the Cuban flag will fly over the public [*44148 64863 67094 29519 37473 - 37640 53025 57142*] buildings. Land marines at once to guard treasury, and of course [*22583 = 46504 47425 - 52486 40046 68210*] I presume also to take possession of forts and guard the water works. [*66571 553502 38133 40046 71095 72354 . *] I hope you can convince insurgents that it is to their interest to [*28377 44453 67792 44661*] lay down arms at once as we intend immediately to hold a new election [*46736 16503 52486 17104 44512 42612 10802 51188 34367*] and that they will have practically all the advantages they would [*55522 13812 12727*] have had if Palma had gone into the original agreement to which they [*40640 - 53278 13640 71711 67263*] assented. [*17560*] Roosevelt. [*quote*] [*Latta*]TELEGRAM. To Collect Gout 2 PK [*[R S Alive?]*] 1052 PM USS Mayflower Sept 29 [06?] Acting Secy War Arrange for six thousand troops to start for Cuba as soon as possible Roosevelt TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. Oyster Bay, N.Y., September 30, 1906. Taft, Havana. Have directed that the sic thousand men go to you. You might announce that they are to relieve the sailors and marines. This may make it a little easier as regards any Cuban insurgent who may wish an 47515 33948 29519 44453 excuse to be suspicious of our good faith. Shall I cable Winthrop to 35831 66157 52273 39482 36688 62881 22990 join you at once? I presume you will wire Funston and Dugall yourself. 45738 72845 52486 I congratulate you most heartily upon the admirable way you have handled the whole matter. It is another great public service you have rendered. Will you also congratulate Bacon most heartily for me upon what he has done? I am especially pleased with the agreement which the revolutionary 60392 committee signed. Have directed the State Department to continue Cuban 25919 foreign relations, consuls and ministers as if no change had occurred. ROOSEVELT. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 3, 1906. My dear Sir: The President directs that you will proceed at one to Havana and report to Secretary Taft. Very truly yours, RUDOLPH FORSTER. Acting Secretary to the President. Brig. Gen. F. F. Bell, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, War Department.TELEGRAM (Copy) The White House, Washington, October 3, 1906. Taft, Havana. I cordially agree with you. Have directed Bell to go at once to Havana. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.TRANSCRIPT. (October 4, 1906) Private. Dear Gov. Woodruff: It seems to me that on that Judiciary ticket there should be a Catholic. All decent citizens should be joined in the effort to beat Hearst; and it would be a capital mistake to let the impression go abroad that there was anything in the nature of discrimination against any body of citizens by us. Ordinarily I would not care a snap of my finger whether a man was a Catholic or Protestant. But this year we should consider the question to the extent of seeing that there is no chance to say (however falsely) that we have discriminated against either. McCarren has three Catholics on his Judiciary ticket. Under such circumstances it would be a bad blunder if there were no Catholic on our ticket; for this is so great a crisis that we cannot afford to fail to do all in our power to get all decent citizens back of Hughes. I strongly advise that you put Carr, if he is as good a man and lawyer as I hear that he is, on the ticket. You will still have the majority of the Committee of 100's nominees. Surely a Catholic must go on; and it seems to me that Carr is the man. I think this extremely important, and earnestly hope you can put on Carr. Sincerely yours, (Signed) Theodore Roosevelt. You can say to Schieren &c what I ask. I feel it vital to do as I suggest; and I ask it as a favor to me--if you won't do it for the sake of the cause! WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. October 5, 1906 My dear Sir: Your letter of the 3d instant has been received. The President wishes you to go ahead and do just as you propose about the heads and skins, except as regards the mountain lions and lynx which are lined flat. On these the President does not want to have the heads and paws mounted as you propose. On the contrary he wishes to leave them as they are, as he finds that it is a great nuisance to have too many raised heads over which it is so easy to stumble. The President would like to have you go right to work as you propose, without any delay. Very truly yours, RUDOLPH FORSTER Acting Secretary to the President Mr. William W. Hart, 451 Seventh Avenue, New York.[7361] [361] [Sherman] COPY. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D.C., October 8, 1906. My dear Sherman: Since you left this morning I succeeded in getting hold of the letters to which I referred, and I send you a copy of Governor Odell's letter to me of December 10, 1904. As I am entirely willing that you should show this letter to Mr. E. H. Harriman, I shall begin by repeating what you told me he said to you on the occasion last week when you went to ask him for a contribution to the campaign. You informed me that he then expressed great dissatisfaction with me and said, in effect, that as long as I was at the head of the Republican party or as it was dominated by the policies which I advocate and represent, he would not support it, and was quite indifferent whether Hearst beat Hughes or not, whether the Democrats carried Congress or not. He gave as a reason for his personal dislike of me partly my determination to have the railroads supervised, and partly the alleged fact that after promising him to appoint Depew Ambassador to France I failed to do it; and, I understood you to say, that he alleged that I made this promise at a time when he had come down to see me in Washington, when I requested him to raise two hundred and fifty thousand dollars for the Republican presidential campaign which was then on. Any such statement is a deliberate and wilful untruth - by rights it should be characterized by an even shorter and more ugly word. I never requested Mr. Harriman to raise a dollar for the presidential campaign of 1904. On the contrary, our communications as regards the campaign related exclusively to the fight being made against Mr. Higgins for Governor of New York, Mr. Harriman being immensely interested in the success of Mr. Higgins because he regarded the attack on Higgins as being really an attack on him, Mr. Harriman, and on his friend, Governor Odell; and he was concerned only ingetting me to tell Mr. Cortelyou to aid Mr. Higgins so far as he could, which I gladly did. He also (I think more than once) urged me to promise to make Senator Depew Ambassador to France, givingme in detaili the reason why this would help Governor Odell, by pleasing certain big financial interests. I informed him that I did not believe it would be possible for me to appoint Mr. Depew, and furthermore[10-8-06] 2 esprest my surprise at his saying that the men representing the big financial interests of New York wisht that appointment made, inasmuch as a member of them had written to me asking that the same place be given to Mr. Hyde, and that as a matter of fact, while I was not prepared to announce any decision, I doubted whether I could appoint Mr. Depew or Mr. Hyde to the place. As soon as Mr. Harriman heard that Mr. Hyde was a candidate and had asked the name of his backers, he hastily said that he did not wish to be understood as antagonizing Mr. Hyde and would be quite willing to support him; and tho I understood that he still preferred Mr. Depew, he left me strongly under the impression that he would be almost as well satisfied with Mr. Hyde, and was much discontented at my informing him so positively, not once but repeatedly, that I did not think I should be able to appoint either. His and my letters now before me of the fall of 1904 run as follows. On his return from spending the summer in Europe, on September 20th, he wrote me stating that if I thought it desirable he would come to see me at any time either then or later (he had been, as you remember, a delegate to the Republican National Convention, having voted for my nomination). On September 23d I answered this letter, saying, "At present there is nothing for me to see you about, tho there were one or two points in my letter of acceptance which I should have liked to discuss with you before putting it out." On October 10th I wrote him, "In view of the trouble over the State ticket in New York, I should much like to have a few words with you. Do you think you can get down here within a few days and take either lunch or dinner with me?" The trouble I spoke of had reference to the bolt against Higgins - that is in reality against Mr.Harriman and Mr. Harriman's friend, Governor Odell. A reference to the files of the New York papers at that time will show that there was a very extensive bolt against Mr. Higgins upon the crowd that Governor ODell had nominated him, and that he had in some matter favored Mr. Harriman evermuch - neither ground, in my judgment, being tenable. Mr. Harriman's backing of Governor Odell and extreme anxiety that he should win out by securing Higgins' election, was a matter of common notoriety and mentioned in all the papers; notably in the New York Sun. On October 12th Mr. Harriman wrote me - 3 "I am giving a very large part of my time to correcting the trouble here, and intend to do so if any effort on my part can accomplish it. ...I will take occasion the first of next week to run down to see you, and think by that time the conditions will be very much improved." After receiving this letter I wrote Mr. Harriman the following letter, which I give in full: "Personal "October 14, 1904 "My dear Mr. Harriman: A suggestion has come to me in a roundabout way that you do not think it wise to come on to see me in these closing weeks of the campaign, but that you are reluctant to refuse, inasmuch as I have asked you. Now, my dearsir, you and I are practical men, and you are on the ground and know the conditions better than I do. If you think there is any danger of your visit to me causing trouble, or if you think there is nothing special I should be informed about, or no matter in which I could give aid, why of course give up the visit for the time being and then a few weeks hence, before I write my message, I shall get you to come down to discuss certain government matters not connected with the campaign. "With great regard, "Sincerely yours." You will see that this letter is absolutely incompatible with any theory that I was asking Mr. Harriman to come down to see me in my own interest, or intended to make any request of any kind for help from him. On the contrary all I was concerned with in seeing him was to know if I could be of help in securing the election of M. Hiffins - a man for whom I had the highest respect, and who I believed would be, as in fact he has been, a most admirable Governor. Moreover, the following letter will show that Mr. Harriman did not have in his mind any idea of my asking him tp collect money, and that on the contrary what he was concerned about in connection with my letter to him was the allusion I made to the fact that I would like to see him before I wrote my message to discuss certain government matters not connected with the campaign. His letter, which is of November 30th, runs as follows: "Dear Mr. President: "I just have had a telephone talk with Mr. Loeb, and requested him to give you a message from me. "I drew his attention to the last paragraph of your letter to me of October 14th, last, and explained that of course I did not want to make a trip to Washington unless it should be necessary; that the only matter I knew of, and about which I had any apprehension, and which might be referred to in your coming message to Congress, is that regarding the Interstate Commerce Commission, and what the attitude of the railreads should be towards it. "I have communications from many conservative men in the West, asking me to take the matter up, they having, which I have not, information as to what you propose to say in your message on that subject, and I am very apprehensive about it. "Mr. Loeb stated he believed that this part of the message could be sent to me, and I hope that he will do so. I sincerely believe it would be best for all interests that me reference be made to the subject, and in any event [*[10-8-06]*] 4 if referred to in such a way as not to bring about increased agitation. It is, as you well know, the conservative element, and the one on which we all rely, which is the most seldom heard from. [ ] "Yours sincerely." This letter to me was crossed by one from me, which reads as follows: "Strictly personal. November 30, 1904. "My dear Mr. Harriman: "Mr. Loeb tells me that you called me up to-day on the telephone and recalled my letter to you of October 14th in which I spoke to you of a desire to see you before sending in my message as I wanted to go over with you certain governmental matters, and you added that you had heard that I had referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission; that you regretted this and wished I had left it out. In writing to you I had in view, especially, certain matters connected with currency legislation, and had not thought of discussing railroad matters with you. However, if it had occurred to me, I [ ] should have been delighted to do so; but if you remember when you were down here both you and I were so interested in certain of the New York political developments that I hardly, if at all, touched on governmental matters. As regards what I have said in my message about the Interstate Commerce Commission, while, as I say, I should have been delighted to go over it with you, I must also frankly say that my mind was definitely made up. Certain revelations connected with the investigation of the beef trust caused me to write the paragraph in question. I went with extreme care over the information in possession of the Interstate Commerce Commission and of the Bureau of Corporations before writing it. I then went over the written paragraph again and again with Paul Morton, who is of all my Cabinet the most familiar with railroad matters of course, and with Root, Knox, Taft and Moody. It is a matter I had been carefully considering for two years, and had been gradually the reluctantly coming to the conclusion that it is unwise and unsafe from every standpoint to leave the question of rebates where it now is, and to fail to give the Interstate Commerce Commission additional power of an effective kind in regulating these rates. "Let me repeat that I did not have this question in mind when I asked you to come down, but that I should most gladly have talked it over with you if it had occurred to me to do so; but as a matter of fact, as you will remember, when you did come down to see me, you and I were both so engaged in the New York political situation that we talked of little else; and finally that the position that I have taken has not been taken lightly, but after thinking over the matter and looking at it from different standpoints for at least two years, and after the most careful consultation with Morton, Taft, Moody, Knox, and Root, as to the exact phraseology I should use. "I do not send you a copy simply because I have given no one a copy, not even the men above mentioned. It is impossible if I give out copies of any portions of my message to prevent the message being known in advance, and the three press associations who now have the message are under a heavy penalty not to disclose a word of it before the appointed time. "Sincerely yours." On December 2d he wrote me the following letter on the same subject: "December 2, 1904. "Dear Mr. President: "Thank you for your favor of the 30th. "It was natural for me to suppose that railroad matters would be included in any discussion you and I might have before writing your message. I am of the opinion that that an effective Interstate Commerce Commission could regulate the matter of rebates, and absolutely prevent the same, without any additional power of any kind, and, as you say, Paul Morton is more familiar with such matters than any one else in your Cabinet, and I believe he will agree with me in this. I fear there has been a lack of cooperation. [*[10-8-06]*] 5 "During the enormous development of the last four years, the railroads have found it very hard to keep pace with the requirements imposed upon them, and the so-called surplus earnings, as well as additional capital, have been devoted to providing additional facilities and the bettering and enlarging of their properties, so as to give the increased and better service required of them. This work of betterment and enlargement must go on, and is all important for the proper development of all sections of the country. There is little doubt that during the next decade every single track railroad in the country will have to be double-tracked and provide enlarged terminal and other facilities, and any move that will tend to cripple them financially would be detrimental to all interests over the whole country. "I beg that you will pardon my not signing this personally, as I have to leave to catch my train for Arden, and have asked my Secretary to sign it for me. "Yours sincerely," I was unable to agree with Mr. Harriman's views on the matter, and left my message unchanged as regards the interstate commerce law. (The rough draft of this portion of the message was completed in October, before the election.) I had always discussed with absolute freedom all my proposed moves in the trust and labor matters with the representatives of the big combinations or big railroads as well as with the leaders of the labor men, of the farmers' organizations, the shippers' organizations, and the like--that is, I had as freely seen and communicated with Mr. Harriman, Mr. Morgan, Mr. Hill and other railroad men as I had seen and communicated with Mr. Gompers, Mr. Keefe, Mr. Morrissey, Mr. Morrison and other labor leaders. Mr. Harriman had, like most of the big railroad men, always written me very strongly protesting against my proposed course as regards the supervision and control over big combinations and especially over the big railroads--in a letter of his August 19, 1902, for instance, he expressed the fear that a panic would fellow my proposed action. It will be seen that the above correspondence is entirely incompatible with what Mr. Harriman now, as you inform me, alleges as to my having asked him to secure money or to subscribe money for the Presidential campaign. As for the Depew matter he professed thruout to be acting in the interest of Governor Odell, and the Governor Odell had been anxious that Mr. Depew should be nominated as Ambassador to France at a time when he was supporting Governor Black for Senator, he had changed his mind shortly after the last letter to me, above quoted, from Mr. Harriman, and on December 10th wrote me the letter I enclose which reads in part as follows: "My dear Mr. President: A great many of your friends here in New York would be very much delighted and pleased if you could find it possible to appoint Mr. James H. Hyde as Minister to France. . . . . . .[*[10-8-06]*] 6 Large business interests have given to him splendid executive abilities and his association with so many prominent business men would be fitting recognition of the effective work done by them in the last campaign. "In addition to this he has behind him, I am sure, the approval of Senator Platt and Senator Depew and, so far as I can speak for the organization, I believe his appointment would be, without question, more satisfactory than any that could be made from New York at the present time. "Personally, I should appreciate your favorable consideration of this suggestion almost beyond any thing else you could do for me. If you so desire, I shall be glad to come to Washington and talk with you about it but I believe there are others who are close to you and who feel just as I do and I thought therefore that this letter would be sufficient as showing the attitude of the organizations and myself personally upon this important appointment.” As you know I was obliged to refuse the request of the New York financiers and of the Republican organizations of the State and city, not deeming it proper to appoint Mr. Hyde to the position he sought. So much for what Mr. Harriman said about me personally. Far more important are the additional remarks he made to you, as you inform me, when you asked him if he thought it was well to see Hearstism and the like triumphant ever the Republican party. You inform me that he told you that he did not care in the least, because those people were crooks and he could buy them; that whenever he wanted legislation from a State legislature he could buy it; that he “could buy Congress" and that if necessary he"could buy the judiciary." This was doubtless said partly in boastful cynicism and partly in a more burst of bad temper because of his objection to the interstate commerce law and to my actions as President. But it shows a cynicism and deepseated corruption which make the man uttering such sentiments, and boasting, no matter how falsely, of his power to perform such crimes, of least as undesirable a citizen as Debs, or Meyer, or Haywood. It is beacuse we have capitalists capable of uttering such sentiments and capable of acting on them that there is strength behind sinister agitators of the Hearst type. The wealthy corruptionist, and the demagog who excites, in the press or on the stump, in office or out of office, class against class and appeals to the basest passions of the human soul, are fundamentally alike and are equally enemies of the Republic. I was horrified, as was Root, when you told us today what Harriman had said to you. As I say, if you moot him you are entirely welcome to show him this letter, altho of course it must not be made public unless [10-9-06] 7 required by some reason of public policy, and then only after my consent has first been obtained. Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT. Hon. J.S. Sherman, St. James Building, 1133 Broadway, New York.TELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. October 12, 1906. Taft, Havana. Yes. Issue proclamation as you suggest. THEODORE ROOSEVELT (Official)[attached to T.R. to Taft 10-12-06] [[shorthand]]THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. October 15, 1906. My dear Cabot: One word about Mr. Weld. I do not care a rap what his services have been or what his general character is, he is an out-and-out fool in this matter, and to pander to him would be not quite as bad as, but just as foolish as, to pander to Hearst and Moran. He and his side may just as well understand that the ridiculous bourbon conservative can not win, and can only harm the moderate man. Look back a year and you will find that those people were just as strong against the railway rate bill last year as men could possibly be, and used exactly the same arguments; and yet the ultra-conservative papers, the Sun and the Times of New York, are now, in answering Bryan and Hearst, obliged to point with pride to the interstate commerce measures and to our control of the corporations to show how well we have grappled with the situation and what folly it would be to put Bryan in control. As for Mr. Weld, 1st me repeat that no matter how gallant a soldier and how good a citizen, it is simply nonsense for him to write about income and legacy taxes at all if he is unaware that every civilized country has them. They are an attack on property just in the sense that all taxation is an attack on property. I do not know what the Boston Herald said, and as I have no communication whatever with the paper I suppose it was simply guessing from my Harrisburg speech. But what I shall say in my message on the matters he refers to has been gone over carefully by Root and Moody2 and is unqualifiedly approved by both, especially by Root. I quite agree with you that Hearst is the most dangerous man in this country--more dangerous than Rockefeller or Harriman or anyone else. From what I can gather Moran is almost as bad. Our people in New York think that the chief danger of Hearst's winning is his being able to persuade the people that the Republican party really is in favor of the corporations, and not in favor, at bottom, of just such legislation as Congress past last winter; in other words, that it is really responsive to men of the Weld type,--and by the way, let me compliment you upon your admirable answer to him. I am convinced at the moment that we shall lose the Congressional election without a shadow of doubt if we let the people at large, the people west of the Alleghenies, for instance, believe that we have halted and become frightened in the movement which has gone on progressively for the last four years, and in which most was done last winter. I wish you would turn to my Watson letter. I certainly meant in that letter to lay as strong emphasis as I possibly could upon the evil work done by the sinister demagog, upon the evils of mob violence and the preaching of unrest. You say I have spoken most about the evils of organized wealth. The explanation is simple. I am trying to get legislation to deal with organized wealth--that is, I am trying to get action about it; whereas there is no action at present to take in reference to the labor men or to agitators. Remember two or three cases where the boot was on the other3 leg. When I came to Chicago at the time of the great strike there and was called on by the labor people, I answered them, it seems to me, as directly and unequivocally as any man could; and I did not at that time talk about corporations to them because corporations were not the issue at the moment. The issue was having the law obeyed by the labor men. So in the matter of the open shop at the Government Printing Office. It was right before election, and yet I enforced the principle of the open shop out of hand, without saying anything about the abuses of capital because they were not the issue at that moment. It was exactly so when Mr. Gompers and his delegation of one hundred called upon me last year. Now I do not quite know how I can say anything of Hearstism and Moranism in the present campaign. If it is thought wise for me to take such stand I shall most certainly take it, but I do want to be sure of my ground and sure that I won't do harm instead of good. Your letter has, however, caused me to reflect very seriously whether it would not be well to put a special page or two in my message dealing with just what you speak of, and I think I shall do it. Ever yours, Hon. H. C. Lodge, U.S.S., Nahant, Massachusetts. TELEGRAM. [*Copy*] [*copies made for the press 10/17/06*] The White House, Washington. Oct. 17, 1906. Mrs. J. Addison Hayes, Hotel Majestic, New York City. Pray accept the most sincere sympathy of Mrs. Roosevelt and myself. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. [shorthand] [shorthand]Personal THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. [October 20, 1906. Dear Cabot: No better illustration could be afforded of the difficulties in which I labor in taking part in the campaign than what has occurred since I wrote you the letter of yesterday which I subsequently canceled, so to speak, by telegram. Gussie's letter upset me a good deal because it made me feel that perhaps I was deserting all the Congressmen and leaving them to shoulder the responsibility for the Panama matter which really belonged to me, and I have also been rendered uncomfortable by what you very justly said as to the needs of laying stress on the elements that enter into the situation in New York and Massachusetts, and they did not at all enter into the situation in Pennsylvania, and it did not occur to me or any of those with whom I consulted to deal with them in that speech at Harrisburg. Accordingly I made up my mind, as I told you in the last letter, to write an article in which I took the entire responsibility, as Gussie requested, for the Panama business, took up the injunction matter, and attacked the movement which has its fine flower in Hearst and to an only less extent in Moran. But last night Jim Sherman came in to talk about the campaign, and I found he cordially disapproved what I intended to do and that Root and Taft emphatically agreed with him; while Moody, who did not disapprove particularly, was doubtful about it and felt that]2 [no real good would be done. Sherman's feeling was very strongly that he did not want me put into the campaign again unless in some manner upon which the managers generally agreed, and after very carefully considering whether more good would come than harm; doubtless he having been influenced by being obliged to turn down persistent requests for speeches, letters and the like from me from New York, which requests alternate with frantic adjurations to keep not only myself but Root and Taft out of New York so as not to drive away from Hughes Democratic votes. Sherman feels very strongly that my speaking on the Panama labor business and doing as Gussie requests--that is, assuming responsibility-- might do real damage in certain Republican districts and might be bitterly resented by some Congressmen as an arrogation to myself of being dictator, and as the statement by implication that Congress simply registered my decrees. He said that a good many Congressmen would certainly object to the implication that they regretted their vote and were not responsible for it, and had merely done what I requested, and that he did not believe any good would come of it, while it was conceivable that some harm might. He felt very strongly that the entire point which Gus seeks to obtain could be obtained far better by immediately republishing in the papers of his district and in the form of circulars to his people, the portions of my interview on March 21st last with Gompers and the labor men which Gussie deems would be most useful in the district, together with the republication of my letter to Watson,]3 if, as Gus says, the average voter knows nothing of it. He felt that I could not strengthen myself in this way by any repetition, while I would run the risk of creating a certain outcry as to my interference - an outcry which might, in New York at least, frighten off Democrats who are coming our way, and be resented by some people who thought I was trying to dictate. Moreover, when it came to making an attack on Hearstism and Moranism, he was very doubtful whether it would be possible to avoid making it either so vague and general as to be ineffective, or so specific as to put me in the attitude of making a personal assault upon Hearst and Moran, which it was possible at least might react in their favor instead of against them. I do not give Sherman's exact language, but these are his ideas, and Taft and Root agreed very strongly with him; Root in particular feeling that I ran the resk of cheapening myself and of doing damage instead of good to the general cause, certainly in New York. They all felt so strongly about it, and especially as to possible damage in New York and the possible resentment of candidates for Congress elsewhere, that I do not think I ought to go on with the plan - certainly not unless we can have some kind of a general agreement by which the interview will meet the general needs, not only some local need. It is hideously uncomfortable to have to write like this, because I have a horrid feeling that it is just possible I am not doing my full share of the work and not accepting my full share of the responsibility. 4 But on the other hand I know you would not want me to do something which those who ought to be qualified to judge think I had better not do. Tell Gus to turn in the Republican Campaign Book to page 63 and 64, where he will find my remarks to Gompers. Sherman was quite unable to understand, and I am quite unable to understand, why to republish these remarks will not sufficiently show my responsibility for what was done on the Isthmus or for the injunction law business. Ever yours, Hon. H. C. Lodge, U.S.S., Nahant, Massachusetts.THE WHITE HOUSE Hon. H. C. Lodge, U.S .S., Nahant, Massachusetts. Personal[*P.F.*] Copy. THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON October 23, 1906. My dear Mr. Patton: Will you please make the following arrangements for the President's trip to Oyster Bay to vote November 6: One five room private car to be attached to the regular train leaving Washington 12:30 a.m., arriving Jersey City 7:08 a.m., and on the return trip to be attached to the regular train leaving Jersey City 1:14 p.m., arriving in Washington at 6:16 p.m.; special tug, Jersey City to Long Island City and return; special train consisting of private car and day coach, Long Island City to Oyster Bay and return, [???] to be run on the following schedule: Leave Long Island City 8:00 a.m., arrive [Jersey] L.I. City 11:30. Also please arrange to serve breakfast and lunch for party consisting of about [ten] 12 persons. Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Mr. Wm. A. Patton, Assistant to the President, Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Broad Street Station, Philadelphia, Pa.Strictly personal. WHITE HOUSE, October 23, 1906, WASHINGTON. My dear Major Sylvester: On Tuesday, November 6th, the President, accompanied by myself and about eleven others, will go to Oyster Bay, N.Y., to vote, leaving Washington at 12:30 A.M, in a private car attached to the regular train of the Pennsylvania Railroad, reaching Jersey City at 7:08 A.M., thence by special tug to Long Island City, leaving there at 8:00 and arriving at Oyster Bay 9:00 A.M. Returning he will leave Oyster Bay at 10:30 A.M.; arrive Long Island City at 11:30 A.M.; go by special tug to Jersey City; leave Jersey City at 1:14 P.M. in a private car attached to the regular train arriving at Washington 6:16 P.M, Please make your usual thoro precautionary arrangements at Washington and Jersey City and acknowledge the receipt of this communication, Very truly yours, Major Richard Sylvester. [calendared] October 23, 1906. WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. My dear Mr. Wilkie: On Tuesday, November 6th, the President will go to Oyster Bay, N.Y., to vote, leaving Washington at 12:30 A.M. in a private car attached to the regular train of the Pennsylvania Railroad. He will arrive at Jersey City 7:08 A.M., and will go by special tug to Long Island City. Leaving Long Island City he will go by special train on the Long Island Railroad to Oyster Bay, arriving there at 9:00 A.M. Returning he will leave Oyster Bay at 10:30 A.M.; arrive Long Island City 11:30 A.M.; go by especial tug to Jersey City; leave Jersey City 1:14 P.M. in a private car attached to the regular train reaching Washington at 6:16 P.M. I shall accompany the President, and there will be about eleven others in the party.Will you please make your usual thoro precautionary arrangements in connection with this trip; and acknowledge the receipt of this letter? Very truly yours, Secretary to the President. Mr. John E. Wilkie, Chief, Secret Service Division, Treasury Department.TELEGRAM. [*Roosevelt war*] The White House, Washington. PONCE, (Received 10:52 a.m., Nov. 21, 1906.) TAFT, Washington. Cables received and sent you an answer in full by wireless just after leaving Colon Saturday night and also sent you cable this morning. Have directed cable of Saturday to be repeated to you. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.[*[11-21-06]*] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. Ponce Station, 21-11-1906 No. of Words 39 Prefix Recd No. 10:35 am Code................. Sent to Stiago At 10:48am By me.......... J McLeod Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff Total Copy From. Please write distinctly. TO. Theodore Roosevelt Taft Secty War Washington Cables received and sent you answer in full by wireless just after leaving Colon Saturday night & also sent you cable this morning Have directed cable of Saturday to be repeated to you CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, howsoever such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively, although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender Ponce Gov Address FreeTELEGRAM. The White House, Washington. PONCE. (P.R.), Received 10:55 a.m., November 21, 1906. TAFT, Washington. Discharge is not to be suspended unless there are new facts of such importance as to warrant you cabling me. I care nothing whatever for the yelling of either the politician or the sentimentalists, the offence was most heinous and the punishment I inflicted was imposed after due deliberation. All I shall pay heed to is the presentation of facts showing the official reports to be in whole or in part untrue or clearly exculpating some individual man. If any such facts shall later appear I can act as may be deemed advisable, but nothing has been brought before me to warrant the suspension of the order and I direct that it be executed. THEODORE ROOSEVELT. -Fd-[11-21-06] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. Ponce Station, 21-11-1906 No. of Words} 118 Prefix Recd No. 10:30 am Code.......... Sent to Stiago At 10:38am By me.......} McLeod Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff ----------------------------- Total From Please write distinctly TO. Theodore Taft Roosevelt Washington Discharge is not to be suspended unless there are new facts of such importance as to warrant you cabling one. I care nothing whatever for the yelling of either the politician or the sentimentalists. The offence was most heinous and the punishment I inflicted was imposed after due CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, however such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender.............. Address...............[11-21-06] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. ...............Station, ..................... 190 No. of Words} ......... Prefix............... No. ..................Code.................. Sent to............. At.................... By me................ Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff ------------------------------- Total 2 From. Please write distinctly TO. deliberation. All I shall pay heed to is the presentation of facts showing the official reports to be in whole or in part untrue or clearly exculpating some individual man. If any such facts shall later appear I can act as may be deemed advisable - but nothing has been CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, however such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender.............. Address...............[11-21-06] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. ............Station,...............190 No. of ................ Words} Prefix................ No. .................. Code........................ Sent to.............. At..................... By me...................... Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff ---------------------- Total From. Please write distinctly. TO. brought before me to warrant the suspension of the order and I direct that it be executed CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, however such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender Ponce Gov Address FreeTELEGRAM. White House, Washington. PONCE, P.R., Received 12:20 p.m., November 21, 1906. TAFT, Washington. Under no circumstances is that order to be suspended and it will only be revoked if a totally different state of facts can be shown than are shown by the official reports submitted to me. If new facts of importance can be shown then when I return I will take the case up. I am absolutely clear as to the course I took and mere agitation no matter how extended will receive no attention whatsoever from me. I must be given new facts or else the statements in the official reports must be successfully traversed. THEODORE ROOSEVELT -Fd- [11-21-06] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. Ponce Station, 21.11.1906 No. of Words} 99 Prefix Recd No. at 12. noon Code } Sent to Stiago At 12.22 By me } [?] Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff ---------------------------------- Total From. Please write distinctly. TO. Theodore Roosevelt Taft Washington. under no circumstances is that order to be suspended and it will only be revoked if a totally different State of Facts can be shown than are shown by the official reports submitted to me If new facts of importance can be shown then when I return I will take the case up. I am absolutely clear as to the course I took and mere agitation no matter CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, however such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender............. Address...................[11-21-06] No. 1. West India and Panama Telegraph Company, Limited. ...................... Station,................. 190 No. of Words} Prefix................. No. .......................Code.............. Sent to............... At......................... By me............ Message Porterage Reply Repetition Continental Tariff ------------------------------- Total FROM. Please write distinctly TO. how extended will receive no attention whatsoever from me. I must be given new facts or else the Statements in the official reports must be successfully traversed. 3 CONDITIONS. The Company may decline to forward the Message, though it has been received for transmission; but in case of so doing shall refund to the sender the amount paid for its transmission. In case the Message shall never reach its destination by reason of any neglect or default of the Company or its servants whilst the Message remains under the control of the Company, they will refund the amount paid by the sender for such Message. The Company shall not be liable to make compensation beyond the amount to be refunded as above for any loss, injury, or damage arising or resulting from the non-transmission or non-delivery of the Message, or delay or error in the transmission or delivery thereof, however such non-transmission, non-delivery, delay, or error shall have occurred. The Control of the Company over the Message shall be deemed to have entirely ceased for the purposes of these Conditions at any point where, in the course of the transit of the Message to its destination it may be entrusted by the Company (and the Company shall have full power so to entrust the Message) for further transmission by or through any system, service or line of Telegraph belonging to or worked by any administration or authority not controlled by the Company exclusively although worked as part of or in connection with the Telegraphic system or service of the Company. I request that the above Telegram may be forwarded according to the foregoing Conditions, by which I agree to abide. Signature of Sender Ponce Gov Address Free [*Not corrected compare with press copy.*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. U. S. S. Louisiana, At Sea, November 23, 1906. My dear Sir George: I am on my way back from a most interesting trip to Panama, including a stop at Porto Rico. Porto Rico is being admirably governed by a set of as nice young fellows as one could find any where; but I suppose in its administration it does not differ materially from many similar dependencies which your people are administering. But Panama is unique. There the greatest engineering feat of the ages is being attempted. It is the kind of work our people are peculiarly fitted to do, and it is also the kind of work in doing and commanding of which they show not only their best but their worst characteristics. The men I have engaged upon it include Stevens, the big engineer, a rough and tumble westerner, born in the Maine back woods, who has worked his way to the top of his profession, by sheer practical skill displayed in the roughest kind of field work, and Gorgas, the health officer, a fairly good administrator and more than a fairly good scientific doctor of the kind whose silence takes the severely practical shape of dealing with the health problems of the tropics. Three years ago the name Panama was a byword for all that is unhealthy and dangerous in tropic countries. Now [of the] of the five thousand American employees and of their twelve hundred women and children who are with them, there was not one died of disease during the last three months. The West India negroes suffer a great deal more, but their leading disease is pneumonia, due to the impossibility of making them change their clothes when they come in wet; and even among these West India-2- negroes the death rate is smaller than in their own islands. By the way, the Jamaican Governor, Swetingham, has been extremely offensive in all his dealings with us and has made it so disagreeable that I think we shall now have to try to get Chinese laborers. As far as I could find out the other Jamaica people do not sympathize with him at all, nor do those in Barbados; On the contrary, most people except himself in the two islands seem to feel that we are caring well for the laborers whom we take, and that it is an advantage to the islands to have this outlet for their labor. But Swettenham seems to be what is now a days a rather rare individual and an old school tory with the old school tory tendencies of dislike for everything American. It is a quality which is entertaining in Blackwood, or the Saturday Review, but less entertaining in a government official with whom I have to deal. In a very amusing and very kindly, and on the whole not unjust book in which Captain Younghusband describes the Philippines, he spoke of our army out there as looking not like an army in [????] European sense but like the inhabitants of a Rocky Mountain mining town. I know just what he meant, and the comparison was not unjust, and in some ways was more exact then he realized. Our army in service now wears a flannel shirt, light or heavy khaki trousers, leggins and a soft slouch hat, and each man on the average believes in his work and has much power of initiative. Well, in dress and traits the five thousand men on the Isthmus keep making me think of our army as I have actually seen it busily at work some half war like, half administrative problem. Of course there are many exceptions, but in the average the white man on the isthmus feels that he is doing a big job which will reflect credit on the country, and is working with hearty good will. He is well-3- housed and well fed. He often has his wife and children with him, in which case he lives in a really delightful cottage, the home life being just such as one reads about in Octave Thanet's stories of the West and of the American labor people. Did not I once send you a volume of her stories? Mrs. Roosevelt went down with me, and we have made the trip on one of our big battleships, the Louisiana. I do not like a sea voyage myself, tho of course I am interested very much in this great battleship and in her officers and crew. The other day we dined at the chief petty officers' mess, and the men are of the type which make the strength of our navy and of yours. I have had a good deal of time for reading, naturally, and among other things have gone over Milton's prose works. What a radical republican, and what a staunch partisan, and what an intense protestant the fine old fellow was, subject to the inevitable limitations of his time and place, he was curiously modern too. He advocated liberty of conscience to a degree that few then able to advocate, or at least few of those who were not only philosophers like Milton but also like Milton in active public life and his plea for liberty of the press is good reading now. His essay on divorce is curious rather than convincing, and while it is extremely modern in some ways it is not modern at all in the contemptuous arrogance of its attitude toward women. Personally I like his Eikonoklastes, but then I am a radical about punishing people like Charles the Second or Jefferson Davis. It may be very unwise to kill either, but it is eminently righteous to do so - so far that is as anything is righteous which is not in its deepest and truest sense also expedient. I have also been reading Dill's account of Roman society from Nero toMarcus Aurelius. You my dear Sir, who are so blessed as to read all the best of the Greeks or Latins in the original must not look down too scornfully upon us who have to make believe that we are contented with Emerson's view of translations. I am now trying to get some really good English editions of [Tacitus] I want to see if it is possible to pick up some old edition with good print and good binding, and then some new editions like the new ones of After I read Milton and Tacitus until I feel that I can stand them no longer I devour short stories or novels. In the novels I am sorry to say I usually have to go back to those I have read already. But in short stories I take a never ending delight in those I am just reading by Jacob's, for instance. Do you ever waste time with a sufficiently light heart to be willing to read Jacob's account of England's sailor sea-faring folk and of their surroundings. With great regard, With Sincerely yours, Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Wallington, Cambo, Northumberland, England.BROWNSVILLE MATTER DISCHARGE OF NEGRO SOLDIERS. see also Hart, Albert Bushnell 11/26/06 Allison, John. 11/21; 11/24/06 Bingham, Robert 11/23/06 President's message filed in separate envelopes[See also draft 11-29-06] 1 Rec'd 10.57 a.m. Proof wanted 1 p m THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. November 30, 1906. My dear Mr. Root: In view of the fact that Mr. Bellamy Storer has sent to each member of my Cabinet, as well as to myself, a pamphlet under date of November, 1906, purporting to give an account of those relations of his wife me which led up to his removal from the position of Ambassador at Vienna, I think it as well that you and the other members of the Cabinet should know certain facts which he either suppresses or misstates. As to the necessity for removing him from his position, I suppose there is not need of discussion. An Ambassador who refuses to answer the letters of the President can not remain an Ambassador. His statement that my letters to him were of a character such that he could not answer them needs no further comment than to point out that in such case it was his clear duty instantly to resign. His publication of the various private letters between his wife and himself and me would furnish any additional justification, were such needed, for his summary separation from the service. He does not give the State Department's final letter to him, which runs as follows:2 September 10, 1906. Honorable Bellamy Storer, "Paris, France. Sir: Your letter of August 3d does not require any comment as a whole, but by direction of the President I answer it as regards one point. "You assume that in the letter of December 11th the President wrote you not as one official of the United States to another, but a purely personal and private letter, and you state that this letter shows on its face that no answer from you was asked for, suggested or expected.[*3 solid*] "It is hard to understand your making such a statement, in view of the fact that the letter you quote derives its entire importance from the accompanying letter which you were asked to read and hand to Mrs. Storer, in which Mrs. Storer was informed that unless she took certain definite action your connection with the diplomatic service would have to be severed. It is of course unnecessary to discuss and it ought to be unnecessary even to allude to, any proposition so absurd so as that this severance of you from the service would be asked for, not by the President as President, but in his private capacity. The President was anxious to treat both you and Mrs. Storer with the utmost gentleness and consideration, and it seemed to him that his end could be achieved in the way easiest for you by following the course which he actually did follow. The letter to Mrs. Storer of course became part of the matter of which you were required to take cognizance. In it Mrs. Storer was asked to fulfill certain conditions, failure to fulfill which would require, she was informed, your severance from the service; which conditions she never fulfilled. You were requested to read this letter and hand it to her. It is difficult to stigmatize merely as folly the proposition that under these conditions the President's letter required no answer. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary.4 It is never pleasant to have to discuss personal affairs, or to quote or explain from personal correspondence; which is one reason why it is held to be a peculiarly [base and] ungentlemanly thing to publish private correspondence. But as Mr. Storer in his extraordinary pamphlet prints various letters written by himself, by me, and by Mrs. Storer, I shall set forth briefly the facts of the case, giving certain letters which are necessary in order to understand clearly those which he prints.[*5*] 3 I first met the Storers while I was Civil Service Commissioner, and he had come to Washington as a Congressman. They were then kind and friendly in their relations with me and my family. I retained a lively recollections of this kind and friendly attitude, and because of the affection it inspired I submitted to conduct from Mr. and Mrs. Storer to which I would have submitted from no other Ambassador and his wife; and I did not resent their actions until it became evident that they were likely to damage American interests. Mrs. Storer insisted to me often that their change of creed had proved a deadly blow to her husband's career, and that they were suffering for conscience's sake. I accepted this statement as true, and it gave me a certain chivalric feeling that I ought to do what I could to help them, and be as patient as possible with them. [*6*] Under President McKinley Mr. Storer was made Minister first to Belgium and then to Spain. Mr. and Mrs. Storer were greatly interested in securing the promotion of Archbishop Ireland to be a Cardinal. I had - and have - a sincere respect and admiration for Archbishop Ireland, a respect and admiration which I have often publicly exprest. The letters from me to Mr. and Mrs. Storer quoted in Mr. Storer's pamphlet give with precision my views both upon Archbishop Ireland and upon the possibility or propriety of my taking in his behalf the steps which the Storers asked; and I can add nothing to what these letters themselves show. When they first wrote to me on the subject I was Governor of New York. Not being President myself, and not having thought out with clearness the exact situation, I [wrote to] asked President McKinley whether he could properly do anything to help Archbishop Ireland. He responded that it was not a matter with which we could with propriety interfere; altho he exprest himself as having the same high opinion of the Archbishop that I had. I had a further conversation with the President on the subject, either just before or just after my election as Vice President. In my letter to Mrs. Storer of November 23, 1900, quoted by Mr. Storer in his pamphlet, I stated with absolute clearness my position and why it was out of the question for the President to try to get any Archbishop made Cardinal; and all the letters quoted by Mr. Storer [*even*]6 [*Rewritten*] about yours. They can no more understand your turning Catholic than you can understand Catholics turning Protestant. Some of the best people I have ever met were Protestants who had originally been Catholics. I cannot stop, and I cannot urge the stopping of, missionaries going anywhere they choose. I emphatically feel, as I have always told you, that the chance for bettering the Catholic inhabitants of the tropic islands lies by bringing them up to the highest standard of American Catholicism. The worst thing that could happen both for them and the Catholic Church would be for the Catholic Church to champion the iniquities that have undoubtedly been committed, not only by lay, but by clerical, should-be leaders in the Philippines and elsewhere. One incident, which I actually cannot put on paper, came to my personal knowledge in connection with a high Catholic ecclesiastic in Cuba, which was of a character so revolting and bestial that it made one feel that the whole hierarchy in the island needed drastic renovation. Now, I very earnestly wish that Archbishop Ireland and those who are most advanced among our Catholic priests - men like the Paulist Fathers for instance -- should be given a free hand in these islands and should [[*stars*] be advanced in every way; [and Archbishop Corrigan's recent letter on the public schools created a very unfavourable impression here.] But you must remember how hampered I am in writing, from the fact that I do not like to see any one admit for a moment the right of a foreign potentate to interfere in American public policy. For instance, you speak of the Pope being angry with Archbishop Ireland for not stopping the war with Spain. As far as I am concerned, I would resent as an impertinence any European, whether Pope, Kaiser, Czar or President, daring to be angry with any American because of his action or non-action as regards any question between America and an outside nation. No pretention of this kind should be admitted fro for one moment. If any man, clerical or lay, Bishop, Archbishop, priest or civilian, was in any way guilty of treasonable practices with Spain during our war, he should be shot or hung, and it is an outrage on justice that he should be at large. But I cannot write in a way that will seem to defend a man for not averting war with Spain, for I cannot recognize for a single moment the right of any European to so much as think that there is need of defense or excuse in such a case. "As you know, I always treat Catholic and Protestant exactly alike, as I do Jew or Gentile, as I do the man of native American, German, Irish or any other kind of parentage. Any discrimination for or against a man because of his creed or nativity strikes me as an infamy. Men like Bishop Keane, like the late Father Casselly, like Father Belford, the parish priest of my own town of Oyster Bay [until recently], and like scores of other priests whom I could name, are entitled to receive from me the same measure of affectionate respect and loyal support that I have given to men like Phillips Brooks, like Mr. Devine and like so very many other Protestant clergymen whom I could name. Moreover, my dear Mrs. Storer, whatever I could do for you and Bellamy, would be done; but I simply do not see how I can do anything in this particular matter. "With real regret, "Very sincerely yours, "THEODORE ROOSEVELT."[*7*] [*even*] as having been subsequently written by me to him or to his wife take precisely the same position. I explained repeatedly that my friendship [for] and admiration for Archbishop Ireland, was like of my friendship and admiration for Bishop Laurence of the Episcopal church and Bishop Garston of the Methodist church, would make me pleased to see any good fortune attend him or churchman [of any creed] like him of any creed; but the [?] could not interfere for his promotion, or [?] in any way in the ecclesiastical affairs of any church. This was also the position I took in all private conversations, and the assertion that [at] in any private conversation I took an opposite position from that which I was thus repeatedly expressing in writing is not only an untruth by an absurd untruth; for I would of course not say privately to anyone the opposite of what I was repeatedly writing to that same person. Mr. Storer asserts that he and Mrs. Storer and various other people after conversations with me put down memoranda as to what they remembered I had said (or wisht to have it appear that I had said). If such action was taken, it was of course simply dishonorable. No one of them ever showed me or would have ventured to show me any such memoranda, and it is [of course] nonsense to expect to bind me by a memorandum the existence of which was concealed from me. The Storers were my guests at the time when, as they assert, they made these memoranda of private conversations with me, and their conduct in taking these memoranda under such circumstances need not be characterized. As a matter of fact, the statements they allege me to have made were not made, save in so far that what they allege me to have said agreed with what, before and after, I wrote to them.[*Rewritten*] [*8*] 7 General Porter is a man of good common sense, but in manner and language he is not just what we call a gentleman." In view of the intense indignation of Mr. and Mrs. Storer at [his] being removed from office now, there is a certain element of the comic in their attempt thus to get me to remove either you or Mr. Choate or Mr. Porter for the purpose of giving them [Mr. Storer] either a cabinet position or an [the] Embassy in England or France. I received many letters of the general tenor of those mentioned, enumerating [their] hardship and services and their enemies - in that of January 31, 1902, for instance, Mrs. Storer writing "Everything that envy, hatred or malice can say will be said to you against us because Bellamy has enemies among corrupt Senators, A. P. A. fanatics, and Catholic reactionaries." [Insert notes] There remains for me to discuss but one matter, and that is Mr. Storer's assertion in his pamphlet that altho in my letters I persistently refused to ask the Pope to promote Archbishop Ireland to be a Cardinal, I gave him a verbal message commissioning him to make the request, my behalf, of the Pope. Mr. Storer also asserts that President McKinley took similar course, commissioning a gentleman whom he names to ask the appointment of Archbishop Ireland as Cardinal "as a personal favor to him," the President, and as "an honor to the country". This is the direct contrary of what President McKinley told me was his attitude in the matter, and Mr. Cortelyou, who was them his private secretary, writes me as follows:[*8*] Mrs. Storer wrote me with great freedom, and sometimes it was difficult to know quite how to answer her. She continually made attacks upon all sorts of people, including President McKinley himself, Senators Hanna and Foraker, and especially members of her own church; her attacks being especially bitter upon Archbishop Corrigan, but also upon Archbishop Farley and others. Both she and Mr. Storer frequently commented with bitterness on various church dignitaries: Cardinal Merry del Val, Bishop Messmer, Monsignor O'Connell, and others. At one time she wrote me with great bitterness against the Protestant missionaries who were being sent to the Philippines, at the same time requesting me to champion Archbishop Ireland because he had been loyal to the United States during the war with Spain, which she asserted was not true as to Archbishop Corrigan. While I was always reluctant to write in a way that would hurt the feelings of either of the Storers, on this occasion I thought it necessary to write just what my position was; and accordingly replied as follows:[*Rewritten*] 9 There remains for me to discuss but one matter, and that is Mr. Storer's assertion in his pamphlet that altho in my letters I persistently refused to ask the Pope to promote Archbishop Ireland to be a Cardinal, I [nevertheless] gave him a verbal message commissioning him to make the request, on my behalf, of the Pope. Mr. Storer also asserts that President McKinley took a similar course, commissioning a gentleman whom he names to ask the appointment of Archbishop Ireland as Cardinal "as a personal favor to him," the President, and as "an honor to the country." This is the direct contrary of what President McKinley told me was his attitude in the matter, and Mr. Cortelyou, who was then his private secretary, writes me as follows: [see Cortelyou, Geo Bruce 12/1/06]May 18th, 1900. My dear Mrs. Storer: Your letter of the 4th has just come to hand; also that of the 6th. I am very, very fond of you, and that is the reason your letters put me in a quandary. You want me to do all kinds of things that I cannot possibly do, and that I ought not to do; and you say things which I do not want to contradict, and yet it makes me feel hypocritical if I seem to acquiesce in them. You must remember that there are many other people who feel about their religion just as you feel yours. yours. They can no more understand your turning Catholic than you can understand Catholics turning Protestant. Some of the best people I have ever met were Protestants who had originally been Catholics. I cannot stop, and I cannot urge the stopping of, missionaries going anywhere they choose. I emphatically feel, as I have always told you, that the chance for bettering the Catholic inhabitants of the tropic islands lies by bringing them up to the highest standard of American Catholicism. The worst thing that could happen both for them and the Catholic Church would be for the Catholic Church to champion the iniquities that have undoubtedly been committed, not only by lay, but by lay, but by clerical, should-be leaders in the Philippines and elsewhere. One incident, which I actually cannot put on paper, came to my personal knowledge in connection with a high Catholic ecclesiastic in Cuba, which was of a character so revolting and bestial that it made one feel that the whole hierarchy in [*even*][*even*] [*10*] the island needed drastic renovation. Now, I very earnestly wish that Archbishop Ireland those who are most advanced among our Catholic priests - men like the Paulist Fathers for instance - should be given a free hand in these islands and should be advanced in every way * * * But you must remember how hampered I am in writing, from the fact that I do not like to see any one admit for a moment the right of a foreign potentate to interfere in American public policy. For instance, you speak of the Pope being angry with Archbishop Ireland for not stopping the war with Spain. As far as I am concerned, I would resent as an impertinence any European, whether Pope, Kaiser, Czar or President, daring to be angry with any American because of his action or non-action as regards any question between America and an outside nation. No pretension of this kind should be admitted for one moment. If any man, clerical or lay, Bishop, Archbishop, priest or civilian, was in any way guilty of treasonable practices with Spain during our war, he should be shot or hung, and it is an outrage on justice that he should be at large. But I cannot write in a way that will seem to defend a man for not averting war with Spain, for I cannot recognize for a single moment the right of any European to so much as think that there is need of defense or excuse in such a case.[*11*] As you know, I always treat Catholic and Protestant exactly alike, as I do Jew or Gentile, as I do the man of native American, German, Irish or any other kind of parentage. Any discrimination for or against a man because of his creed or nativity strikes me as an infamy. Men like Bishop Keane, like the late Father Casselly, like Father Belford, the parish priest of my own town of Oyster Bay, and like scores of other priests whom I could name, are entitled to receive from me the same measure of affectionate respect and loyal support - that I have given to men like Phillips Brooks, like Mr. Devine and like so very many other Protestant clergymen whom I could name. Moreover, my dear Mrs. Storer, whatever I could do for you and Bellamy, would be done; but I simply do not see how I can do anything in this particular matter. With real regret, Very sincerely yours, Theodore Roosevelt.[*12*] 7 As soon as I became President I began to receive letters from Mrs. Storer asking for the promotion of Mr. Storer, and letters from both of them complaining that the work in Madrid was uncongenial, and complaining also of the character [and standing] of various people [in the public service.] On September 22, 1901, eight days after President McKinley died, Mrs. Storer wrote me urging that I should appoint Mr. Storer to the Cabinet, and specifying as a desirable place the War Department, of which you were head; the letter running - "Please give him either the Navy or War. * * * I pray that Bellamy, who so richly deserves it, shall have a chance for honorable service at home to his country." When I explained that I did not intend to remove you or make any other changes in the Cabinet at the time, she wrote me, on October 17th, saying that she distrusted Senator Hanna as well as Senator Foraker and was afraid they might persuade me against my better judgment [*even*][*even*] [*13*] to pass her husband by, and continuing, "The Embassies of London and Paris are places in which to do eminent service to the country, and a man who is fit to go there may thank his stars for the chance - and not simply wish for a soft place in which to make facetious after-dinner speeches. *** For the Cabinet a man may be socially a 'hayseed', any sort or rough diamond *** but for a high diplomatic post a man must be a gentleman in our sense of the word. *** If he be not a gentleman and his wife a lady such as you or I would care to meet - I don't care how much American honesty and intelligence he may have, he will injure his country and her reputation abroad. *** Take a man of Choate's astuteness and standing with us as one example. His utter lack of manners has made him notorious from his first arrival. (She then recites a doubtless fictitious anecdote as to Mr. Choate's behavior in London.) ***[*even*] [*14*] 8 General Porter is a man of good common sense, but in manner and language he is not just what we call a gentleman." In view of the intense indignation of Mr. and Mrs. Storer at his being removed from office now, there is a certain element of the comic in their attempt thus to get me to remove either you or Mr. Choate or Mr. Porter for the purpose of giving Mr. Storer either a Cabinet position or the Embassy in England or France. I received many letters of the general tenor of those mentioned, enumerating their hardships and services and their enemies - in that of January 31, 1902, for instance, Mrs. Storer writing, "Everything that envy, hatred or malice can say will be said to you against us because Bellamy has enemies among corrupt Senators, A. P. A. fanatics, and Catholic reactionaries."[*even*] [*15*] reactionaries." As Mr. Storer in his pamphlet quotes a letter of November 24th from me marked personal, in which I told his wife that he should be made Special Ambassador at the marriage of the King of Spain, stating that this was a fresh mark of my approval of his conduct, I may mention that the letter containing this statement on my part was in answer to one from Mrs. Storer in which she begged for the appointment of her husband; [her] the letter running in part as follows: "Please, please send us to Madrid as Special Envoys to the wedding. It would be very appropriate, and I would love it." It is hard to find the exact words in which to criticize Mr. Storer's effort to twist [the meaning of] my granting such a request, couched in such a style, [into the meaning which he gives it.][*16*] 9 There remains for me to discuss but one matter, and that is Mr. Storer's assertion in his pamphlet that altho in my letters I persistently refused to ask the Pope to promote Archbishop Ireland to be a Cardinal, I nevertheless gave him a verbal message commissioning him to make the request, on my behalf, of the Pope. Mr. Storer also asserts that President McKinley took a similar course, commissioning a gentleman whom he names to ask the appointment of Archbishop Ireland as Cardinal "as a personal favor to him," the President, and as "an honor to the country." This is the direct contrary of what President McKinley told me was his attitude in the matter, and Mr. Cortelyou, who was then his private secretary, writes me as follows:[*17*] Office of the Postmaster General Washington, D.C., December 1, 1906. My dear Mr. President: In the pamphlet - 'Letter of Bellamy Storer to the President and the Members of his Cabinet, November, 1906' - are several statements referring to the late President McKinley, among them the following: President McKinley heartily furthered the efforts made by Mr. Roosevelt, myself and others to promote the appointment of Archbishop Ireland (as Cardinal), and in the spring of 1899 he commissioned Bishop O'Gorman to say to the Pope that "the appointment would be considered a personal favor to him, the President, as well as an honor to the country." And this the Bishop did, speaking in the President's name in a personal audience with the Pope.'This statement of Mr. Storer distorts what was evidently an expression of deep personal regard and respect for an individual into what is in substance a request for his advancement as a member of an ecclesiastical organization. The late President never made such a request, never 'furthered the efforts' of any one to bring about such an appointment, nor would he permit any official of his administration to do so. He was scrupulously particular in this regard, and he made no compromise with his convictions on the subject. 18Speaking from personal knowledge of President McKinley's attitude concerning Archbishop Ireland, I wish to say that he had the [*19*] highest regard for the Archbishop and believed that while devoted to his church he was in full sympathy with American ideals, and that because of this he was able to render immeasurable service both to his church and to his country. But if Bishop O'Gorman made any such representation as that alluded to by Mr. Storer he did so under an absolute misapprehension. I have repeatedly heard President McKinley state that in all such matters he could not divorce himself from his position as President, and that he would not under any circumstances interfere with or attempt to influence the action of any religious organization here or abroad looking to the preferment of any of its members.[*19*] [*20*] "In the following this course he was true to fundamental principles of the American government, as you have been. "What I have said regarding the particular quotation above referred to applies to any other similar reference to the late President in this pamphlet. "Very sincerely yours, "Geo. B. Cortelyou.[*21*] As for Mr. Storer's assertion that I authorized him to make such a statement as he says he was authorized to make to the Pope, it is untrue. I gave him no such authorization. Mr. Storer proceeds to say that he at once wrote me a letter giving a full account of his visit to the Vatican, and of the message he personally gave the Pope. A careful search of the files in my office fails to show any such letter from him; and neither I nor my Secretary, Mr. Loeb, who receives and examines all my correspondence, have any remembrance of ever receiving such a letter; and had it been received we could not fail to remember it. I never received from him any letter giving any such account of his visit to the Vatican and his conversation with the Pope as he now says he sent me; and this is evident from the letters which he gives [*even*][*Rewritten*] [*a*] As for Mr. Storer's assertion that I authorized him to make such a statement as he says he was authorized to make to the Pope, it is untrue. I gave him no such authorization. Mr. Storer proceeds to say that he at once wrote me a letter giving a full account of [what he had done. I believe all his letters are on the files of my office and] his visit to the Vatican, and of the message he personally gave the Pope. A careful search of the files in my office fails to show any such letter from him. I never received such a letter from him, and this is evident from the letters which he gives as written by me to him on December 27th and December 30th, in which, as you will see, I specifically state that I did not know whether or not he had even called at the Vatican, and that he might merely have seen some Cardinal privately - a statement wholly incompatible with my having received such a notice as that which he says he sent. On December 19th I had written him, anent a request made to me by Monsignor O'Connell that I should write a letter for Archbishop Ireland, [saying] - "I told him of course that I could not interfere in such a matter, as it was none of my business who was made Cardinal; that personally I had a very strong friendship and admiration for the Archbishop, and that individually it would please me greatly to see him made Cardinal, just as it pleased me when Dr. Satterlee was made Bishop of Washington; but that I could no more interfere in one case than in the other - in short, that my feeling for the Archbishop was due to my respect for him as a useful and honorable man - just such a feeling I have had for Phillips Brooks and for many other clergymen of various denominations; but that I could not as President in any way try to help any clergyman of any denomination to high rank in that denomination." I say that I never received such a letter as that which Mr. Storer alleges he wrote me. I may add that I do not believe he ever sent such a letter. My reasons are, the statements he makes on pages [24] 23 [and] to 25 of his pamphlet, running as follows, he having first stated that from my letters he gathered that I had resolved to repudiate all authority for his action and to appear ignorant of it: [*insert pp 23 & 24*][*Rewritten*] As for Mr. Storer's assertion that I authorized him to make such a statement as he says he was authorized to make to the Pope, it is untrue. I gave him no such authorization. Mr. Storer proceeds to say that he at once wrote me a letter giving full account of his visit to the Vatican, and of the message he personally gave the Pope. A careful search of the files in my office fails to show any such letter from him! I never received [such a letter from him] from him any letter giving [statements] any such account of his visit to the Vatican and his conversation with the Pope as he [?] says he sent me; and neither I nor my secretary Mr. Loeb, who receives and opening [sees] all my correspondence, have any remembrance of ever receiving such a letter; and had it been received we could not fail to remember it, and this is evident from the letters which he gives as written by me to him on December 27th and December 30th, in which, you will see, I specifically state that I did not know whether or not he had even called at the Vatican, and that he might merely have seen some Cardinal privately - a statement wholly incompatible with my having received such a [notice] letter as that which he says he sent. On December 19th I had written him, anent a request made to me by Monsignor O'Connell that I should write a letter for Archbishop Ireland, "I told him of course that I could not interfere in such a matter, as it was none of my business who was made Cardinal; that personally I had a very strong friendship and admiration for the Archbishop, and that individually it would please me greatly to see him made Cardinal, just as it pleased me when Dr. Satterlee was made Bishop of Washington; but that I could no more interfere in one case than in the other - in short, that my feeling for the Archbishop was due to my respect for him as a useful and honorable man - just such a feeling as I have had for Phillips Brooks and for many other clergymen of various denominations; but that I could not as President in any way try to help any clergyman of any denomination to high rank in that denomination." I say that I never received such a letter as that which Mr. Storer alleges he wrote me. I may add that I [am inclined to doubt whether ] [do not believe he ever sent such a letter. My reasons are, the statements he makes on pages 23 to 25] am [not] by no means certain he ever sent me such a letter, my doubt being [? based on] due to the facts [I shall now] I am about to set forth, which show that when he [now speaks] now attempts to describe the letters he sent me, Mr. Storer's memory becomes exceedingly treacherous.[*22*] 11 [*even*] as written by me to him on December 27th and December 30th, in which, as you will see, I specifically state the I did not know whether or not he had even called at the Vatican, and that he might "merely have seen some Cardinal privately" - a statement wholly incompatible with my having received such a letter as that which he says he sent. [In his answer to this letter he never ?????????? on in any way alluded to this statement of mine; which he could hardly have failed to do had he sent me already written me such a letter as he now describes.] On December 19th I had written him, anent a request made to me by Monsignor O'Connell that I should write a letter for Archbishop Ireland,[*23*] I told him of course that I could not interfere in such a matter, as it was none of my business who was made Cardinal, that personally I had a very strong friendship and admiration for the Archbishop, and that individually it would please me greatly to see him Cardinal, just as it pleased me when Dr. Satterlee was made Bishop of Washington; but that I could no more interfere in one case than in the other - in short, that my feeling for the Archbishop was due to my respect for him as a useful and honorable man - just such a feeling as I have had for Phillips Brooks and for many other clergymen of various denominations; but that I could not as President in any way try to help any clergyman of any denomination to high rank in that denomination.I say that I never received such a letter as that which Mr. Storer alleges he wrote me. I may add that I am by no means certain he ever sent me such a letter; my doubt being due to the facts I am about to set forth, which show that when he attempts to describe the letters he sent me, Mr. Storer's memory becomes exceedingly treacherous. [*24*][*25*] 12 On pp 23 to 25 of of his pamphlet, [running] Mr. Storer writes as follows, (he having first stated that from my letters he gathered that I had resolved to repudiate all authority for his action and to appear ignorant of it) "Shortly after writing this I received another letter from the President. I quote the portions referring to this matter:[*26*] Let me repeat to you that in reference to matters affecting the Catholic Church events have absolutely (and conclusively) shown that while you are Ambassador you must keep absolutely clear of any deed or word in Rome or elsewhere which would seem to differentiate your position from that of other Ambassadors. The mere fact of a (the) report in the newspapers about your calling at the Vatican (has) had a very unfortunate effect. I daresay you did not call. You may merely have seen some Cardinal privately, but the unpleasant talk over the affair emphasizes the need of extreme circumspection while you are in your present position. While I am President and you are Ambassador neither of us in his public relation(s) is to act as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile, and we have to be careful not merely to do what is right but so to carry ourselves as to show that we are doing what is right. I shall ask you not to quote me to any person in any shape or way in connection with any affair of the Catholic Church and yourself not to take action of any kind which will give ground for the belief that you as an American Ambassador are striving to interfere in the affairs of the church.This letter, with its virtual assertion that my visit to the Vatican was not only authorized, but was so contrary to what could have been expected that the President hardly then believed that it had occurred, was unintelligible except on the theory that he had resolved to repudiate all authority for my action, and to appear ignorant of it, and was now writing a letter which would be serviceable if needed later as evidence to support that position. In fact, this was the use to which the letter was afterwards actually put by him in quoting it to persons not informed of the facts, as will appear later. 27 I felt that the only thing for me to do in this situation was to tender my resignation at once, and that I immediately did accompanying it by a letter to the President of which I regret to say that I can find no copy. To this I received the following reply: --[*28*] White House, Washington, January 29, 1904. Dear Bellamy: I have your letter. It is absolutely all right; we will treat the incident as closed. Nothing would persuade me to accept your resignation, old fellow, and I am sure John Hay feels as I do. When I see you I shall explain, as I do not like to do on paper, both how full had been the steps taken by Hay in investigating the matter, and the use that was made against me of your letter. I shall give Hay your note. Faithfully yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.29 With the the incident closed. I had followed exactly the President' request in seeing Pope Pius X. I had reported to him in detail my interview; I had put it squarely to him that I had done nothing beyond what he had asked me to do, and he had thereupon left the subject, not disavowing his authority nor dissenting from any statement. I accordingly accepted as sincere the cordial expressions with which he refused to accept my resignations, as it was apparent that his irritation had been caused, not by my acts but by the publicity which had unfortunately been given to things which he wishes to have done, but wished to be kept secret. 30 14 Fortunately I have the original of the letter of which Mr. Storer says he kept no copy, and it shows that Mr. Storer's statement is false. This letter was in answer to a letter of mine which he quotes in part, but which in its entirety is as follows: Peraonal] THE WHITE HOUSE Washington, December 30, 1903. 31 My dear Bellamy: In my last letter to you I wrote you as to a report I had heard about your writing a letter concerning the dismissal of Hurst. This came to me from an outside source, and I did not credit it. Since then Secretary Hay has sent me over a letter (of yours) to Senator Hanna which the latter put before the Department with a request that he be given information in order to answer you. Secretary Hay feels, of course, exceedingly indignant over your having written in such a manner to an outsider, and feels that there should be some official rebuke. Because of our personal relations I write in this way to you instead.I hardly think you could have thought exactly what you were writing. You say, for instance, about the dismissal of Hurst, "I do know the manner of his removal, in a way I should be ashamed to employ with a common servant. *** I have never known, if what I hear is the case, of a more sudden or unexpected action of any administration *** It may be none of your business nor mine, but I know you do not like injustice.' 32Of course, this amounts to a bitter attack upon the administration of which you are a part. You make charges of a grave nature against the Secretary of State and the President under whom you are serving. If these charges were true that would not, in my opinion, justify you in writing to the Senator in such fashion. As it happens, they we absolutely without foundation. No case was gone into more carefully than this. I have reports before me from Ambassador McCormick and from a special and trusted agent of the Department - a man in whose judgment the Department has absolute confidence. No other action was possible in view of these reports. [*33*]"I know, my dear Bellamy, that you have not intended to do anything disloyal or improper, but surely on thinking over the matter you will see that there would be but one possible construction to be put upon such a letter from you. Think of the effect if your letter were made public! 34— Let me repeat to you that, in reference to matters affecting the Catholic Church, events have conclusively shown that while you are Ambassador you must keep absolutely clear of any deed or word in Rome er elsewhere which would seem to differentiate your position from that of other Ambassadors. The mere fact of the report in the newspapers about your calling at the Vatican has had a very unfortunate effect. [*35*] I daresay you did not call; you may merely have seen some Cardinal privately; but the unpleasant talk over the affair emphasizes the need [*even*] [*36*] of extreme circumspection while you are in your present position. While I am President and you are Ambassador neither of us in his public relations is to act as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile; and we have to be careful, not merely to do what is right, but so to carry ourselves as to show that we are doing what is right. I shall ask you not to quote me to any person in any shape or way in connection with any affair of the Catholic Church, and yourself not to take action of any kind which will give ground for the belief that you, as an American Ambassador, are striving to interfere in the affairs of the church. With love to Maria, Faithfully yours, Theodore Roosevelt, 37 In response to this Mr. Storer wrote me a letter tendering his resignation, not as he asserts because of anything in connection with his visit to the Vatican, but solely because of his conduct in the Hurst matter. In this letter in answer of mine of December 30th he makes absolutely no allusion whatever to what I said in that letter as to his call at the Vatican; for this letter of mine shows that I had then never heard from him that he called at the Vatican; and his absolute silence at the time shows that what he says now on the subject is a pure afterthought. He never in any way dissented from the statements I made in these three letters of December 19th, 27th and 30th; and in this letter of January 16th, in which he tendered his resignation, his whole concern was over his conduct in the Hurst affair. His letter runs in part as follows (all the omitted parts referring also exclusively to the Hurst matter):[*d*] [*Rewritten*] I daresay you did not call; you may merely have seen some Cardinal privately; but the unpleasant talk over the affair emphasizes the need of extreme circumspection while you are in your present position. While I am President and you are Ambassador neither of us in his public relations is to act as Catholic or Protestant, Jew or Gentile; and we have to be careful, not merely to do what is right, but so to carry ourselves as to show that we are doing what is right. I shall ask you not to quote me to any person in any shape or way in connection with any affair of the Catholic Church, and yourself not to take action of any kind which will give ground for the belief that you, as an American Ambassador, are striving to interfere in the affairs of the church. "With love to Maria, "Faithfully yours, "Theodore Roosevelt.” In response to this Mr. Storer wrote me a letter tendering his resignation, not as he asserts because of anything in connection with his visit to the Vatican, but solely because of his conduct in the Hurst matter. In this letter in answer to mine of December 30th he makes absolutely no allusion whatever, to what I had said in that letter as to his call at the Vatican; for this letter of mine shows that I had then heard from him that he called at the Vatican; and his absolute silence at the time shows that what he says now on the subject is a pure afterthought. He never in any way dissented from the statements I made in these three letters of December 19th, 27th and 30th; and in this letter of January 16th, in which he tendered his resignation, his whole concern was over his conduct in the Hurst affair. His letter runs in part as follows (all the omitted parts referring also exclusively to the Hurst matter): "16, January, 1904. "My dear Theodore, "I find in answering your letter of December that I made an error of date. The letter I wrote Hanna, as also the writing to yourself on the Consul General matter was after 22d Feby 1903, instead of in January as I inadvertently stated. Since then I have received your second letter of 30 December.[*38*] 16 January, 1904. My dear Theodore, I find in answering your letter of December 1 that I made an error of date. The letter I wrote Hanna, as also the writing to yourself on the Consul General matter was after 22d Feby 1903, instead of in January as I inadvertently stated. Since then I have received your second letter of 30 December. 16 [*39*] My writing any letter in the terms I did, was inexcusable and that I admit fully and with the deepest regret. *** If in your judgment it would clear me in Mr. Hay's eyes, will you hand him the enclosed note of personal apology. But I beg you will do this or not as you think wise, as I must not appear to try to escape official pressure by personal repentance. Therefore give or burn this note as you deem best. Not to justify my writing at all, or in using the language I did, but to explain the affair, I must call attention to the difference of procedure in this consular case to what I had supposed was precedent. *** All this is no excuse for a public officer writing as I did outside of the Department. If in weighing the matter it seems as if I by my own act have lost the confidence of the [*even*]40 even Secretary of State, you must, without regard to me, treat me as you would any other public officer for the good of the service. Without the confidence of the Department the work can not go on. But for your own sake I should wish that my leaving the service might be made to appear a voluntary one, in the spring or early simmer. As also I think it would be better to have it known after June. In spite of everything, it might make political gossip which I should wish to postpone until the din of the campaign is on. I thank you, my dear Theodore, loyally and sincerely for your letter. I never doubt your absolute loyalty in friendship to me and mine. Faithfully yours, Bellamy Storer.[*41*] There could be no fuller confession of wrongdoing or more absolute throwing himself upon the mercy of his superior. It was this letter which I answered saying, as he has himself quoted, that I would treat the incident as closed and would not accept his resignation, and that I was sure that John Hay felt as I did. With peculiar perfidy Mr. Storer now seeks to turn this act of cordial, and I think I may add generous, friendship on my part, into an attack upon me by treating my refusal to accept his resignation as an endorsement of his position in the matter of the Vatican, to which there was absolutely no allusion whatever of any kind or sort in his letter of resignation.This [bare] recital of facts is in itself the severest possible condemnation of Mr. Storer's disingenuousness. Very truly yours, [*42*] Hon. Elihu Root, Secretary of State. [*X*]11-30-06 [[shorthand]][attached to memo 11-30-06]Sent to Mr. Buck 12/3/06. M.C.L. Whitridge Special Ambassador Report of[*Panama*] TRANSLATION OF CABLEGRAM SENT December 4, 1906. To STEVENS, Ancon. Without deciding matter hope you will not take action about Sullivan as I wish to disturb things as little as possible until I see you. Theodore RooseveltCHARGE TO Panama. GOVERNMENT RATE. CABLEGRAM. OFFICIAL BUSINESS. Bureau of Insular Affairs, WASHINGTON. December 4, 1906. STEVENS, Ancon. 76351 29224 49246 41678 11042 10230 sullivan 15839 76266 32231 70762 47919 73315 42200 64898 76958. Theodore Roosevelt.[*Rewritten*] THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON. December 6, 1906. [CO] or [WA] My dear Senator Clark [?????] In reference to the [matter of] query about Mr. Alford W. Cooley, nominated as Assistant Attorney General, I hope you will [in your discretion bring this letter to the attention of any member of the Judiciary Committee who ?? may desire to know the facts.] put this letter before the members of the Judiciary Committee, and I particularly ask that it be brought to the attention of Senator Knox, as he has himself been Attorney General. Mr. Cooley was recommended to me for this position, wholly without any suggestion on my part, by Mr. Moody, who at the same time said that he thought that inasmuch as Mr. Bonaparte was so soon to succeed him, Mr. Bonaparte should be consulted. I accordingly asked Mr. Bonaparte to look into the matter, and Mr. Bonaparte reported to me that he had done so and that be particularly desired Mr. Cooley's services. I acted in this case exactly as I acted in every [such] case while Mr. Knox was Attorney General, as I have acted in every [such] case while Mr. Moody has been Attorney General, and as I shall act while Mr. Bonaparte is Attorney General - that is, I told both Mr. Moody and Mr. Bonaparte that they were to have an entirely free hand, (subject only to the Senators [of] from the State from which the man was appointed consenting to his appointment) because in such an intimate position as this I feel that the Attorney General should have the man he wants. I may add that I most heartily concur in the feeling of Messrs. Moody and Bonaparte as to Mr. Gooley's fitness. What they especially wanted was a man who could take12-10-06 Peirce US [[shorthand]][attached to T.R. ca 12-10-06]Copy. The White House, Washington, December 10, 1906. Mr. J. Lovland, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Chairman of the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament, Christiana. I am profoundly moved and touched by the signal honor shown me thru your body in conferring upon me the Nobel peace prize. There is no gift I could appreciate more; and I wish it were in my power fully to express my gratitude. I thank you for myself, and I thank you on behalf of the United States; for what I did I was able to accomplish only as the representative of the Nation of which for the time being I am President. After much thought I have concluded that the best and most fitting way to apply the amount of the prize is by using it as a foundation to establish at Washington a permanent Industrial Peace Committee. The object will be to strive for better and more equitable relations among my countrymen who are engaged, whether as capitalists or wage workers, in industrial and agricultural pursuits. This will carry out the purpose of the founder of the prize; for in modern life it is as important to work for the cause of just and righteous peace in the industrial world as in the world of nations. I again express to you the assurance of my deep and lasting gratitude and appreciation. THEODORE ROOSEVELT.12/12/06 [[shorthand]]THE WHITE HOUSE. WASHINGTON. [*Letter from Charles Curtis, M.G., and enclosures ???????? 12/17/06*] December 15, 1906. My dear Mr. Smith: I dislike to have to write you that I hear very badly of Judge Townsend, and from sources that I think are entitled to much credence. He apparently is not satisfactory at all, chiefly because of things that have happened to him because of his age. I am keeping an open mind about him, however. With regard, believe me, Sincerely yours, Hon. Charles Emory Smith, The Press, Philadelphia. [*Send all to Dept of Justice*](Copy) THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON December 27, 1906. My dear Mr. Ambassador: Your favor of the 14th instant, relative to the visit to America of the Wiener Mannergesang-Verein, has been received, and I shall be glad to arrange for the President and Mrs Roosevelt to receive them in the East Room of the White House at 2:30 o'clock some afternoon, say in connection with their engagement at Baltimore. When that day has been definitely fixed, please have me advised. Very sincerely yours, (Signed) Wm Loeb, Jr Secretary to the President Hon Charles S Francis Ambassador of the United States, Vienna, Austria.Stour [[shorthand]]2 [[shorthand]]3 [[shorthand]]4 [[shorthand]](5) [[shorthand]]6 [[shorthand]]1 [[shorthand]]8 [[shorthand]]9 [[shorthand]]10 [[shorthand]]11 [[shorthand]]12 [[shorthand]]13 [[shorthand]]14 [[shorthand]][ca 1906]?