Do Socio-Economic Conditions Influence Dynastic Politics? Initial Evidence from the 16th Lok Sabha of India

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1. Introduction

At a campaign rally in Kishtwar in November 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India asked: "Will only two families rule in Jammu and Kashmir, cannot other families produce leaders? You are repenting for the last 50 years" (The Economic Times 2014). Months earlier, in May 2014, when Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ended the nearly seven-decade reign of the Nehru-Gandhi-led\textsuperscript{1}Indian National Congress (Congress), many wondered whether it would signal the end of dynastic politics in India.

There is a rich literature examining Indian politics and its relationship with public policy. Some studies on Indian political economy revolve around the issue of party politics. One strand focuses on the effects of religion, ethnicity, language, caste, socio-economic classes, and politicians' personal motivations on party affiliation and the development of party platforms (see Banerjee and Somanathan 2007; Chhibber and Petrocik 1989; and Varshney 1999). Another strand examines the possible effects of competition of political parties on the delivery of public services (see Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005). For example, Indian states with electoral competition solely between two parties deliver public goods more efficiently than the states with robust multi-party electoral systems (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004). It is possible that a two-party system forces the two rival candidates to appeal to a broader section of the populace, in contrast to a multi-party system where simply focusing on the delivery of benefits to one constituency can guarantee seats in public office.

However, in the case of some developing countries, some analysts contend that the primary political unit is not the political party but the family (McCoy 2010). For instance, recent literature on political economy emphasizes the role of political dynasties, i.e., politicians and their relatives serve in public office simultaneously or in succession. The allocation and distribution of State resources, the trajectory of development policies adopted by the bureaucracy, and the norm in government-constituent relations could be influenced by privileged families in the political arena (De Dios 2007). Therefore, this growing area of research contributes to our understanding of the political economy of reforms, notably in cases where democratic institutions are in the early stages of development.

\textsuperscript{1} The political family is not related to Mohandas K. Gandhi, one of the leaders of Indian national independence.
This study contributes to the literature by focusing on the case of India, in particular the members of the parliament (MPs) of sixteenth Lok Sabha (i.e., the lower house of the Indian parliament). It is notable for it marked a decline in the dominance of the Indian National Congress in the country's political scene. The Congress party, once led by India's founding fathers Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, has long been dominated by the political family started by Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi. The situation of India mirrors the politics of other countries in South Asia, where the national governments are--or were--led by entrenched ruling families: the Bhuttos of Pakistan; the Bandernaikes of Sri Lanka; the Koirala family of Nepal; and the Sheikh Mujib dynasty of Bangladesh (Amundsen 2013).

The Indian National Congress was the force to be reckoned with in Asia's largest democracy until its defeat in the 2014 general elections by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of Narendra Modi, a former tea-seller who served three consecutive terms as chief minister of Gujarat before assuming the premiership of the 16th Lok Sabha. Given his humble origins and his party's challenger status, Modi styles himself and his political party as the new face of Indian politics. The findings of the study, however, question the idealized picture of the new national government. The present Modi-led parliament registers one out of four Members of the Parliament as dynastic. Even Modi's own BJP includes dynastic legislators among its ranks, as the succeeding sections further elaborate.

This study builds on earlier studies that examine the possible links across political dynasties and socio-economic outcomes at the sub-national level (e.g., Balisacan and Fuwa 2003; Mendoza et al. 2012; Monsod et al. 2004 for the Philippines; Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou 2015 for Greece; Camp 1982 for Mexico; Asako et al. 2015 for Japan; Dal Bo et al. 2009 for the United States). In the case of India, local magazines and newspapers have analyzed the existence of dynasties in either the national or state governments (The Hindu 2014; Merchant 2014; Wyatt 2014), but as one reviewer of the study comments, a gap exists in the formal academic literature.

In the present case, the research hypothesizes that state-level socio-economic indicators influence dynastic representation to the Lok Sabha. The results of the study do not claim causation but suggest the existence of patterns and relationships worth exploring in future studies. These patterns are then compared to the Philippine case, the latter being the subject of a series of
extensive research (see Mendoza et al., 2012; Mendoza et al., 2014; Mendoza et al., 2015). The remaining sections are divided as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature on political dynasties. Section 3 discusses the data sources. Section 4 elaborates the findings of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.

2. Review of Related Literature

Recent literature highlights the role of elites in a country’s economic development. Several studies focus on the way the elites influence the allocation and distribution of the resources of the State, ensure that market regulations will be advantageous to them, and include or exclude non-elite interests in their decision-making processes (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; and Amsden, DiCaprio, and Robinson 2012). Studies discussing the inclusivity of political institutions contend that the entrenchment of elites in the political arena inhibit development by creating an incentive structure that rewards rent-seeking behavior and personal gain over execution of public service that is sensitive to the needs of society (Acemoglu 2008; and Bull 2014).

The elite are generally understood to be the group that occupies the top position in the political and/or economic hierarchy. There are different channels that exist for recruitment to elite membership. There is a strand of literature, however, that specifically underscores the elites as bonded by kinship. For example, family ties characterize the selection of politicians in Peru, legislators in Guatemala, and elected local officials in Brazil (Camp 1982). Elites tied by blood or by marriage are termed “political dynasties,” and their relevance on democratization and economic development has been studied in Argentina (Rossi 2014), Brazil (Frank 2001), Japan (Asako et al. 2015), Mexico (Camp 1982), the United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder 2009), and the Philippines (Balisacan and Fuwa 2003; Mendoza et al. 2012; Monsod et al. 2004).

Various studies indicate how political dynasties in government—notably in parliament—have become a dominant political force in many democracies. For instance, recent efforts to estimate the share of dynasties in various parliaments indicate that they may range from as low as 6% (United States) to as high as 75% (Philippines). See Figure 1.
What factors explain this dynastic prevalence? There are empirical studies that argue how the existence of political dynasties is related to legacy-building behavior of politicians. In an analysis of congressional elections in Argentina from 1983 to 2008, Rossi (2014) for example finds evidence that a legislator’s tenure length could be linked to the probability that he or she will be succeeded by someone from his or her family. In the said study, five more years in a typical Argentinian’s legislator’s term increases the likelihood of him/her having a relative in future congresses by eight percentage-points.

Dynastic persistence can also be seen among some industrialized countries, albeit in much earlier stages of their democracy. For example, Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder (2009) analyzed officials that composed the United States Congress from 1789 to 1996, comparing the percentage of representatives who barely won a re-election and would have a relative elected into future congresses vis-à-vis the percentage of representatives who barely lost a re-election campaign but would have a relative elected as legislator in the future. Among congressmen who won by less than 2.5% margin of votes, they found that 8.2% would have relatives elected into
future legislatures. This is in contrast to the 3.6% of congressmen who lost by less than 2.5% margin of votes but had relatives elected into office after.

These aforementioned studies contend how name recall among voters (obtained after a long tenure of a politician) makes it easier for future family members to aspire for and win elected public office.

Additional research also link the existence of political dynasties to a country’s socio-economic structures. In the case of the Philippines, the historical literature pioneered by Anderson (2004) traces most of the existing political dynasties in Congress to land-owning families that accumulated their agrarian properties during the Spanish and American colonial periods. The primacy of land ownership in sustaining these dynasties has led to the use of terms such as “oligarchy,” “cacique democracy,” "landed gentry," and “feudal elite” to describe the privileged few that dominate the Philippine political landscape. As such, De Dios (2012) attributes the existence of political dynasties to “historical conditions” that facilitated the prevalence of clan-based politics of stable party systems and platform-based governance.

As regards empirical analyses, Mendoza et al. (2012), for example, analyze the district representatives in the 15th Philippine Congress and they examine if dynastic jurisdiction could be linked to a province’s socio-economic conditions. The study concludes that dynamic jurisdictions are positively correlated with various indicators of deprivation (i.e., poverty incidence, poverty gap, and poverty severity) and negatively correlated with the provincial Human Development Index score and real per capita income. This gives credence to the idea that socio-economic conditions are inextricably linked to the existence and persistence of political dynasties.

However, the above-cited study does not establish causality. It is plausible that the political dynasties are the roots of under-development in the provinces, or that underdevelopment and dynastic concentration mutually reinforces one another. The former is the argument adopted by Monsod et al. (2004) in their study on the status of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the provincial-level for the year 2000. Dynastic concentration per province is measured by the share of governor, vice-government, and district representatives related to one another by blood or by marriage in 1998. Highly dynastic provinces lag in MDG targets relative to provinces with lower dynastic share. Specifically, a high dynastic share is positively correlated with poverty incidence while negatively correlated with average income and primary education completion rates. Monsod et al. (2004) interpret these results as evidence of the damaging effects of dynastic
politics to the quality and provision of public services, as well as the proper functioning of markets in the locality.

Furthermore, Balisacan and Fuwa (2003) explore the linkage between dynastic concentration and standard of living in their study of average annual growth rates in per capita income of Philippine provinces between 1988 and 1997. They used as explanatory variable the share of governors, vice-governors, and district representatives within a province that are related to one another by blood or marriage. The share of dynastic elected officials is interpreted as a proxy for "political competitiveness," i.e., the less dynastic a province is, the more competitive is the local political arena. This then links the said study to the dominant literature that highlights the positive effects of democracy to income per capita (see Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2008). The results of Balisacan's and Fuwa's analysis indicate that dynastic concentration negatively and significantly affect the growth of local standards of living, and they conclude that this stems from the "sub-optimal policy choices" within an uncompetitive political environment.

Political dynasties as determinant of local economic development is also the framework adopted by Asako et al. (2015) in their analysis of Japanese legislators from 1997 to 2007. They develop a model where legislators who inherited political advantages alter policy choices, and a corresponding empirical analysis is made to test their model. The results show that districts which elected dynastic politicians to the Japanese parliament exhibited lower economic performance, as measured by district-level GDP growth, relative to districts with non-dynastic representatives.

On the other hand, Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou (2015) analyze the persistence of dynastic legislators, defined as incumbents related by blood or by marriage to a previous or co-incumbent legislator, in the Greek parliament from 2000 to 2012. The study finds that dynastic concentration in the parliament hovers around 14 to 16 percent during non-crisis election years, while the share declines to around 9 to 10 percent during election years marked by social and economic instability. However, if one distinguishes between 'single dynastic' MPs (related to one other MP) and 'multiple dynastic' MPs (related to more than one MP), data suggest that economic shock only adversely affects the single dynastic legislators. As a case in point, around the time of the global financial crisis, 93% of the multiple dynastic legislators got re-elected in the 2012 elections, vis-a-vis the 19% among the single dynastic MPs. The findings hint that
expanding a political family's control over a number of elected government positions tend to exclude them from being voted out of office due to poor economic performance.

Finally, in India, literature on political dynasties appears nascent. French (2011) explores the members of the 15th Lok Sabha who succeeded relatives in office, or have members of their families elected into positions simultaneous with their terms. However, his work resembles McCoy's (2010) seminal study on clan politics in the Philippines. Both treat political dynasties as a historical investigation rather than an empirical question. French puts greater emphasis on the family background of individual politicians over establishing whether and to what extent dynastic patterns are related to socio-economic variables.

Other studies on Indian politics are focused on the role of political elites (see Chhibber and Eldersveld 2000; and Chandra 2000). Yet, as already clarified earlier, political dynasties and political elites are not exactly the same. There are avenues for elite recruitment that are not mediated by bloodlines or marriages. As such, there is a gap in the literature—that which focuses on political dynasties—which this study seeks to augment.

3. Data and Methodology

The primary dataset for this paper is culled from the collected data of The Hindu, which the Indian Readership Survey (2013) considers as one of the most widely-read English-language newspapers in India. Citing "ground-level sources," the said publication in 2014 listed down "hereditary politicians" among the newly elected members of Lok Sabha and identified former and incumbent elected officials related to the said MPs up to the fourth degree of consanguinity and third degree of affinity.

Thus, information from The Hindu includes name of the legislator, party affiliation, and relatives in elected public office before or simultaneous with the MP’s term. We review the dynastic linkage by searching for online news reports that can confirm the family relationship (i.e., by marriage or bloodline) of a given MP to a certain politician. Data on gender, age, number of terms in office, and occupation draw from official profiles of the parliamentarians in the Lok Sabha website.

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2 This is different from the analysis made by French (2011), wherein he also considers dynastic the MPs who are related to the leaders of political parties.
The analysis of the Lok Sabha only covers the MPs that won in the elections from 7 April to 12 May 2014. It must be underscored that a couple of by-elections occurred in India after the 16th Lok Sabha general elections due to death or resignation of certain MPs. However, there might be factors influencing the outcomes of these by-elections (e.g., "sympathy votes" arising from the death of the MP, public sentiment on the first few months of the Modi government) that were not present during the general elections, thus introducing comparability issues in the empirical analysis. Thus they were excluded from the present study.

The measures of economic growth, per capita income, and poverty incidence are computed based from the data tables of the Indian Planning Commission (2014). The real gross state domestic products (GSDP) are expressed in constant 2004-2005 Indian rupees. Economic growth is the percentage growth of the real GSDP. Per capita income is the real GSDP divided by the population reported in the national census. Poverty incidence refers to the percentage of people living below poverty line.

Furthermore, the state-wide urban population and share of urban to state population are derived from the data tables of the Indian Rural Development Report (Ministry of Rural Development 2014). Land inequality is measured by Rawal (2008) as the Gini coefficient of the distribution of state-level ownership of all lands except homesteads. The average monthly crime rate is computed as the number of crime reported in the state per 100,000 people. Crime here is understood as the sum of reported incidents of riots, murder, arson, and banditry. Raw data are attained from the Crime in India database by the Center for Systemic Peace (2008).

Data on the Philippines and the Philippine legislature is also analyzed herein in order to facilitate a rough comparison. For the Philippines, real economic growth, per capita income, and poverty incidence are derived from the data tables provided by the Philippine Statistics Authority to the authors. Economic growth is measured as the percentage growth in real gross regional domestic product (GRDP). In turn, the real GRDP and real per capita income are expressed in constant 2000 Philippine pesos. Poverty incidence refers to the number of poor people in a region as a percentage of the total regional population.

Similar to the case of Indian statistics, urbanization and crime rate indicators for the Philippines are culled from various sources. The shares of urban population to regional population come from the data tables of the Philippine Statistics Authority. The average monthly crime rate is obtained from the crime statistics provided by the Senate Economic Planning Office.
Crime is defined as any violation of the law which prohibits it and where a penalty or punishment is handed down after a conviction. Crime statistics are measured at the regional level.

All socio-economic variables precede the dynastic indicator in time period. In India, an annual indicator corresponds to the beginning and end of the Indian government's fiscal year (e.g., real per capita income is labeled as 2011-2012). As such, Indian socio-economic indicators are labeled by the calendar year when a fiscal year ends (e.g., real per capita income measured in fiscal year 2011-2012 is labeled as 2012). In the Philippines, an annual indicator covers the calendar year (January to December of the same year). Further details on the measurement and time coverage of the indicators are given on Table 1.

4. Analysis of Dynastic Leadership Patterns

4.1. India's 16th Lok Sabha

In the literature, political dynasties are defined as those elected politicians with relatives in elected office in the past or present\(^3\). Data from The Hindu shows that 130 dynastic legislators (out of a total of 540\(^4\)), or 24%, comprise the 16th Lok Sabha (see Figure 2). In terms of numbers, the five political parties with the most dynastic MPs are the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Indian National Congress, All India Trinamool Congress, Biju Janata Dal, and Telugu Desam Party. The first two are relatively larger political parties with a national presence. The last three are considered state-wide and regional political parties.

Two observations can be gleamed from this. Firstly, clan politics persists even under the new administration. While BJP asserts that its landslide win is a rejection of political dynasties in India (The Hindu 2014), data suggests that a significant number of dynastic MPs constitute the new ruling party. Nevertheless, dynastic presence in BJP is admittedly less than in the other major political parties. Most parties that won between six to 40 seats have share of dynastic MPs ranging from 22 to 44 percent, while BJP has 16%. Secondly, the inclusion of the other three

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\(^3\) As stated earlier, family relationship is covered up to the fourth degree of consanguinity and affinity. An MP is flagged as dynastic when he or she has a relative that is holding an elected national or local position from May 2014 to present, or if he or she has a relative that held an elected national or local position within May 2009 to May 2014 (the term of the 15th Lok Sabha).

\(^4\) Excluded from the list are constituencies whose elected MP chose another constituency to represent. An example is Vadodara. Prime Minister Modi ran to represent both Varanasi and Vadodara in the general elections. He won in both but chose the former to represent in the Lok Sabha.
parties in the ranking hints that political parties which are more attuned to answering the needs of specific constituencies than expanding a national presence appear to be more prone to including more political dynasties among its MPs.

Figure 3 corroborates the latter point. All of the political parties that garnered more than 50% of dynastic parliamentarians have won six seats or fewer. Most of these political parties that registered significant dynastic concentration are parties that cater to sectarian, ethnic, and/or local communities. One possible explanation is the diverse interests that a national party should consider for it to gain a wider following. The plurality of competing perspectives could make it difficult for certain families to entrench themselves in the party hierarchy.

Contrast this to state and regional parties that arguably are more homogenous in terms of members and where the organizational structure is simpler. Through this, it could perhaps be easier for a political family to cultivate good relations with party cadres and sustain a mass following. Another plausible explanation is the need of minor political parties to counter the advantage in popularity of major parties during elections by asking its charismatic members to run for office. This can translate to the candidacies of the founders of the political party, and eventually their relatives. In effect, this highlights the influence of party organization in the dynastic orientation of parties. Allocation and distribution of tickets on the basis of kith and clan is plausibly determined by the party’s organizational structure: the interaction between the national party leadership and the local branches and grassroots, the groups and communities that form its voter base, and so on.

Dynastic concentration can simply be related to the size of the political parties. Small political parties that have few elected seats in the government can be prone to dynastic capture relative to the large political parties where competition and factions are expected.

Lastly, dynastic concentration in political parties may represent a penalty on poor governance. Under the assumption that dynamic MPs have a higher likelihood of re-election than non-dynamic ones, a previously large political party may have lost a substantial number of seats in the recent parliamentary elections except in the “safe” constituencies held by dynastic MPs. The high dynastic concentration of this political party thus stems from the defeat of its non-dynastic candidates in several “unsafe”/contested constituencies, indicating voter dissatisfaction with the performance of the said party while it was in office.
On the state level, the following do not have any dynastic politician among their representation to the current Lok Sabha: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Goa, Lakshadweep, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim. At the extreme end of the spectrum, the five states with the most number of dynastic MPs include Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, West Bengal, and Bihar. (See Figure 4.)

In terms of concentration, Figure 5 shows the states with half or more than half of their MPs tagged as dynastic are Puducherry, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, and Meghalaya. These states all have small constituencies that are represented by one or two MPs. It appears that states with smaller legislative territories display a tendency towards having more dynastic parliamentarians. From here it can be argued that constituencies from larger states tend to be more competitive and dynamic given the complex web of interests aiming for political representation and the heterogeneity of voter background associated with large voting populations.

4.2. Gender, Term in Office, Age, and Occupation
The following mirrors the analysis done by French (2011) in his study of the 15th Lok Sabha. In terms of gender, the number of non-dynastic female MPs (36) is higher than the number of dynastic MPs (24). In terms of ratios, however, a different picture emerges. One out of five dynastic MPs is a female. Among non-dynastic legislators, it is one out of ten. Both numbers and percentages suggest that females constitute a minority whether one looks at the dynastic or the non-dynastic groupings of parliamentarians. This is indicative of gender disparity in political representation. Yet, a higher concentration of females in the dynastic group of MPs relative to the non-dynastic group hints at the significance of political capital that dynastic affiliation provides to a female aspirant for elected public office. This is consistent with the findings of Dal Bo et al. (2009) in the United States Congress. Figures 6 and 7 display the relevant charts.

Looking at the terms in office, there are 314 first-time officeholders elected in the 16th Indian parliament. They are roughly 60% of the current Lok Sabha. Among the newcomers, the non-dynastic MPs outnumber the dynamic ones. Some 79.94% of the first-time officeholders are non-dynastic, while the dynastic legislators form the remaining 20.06%. For those who have served for two terms or more (inclusive of their incumbent term in office), seven out of ten MPs are non-dynastic, while three out of ten are dynastic. Figure 8 displays the relevant chart.
In terms of age, the typical dynastic legislator is younger than the typical non-dynastic MP. The average age of dynastic parliamentarians is 49 years old, while the average age of non-dynastic parliamentarians is 55 years old. Looking at the dynastic concentration across different age groups, a pattern emerges. The younger the MP is, the more likely he is affiliated to a political dynasty. To illustrate, roughly 11% of MPs who are 56 to 65 years old are flagged as dynastic. The percentage of dynastic MPs increases to 38% for the 36-to-45-years-old age bracket. It becomes 61% when looking at the youngest cohort, or those MPs who are 25 to 35 years old. Figure 9 displays the relevant chart. It appears that recruitment for the next generation of political leaders is skewed in favor of dynasty-affiliated politicians. For some analysts, this could signal the continuity of the status quo rather than a change in regime. In Mendoza et al. (2012), for example, seven out of 10 district representatives aged 26-40 belong to political families.

According to profession, a majority of the dynastic MPs lists political and social advocacy (34%), agriculture (24%), and business (21%) as their line of work. The same fields of occupation dominate the professional background of the non-dynastic MPs. These observations are supported by Figures 10 and 11.
Figure 2.  
Dynastic MPs in the 16th Lok Sabha, by Party Affiliation

Notes: Data from The Hindu (2014). The following parties do not have dynastic MPs in the current Lok Sabha: Apna Dal, Indian Union Muslim League, Janata Dal (Secular), Janata Dal (United), Naga People's Front, Pattali Makkal Katchi, Rashtriya Lok Samta Party, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Sikkim Democratic Front, Swabhimani Paksha, and Community Party of India. Likewise, independents MPs are not dynastic.
Figure 3.
Dynastic Concentration in Political Parties

Notes: Data from The Hindu (2014). The following parties do not have dynastic MPs in the current Lok Sabha: Apna Dal, Indian Union Muslim League, Janata Dal (Secular), Janata Dal (United), Naga People's Front, Pattali Makkal Katchi, Rashtriya Lok Samta Party, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Sikkim Democratic Front, Swabhimani Paksha, and Communist Party of India. Likewise, independents MPs are not dynastic.
The following states do not have dynastic MPs: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Goa, Lakshadweep, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim.
Source: The Hindu (2014). The following states do not have dynastic MPs: Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Goa, Lakshadweep, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim.
Figure 6.
Concentration of Female MPs among Dynastic Legislators, 16th Lok Sabha

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014).

Figure 7.
Concentration of Female MPs among Non-Dynastic Legislators, 16th Lok Sabha

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014).
**Figure 8.**
**Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs Grouped by Terms in Office**

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014). Data labels pertain to the number of legislators.

**Figure 9.**
**Dynastic and Non-Dynastic MPs Grouped by Age Bracket**

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014). Data labels pertain to the number of legislators.
Figure 10. 
Dynastic MPs by Profession

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014).

Figure 11. 
Non-Dynastic MPs by Profession

Source: Official profiles of MPs in the Lok Sabha website (2014); data on political dynasties from The Hindu (2014).
4.3. Scatter Plots and Correlates with Socio-Economic Indicators

Without inferring causality, we then proceed to examine the links across dynastic patterns on the one hand and socio-economic indicators on the other, at the Indian state level. Factors of interest include economic performance, standards of living, urbanization, land inequality, and incidence of crime. Pair-wise correlation suggests the following.

First, the dynastic share at the state level is found to be negatively correlated with annualized state-level economic growth (from 2009 to 2013). The correlation value between the two variables is -0.1708. This hints at smaller prevalence of dynastic legislators in better performing state economies. Meanwhile, the correlation value between dynastic share and average economic growth (from 2010 to 2013) is -0.2139. The correlate suggests that dynastic MPs are less concentrated in states where the economy grows faster on average. Figures 12 and 13 provide the relevant scatter plots.

There are several possible preliminary interpretations for these results. On one hand, better economic performance could be predicated on a more competitive environment. Businesses and entrepreneurs thrive in such a climate, and thus have incentives to counter any political activity (e.g., entrenchment of dynastic legislators) creating rent-seeking opportunities that hinder competition. On the other hand, the stronger and more stable performance of the local economy can embolden voters to "experiment" with their choice of political leaders, giving opportunities for new entrants (non-dynastic politicians) to participate successfully in the electoral arena. It is possible that there is confidence among key stakeholders that changes in local government administration will not adversely affect economic conditions.

Both the levels (real per capita income, for year 2012) and growth in standards of living (growth of real per capita income, from 2002 to 2012) are negatively associated with dynastic share of Indian MPs, with correlation values of -0.2097 and -0.3392 respectively. See Figures 14 and 15 for the relevant graphs. That is, dynastic concentration is smaller in states where citizens are relatively better-off and where the socio-economic standing of the average person is rising. These preliminary findings complement the earlier link explored between economic performance and political dynasties. These also cohere with studies in other developing democracies, such as the Philippines (Mendoza et al. 2012).

It can be argued that rising living standards weaken patron-client relations that tend to sustain political dynasties. The more economically independent the typical voter is, the less
reliant he or she is to patronage politics that political families peddle during elections. One can also explain the negative correlation between living standard and political inequality by the lowering of barriers to entry in elective positions: Relatives of established politicians enjoy built-in access to networks, election funds, etc., which makes it easier for them to run for office while outsiders have high entry barriers. Rising incomes however denote economic empowerment, or the creation of resources that can be tapped for political campaigns.

The same reasoning can apply when it comes to the dynasty-poverty linkage, given that analysis shows how dynastic share is positively correlated with a rising poor population (from 1994 to 2000). The correlation value between the two variables is 0.1546. In other words, dynastic legislators persist in states where there is low living standards and rising poor population. It must be noted though that the relationship between the levels of poverty and political dynasties is weak; the correlation value between the two variables is 0.0475. See Figures 16 and 17.

Historical literature in the Philippines, traces the origin of political dynasties to the feudal elite (see Anderson 2004). It is of interest then to see if the same association between landlordism and political dynasties can be seen in India. Figure 18 provides very preliminary and partial evidence supporting this view. It appears that dynastic share of MPs increases as land Gini (for year 2004) increases. The correlation value between proportion of dynastic parliamentarians and inequality in land ownership is 0.1203. This is suggestive of a historical link between the feudal structure of the local economy and the political conditions of a state. It is possibly reflective of the way the distribution of factors of production affects the distribution of political resources. Inequality of factors of production results to inequality of incomes from the use of these factors. In turn, income inequality relates to political inequality by the way economic elites monopolize control over political institutions to reinforce their position in society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

Furthermore, Figure 19 also appears to hint at a negative relationship between urbanization and dynastic politics. The correlation value between share of dynastic legislators and share of urban population (for year 2011) is -0.3211. Perhaps this is due to the fact that more urbanized constituencies do not form a homogenous electorate and stakeholders often aggressively compete with other groups for access to political power. Public office is hence more
competitive and it is more difficult for families who want to entrench themselves in elected positions.

Finally, the incidence of dynastic parliamentarians is positively correlated with high crime rates and rising criminality. The correlation value for the dynastic share and crime rate (for year 2006) is 0.1515 while the one for dynastic share and growth of crime rate (from 2004 to 2006) is 0.1017. One way to make sense of this is to perceive dynastic politicians as guarantors of stability and order from the eyes of constituencies with high crime incidence. As such, states that see a greater incidence of violence and crime could tend to elect leaders from political dynasties in public office. Nonetheless this interpretation might seem tenuous to some analysts, and the correlation merits more in-depth investigation.
Figure 12.
Dynastic share and annualized economic growth

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Annualized economic growth is obtained from the difference of the natural log of 2009 GSDP and natural log of 2013 GSDP divided by four, then multiplied to 100 to express in percentage. Graph does not include Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; and Odisha for lack of data.

Figure 13.
Dynastic share and average economic growth

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Graph does not include Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; and Lakshadweep for lack of data.
Figure 14.
Dynastic share and standard of living

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Graph does not include Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; and Lakshadweep for lack of data.

Figure 15.
Dynastic share and rise in standard of living

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Graph does not include Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; and Lakshadweep for lack of data.
Figure 16.
Dynastic share and poverty incidence

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Graph does not include Chhattisgarh; Jharkhand; Telangana; and Uttarakhand for lack of data.

Figure 17.
Dynastic share and growth in poverty incidence

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and the Indian Planning Commission (2014). Graph does not include Chhattisgarh; Jharkhand; Telangana; and Uttarakhand of lack of data.
Figure 18.
Dynastic share and land inequality

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and Rawal (2008). Graph not include Andaman, Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Delhi, Goa, Lakshadweep, and Puducherry for lack of data.

Figure 19.
Dynastic share and urbanization

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and Indian Ministry of Rural Development (2014). Graph does not include Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; Lakshadweep; and Puducherry for lack of data.
Figure 20.  
Dynastic share and crime rate

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and Center for Systemic Peace (2008).

Figure 21.  
Dynastic share and rise in crime rate

Note: APC staff computations given data from The Hindu (2014) and Center for Systemic Peace (2008).
Still, it is also possible that political dynasties contribute to the factors behind the conflict. It is also possible that the more entrenched a political family is in office, the greater probability that its members will resort to violence to secure elected positions. See Figures 20 and 21 for the relevant scatter plots.

4.4. The case of the Philippines

In order to further appreciate the patterns observed in India, we discuss briefly here some of the same patterns present in the Philippine case. Table 1 presents the results.

Economic growth (both annualized, for years 2009 to 2013, and averaged, for years 2010 to 2013) appears to be uncorrelated with dynastic concentration. Although the growth of living standards (from 2009 to 2013) seems to be also uncorrelated with the share of dynastic legislators, there is a strong and negative relationship existing between real per capita income (for year 2013) and the share of dynastic representatives of a given region. Regions with higher living standards (real per capita income, for year 2013) tend to have a lower share of political dynasties in their representation to Congress. In terms of poverty, both the poverty incidence (2012) and growth of poor population (from 2006 to 2012) are positively associated with regional dynastic concentration. That is, dynastic district representatives usually come from regions with high poverty incidence or a rising poor population.

The aforementioned observations so far are consistent with earlier studies that show how political dynasties in the Philippines persist in more underdeveloped areas. For example, Mendoza et al. (2015) pinpoint how income poverty at the provincial level fuels the expansion of the largest political dynasty in that area. After applying the instrumental variable approach to provincial-level variables, the study shows that per capita income and poverty incidence are strong determinants of DYNLAR (the number of positions occupied by members of the largest political dynasty in the province) and DYNHERF (a measure of concentration of political power, equal to the sum of squared shares of the total positions of each political dynasty in each province).

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5 The ideal case would be to find the correlates of concerned indicators at the provincial-level. However, unlike India where a state is represented by several MPs, a Philippine province is commonly represented by one or two district representatives only. The outcome of this is that the dynastic shares of legislators in the Philippines would assume extreme values, i.e., 0%, 50%, or 100%. As such, the correlation analysis here makes use of regional share of dynastic legislators instead.
Dynastic concentration is negatively correlated with the share of regional urban population (for year 2010). In other words, urbanized regions tend to elect relatively more parliamentarians (as a share of the total) among non-dynastic leaders. Aside from the explanations on dynasty-urbanization linkage as mentioned in the earlier subsection, the Philippine case can be seen as proof of the continued dominance of landed political dynasties in the local politics of rural (i.e., largely agrarian) areas.

So far, the signs of correlates of dynastic concentration and socio-economic indicators have been the same for India and the Philippines. For example, in both countries, the share of dynastic legislators is negatively associated with the levels of standards of living and urbanization while it is positively correlated with poverty incidence. Hence, India like the Philippines produces the main pattern that there are more dynastic legislators and parliamentarians from places with higher poverty and less human development.

In contrast to the Indian case, however, both the levels (for year 2012) and rise (from 2010 to 2012) in crime rates in the Philippines are negatively associated with dynastic concentration. That is, regions with high or rising crime rates tend to elect fewer dynastic district representatives in the Philippines. A plausible interpretation is that areas with high or rising crime rates are prone to election-related or politically-motivated violence that creates disincentives for future generations of a political dynasty to involve themselves in public office.
Table 1.
Dynastic Share and Correlates with Socio-Economic Indicators for India and the Philippines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIA</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (%), annualized, 2009-2013</td>
<td>Economic growth (%), annualized, 2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.1708</td>
<td>-0.0073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (%), average, 2010-2013</td>
<td>Economic growth (%), average, 2010-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.2139</td>
<td>-0.0035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real per capita income, in Indian rupees, 2012</td>
<td>Real per capita income, in Philippine peso, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.2097</td>
<td>-0.7526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of real per capita income (%), annualized, 2002-2012</td>
<td>Growth of real per capita income (%), annualized, 2009-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.3392</td>
<td>0.0179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty incidence (%), 2005</td>
<td>Poverty incidence (%), 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0475</td>
<td>0.3481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1546</td>
<td>0.1690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land inequality, Gini, 2004</td>
<td>Land inequality, Gini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1203</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of urban to state population (%), 2011</td>
<td>Share of urban to regional population (%), 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.3211</td>
<td>-0.5821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly crime rate, per 100,000 people, 2006</td>
<td>Average monthly crime rate, per 100,000 people, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1515</td>
<td>-0.6121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth in average monthly crime rate (%), annualized, 2004-2006</td>
<td>Growth in average monthly crime rate (%), annualized, 2010-2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1017</td>
<td>-0.3650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: APC staff computations based on data from Center for Systemic Peace (2008); Indian Planning Commission (2014); Indian Ministry of Rural Development (2014); Philippine Statistics Authority; Rawal (2008); Senate Economic Planning Office (2013); and The Hindu (2014). Annualized growth of Variable X for years $t$ to $t+x$ is computed as $\frac{\log X_{t+x} - \log X_t}{x}$. Average growth of Variable X for years $t$ to $t+x$ is computed as the average of the annual growth rates of the said variable for the specified years.
5. Conclusion
The link between socio-economic conditions and the existence of political dynasties is an empirical question worth exploring in many developing democracies exhibiting dynastic leadership patterns. Previous studies pinpoint either underdevelopment as originators of dynastic persistence or dynastic politics as a potential contributor to lower economic performance. Our study contributes to the literature by focusing on the relationship between dynastic concentration and state-level socio-economic variables in the present parliament of India.

We find evidence of a higher concentration of dynastic MPs in small political parties and rising dynastic concentration in younger age brackets.

Furthermore, the empirical analysis suggests that a higher share of dynastic representation in the legislature is associated with lower economic performance, a poorer standard of living, and a lower level of urbanization. Meanwhile, greater dynastic concentration among state MPs is associated with higher poverty incidence, inequality in land ownership, and higher crime rates.

All these results appear to largely cohere with the findings of existing empirical literature. Certainly, similar patterns are, for the most part, present in another large developing democracy in Asia, the Philippines. Furthermore, the findings are suggestive of the influence of poor socio-economic conditions on the creation of political dynasties, or a possible deleterious effect of dynasties on local economies.

The study is limited to correlation analysis and does not make categorical claims on the direction of causality. Moreover, the scope of the study is circumscribed to the Members of the Indian Parliament as of 2015. One needs to keep in mind that the election results were after two consecutive terms for the Congress-led coalition and thus reflect the anti-incumbency sentiments of the voters. It is suggested that future studies extend the analysis to earlier Lok Sabhas, possible up to two previous legislative terms.

The share of dynastic representation to Lok Sabha has served as a rough proxy for political inequality in this study, following Mendoza et al. (2012). While the relationship between the composition of the national parliament and state-level economic conditions may be stronger for the Union Territories (e.g., Andaman and Nicobar, Chandigarh, and Lakshadweep), where the national government has more influence in state affairs, the same cannot be said for the other states. Succeeding studies hence should extend up to the dynastic composition of state
governments, i.e., determine the dynastic affiliation of officials in local elective positions, preferably up to the panchayats (rural village councils) and municipal governments. This will further the conclusiveness of the interpretation of empirical results. Moreover, the inclusion of other officials in succeeding studies expands the data under scrutiny and allows the discussion to go beyond correlate analysis.

Lastly, future research can explore questions of causality, associating dynastic patterns with economic development and poverty reduction in India. These are critical areas for monitoring and study, given the importance of these leadership patterns on Indian development.
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