Interview with Lester Mallory

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR LESTER MALLORY

Interviewed by: Hank Zivetz

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Q: What prompted you to enter the Foreign Service?

MALLORY: I had a research assistantship at the University of California, Berkeley, 1929. I had about finished my doctorate in 1931; in the field of agricultural economics, with a heavy emphasis on statistical analysis. At that time, I wanted to go out as a professor in the field, but the professor market was rotten in 1930 and 1931. The only jobs you heard of were lectureships in the middle west, at $900 a year.

And it came to my attention, through the head of the outfit, that the Department of Agriculture, in Washington, was recruiting people for the Foreign Agricultural Service, which was then a small, specialized, rather elite group. So I applied.

I claimed a knowledge of French, because they wanted somebody to go to Marseille. I'd had high school French, and I'd had a couple of years of college French, but my French wasn't very good; anyway, it worked. I got a job, with the stupendous salary of $2,600 a year, to become the Assistant Agricultural Commissioner in Marseille, France, for the Foreign Agricultural Service.

We had a regional operation, which covered Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, Northern Africa, and in some respects we reached out elsewhere. So it was tremendously good training. That lasted until 1934, when we had the bust-up in Washington.

Roosevelt devalued the gold dollar, and some of us were pulled back to Washington. I spent about a year and a half with the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Then in 1934, I went back to Paris, where we had moved the offices at that time because the French wanted to collect income taxes on people who weren't actually in the consular service—in Marseille. So I spent five years in Paris.

Then Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture, thought there was much too much emphasis being put onto Europe, and nothing on Latin America.

Q: You were in Paris on the eve of the war. Could you give us some impressions of what was happening at the embassy; what was the reaction to the events that were leading up to the Second World War?

MALLORY: We were stationed in the embassy, but we had no information on policy. We attended the weekly staff meetings, with the ambassador. And we were not aware —embassy wise—of what was going on. Of course, we heard Hitler's speeches on the radio. (I can be confidential about this, I suppose.) I remember one day Ambassador Bullitt said, “Look, the French are now finally waking up. They need an air force (inaudible), and they want planes. If you people have something that you want to get out of the French government, now is the time to strike.”

Well, Pierre Cot was the minister of aviation at that time, and they'd resisted all this business, but it was by then pretty late. That was the only concrete thing that I remember.

Q: What year was that?

MALLORY: That would be about 1938. But we weren't privy to these things, and it wasn't until much later—after I got here—that I read Bill Bullitt's biography, by his brother; which covered his correspondence to Roosevelt, in which much of this stuff came to light. It's beautifully done; it's very, very interesting, particularly those things which get into some of the nitty gritty, and the internal politics, which aren't very pleasant.

When Joe Kennedy was ambassador to London, and he had been told by Bullitt that the Gray Code had been jeopardized; but Kennedy wouldn't do anything about it. The Germans had our stuff for quite a long time, right from our cables. Bullitt told Roosevelt about this, but I don't know what happened. But Kennedy, as far as the information on the war, was just strictly bad news. I don't know that his sons—Jack and Joe at that time—were old enough to appreciate any of this or not, because they were quite junior. But it wasn't a good time, by and large, and our appointments weren't good.

Bullitt was a very dynamic, forthcoming guy, and he operated a lone-wolf sort of operation.

Q: What do you mean by lone-wolf?

MALLORY: He didn't bring a lot of people into his confidence, as far as I know, and a lot of his stuff was done very directly. Many of his things—as you'll see in that book, if you ever get a chance to look at it—were “for the eyes of the President.” And when he had something that he wanted to get off his chest, he stayed up until 2:00 in the morning and got on the telephone; and this happened quite frequently. He called Roosevelt directly.

As I say, in my position, as number two in the agricultural office, we were not aware of what was going on, except what we saw in the newspapers. I was aware of a group of younger Frenchmen, who were quite concerned with relations with Germany; and they were preparing a sort of—not a coup—but a situation where they were going to support the Germans. They didn't come out much in the open, but I do know that at least one or two of them had had their houses searched by the French secret police. Apparently the

police were getting on to this. I knew it, in part, from friends of mine in the Associated Press and United Press, who had been friends of mine for years there; and they were getting on to this.

Also, I heard of it because I was a member of a sort of social club, with not much importance, and a lot of these people were in it. And they were people of maybe 35, 40 years old.

Q: This was a French social club?

MALLORY: Yes, a French thing. I don't know why I was in it, just by chance I guess. I think they had to run for cover when things broke, but I have no recollection because I left there in June of '39.

Q: So you left before the war broke out?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Was there a sense, in Paris, that things were coming to the edge—that the war was imminent?

MALLORY: Not really. I wasn't privy to enough of the French thinking. But again, I say my close association with the correspondents should have been enough to know what was going on; and I didn't get much of that feeling at all.

Q: I see. Now, interestingly, you came back to Paris after the war. How soon after the war were you back in Paris?

MALLORY: I arrived in Paris during the Battle of the Bulge. As I mentioned, Henry Wallace thought that Latin America ought to have some attention. So they decided the first agricultural attach# should be in Mexico. I came back from Paris in June, of '39. (Somebody in Washington was pretty clever about this, because they were beginning to

close down our operation.) I spent five years in Mexico, getting things started, trying to build up a background of information, which we didn't have at all.

Q: A background of information on what?

MALLORY: On agriculture—the food production, needs, and so on. Then the war broke out, and I became terribly involved in the whole business about rubber, and medicinal plants, and strategic things of that nature. But then, in late '44, I heard from Washington, and they asked if I would go back to Paris? I said I would go back for a year, if they would bring me back to Washington afterwards, because I wanted to get married.

The business in Paris was to reestablish the office. The embassy was just opening with a few people. But the important thing was food supplies. The American army needed munitions; the French wanted food stuffs. How much food stuff did they need?

Well, by great good luck when I got back to Paris, after five years, down in the basement I found my complete files! So I had the basis of operations. It wasn't much extra effort to sit down and make a judgment on food production; what was available. Because the French were under rationing at that time, they were screaming, but actually there was plenty of food if it had been distributed. They couldn't get it from the farmer to the town. So the rationing went on, particularly for bread stuffs.

Anyway, I was able to pull things together, and submit some reports to Washington pretty promptly—relatively speaking. It took a little while to catch up. That was my primary job when I got back, to see what the food situation was. I worked on that pretty intensively, and I had a young man with me who was good. We spent a lot of evenings over in the embassy; there wasn't anything else to do around there.

Q: Was this an American or Frenchman?

MALLORY: American.

Q: Who were you dealing with on the French side?

MALLORY: Primarily their Ministry of Agriculture.

Q: And was there the beginnings of the division of the Gaulists, or the communists?

MALLORY: No, not at that time. The people we were dealing with were a few of the older holdover bureaucrats; but primarily, people that had come out of the resistance, and had worked in it and knew it. And we cooperated right across the board with them.

Q: And when the war ended, did things change? Did the relationship between the French and the Americans change after VE day?

MALLORY: No, it just went on as far as we were concerned.

Q: And you felt it was a cooperative arrangement?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Because, as you know, with de Gaulle and so forth the tensions began to arise.

MALLORY: That was later.

Q: Later, okay; that's what I wanted to know.

MALLORY: Yes, I think that was later. As a matter-of-fact, when the war was over, and things broke up, we had tremendous demands for certain things. For example, French agriculture—as far as grains were concerned—was still based on the combine; and the combine needed binder twine. They didn't have binder twine, and we didn't have a lot of stuff to give them because we were using it all up for cordage for the Navy. Well, I had a whole commission of Frenchmen go to Washington for binder twine. This was just after the war was over, you see, and the approach of harvest. So we had things like that come up.

Q: Was there a great deal of hunger in France, at that time?

MALLORY: No. Hunger—not really; a lot of people got thinner, but I wouldn't call it hunger.

Q: Now, you stayed in Paris until when?

MALLORY: Until the end of 1945 - beginning of 1946.

Q: That's right—'45, '46 you were back in Washington. In my questions here, I jump to Argentina, because that seems to be of special interest, at least to me. You served in Havana, after Washington. If you feel that there was something of interest there, please talk about that; but otherwise, I'd jump to Buenos Aires. I understand the position you had, but were you able to make some appraisal of Juan Peron, or Eva Peron?

MALLORY: Let's back up a little bit. These are observations. During the years I was in Mexico City, the first ambassador I had was Josephus Daniels, who had been editor of the Raleigh News and Observer. He was Secretary of the Navy, with Franklin Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, when—as I recall—in 1914, they sent the Navy into Veracruz. He subsequently became ambassador to Mexico, while Roosevelt was President of the United States. And it is assumed—I think I'm on pretty good authority—that Josephus felt a certain amount of guilt about the Veracruz landing. For that reason, he wanted to make some sort of atonement; he wanted to go, and he went.

And he wasn't welcomed. But he stayed on, and on; as I recall he was there seven or eight years. He was quiet, affable, friendly, didn't throw his weight around, and it got to the point that he was universally liked. I think that this is a point that we might make sometime. I don't know what's happened to the man in Japan just recently, but if you stay on long enough, and it doesn't become overburdening, eventually things wash out and you make your place. And I think Josephus did. Our relations with Mexico, at that time, were quite good. I happened to be there.

I'd like to make a footnote to history, too. This will take little while, if you don't mind. It's about the Green Revolution, which I think is a complete prostitution of what happened. In 1940—this is history you probably don't have any place else—in 1940, General Avila Camacho was being inaugurated as President of Mexico. The man sent down to represent the United States was Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Agriculture. Henry got to the border in a hired car, and some of us went up to meet him, and we came back in a two-car caravan, so to speak. We had the inauguration, and all that.

Then Henry, who had been interested in Latin America and Mexico, and who had been studying Spanish with some of the people from the Mexican Embassy, had an arrangement to go out and see the country. I was appointed, I suppose, as shirt holder or something; I went along. We drove out in the country, and we looked at cornfields from here to there. We saw a lot of corn; a lot of poor corn.

When Henry got to Washington, he went to see—or called—the director of the Rockefeller Foundation. He told him that they'd done a great job on public health, and the world was a lot better for it, but how about nutrition? They ought to do something about food supplies. He convinced Dr. Fosdick that they should open up in Mexico. The result was a high-powered commission of Dr. Mangelsdort, the botanist and corn man from Harvard; Dr. Bradfield, a soils man from Cornell; and Dr. Stakman, a plant pathologist from Minnesota. They came down and looked the place over.

It ended up by the Rockefeller Foundation setting up an operation on plant breeding in Mexico. They got a good young man—not too young—Dr. Harrar, who subsequently became head of the foundation, to come down and start it up. And they did a very clever thing. They did not leave this in the Ministry of Agriculture; they set up an institute, which was free of any political influence on appointments and jobs. And they sent some young men to the States for training, and began to breed—corn, and corn, and corn, and subsequently wheat.

The result was magnificent. Mexico became self-sufficient in food stuffs. Then they began to move out. They did a job in the Philippines on rice; a tremendous job in India—the Institute did. The result was, eventually—and here's where I take umbrage—that this guy, Dr. Borlaug, was given the Nobel Prize for the Green Revolution. He had worked on wheat; the big job was corn, which is done by Wellhausen, not Borlaug. They got credit for the Green Revolution. But I think the credit ought to go to the guy that started it, which was Henry Wallace, and it's never been said as far as I know. But I was there, and went through it, and I saw this whole thing develop. So, that's my footnote to history.

Q: That's very interesting.

MALLORY: Another thing out of agriculture: I'd come back to Washington, perhaps in '46, and the Assistant Secretary for Latin America called me in. And he said, “There's a lot of pressure being put on by Ambassador Messersmith to allow some brahma bulls to come in from Brazil. What do you think about it?”

I said, “No soap.” The head of the agricultural department, in Mexico, in livestock, went to Brazil and bought Brahman bulls. Well, this may be all right, but sometimes you begin to think, “Well, what was the pay-off? What did he get out of it?”

But they had the bulls vaccinated, which was a relatively new thing then; vaccinated for foot and mouth disease. They brought them to an island, just off of Veracruz. And they held them for six months. The minister of agriculture, who had a good working relationship with Ambassador Messersmith, kept pressing him about this. Finally, he won out, and they let the bulls in. Not long there afterwards, we had an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Mexico, and all hell broke loose. Fortunately, we had very good relations with the Mexican Army, on this problem; and the outbreak was contained. It cost us $300,000,000 at that time; today it would be fabulous.

What most people don't realize is if you ever got foot and mouth disease going in this country, and cut down—even by 10%—the production of milk and meat, what it would cost for our economy.

Q: Is that why you were opposed to the importation of these bulls? Because you feared foot and mouth disease?

MALLORY: I had enough experience in Europe with foot and mouth disease, that I automatically said no. You never know, and they didn't know, at that time, whether the vaccination perhaps left them latent, which it did. Anyway, it happened. The policy part was this: there's sometimes when the Department of State has to put its foot down, and tell a really strong ambassador, “You can't do it.”

Q: But I don't understand. Why would this be an American decision, rather than a Mexican decision?

MALLORY: Because we have a treaty arrangement.

Q: Arrangement on what?

MALLORY: We keep the area free of foot and mouth disease.

Q: I see.

MALLORY: Which is another reason why—some people don't understand—why we should not have a road from Columbia to Panama. If we ever do, we'll have foot and mouth disease coming right up trans-central American chain.

Q: Then you went to Cuba, also in agriculture?

MALLORY: No. I came back from Paris. I think they didn't quite know what to do with me, but then agriculture appointed me . . . Before I get to that, this time I was a Foreign

Service officer, because in 1939 Roosevelt issued Executive Order 2, which took the Foreign Commerce service, and the Foreign Agriculture service, and put them in the State Department. We automatically became Foreign Service officers. So when I went to Mexico, I was a Foreign Service officer, although there was an arrangement whereby I did not report to State at all, I reported directly to agriculture.

Well, when I got back to Washington in 1946, they made me liaison officer between State and Agriculture, with the major job of redoing the whole reporting setup. The war was over, we were going to put a lot of people in the field, and we needed to revamp our informational needs. That concerned me for well over a year. In the meantime, I sat on a selection board, and things like that.

Then along in May or June of 1946, I was asked to go as counselor to Havana. The same day I was approached to go to the first class of the War College. Well, what do you do? I thought I couldn't choose, they'd have to make up their minds. I've been sorry to miss the War College ever since. Anyway, I went to Havana.

I had two years in Havana, and I have a few remarks about Havana.

Q: Who was running the place at that time?

MALLORY: Henry Norweb.

Q: That's our ambassador. Who was the ruler of Cuba?

MALLORY: Ceram San Martin.

Q: And what was the American-Cuban relationship at that time?

MALLORY: Quiet, with no big problems. Our big interest, officially, was sugar. And the embassy didn't have much to do with sugar, because the sugar business had enough clout in Washington to do anything they wanted, practically. We had a big investment there. So

the embassy didn't do much of anything, except representational, and to keep our noses clean.

There were incipient problems, but nothing big at that time, except when I arrived I had been there a month when I was left in charge. The Caribbean Legion was trying to overthrow the Dominican Republic. It was helped from Guatemala and Venezuela, and there was a training on an island off the north coast, called Cayo Contites. Fortunately, we had good coverage on that, because there were regular flights from Guantanamo to Key West, by our people. Every time they went over, we'd ask them to check on any boats there, what was going on, and so on. We got a pretty good coverage from local sources and help from Ernest Hemingway and his friends.The Cayo Contites thing was washed out, about November. They brought all those people in by train, and the Army took over pretty much. What I can't be sure of was which Castro it was, but there was a Raul Castro listed among those people who came back from Cayo Contites.

Q: Your saying that this effort at overthrowing the Dominican Republic was started, somewhat, from Cuba? That there were Cubans involved?

MALLORY: Largely Cubans. Some help from Venezuela.

Q: Why were they involved? What was the tie-in between Cuba and the Dominican Republic?

MALLORY: Well, the official tie was friendly, but leadership in the Dominican Republic was considered to somewhat of a dictatorship, and you had this movement all over the Caribbean to throw him out.

Q: So it was kind of a popular movement, that extended beyond the borders of individual countries?

MALLORY: Yes. For example, we followed the progress of a sloop from Guatemala, which came with a load of arms.

Q: In modern days, when these things happen, we immediately say this is a communist plot; but was that an issue at that time?

MALLORY: No, I don't think it was an issue. There was an idea of freedom running, much of it sparked from Venezuela at the time.

I want to say something about the value of foreign military officers. We've done a lot of that in recent years in Panama. We bring them up from Latin America, at various levels, and they're trained, I think at Fort Gulick, Panama. They're given some training, some orientation; and the idea is to get them onto our side of the fence, make friends, and so on. I've seen some criticism of this, that this was a bad idea; that we were training people who would eventually become dictators and so on. I've seen no evidence that, of the officers I know, in South American and Central America. But I do know of one instance in Cuba, and the story—I think—is well worth telling, if nobody has seen the full report of it.

One Friday afternoon, we had four submarines come in, for shore leave.

Q: American?

MALLORY: American. The next morning all hell broke loose. The paper had headlines right across, “The statue of Marti,” who was a great guy, “has been desecrated.” They had a picture of a sailor sitting up on the shoulders of the statue, and liquor running down. He had urinated on Marine. Well, we'll never know what happened, but it's very coincidental that the photographer happened to be there just as that bottle of beer was thrown. Anyway, it was bad. Saturday morning I received the paper, and took off. We tried our damndest to get the ambassador, but we couldn't find him; he had just disappeared.

Finally, about noon, I was at the embassy and we were trying to assess things. Our liaison with the police, at that time, was an FBI officer; they were called Legal Attach#s. We had that cooperation working. A man from the Associated Press came in, and he sat down at the typewriter, and typed out a little statement which in Spanish you'd call a desagrare. It means “ to take away the hurt.” I was in no condition, at that point, to do any writing myself.

The ambassador showed up eventually; this was not Henry Norweb, he would have known better. He sent him over to the foreign ministry, where the foreign minister was waiting. The foreign minister had a wreath of flowers ready. And the foreign minister walked—with the ambassador—from the foreign office to the statue of Marti, to place the wreath; and made our little statement. The foreign minister saved our neck, really; he didn't need to do that. And if he had had any feeling against us, he'd have let us sweat it out. But no, the foreign minister was a proud graduate of the United States Naval Academy, and it paid off.

Q:We want to get to the times you were ambassador. But I'm still curious about the Perons.

MALLORY: Well, we'll get down to Argentina.

Q: In what capacity did you go to Argentina?

MALLORY: Counselor.

Q: Were you in the political section?

MALLORY: In the old days you had one Counselor; now you have lots of them. I was the DCM. Actually, I was kicked upstairs. The ambassador to Cuba hated my guts, because he was trying to get away with a lot of things which were illegal, and I was trying to hold the staff together.

Anyway, I went to Argentina by ship—a nice trip. The ambassador was Jim Bruce. He was only there a month before he left, and I was in charge again. No big problems; things were quiet. We'd had a bad time with Peron because Spruille Braden had been ambassador, really fought an election against Peron, and tried to defeat him at the polls. He lost. And the popular thing was Peron si Braden no!

Anyway, nothing big was going on, and we didn't have any great problems with Argentina. Really there wasn't much to be done about anything. Peron was spinning in the saddle, but unless we were going to put an all-out effort to get him thrown out, we just had to ride with him—which we did.

We had quite a large staff. We did a lot of economic reporting. We did a fair amount of political reporting, although there wasn't much of an opposition to report on. We had quite a consular section. Anyway, we had a busy shop.

The social life was awful. There were 103 foreign representations, and each one of them had a national day—that means two a week. Besides, it was a time of lots of social activity. The only way I could keep alive was to insist—personally and with my wife—that my weekends were sacred; I would not accept anything on the weekend. However a lot of those things were useful. You'd go to a cocktail party and you'd see the Uruguayan, the Frenchman, the Italian, and so on; you'd exchange all the gossip you could.

[Tape interrupted, tape difficulties]

MALLORY: I think what we need to mention is the rather quiet policy time we had. Previously, Spruille Braden had been ambassador to Argentina, and had himself tried to oppose the election of Peron. This caused a great deal of internal trouble, because no foreigner could come and tell an Argentine what to do. The popular theme on the street was Peron si, Braden no!. After Braden left, he was replaced by George Messersmith,

I think. There was an interregnum of professional quiet. Then he was replaced by Jim Bruce.

I arrived in Argentina one month before Bruce left. He took me over—after a week—to meet Peron. And since Bruce did not speak Spanish, he asked me to translate. I told Peron that my Spanish wasn't that good; I wouldn't translate word for word, but I would try to give him the gist of what was going on. It wasn't until a long time later that I found out Peron understood English very well. But there was a secondary effect; because of that, I think, Peron had always accepted me at face value, and did not mistrust me. On a number of occasions, on which I had to see him over the years, we were able to sit down and talk right across the table, without anything being covered up.

There was a certain amount of anti-American feeling running around, particularly among the Peronistas. We had a few bombs, none of which were lethal; destructive of things like the library. We had a continual stream of people from the American press, who came down to see these horrible people, Juan and Evita Peron; they tried to get something on them, to publish. This didn't wash very well, and caused us some trouble, because their reports back home were all pretty well written with a certain amount of malice.

We had one particular case, I well remember. At the time when Messersmith came back—following his retirement from the service—my wife and I put on a dinner at the residence, where we invited the Perons, the minister of defense, and so on. And the atmosphere was absolutely frigid, because that day an American press correspondent had been thrown in the hoosegow. As I remember, it was New York News. As usual in cases like that, the whole press got in an uproar, and filled the wires. Fortunately, Messersmith, who had been able to talk pretty frankly to Evita previously, took her off into one corner after the dinner, and talked at some length. The next day, the man was released from jail. Our role in that, as far as I know, was never reported; and it's just as well, because all it would have done was more press speculation on what we were doing there.

Q: What do you man by that?

MALLORY: Why did the American embassy do this now, and not at other times? Why don't we do this now, and so on? You're always under suspicion.

Q: Suspicion that you were playing games?

MALLORY: That we weren't being tough enough with Peron.

Q: But in this case you did achieve the release of this guy.

MALLORY: Yes, fortunately, George was there, and I don't think my clout would have been big enough to do it. But he had those previous relations with Evita, and it worked. George had been ambassador previously, and come back on a visit.

Of course, we had an amazing amount of visitors of one kind or another.

Of course, the big event in the time I was there was the death of Evita. She had cancer of the uterus, and had let it go, not checked on it. They finally brought a medical man down from the States—a distinguished surgeon—and he checked her and left. She lasted a while longer, and then passed on. The scenes, which are amply reported in the press, we don't need to go into. But the streets were filled with mourners, day and night.

Q: The fact that an American doctor had seen her; had the embassy had anything to do with this?

MALLORY: The embassy had nothing to do with it. We didn't know the guy was coming until he arrived. By great good fortune, at that time Ellsworth Bunker was ambassador. He knew the name. He knew what flight the man was leaving on, so he went out personally to the airport, and got a private briefing. But that's the only contact we were able to make.

There's usually a way to do something, but sometimes you have to be rather adroit about it.

Now, after four years, I was proposed for Jordan. We went to Washington for a few days. Got a ship to Beirut, where we arrived on Thanksgiving Day, in 1953. Took a car down, and arrived in the late evening, in Amman. This whole appointment was a surprise; I never thought about the Near East, and knew virtually nothing about it. Fortunately, there are certain similarities, between Latin America and the Near East. I was quite struck. One day when I left the office of the then-prime minister, which was upstairs, I turned around to wave goodbye, and the remark was made, “How do you know about our customs?”

I said, “Well, it's because I've been in Latin America, and many of the little gestures are the same. The Spaniards picked up a lot of their customs on the way.” One thing that was easy was a custom, apparently among the Arabs, of not forcing a conversation. You'd be talking a while, and then silence would ensue. You might sit there quietly for a little while, without saying a word, but then go on. This whole aura of personal relationships was quite different, but still there was enough similarity that I had no problems.

I had no problems with the language, because when I arrived I asked how long it would take to learn Arabic, and they told me five years. I told them I didn't expect to be there five years, and I didn't learn the language. But, there were enough Palestinians in the government, with British training, and they spoke English. And those that didn't, had been trained in Syria or Turkey, and they spoke French, with which I was familiar. So there were not problems on the language.

The King had only been in office about six months; quite young.

Q: How old was Hussein at that time?

MALLORY: At that time, officially, he was 18; but I'm not sure he was really 18, because the Arabs count age from conception, so you've got to take nine months off.

When his father had been removed from office, the boy was sent to Sandhurst Military Academy, in England, for six months; which I think was a marvelous thing for him. He learned a great deal about behavior, comportment, and so on. And it didn't hurt his English any, which was quite good. He had been to school previously, in Egypt.

He had a lot of very good help around, principally from his mother, Queen Zein. She has been seldom given credit for what she did for this young man over the years. I was there four years, and saw this thing develop. Also, Hussein got a great deal from his grandfather, who was Abdullah — originally Emir Abdullah — who was less a king than he was a sheik—a great sheik. He loved nothing better than to go down to the floor of the Jordan Valley, get in a goat-haired tent, and see the people around him. He behaved like a Bedouin from the desert. But he had a lot of good philosophy, and he passed it on to the boy. And I think Hussein himself probably got more from his grandfather than from anybody else.

At the time, as I recall, when we got to Amman there were only 12,000 people there; it was a village. It had bilateral cultures; strongly from the Bedouins of the desert, and also strongly from the Palestinians who had come from what is now Israel. The Kind knew enough, or felt enough—probably from the grandfather—to know how to handle the Bedouin people. I'd been out in the desert with him, visiting some of the desert sheiks, and it was a delight just to watch the smoothness with which he operated.

He had some senior advisors, in the government, who stood him in good stead. In the first couple of years this young fellow didn't know what it was all about, and what was going on. It took time.

Q: Who, in your view, was the real power then, in Jordan, in the first couple of years of Hussein's rule?

MALLORY: In the first couple of years I would say Queen Zein behind the scenes, and the senior ministers of cabinet.

Q: Were they mainly Bedouins, or Palestinians?

MALLORY: Both. Well, I wouldn't call them Bedouins, but the old prime minister, who had been Turkish trained, was of old stock from the area from Saudi Arabia all the way up. His heritage went back practically to the Great Deliverer.

The King has developed over the years; he's had quite a few attempts on his life. He's had four marriages, I think.

Q: When we talked earlier, you indicated that he was a lonely young man, and that there were some efforts made to assuage this loneliness, and bring him over to the Western view.

MALLORY: Well, he was alone; and as a young many I don't think there were many areas of entertainment which he could enter. Part of this was assuaged by the head of the Air Force, Colonel Jock Dalgleish.

Q: Who was a Brit?

MALLORY: Yes. This started early, because when Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem, Dalgleish was over there with his plane, and he found Hussein sort of abandoned, lost, he didn't know what to do. Dalgleish went to him and said, “Come on, I'll take care of you.” He put him in his plane, and flew him back to Amman. From then on he taught Hussein how to fly, was with him a great deal. Jock was a very descent, honorable man—a very personable person. And I understand that whenever you're taught to fly you have a great deal of attachment to the person that taught you. So he was close to Dalgleish.

But Dalgleish and his wife, who was just as Scotch as they come, would have a little entertainment in their rather humble house—for example, an evening of Scotch dancing, and some food. Well, the British ambassador had an evening on, and the American ambassador had one, and the head of the Italian hospital also had one and so on. This didn't occur often, but from time to time, there was an opportunity to mix with other people. There were women present. Everything was very decorous. Generally the food was pretty good. We didn't have any outsiders; it was all music by records. So we tried to provide an atmosphere that might be a little different, and a little more friendly. This worked out pretty well, because his relationships with the Americans, and the British, were very good.

We did have change later.

Q: At this point, what was the relationship of the British military group that was in Jordan?

MALLORY: I'll come to that. We had a big role to play in Jordan, because the British were pulling out of the whole area. Palestine first. They wanted to pull their assistance out of Jordan, and out of the gulf states. The result was that we were taking over the economic aid, which we did increasingly. The aid program was the big part of it, and before we finish today I'd like to talk about aid in general.

I think my most important job was in taking care of this aid thing. We didn't have much to do about throwing our weight around otherwise. We had a policy eye on the Russians, primarily because Secretary Dulles had this great program of containment of the Russians. When there was a threat from Syria: one morning I was told there was a lot of material arriving by plane, and I got the whole cabinet out on the airfield, and we received this stuff. I had never asked for it, and didn't know about it. But there wasn't any more Syrian threat from that point.

Q: You got the Jordanian cabinet out? And what was in the shipment?

MALLORY: We had a lot of artillery; it was military. But primarily, they were jeeps with 106 mm recoilless cannon on them. I was able to say in the loud voice, to the prime minister, that these would knock out any Russian tanks that the Syrians might have.

Q: What prompted the Syrian threat?

MALLORY: They had a period there of what they called “Bathi.”

Q: The Bathi political party?

MALLORY: Yes, and at that time they were trying to throw their weight around. One time later on, when Hussein was flying with Dalgleish from Beirut to Amman, they tried to gun him down. Things weren't very friendly there for some time.

[End tape 1. Proceed to tape 2, side a.]

MALLORY: As to the Syrian threat, I don't know how it came up. It may have been intelligence out of Syria to Washington; it may have been our military attach# to Washington, describing what the situation was. But I never asked for it, and I was never told how it came about, except that it arrived. And I always give credit to Secretary Dulles for this. That was pretty direct aid, at a time when it apparently was needed.

We had a lot of violence, particularly from Nasser, in Egypt, in Jordan.

Q: Directed at the King?

MALLORY: No, just wait. We had a long series of what I called nuisance bombs. We never had one at our residence, but a number of the cabinet ministers had bombs. I might say, amusingly enough our counselor had an apartment above the apartment of the Egyptian counselor, and he was thunderstruck and very distressed when he learned that the Egyptian had a box of grenades in the bedroom underneath him. He said, “Can you

imagine, the threat to his own children?" He was as upset about the Egyptian children as himself. But the stuff was getting out all right; it was being used.

I think if you go back in history, and read—it's Eisenhower—the time that Ben Gurion went over and whacked the Egyptians, really set Nasser off. Before that he'd been all right. From then on it was all wrong.

Q: That was the '56 invasion of Suez?

MALLORY: No, long before that, before my time.

Q: The only war before that was the 1948, for independence.

MALLORY: It wasn't a war; it was an attack by Ben Gurion's group, and it was down toward the Gaza Strip. I've forgotten the reference to this, but it's been published; I read it.

Now you asked about the army. The army was built up by Glubb Pasha, who'd had experience, up from the Mesopotamia area, and became the head of the army, and trained these veterans. He was excellent. He spoke the language fluently; he had a feeling for the Arabs and the Bedouin types. He developed a first-class military machine; it wasn't big, but it was good.

It was often said that they didn't stand out in the 1947 war. I'll explain something of that. We had a visit of a War College group. I think they split up each year into a couple of groups; one goes to the West, and one to the East, or something. One came through and we arranged for a briefing of this War College group, and there must have been about 40 or 50 of them. The briefing was done by Glubb Pasha.

Q: This was in '53, '54?

MALLORY: About '55. The King was invited and he came. He sat there and he listened; and I don't think he listened enough. Glubb explained what had happened in the '47 war.

The important thing, to me, was his account of the way the sectors were divided. The Jordanians were along the Jordan River, about the middle sector. And on the right were the Iraqis. According to what I gathered from Glubb, the Iraqis were very quiescent; were not at all war-like, and didn't stand up to things. But Glubb said he was stopped cold, because they got down to 14 cartridges per man, and they couldn't expend those and still be defensive. And they couldn't attack with that little. They begged the British to give them supplies, and the British refused. He said, “There we were, stuck, in the middle sector. We couldn't advance against the Israelis, because we didn't have the ammunition.”

This was quite a surprise to me. Now, the King heard this. As time went on we began to get outside influences, and one day—abruptly—Glubb was told to get out, and leave that night or the next morning, which he did. The British ambassador intervened, but no soap. I knew all this because I was at dinner with the British ambassador when we got the news that this had happened. In a way it was a great shame, because here was a good outfit, and a good commander.

But there'd been increasing influences from an outside group of Arabs, particularly Abu Nuwar, who became the new chief of staff. His relationships were with Egypt. Well, as time went on, after a year or so, we began to see that the Bedouins were being moved out of the legion, and the Palestinians moved in. The Bedouins were thoroughly loyal to the King.

I'll tell you a story now, which I haven't told before, and which I didn't report myself, because I didn't want my own action to be known in it. But it can be told now, I think.

One night I was in bed when a young fellow came to the door, and woke me up, and said the approaches on every road to Amman was being blocked by personnel carriers. Now this young man had been very carefully chosen on the staff.

Q: He's an American?

MALLORY: An American, on my staff. He had become friendly with the King—personally friendly; they were both young, the same age, and so on. So I said, “Look, you get to the palace, and get in, and tell the King.”

I couldn't do this; if I did, it would have been broadcast everywhere that the Americans were into it. But he went, and he was so well known that nobody paid any attention. The King looked at him, and said, “I'll take action at once.” And he started walking away, and characteristic of him, he turned around and said, “Thank you very much.”

He got hold of Abu Nuwar, and put him in the car, and they drove out to the army base. He got up on top of a tank, and told them of the uprising. And the Bedouin troops began to scream, and said, “Let us at them; we've got to get him.” And apparently Abu Nuwar was shaking in his boots.

Q: Because Abu Nuwar had been behind this?

MALLORY: Abdul Nuwar didn't last very long; he ended up in Egypt. I think if Hussein had paid more attention, to Glubb, none of this could have happened. But, also here was the business; the British were here, running us. It was time for them to do their own thing. It got around, and it got to the King. Anyway, he overcame that, and did it beautifully.

Q: Perhaps you will get to this, but it relates to what you just said, with the British pushing membership in the Baghdad pact. What was the Jordanian position on this?

MALLORY: Frankly, I don't remember.

Q: From what I understand, this was just about the time that the British, and the French, and the Israelis—'56. And there seemed to have been some reaction on the part of the most of the Arab states, against the Baghdad pact, because of the action of the British and French in the Suez.

MALLORY: That I don't know. I don't know about the Baghdad pact; it was just sort of foreign to us, as it were. The '56 war; Eisenhower gave me credit for waiting for an attack from Israel, but I didn't know about it ahead of time. It's in one of his books. All I know is on a Friday, for the first time we received two men who were going to make an inspection of the embassy. I'd been four years in Argentina, without any inspection; I was in Jordan without any inspection. And they said they'd see the man about consular stuff on Saturday, and come do the rest of it on Monday.

Well, on Monday morning, I called them over and said I had a car leaving for Beirut in about an hour, and you'd better get in it. They were very surprised. I said, “We are evacuating.” I had a telegram that morning, “Evacuate.”

Well, fortunately we had very considerable plans for evacuation, in the event of trouble. Most of them were based on the idea that we might be attacked by Syria, and we'd have to escape across the desert, to Iraq. But it didn't happen that way. We were able to go up through Syria, and I could send most of the men by car. I wouldn't allow the women to go through Syria under these circumstances, so I had a plane come in, and by dusk that evening we had everybody out. I didn't see my family for nine months.

Q: You did retain a skeleton force?

MALLORY: Yes.

Q: Was this because there was a concern that the invasion of the Suez would also turn on Amman?

MALLORY: We didn't know what would happen. Because until the Americans were able to get the others to stop, we didn't know where this war might go. We had a skeleton staff. We lived through it quietly. I still had some aid personnel, and the thing worked. We did our jobs and got along. But it was a pretty lonesome time, as it were.

Q: What was the reaction of the Jordanians, toward the Americans, as a result of the war? Was it a positive reaction because of Eisenhower's intervention?

MALLORY: Yes. We were sitting very well. Of course, there was a certain amount of sympathy for the Egyptians, who'd taken a beating, but as it was against the Israelis, they were all for that. But we weren't much affected, one way or the other; it was sort of another world, as it were, out there. It didn't bother us. We just went on with our business, and lived through it.

Q: One of the reactions, as I understand it, of the Suez War—in Jordan—was a move leftward; as a reaction against the British, who were considered part of the West.

MALLORY: Well, moderately yes; but it didn't change anything very much fundamentally.

Q: Weren't there changes in the government—some of the ministers were shifted?

MALLORY: Well, they were shifted from time to time. Nothing much happened, really.

Q: In the years that you were there, was there an appreciable increase in Palestinian influence in Jordan—in the governmental levels?

MALLORY: Well, there'd always been a strong Palestinian—less influence, than capacity. We had quite a number of Palestinians, or West Bankers if you will, who were in the senior councils of the government. And there weren't very many old-line Jordanians to run the government; they just weren't trained that way, and didn't have the capacity. But I wouldn't call it influence, because there was a period of quiet there, and you couldn't do anything about it. Israel had it, and what could you do?

Q: But in terms of Hussein; was he always in charge? Did people know this was the guy that was running the country? Or was there a sense that they were tolerating his continuance?

MALLORY: Well, in the beginning that was true. He was young, new, and he didn't know his way around. He just somewhat did what he was told. But as time went on, his importance increased; but it wasn't great, even up to the time I left, after four years. And I would say it took probably ten years of his reign before he really began to conduct things very much; not as he does now, where he comes out and makes policy statements with typical frequency. He didn't make any policy statements in the beginning, at all.

We had a possible coup, as I told you, by Abu Nuwar; and Nasser was behind that.

Q: Wasn't there also another Syrian threat?

MALLORY: No, not really; there was always a little poking and picking.

Q: In physical terms, in your tenure in Jordan, did our embassy grow?

MALLORY: Very much. Not the embassy per se. The embassy per se was small. There was an ambassador, a counselor, about three secretaries, and that was it. But we had an increasingly large aid group. The aid program was big. It took care of a lot of operations there, to the extent that one of the Arab wives told my wife that they'd like to have this American ambassador Santa Claus, because he was bringing them so much.

Well, I didn't ask for all this; the thing kind of grew like topsy. Mostly it was a pretty good program.

I must tell you a story, which I think ought to be in the record someplace, although it's pretty touchy. It's about Ezra Benson, now president of the Church of Latter Day Saints, then Secretary of Agriculture.

I received a telegram saying that Ezra Benson, accompanied by his wife and two daughters, was taking a trip around the world in a DC-4. And they would arrive in Jordan, but because the airfield in Jerusalem was too small for a DC-4, they wanted to land

in Amman and immediately take off for Jerusalem. I had a knock down drag out fight half-way across the world with that. I said, “You can't do it. A secretary of the American government can not come in and lightly pass the King by. It just isn't done.”

Q: He was Secretary of Agriculture at the time?

MALLORY: Yes. Apparently, somebody along the line backed me up, and said, “You better do this.” Anyway, Ezra arrived. My wife took the females out to the residence to freshen up, and I took Ezra to meet the King. Ezra talked a while—nothing of importance. The King was very polite—non-committal.

Then Ezra said, “I'd like to give you two books. This is the book of Mormon. You understand that we believe we are descended from one of the last tribes of Israel.” The King didn't turn a hair. I can imagine somebody like Nasser would have had him thrown out of the office, but the King was very polite. Then I took Ezra and his family out to the desert; he was kicking it like a steer all the way, because the Minister of Agriculture—of Jordan—was a son of the paramount sheik of the Beni Sacr tribe. And he was giving a lunch for the Minister of Agriculture of the United States.

So we arrive at their goat-haired tent. They bring in this tremendous tray with about three sheep on it. My wife teaches them how to eat with their right hand, and so on. First he wasn't going to go at all; he said, “We don't eat on Sunday.”

We said, “Well, this isn't going to cost you anything. You've got to go.” Anyway, they went out and really had a good time. They I said, “All right, you take my car. Our counselor, who has been writing a book about the history of this area, will show you every hill, every iron-age thing, everything from the Bronze Age, all the places of historic interest of the bible. And he'll drive you to Jerusalem.”

Anyway, what I want to say is this; how in the world Ezra Benson could command what is virtually a private airplane for his family, clear around the world, I never did understand.

Q: Could you touch on the aid program? Then I think we would like to go on to your position as Deputy Assistant Secretary.

MALLORY: That's much later; we've got to go to Guatemala first. Let me cover the aid program later on.

Q: That was your assignment right after Amman?

MALLORY: Yes. I'd had a lot of Latin American experience, and I was ready for a change. They proposed Guatemala, and I accepted it. I had to hurry to get there, because a new President was to be inaugurated, and I was supposed to be in place before that. So we flew to Washington, had a brief time, and took off for Guatemala.

I had no policy briefing whatever, from anybody in the ARA. The Assistant Secretary didn't give me any guidelines; I just went.

Q: This was what year?

MALLORY: This was the beginning of 1959. Well, we had a fair-sized embassy there. We reported in the usual style. We tried to keep in contact with the opposition to the government, to know what was going on; more particularly in contact with the government. They had a new president, General Miguel Vdigoras Fuentes. He had been ambassador to London before that. He was able to win the election, and he started out to be a pretty good president. As time went on, things didn't get so good.

He had a son, and a son-in-law, and a very good Columbian friend; and they were not above dipping their hands in the till. It got to the point, after the better part of two years, that I wrote a private letter to Washington, and said, “I propose to go and tell the president that he'd better pull up his socks, or he's going to be in trouble.”

I got a letter back saying to go ahead. I didn't send any telegrams, which gets spread all over; but kept it private. And I did go to see the president, and I told him, and he said, “Well, tell me who they are.” So I did. He said, “Well, I'll do something about it.” But he didn't. And some time after I left—I guess it was a couple of years—things got bad enough that the same old Latin American stuff happened; when things get too bad, the army just takes over. And he was out.

This has happened time after time in Latin America. I didn't expect it to happen there, because he wasn't that kind of a guy himself; but he just didn't stop it. It was too bad.

Q: I don't remember the chronology here; when was Arbenz in? Was that much later?

MALLORY: No, much before.

Q: Was there any kind of leftist opposition to the government when you were there?

MALLORY: Not much. Opposition yes; it was quiescent opposition, and we didn't have anything which occurred later, where they were hunting the people down. More particularly, when the leftists began to go up in the hill country with the indians, and work with them, the army got tough. They didn't have that in the beginning. Let's go back a little.

Q: That was really only my ignorance; the people who hear this will have known. But in your tenure, things were rather quiescent, in terms of this?

MALLORY: By and large they were very good. We didn't have any army uprisings; we didn't have any persecutions, as it were. We had a few little upsets. Had a bomb late one afternoon at the embassy office. The leftist press tried their best to amplify it. There was also a bomb—at the same time—at the palace of the Archbishop. They tried to pin that on the Americans. Well, this was so laughable that nobody believed it, and it didn't work. They just lost that round.

There were a few interesting events. One was the Mexicans came down, and were fishing in what were thought was Guatemalan territorial waters. Some planes went out and told them to move out. What they didn't know was—the Mexicans didn't know—was: they were talking to each other and using some pretty foul language, about the Guatemalans. They didn't know that the Guatemalans were tuned in on their frequency. So they came down with machine guns, and drove them out. Well, all hell broke lose. The Mexicans immediately broke relations. The Mexican embassy was taking about two days to get out. I went over—interestingly enough—and helped the Mexican ambassador burn his files. He was a good friend.

Q: They gave him time to leave?

MALLORY: Yes. One problem we had was about visas. For example the head of the university was a medical doctor, pretty far to the left. And because of some statements he had made, when he applied for a visa our consul turned him down. Well, we got a lot of pressure, particularly from all the leftist groups and the press. A lot of people came to me and tried to make me have the consul cave in. I wouldn't do it. I said, “He's doing his job, and the only man who can tell a consul what to do about visas is the United States Congress.”There was a Eucharistic congress, held in Guatemala, for which the papal representative was Cardinal Spellman. Spellman let it be know to us, through the Department I guess, that he wanted to visit Chichicastenango, which is the great Indian center. I set up a visit. We had one DC-3 of our own, in the air attach#'s office. I got another DC-3 out of the Guatemalan Air Force. We were all set up, until the last morning when I learned that the Papal Nuncio had gone to the Minister of Defense, to get the thing canceled. It was none of his business; except, he was anti-American. And the priest in Chichi was a Spaniard, who didn't like us very much.

Well, you don't turn down a papal legate that way. So I immediately got to the president, and had the whole thing put back on—the President of Guatemala. So we put the two planes together. You couldn't land in Chichi; there was no field. We had to land about

20 miles away, and it was a tremendously emotional thing—the whole business. As he got out of the plane, there was a fence nearby, with a great row of indians kneeling down, and singing in a deep chant. Well, Cardinal Spellman had tears in his eyes. It was tremendous. And we drove up towards Chichi, got out of the cars, walked up—proceeded by a Cofradia, with a guy on a simulated horse, like Santiago - St. James.

Anyway, we got up to the church, and inside—I was scared to death. That church has about 30 or 40 feet of candles burning on the floor, about three feet wide. He swept right up there, with his robes practically touching these; I was afraid he was going to burn. No, he got up and they have what they call a papal mass. The Cardinal, assisted by bishops, and the cofradias, with all their costumes, and it was tremendously impressive. But there was a light motive in it, that you just couldn't believe. Here was the papal legate conducting a mass in Latin, and with a Boston accent you could cut with a knife.

Q: I had a question in regard to your position as Assistant Secretary for Latin America.

MALLORY: Can we talk about aid now?

Q: Yes, please.

MALLORY: I don't claim to have much authority or knowledge about policy in general, but I do feel I've had some experience with aid. I have pretty strong feelings about when you should and shouldn't give aid. Too often this is a bureaucratic process.

When I was in Argentina, I was approached, “Can't you get us in?” Not did they need it, not was there a place for it, but “Can't you get us in?” I felt that was pretty awful. But fortunately, Peron said he didn't want any aid, it was not an underdeveloped country. So we didn't have any aid, and I'm sure if we had had, we would have had endless trouble. You don't tell Argentines what to do. You can influence them indirectly; you can set up situations. But you're not going to tell them; that's just the nature of the beast. Too often our aid is a mechanistic thing; sort of an engineering kind of operation, rather than, “Do we

need it?" I feel very strongly that need must be perceived, and we tend to go in and say, "They need aid for this," whether the people realize they need it or not.

And if they don't feel they need it, it isn't going to work.

Q: How would you characterize the aid program in Jordan?

MALLORY: The aid program in Jordan was good; they wanted aid. And we had people who had been trained under the British; they understood things. They knew that when you wanted an irrigation project—what it was. Or if you were building a road, what the purpose of the road was, and where you were going, and so on. It doesn't always work that easily.

For example, we built roads in Jordan. This was good, but on one occasion I had to practically stop the road program because the minister was trying to put too many people on the payroll, and I threatened to cut him off. Anyway, it worked out.

We had, down in the Jordan Valley, preparations to dig a deep well, and put in a deep well pump. As far as I know, we hadn't prepared the population for it. Once when we had one of the uprisings, caused by Nasser, they went in and severely damaged the pump. Now the pump was for them—for their purpose, but they hadn't been imbued with the idea that they wanted the pump, not the Americans who were pushing it on them. This happens and happens.

We had a pretty fair agricultural program, and a clever man in charge. We found that they needed fresh tomatoes—for example—down in Kuwait. They could be taken down by air, if we could grow them in the Jordan Valley. But you didn't go out and tell a guy, who couldn't read or write, what kind of tomatoes to plant. They didn't have any of these damn American tomatoes. So, our agricultural guy sets up a demonstration plot, and plants various kinds of thing; sees how they grow, what varieties are best, and so on. He took his best tomatoes and planted them right on the outside edge, so they could be stolen. And

it worked they were no longer our tomatoes, they were their tomatoes; and it worked. We were developing understanding. So you perceive the need.

In Guatemala we had a housing program. Well, the Guatemalans had built houses out of adobes. Up in the highlands they built them out of lumber. They knew about houses. They also knew about earthquakes. We put up a self-help program, where we provided the materials, and they did the work. We put in teams of eight men, for example, and build eight houses in groups. This program went on, and on, and was wonderfully successful. We had a young fellow designing houses, with just a few pieces of steel in the right places. They were put together with concrete. They were good houses. This program was great. The president didn't miss a chance to go out and present the titles to the houses, because this was good public relations. I went along on all these things for fun.

I liked that program. But we went down in the valley, towards the coast, and found out that we could have an export of melons to New Orleans, if we could get water. We'd drill a well. We did, and got the water, but we didn't take the people to New Orleans and show them what a melon looked like, or what the market was. I went down later to see about this well, and I found a field of corn. The whole thing was a complete fiasco. If they had gone out and first, and developed the perceived need, then it might have gone.

Q: I thought they had been growing melons there; but they had not?

MALLORY: They had not; we had to develop a desire to grow melons.

I think—not only in the aid program, but in the Department in general—there's a need for some social anthropologists, to go out and access how people think, and what they think. How do you develop a proper result? We've never done this. In our training, as officers, you're supposed to go out and suddenly know all about how these people do . . . why they act as they do, and so on, by some kind of osmosis. That works kind of slowly. Then you get moved around and so on. I do think that some of our policy planning people ought to take a hard look at the idea of how, and where we can use some good help by cultural

anthropologists. Not that you can find any good ones easily, this is a hard job. But I think we need them.

Q: I was interested in when you moved from Guatemala to become Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America, in 1960. In late 1960, weren't preparations underway for the Bay of Pigs, and weren't Cuban U.S. relations deteriorating? Could you comment on some of that?

MALLORY: That was before.

Q: Well, the Bay of Pigs was the beginning of 1961, wasn't it? When Kennedy . . .

MALLORY: I had left.

Q: I see. But what about relations with Cuba, in the period you were Deputy Assistant Secretary for Latin America?

MALLORY: They weren't good!

Q: Had we broken diplomatic relations at that point?

MALLORY: Not really broken; they had a representative from Washington. Of course, our whole attitude about Cuba had been strongly influenced by Herbert Matthews, who was the apologist for Castro, with the New York Times. Here was this great agrarian reformer coming in; this poor farm guy, who's going to take out the horrid militaristic people around him, and so on. And the United States was pretty well convinced that Castro was all right. It wasn't till after Castro went to the United Nations, and started trying to cook chickens in the fireplace, that he began to be somewhat an object of ridicule.

We had a difficult time, yes. And we would like to have done him in. I don't really know how much I can or should tell you about this. For example there was a point where food was needed, and they needed rice. I proposed that we stop all shipments of rice to Cuba. The

powers that be said no, “Senator Ellender is from Louisiana, and we can't cross him,” so we didn't stop the rice.

On another occasion, there was a program where there was a shipment of oil going to Cuba. It was proposed that certain ingredients be included in the oil, which would wreck their refinery. It came to me, and I approved it. One of the congressmen raised hell on the floor of the House, “How can we ship oil to Cuba, to that so and so?” The program didn't go through; we didn't stop their refinery.

There were a number of cases like that, where you wanted to get something done, and you were stopped here, and stopped there. So we just lived with it, as we could.

I had one of the senators come over, and bring a former Cuban—I guess he was. “Why weren't we doing so and so?” Well, it was pretty hard to sit there and defend yourself, without letting any cats out of the bag, or saying anything. I'm afraid I ended up looking like somewhat of a jerk; but I couldn't do anything about it.

Q: Who was the Assistant Secretary for Latin America at that time?

MALLORY: He'd had some Latin American experience; he'd been posted in Columbia. Rubottom from Texas.

Q: From what you've related, the sentiment within the Department, was to do as much as possible to make things difficult for Castro.

MALLORY: It depends on the level. I had very close relations with the CIA, and we worked together on this. But when it went up the line to the Secretary and so on, a lot of this stuff stopped—like the rice business. Rubottom didn't concern himself much with these things. I'll go so far as to make a personal judgment about him.

He had two grandfathers, who were horse and buggy protestant ministers. He was quite devout. And I think his whole intellectual focus was, “If you work hard, and do right, everything will be all right.” And it doesn't happen that way in Latin America.

Q: How much influence, if any, did the growing Cuban exile community—in Florida—have, on policy?

MALLORY: It hadn't gone that far yet; there weren't that many there.

Q: You indicated earlier that you weren't aware of the preparations for an invasion of Cuba?

MALLORY: No, the Department wasn't concerned with this, really; this was a CIA operation. I knew a little of it, because I knew what was going on in Guatemala; where the preparation started. But apart from that, no.

Q: I think we've pretty well covered. We went back into the early '30's. Thank you.

MALLORY: On this business of aid, I should write an essay on it. It takes a little thought, particularly when you're talking about developing perceived need. This is not something that is a popular subject, or popularly understood. I ought to do that. I do feel quite strongly about it, that somebody ought to do something.

End of interview