

Hudson Maxim's Interesting War Prophecies

Allies Will Fight on Without any Thought of Compromise, for Many Years Unless Germany Can Invade England and Capture London.

By Hudson Maxim,

The Noted Military Inventor and Author.

If we let the wish father the thought all our prophecies will be of immediate peace. If we desire to comfort ourselves by our thinking we shall let our minds dwell on only what is pleasing.

It is not pleasing—it is very unpleasant, yes, horrible, to contemplate the possibility that this great war can continue for many months longer. But if we are guided by reason, unbiased by sentimental considerations, we can discern the truth more clearly.

There are three, and only three, eventualities which may bring peace—first, that the Germans may be defeated; second, that the Allies may be defeated; and, third, that the war may end in a draw.

With due respect to all of the opinions about the various causes which led to the war, the events of the past forty years teach us very early that this war was inevitable. That the Germans prepared for it far better than the Allies is not to the discredit of Germany, but to Germany's credit. That the Allies were miserably unprepared—that they did not foresee—that they did not listen to the wisdom of men like Lord Roberts to get ready for a life and death struggle, was a crime of negligence.

The present great war, is a tragedy evolved out of human destiny. The fact that it was not foreseen by the Allies twenty-five years ago is not because there have not been most convincing indications during that period, but because those indications have not been seen and heeded except by a more discerning few. Germany had greater discernment, and her preparations were correspondingly greater.

The Anglo-Saxon people of Britain, being the most progressive and powerful, became the dominating people of the world, and they conquered all of the little peoples and spread their colonies round the earth.

England or Germany Must Be Crushed.

The great Germanic people of the German and Austrian empires, after the unification following the successful war with the French, have been forging forward by leaps and bounds. Realizing, and correctly estimating the task that confronted them, they studied and practised national economies as no other nation has ever done before, and they developed their arts and sciences as no people had ever done before. It was inevitable, therefore, that there should come a time when Germany and England must come into collision with such straining of relations as to precipitate war.

This war is no half and half affair. Either England must go down under the mailed fist of Germany, or Germany and German militarism must be crushed under the heel of England.

If peace is declared without a decisive victory for either of the belligerents the result would be but a truce, and both sides would arm with all their might for another struggle.

If the war should end in a draw it means that any peace will still be a truce for continued greater preparations for war, and any such truce or such peace would be the next thing to victory for the Germans, and the next thing to defeat for the Allies.

Germany will naturally hold all conquered territory if she is able to do so unless or until she has squeezed a large indemnity from the Allies. This can only be by acknowledgment of defeat by the Allies, and this is not likely to be in the near future.

England's resources are stupendous, and the British spirit is a spirit of dogged determination. Therefore, I prophesy that the Allies are going to fight it out without any thought of compromise which will be to their detriment or dishonor, unless Germany shall develop such unforeseen and unguessed power as to win an overwhelming victory over the Allies, invade England and capture London. Therefore, the prospect is a long war—years and years of war—yet to come before peace can be.

The Allies' Tragic Lack of Foresight.

Germany has already won such success that for the Allies to accomplish her utter defeat would require several more years of war. The prospect is gloomy, but let us not deceive ourselves.

When the war first broke out there were many well-known persons who prophesied the discomfiture of Germany, and the capture of Berlin within a few weeks—a few months at longest. So imbued was English opinion of the ease with which the Allies could overcome Germany that orders for war munitions were but small, while they should have been very large. Had the Allies, when the war first broke out, placed orders for munitions of war in America with such prodigality as they are now placing them, the story of the war would have been different.

Great nations through all history have been defeated mainly because they underrated the power of their enemies.

Let not the Allies to-day continue to underestimate the power of Germany, for the German Empire, with her ally Austria, constitutes the greatest military power that has ever yet risen in this world.

The end of the war is yet far off.

The New Kind of Ships We Need to Meet Modern War's Demands

Lieutenant H. R. M. Robinson, One of the World's Greatest Naval Experts Describes the Battleship to Withstand Submarine Attacks

H. R. M. Robinson was an officer in the United States Navy for twenty-one years, and for eight years was assistant to the Chief Constructor of the Navy and in charge of the Design and New Construction Division. He supervised the design of every United States dreadnought now in commission and of most of those now building, and has probably had more to do with the development of the American dreadnought than any other one man. He has also designed many other surface ships for the United States, and is now designing and constructing submarines as the managing director of a private corporation. Among his noteworthy contributions to the battleship is the present skeleton mast, the vertical centre line turret arrangement now common to all dreadnoughts, and the double protective deck. Lieutenant Robinson has probably had more to do with the design of the modern dreadnought of the United States than any other one man, and he speaks of design with authority.

By Lieutenant H. R. M. Robinson, U. S. N. (Retired).

I HAVE considered the design of ships to withstand the submarine, and I have mapped out a new navy based on submarine conditions.

There are many who will say, "Why talk about ships when submarines will make up the navies of the future?" If the statement included in this question was true it would be futile to plan or build surface ships; but the statement is not true. Surface ships are not so important as once they were, but they must still be an integral part of every well-balanced navy. The submarine is not yet swift enough to convoy troops, it cannot run down and capture the ocean liners, and it cannot carry guns of sufficient weight to bombard fortifications or cover the landing of invading troops. There are many, many uses for the ships of the line if they can be designed to withstand the torpedo.

The ship which I favor for to-day's warfare takes features from both the dreadnought and the cruiser. It also has construction features entirely of its own. It will be nearly as powerful offensively as the dreadnought, and even quicker and faster than the cruiser.

The ship which I would build to cope with the submarine would have a speed of at least twenty-five knots, and be armed with eight main battery guns of maximum calibre—say sixteen-inch—located in four twin turrets on the centre line. The armor for protection against gunfire should be somewhat lighter than in present ships, and the whole ship built without an extra pound of metal expended for unnecessary fittings. The luxuries of present-day sea fighters would be cut to the lowest possible point consistent with the health of the crew.

The hull to be protected under water against the torpedo and the ship divided into many small compartments, with a compressed air system to check the rush of water in the case of underwater damage. A balancing system for the correction of the listing of the ship due to damage is an essential feature. The length should be kept to a minimum consistent with the attainment of the speed desired, and the vessel designed to permit quick maneuvering.

This craft would present the best thought on submarine protection, because it should have the power to avoid damage from the submarine in the event of attack therewith, and if it should be damaged it would take more than one blow from a torpedo to sink it. Finally, its cost should be less than that of the present enormously expensive super-dreadnought, and for a given expenditure of money a greater number of units could be obtained.

The size of these ships may vary within the limits of mobility, but the ability to cut, run and dodge like a football player in an open field is paramount, and must not be sacrificed unless torpedo protection advances far beyond its present state. The warship of the future will not be big and imposing.

Speed and Long-Range Guns Are Essential.

A pace of less than twenty-five knots an hour will not take a warship away from a speedy submarine, nor will it permit escape from an onrushing torpedo. A torpedo, as compared with a rifle projectile, is a slow moving danger, and it is largely luck when it hits a swift vessel. I do not limit the speed to twenty-five knots—the speed must not be less than that figure. The faster the ship the less chance it has of being hit. The average speed of the fleet should be nearer thirty than twenty-five knots.

The information which we have derived from the present war and the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war show the futility of guns of medium calibre. The pre-dreadnoughts had a main battery of big guns, an intermediary battery of lighter guns, a secondary battery of yet lighter guns, and sometimes a tertiary battery of small rifles. The dreadnought and its successors are fitted with a main battery of very big guns and a secondary battery of lighter guns; the intermediary and the tertiary batteries are omitted.

I am of the opinion that the secondary battery of small guns should be retained, at least for the present, for torpedo defense, but the power of the ship should be concentrated in the main battery, which should have the largest calibre and longest range rifles that it is possible to produce. All the sea fights have been won by the ships with the biggest guns. Therefore the guns of the new ships should have a calibre of fifteen or sixteen inches; I have selected a major battery of eight rather than twelve guns in order to reduce weight. Since ships do not fight at close quarters in these days the secondary battery need only



Lieutenant H. R. M. Robinson

have such guns as are required for the destruction of merchantmen or small armed craft.

The modern battleship has a host of comfortable but not essential fittings, which make for the comfort of the officers and the crew, but which do not add to the fighting power, while they do add to the weight of the hull. I would fit the new ships as simply as possible, cutting down to the barest necessities, and put the saved weight into the boilers and engines—put it into speed.

Since the torpedo is a more deadly enemy than the projectile, much of the present armor may come off and the ship further lightened. It might be well to wholly abandon armor, but on that point I am not yet decided. Certainly the armor must be limited to the protection of the vitals and the stability of the ship; one-half of the present weight should be enough for these purposes. In any event, it is doubtful if armor protects against a full blow from a big shell.

A Ship That the Submarine Cannot Sink.

The hull of the proposed ship will not differ in general appearance from the ordinary hull, but its construction will be on new lines.

The underwater armor will be inside, and so placed as to resist the attack of the explosion upon the frame of the ship. This armor will not save the ship harmless, but it will minimize the destructive power of the torpedo.

Since the torpedo will undoubtedly do some damage, the matter of watertight compartments is most important.

The question of the design, size and construction of the internal compartments of the ship should be one of major consideration, and the number, location and character of such compartments should be most carefully thought out.

Auxiliary to the safety compartments will be a compressed air system, which can instantly check the water in any opened compartment on the principle of the calson, which is so extensively used in bridge and tunnel work. An arrangement is easily made by which the air may also be let into the compartments adjoining the damaged one, for to put the greatest pressure only in one compartment would be to rack and strain the ship. The sudden filling of a compartment with water may turn a ship on its beam ends, and a balancing system is needed to admit water into another equalizing compartment.

Here then is a ship which is not immune for a submarine attack, but which it is hard for a submarine to hit a fatal blow. And if badly hit the vessel should, under ordinary circumstances, be able to escape for repairs.

Time will bring many improved methods of defeating the might of the submarine, but the type of vessel which I have sketched represents a vast advance over the dreadnought, and is a type which might well be followed in the future ships of the United States—at least until some one comes along with a better design.

Manifestly the surface ship is at a disadvantage in resisting a submarine attack—it cannot hit back; and, therefore, the general principle of inflicting damage to a ship to further the major operation of the fleet must be modified, and a proper ship ought to have the speed and mobility to escape any sighted submarine; the big, lumbering dreadnought cannot escape the submarine without ample warning; it cannot get up and run on a second's notice. The dreadnought is designed and equipped for the give and take sort of warfare, and not to run away.

Take the super-dreadnoughts; these ships are to-day over six hundred feet in length and the tonnage is around 22,000. They carry a main battery of fourteen to sixteen inch guns distributed among four turrets; they also have a great number of smaller guns of various sizes. To protect the ship's vitals from projectiles a band of armor is attached along the

thick and heavy; it extends from eight or nine feet below the waterline to about ten feet above.

The weight of the twelve heavy guns and the protective armor makes necessary a most ponderous vessel, but in addition to this great weight is the elaborate equipment for the comfortable housing of the nine to twelve hundred men who form the crew. A thousand things go toward making the modern dreadnought a heavy, complicated piece of machinery.

The ship is, of necessity, clumsy; the marvel is that these ships are so easily handled. The best of them will make about twenty-one knots an hour. They fulfil neither of the modern requirements for speed and mobility.

Some genius may find a complete answer to the submarine, but he has not yet appeared. In the meantime we can only use the materials and the methods we know, and these are fairly adequate if we can keep the torpedo as a constant factor. That is where the rub comes. I will agree to build a ship that will resist any given torpedo; I know the strength of that torpedo, and I can build against it, but I cannot build against all torpedoes, and it is far easier to increase the power of the torpedo than it is to build a new ship.

The best outside protection is a cordon of destroyers or other craft to detect and sink the submarine if it happens to come to the surface. This is guarding rather than protecting, and depends upon keenness of vision and an obliging excursion by the submersible to the surface.

Steel nets may also be placed at some distance about the ship, and these will catch the ordinary torpedo, but now these weapons have been fitted with a wire cutter, and the net is of doubtful value; it is entirely without value when the ship is in motion, because it not only makes the ship very slow and unwieldy, but the motion of the ship also brings the net to the surface and defeats its object. Another defense is more in the nature of a warning than a defense; the aeroplane may drop a bomb on the submarine, but the chance is very slight—so slight as to be largely a matter of luck.

The protection of the ship struck by a torpedo is a very difficult matter; the only known means is underwater armor combined with a compressed air system and a new plan of watertight compartments.

This underwater armor differs greatly from the ordinary above-water armor, for the action of a torpedo on the hull of a ship is very different from that of a projectile. The explosion has a crushing effect which results in a tearing of the riveted joints; it would seem that the rivets are attacked in detail. External armor does not protect the joints, and therefore the mere addition of more metal on the outside of the hull will not strengthen the rivets and will not give more protection against the explosion.

The proper armor for torpedo defense is not a mere plastering of the ship with heavy metal, but an incorporation of the armor within the body of the ship, so that it will not only protect but also strengthen the structure. The United States has about perfected what I consider the very best way yet devised of placing this armor to give the surest protection, but I am not at liberty to tell the exact method.

The Submarine Has the Whip-Hand for the Moment.

I have given the elements of the problem that the designer is up against when he starts to create a ship to withstand the torpedo.

It is one thing to build a boat which a torpedo will not sink, but it is a better accomplishment to build a boat which will be so elusive that the submarine cannot get near enough to take true aim. The ship of the future will be able to escape any submarine which it sees, and it will be so constructed that the explosion of one or two torpedoes will not cause fatal damage. To date in the present war the battleship has been chiefly noteworthy only for its surprising ability to sink cleanly and quickly upon the impact of a torpedo.

The submarine has checkmated the battleship in the war game. The enormous power of the great ships has not been felt in any battle at sea; their only public exhibition has been in the bombardment of the forts at the Dardanelles. The German navy is behind barriers in the Kiel Canal, and might as well be in a museum; it is afraid to venture into the open because of the British ships, but the British squadron is boomed in somewhere to the north of Scotland; it is afraid to venture into the open because of the German submarines. The French and Italian squadrons are likewise under cover. The only ships which roam the seas are the submarines, the torpedo-boat destroyers and the fast scouts and cruisers. The three open sea battles of note—the two in the South Seas and the one off the Dogger Banks—were decided by swift battle cruisers. The submarine has cleared the seas of every lumbering warship.

The submarine has the whip hand for the moment. The British have already marked the change in policy. As far back as June Admiral Sir Percy Scott, of the Royal Navy, said, "In my opinion, as the motor vehicle has driven the horse from the road, so has the submarine driven the battleship from the sea." The United States, not yet having had a battleship sunk, is conservative. The Naval Committee said in its last report to the House of Representatives, "While the committee believes in the effectiveness of submarines and airships, it does not believe that sufficient has been learned from the European war to warrant any change in the 1910-11 programme as has heretofore been authorized."

I take a position somewhere between these two stands. I still have faith in the surface ship, but I fully recognize that the slow floating fortress has passed its usefulness. A radical change in design and policy is imperative if the United States hopes to keep its feet off the bottom.

Mr. Chesterton Thinks Prussians Are Like Turks

Comment Upon a German Prediction that Germany's New Christianity "Will be Particularly Attractive to Heathens."

By G. K. Chesterton,

The Famous English Essayist and Moralist.

A PROMINENT German journalist, in discussing the future of German religion, especially with reference to German missions, said that it would be impossible to associate further with English Protestant missionaries after the war.

This was not only because the English missionaries "would certainly be filled with malice and spite," but because German Christianity (in this writer's opinion) will be "very different from English Christianity." It will be, he says, "a manly Christianity, and permeated with the new German spirit." This, he adds, will make it particularly attractive "to Mohammedans and heathens."

It might be suggested that though "manly Christianity" may be very suitable to Mohammedans, it may not be so suitable to Mohammedans as Mohammedanism. It also might be suggested that if Christianity needs to be "new," it does not need to be Christian. In justice to the Turks, it should also be said that, if they are rude as the Germans in war, they are much more polite in peace. But the most important point in the parallel is one from which many seem to shrink. Mr. Charles Buxton, the distinguished writer and traveller who was recently wounded by Turkish assassins on account of his great sympathies and services for the Balkan peoples, has been interviewed by the Christian Commonwealth, which gives (I presume correctly) his opinions on a possible settlement with Germany.

Why Not Treat Prussia Like Turkey?

His views seem to me singular in themselves, and especially singular in him. He seems to rebuke those who hope for a final breaking of the Prussian power, as if indicating that so powerful, widespread, and well-armed a combination cannot be reduced to impotence. I should say that it is precisely because it is powerful, widespread, and well-armed that it must be reduced to impotence. It is a paradox, but a very practical truth, that what is indispensable is generally nearly impossible. Unless the enemy were strong enough to hurt us, it would not be necessary or indeed justifiable, for us to hurt him.

But if the attitude be strange in any case, it is especially strange in one with Mr. Buxton's almost romantic record. Surely he of all people ought not to say that it is impossible to break the back of a great empire of great military prestige, if Turkey had been left powerful, if Turkey had been left united, if Turkey had been left as Mr. Buxton would apparently leave Germany, the Turks would have been far too happy shooting the British and the French out of the sky. What Mr. Buxton thinks it impossible to do is what Mr. Buxton has been largely instrumental in doing. He has seen—and, as I imagine, approve—the cutting down of one of the great conquering empires of the Continent to the smallest margin of what it has conquered.

We could not break the back of a great empire, because they never had one; we could only in a certain large degree distract upon stolen goods. But we did take away from them—or rather, Mr. Buxton's very brave friends in the Balkans did—enough to prevent their being a power in the sense of keeping other people power inside the door. The smallest moral excuse for restricting the Turks to little more than Constantinople which is not also a moral excuse for restricting Prussianism to little more than Berlin. That it is much more difficult to do makes it much more necessary to do it. And if we do not do it, if we do not disarm Prussia as we have disarmed Turkey, then indeed, in the very wide words of a French Socialist uttered the other day, "the greatest effort ever made by the human race will have been made in vain."

I must agree with Mr. Buxton on the general rate that no European nation should be reduced because it is defeated. I cannot understand why he should see that the Turkish case is an exception, and not see that the Prussian case is an exception also. They are exceptions for this vital reason, that they do not place their community inside the European community; they are always outside it, whether as outcasts or as invaders. The Turks put themselves above all national affections upon a supposed supernatural right, now a thousand years old and only now beginning to wear thin. The Prussians put themselves above all national affections upon a supposed natural right, which is now only fifty years old. The natural right is more unattractive than the mystic one.

The Sacred Dogma of German Superiority.

The profound impossibility of Prussia consists ultimately in this that she has broken an implied understanding among all Christian men by taking victory too seriously. Glory is only a good thing when it is a good joke. With all the other peoples success has been a legitimate vanity and not a lawless pride. The French were naturally proud of having ridden into the gate of almost every European city; but they were equally satisfied with having ridden out again, and they were quite as conscious of their defeats as of their victories, draping the statue of Strasbourg and probing the wound of Waterloo.

But the Prussians have broken all this implied balance of battles by building on one victory a domination that is meant to last forever. They built on the battlefield of Sedan not a temporary trophy, but a tower of eternal brass. What happened after or during 1870 was not primarily the union of Germany, but rather the division of Europe; it was divided into Germans and non-Germans. It was made something more even than a racial, it was made a biological division. It was supposed to be a fundamental and physical superiority, as of the German eagle over the Gallic cock.

Only one dogma will always remain sacred, the dogma of the German's superiority. Only one duty will never be lifted off him: the duty of praising himself. He is free to do everything except repent.