Rama Deva: Good evening. On behalf of the Asian Division of the Library of Congress and the Asian Division Friends Society, I'd like to welcome you to the 2008 Asian Pacific American Collection Lecture Series for 2008: "Bridging Homeland and Homegrown." I'm Rama Deva, board member and vice president of the Asian Division Friends Society. In October 2007, we had a successful conference of establishing a national Asian Pacific American -- that's APA -- collection. We are pleased to report that this is now in place within the Asian Division of the Library of Congress. The APA Librarian is Reme Grefalda. Reme? [ Applause ] Reme Grefalda: Please rise for the presentation of color by the Armed Forces Color Guard, and please remain standing for the national anthem after that. Thank you. [ Color Guard Presentation ] Male Speaker: Oh, say can you see, By the dawn's early light, What so proudly we hailed At the twilight's last gleaming, Whose broad stripes and bright stars, Through the perilous fight, O'er the ramparts we watched Were so gallantly streaming? And the rockets' red glare, The bombs bursting in air, Gave proof through the night That our flag was still there. O, say, does that Star-Spangled Banner yet wave O'er the land of the free And the home of the brave? [ Applause ] [ Pause ] Rama Deva: We now invite Ms. JoAnn Jenkins, chief operating officer of the Library of Congress to make her welcoming remarks. JoAnn Jenkins: Good evening. Ambassador Hill, Mrs. Fulbright, other distinguished guests, we are honored and pleased to have all of you here with us tonight here at the Library of Congress. It is an inspiring sight to see so many of you here as we launch the Asian Pacific American lecture series as part of introducing the Asian Pacific American collection, established recently here at the Library of Congress. I'd also like to take just a moment to thank Judy Lu, who is our acting director of the Asian Division. [ Applause ] I take special pride in Judy because I also run the leadership development program, and Judy was in our first class. She has certainly come up through the ranks here at the Library. So it's an honor for me to be working with her here today. As those of you who have been working with the Asian American and Pacific Islander field know, the challenges of locating documentation about Asian Pacific Americans and bringing it to the forefront are formidable. Nevertheless, the Library of Congress is committed to expand this important aspect of our nation's heritage with our holdings here at the Library of Congress and to make a more concentrated efforts to preserve the records of Americans of Asian decent and those of Pacific American Islanders. I want to congratulate all of the staff who have been working to support this effort and all of you who have come here tonight for this important evening. It's now my pleasure to introduce our former head of the Asian Division, Dr. Hwa-Wei Lee, who is fresh from 30 days of retirement, who has come up from Florida to be with us here tonight. Dr. Hwa-Wei was one of the ones who originally envisioned this idea along with Mr. Honda, Congressman Honda, and a number of other people who thought so strongly about how the Library of Congress needed to build its Asian American Heritage Collection. So it's a pleasure to introduce Dr. Hwa-Wei Lee. [ Applause ] Hwa-Wei Lee: Good evening, honorable keynote speaker Christopher Hill, Mrs. Fulbright -- I have to say something. I was one of the Fulbright Senior Specialists many years ago also serving as a panel for selecting Fulbright scholars. So it's quite an honor to have you here. And other distinguished guests and friends, you may be wondering who is this guy who does not look like Mike Honda. In fact, as a former chief of the Asian Division, I am very honored to step in for Congressman Honda this evening. Congressman Honda, who is also the chair of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, has been our strongest advisor and supporter for a newly established national Asian Pacific American Collection at the Library of Congress. Unfortunately, he's under the weather today and had to cancel all the activities. So when I came back from Florida and stepped into Judy's office at 3:00, Judy said I have an assignment for you. You have read Congressman Honda's short message because he left office in the great hurry and didn't have time to really write a long one. So here I am very happy to read his short message. "I deeply regret that I cannot attend this special event this evening and to extend my warmest greetings to you at the inauguration of the APA collection lecture series. I am very pleased to know that honorable Christopher Hill will be the first keynote speaker for this newly created lecture series. I wish that I could be here with you to hear his speech. As chairman of the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, I commend the Asian Division of the Library of Congress for taking the major responsibility in developing such a national collection. This is a necessary and appropriate progression for the Library of Congress, one that will centralize the APA experience in our county. Your energy, enthusiasm, and determination for establishing a comprehensive APA collection will help to preserve a very important part of our nation's history. [unintelligible], Mike Honda." I understand that Congressman Honda wrote this message in a great hurry. I am honored to read this short message for him and want to wish him well. Thank you very much. [ Applause ] [ Pause ] Rama Deva: We'd like to invite Mr. Robert Dizart, Jr., Deputy Associate Librarian for Library Services to introduce honorable Christopher Hill. Robert Dizart: Thank you, Rama. Before I introduce our keynote speaker, please allow me just briefly to acknowledge our retired chief of the Asian Division, Hwa-Wei Lee. I don't want to discourage Hwa-Wei from coming back to the Library by acknowledging him every time he comes publicly, but it's only been a month since he's gone. It's way too soon for us to be pulling back on the accolades. I told Hwa-Wei before he left that in many ways he's a model for our curatorial chiefs here in the Library in sustaining our collections, in increasing the use and building outside support for them, [ Applause ] Robert Dizart: This evening we welcome to the Library of Congress Christopher Hill, assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He is someone who's current work is -- I'm sure -- being carefully followed each day and analyzed for Congress by our Congressional researcher, who works just a few floors below us here right in this building, and certainly one day will be documented in the Library's collections. Ambassador Hill is currently the United States point person for the six-party talks aimed at better understanding in dealing with North Korea's nuclear capabilities. The countries in these talks are the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and North Korea. A career foreign service officer, Christopher Hill has served as ambassador to the Republic of Korea, U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia and Special Envoy to Kosovo. He received the state department's distinguished service award for his contributions as a member of the U.S. negotiating team in the Bosnia peace settlement, and was cited by the department for his work on the Kosovo crisis. Today Ambassador Hill is in the one of the brightest and perhaps hottest spotlights on the world diplomatic stage. Earlier this week, for example, Ambassador Hill, during consultations with his South Korean counterpart, indicated that the six-party talks will continue despite revelations last week that North Korea had apparently been helping Syria build a nuclear reactor. Yesterday, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved legislating noting its requirements for the talks. So the complexities of the task before Ambassador Hill are numerous, interwoven, and shifting. In fact, when you read the news reports it sometimes appears that Ambassador Hill's talks with the five Asian nations are fairly more difficult than the negotiation and persuasion that he must be doing here in the United States between the rounds of talks. Along with the day-to-day developments of the six-party talks, Ambassador Hill has taken a longer view of them as well. He recently noted that the talks carry other benefits stating, something that began as a way to address one very difficult issue might actually bring together a region like never before, specifically, "Getting these countries together into a shared sense of community." Regarding China, he pointed out, "We worked diplomatically with them shoulder to shoulder. We haven't done this sort of thing before with China." He has called the Chinese relationship "the most important bilateral relationship we have in the world." We have some 57 dialogues with Chinese counterparts ranging from global warming to economic and trade issues. I would say we spend a great deal of time and attention on things Chinese with the understanding that in the long run we have to have a good working relationship with 1.3 billion people. Fostering understanding of other nations and peoples is a key goal of the Library of Congress. It is one reason we have a universal collecting holding the record of America's creativity, but also the world's knowledge. We collect in part so that understanding by Americans of other nations and peoples and by others of us can be furthered through research and scholarship here and increasingly through making our collections available around the world digitally, including partnerships with other national libraries. The Asian Division is a leader in this respect, collaborating with the National Library of Korea, the National Library of China, the National Central Library in Taiwan, among others. Ambassador Hill, we are pleased you are able to join us here tonight, and welcome to the Library of Congress. [ Applause ] Christopher Hill: Thank you very much, Bob. Thank you so much for those very kind remarks and for your comment that the front is often right here in Washington. I want to assure you that it's not that bad, and indeed we are making some progress even if I am taking some incoming at times. But let me just say what a delight it is to be here on this first day of the Asian Pacific American heritage month. Now I know that at ADFS every single month of the year is Asian Pacific American heritage month, because what the ADFS is to bring really, bring our cultures together, bring materials together, bring really put together a collection here that really is second to none in the world. So I really congratulate you on all your work and ask that you really keep it up because we have talked for so long about the century of Asia, but I really do believe this time it is really upon us. We are very fortunate to have this ADFS here and working. In so many respects, what the ADFS does is very similar to what we do at the East Asia Pacific Bureau in the state department now. Probably a lot of you don't realize this, but this is the 100th year. This is our centennial year in the state department of creating the East Asia Bureau. At one point it was known as the Far East Bureau, but calling it Far East that sort of depends on where you are. At a certain point they made it East Asia. Then they thought, well, actually there are some people from the Pacific who may not be Asian or from East Asia, so we added the element of the Asia Pacific. I suspect you've gone though a similar evolution. But now what we are all trying to do really is we look at that Pacific Ocean and we think how big that thing is and how much the Pacific Ocean can divide us. Then we look for ways to see how it can actually join us. So I think we are all working on that together. I think it's been a particularly important to bring people together. I have taken some pride in working on that. In fact, when the Boston Red Sox, my team, first got the posting rights to Matsuzaka I was the first to encourage him to see what he could do about coming to Boston. We after all some pretty good learning experiences if we wants to continue his education as long as he keeps that fastball at 94 miles an hour. [laughter] So a lot going on, but I know that what you all have been involved in is bringing top-notch Asian scholars here, working together, making sure that our campuses here are able to do research and really to bring our whole academic communities more closely together. In fact, when you look at the number of American students now in Asia it is truly extraordinary. By the way, it's not just in Japan or in China. You see American students everywhere in Asia. I was in Thailand recently, and I ran into all these American students studying at the top universities there. So I think this is all very, very good news and all a product of some very, very hard work, because I think as Asia and the United States try to -- as we work together on some tough problems, on climate change, on the current issue we're dealing with now with food and rice shortages, on the problem of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula -- I think it would be very, very important that we understand each other much better. I have felt it necessary to point out to people that I'm not the assistant secretary for North Korea. This comes as somewhat of an emotional shock to them, but I want to assure them there are other places in Asia that I think are deserving some attention. Indeed, I've been able to travel to places like Thailand. I think I've been there some five times, and the Philippines five or six times. I've been out to some of the Pacific Islands, and I can see that America has a lot of friends in a lot of places in the Asian Pacific area. So I think what is truly extraordinary is to understand the diversity in Asia, what we're dealing with, the fact that we -- there are so many different cultures -- and the fact that in some respects, really, countries in Asia have not come together in the kind of community that we would like to see because it is so incredibly diverse. So in a strange sort of way, it's the United States that's very far off place that has been able, I think, to help foster community in Asia. Partly, the way we've been able to do it is with our America citizens with their Asia Pacific heritage. We are very, very proud to have you here. So I think we need really to continue to work on this sense of community. Indeed, if you look at the six-party talks -- and Bob alluded to this a while ago -- we put together the six-party talks with the idea of dealing with this rather -- how to put it -- rather nettlesome problem of North Korea's aspirations for having nuclear weapons. So as we've gone forward on this and as we've dealt with this problem in a sort of daily basis -- you know, we try to try all kinds of different ways to deal with this. I'll get to some of the specifics a little later. We found that, you know, in this sort of production that we're doing, we found that there was kind of an interesting byproduct that we hadn't really planned on having. That byproduct that we found for the six-party process is low and behold, even apart from North Korea, we found countries were actually dealing with each other better in the six-party process than they were bilaterally. We found that even in the most difficult moments back in '05 when Japan was having real problems with China with textbook issues and things like that, we found that within the six-party process, they're dealing just fine together. We found that South Korea and China who really have been neighbors for a long time, but it's been a very new experience recently as China and South Korea recognized each other only about 20 years ago -- that they were actually getting to know each other a lot better though the six-party process. So we found that this byproduct of the process was actually almost as good and in some ways better than the actual thing we're trying to produce, which was the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. So it got us to all thinking that maybe the six-party process is something that we really need to, you know, put in a bottle and preserve, and that six-party process may be something that we can use as the founding architecture really of Northeast Asia, because clearly Asia needs more multilateralism. They need more fore for people to get together. Not everything should have to go to a bilateral channel. Now there are some people who say, but you don't understand Asia. It's much too hierarchical, much too many vertical structures. There's no way people can really deal with each other in the sense of the equality, in the sense of, you know, having horizontal structures where everyone is equal on the table. It's just not true. When we sit at the table, when we sit at six-party meetings no matter who you are, the others are listening. In fact, I think we've been able to do a lot together. I know the United States has been able to work very closely with South Korea. I know South Korea's made many contributions to the six-party process. It's a much smaller country than China, and yet when the South Koreans come and talk to the Chinese about their ideas for how we can manage some of these issues, China listens very carefully. So there is, I think, an ability of small states to deal with big states in a multilateral setting. There's absolutely nothing about Asia -- there's no congenital issue in Asia that should prevent this. So we look forward, really, to the six-party process as being part of the architecture of the Asian mainland, that architecture Northeast Asia where we look forward to seeing that even beyond the resolution of the North Korea problem that we could have some sort of Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism where we can build this neighborhood. What we're really looking for is not only, we're really looking for community, a cooperative community that can deal with some of these pandemic issues: climate change, trafficking, other issues like that. But the United States in a funny way, we feel very much a part of the Northeast Asia security. We would very much like to be a part of this process. You know, I tried to explain -- in fact I was sitting with the North Korean delegation explaining the concept that as we go forward we really need everybody to have a sense that they're getting something out of the process and that they shouldn't look at things in the zero sum sense, but rather they should look at things at a win-win sense. I noticed the interpreter had a heck of a time explaining to the North Koreans what is win-win? The North Koreans were rather sure that I was talking about a Burmese general, but I was not. I think we can impart this concept. Some concepts take longer than others to cross, but I think there is a notion that as we go forward everybody needs to get something out of the process. Everybody has to take ownership and feel ownership of this process. We can't have a situation where the U.S. and North Korea and China feel things are going forward and Japan doesn't feel that way. So we have to make sure that everyone feels a part of it, and I think we can do that. I'll get back to some of the issues of the six-party process and maybe bring you up to date on where we stand in this. But let me just say a few words about China, because nobody is indifferent to China in these days. Although, frankly, if you ask six people in Washington you'll get eight different answers on what China is. So, you know, it is interesting that I think it was only a few months ago in January that the China minister of culture was actually in this Madison Building. I'm very struck by the fact that in my lifetime -- or in our lifetime I should say -- we've all seen some history throughout the world, but nowhere is that history more clearly in the making than in China. Really, when you look at what has happened in China in the last generation it is one of the great stories of our lifetime. It's not over. It has a long, long way to go. But I think we can see that what is happening in China is in many respects unforeseen, but in many respects we don't know how the story will end. So to some extent we will be, the United States, other partners of China will be involved in shaping the environment for how China turns out. So in some respects if people want to look at China as some kind of enemy, maybe they can shape an environment and make it into an enemy. Maybe there can be a self-fulfilling prophecy, but why would that be in our interest? Rather, I think, we should see China in its complexity. We need to understand that it is very difficult to generalize about a country with 1.3 billion people. It's very difficult to generalize about some of the issues that we differ on with China and some of the issues that we agree on with China. Indeed, there are many issues that we don't agree on China. We've had many differences over issues like how to affect change in Burma, how to make sure Iran also stays away from nuclear weapons ambitions. We want to see more openness within China. There is no question that the Tibet issue has for many Americans symbolized the fact that there needs to be more openness in China. But in some respects it's also brought forward an issue that we have to be careful to control, and that is we need to see a little emotion drained out of this. We need to situation clearly, and we need to look for ways that all parties will show restraint and look for ways that all parties can have a feeling that we've got to get through this and resolve and somehow resolve this issue. I do believe that as we address the issue of Tibet, a very difficult issue, we should not do it in the way that is perceived by the Chinese people as undercutting or humiliating them or somehow keeping China down. We need to approach it in a way where China will understand that its interests are served by reaching out to the Tibetan people to the Tibetan leadership and having a meaningful dialogue and seeing what can be done to address their desire for autonomy. Indeed, I believe, I believe our president has done a very good job of making clear that he wants to see China deal with the problem of Tibet. He wants to challenge China to deal with some of these problems but to do it in a respectful way and to do it in a very outcome-based approach. I believe that as we -- I saw earlier today, I saw one of the chief aides to the Dali Lama. He told me -- he is on his way to China very shortly to begin this dialogue. He asked me, actually, what do you think, what is your advice about how to start the meeting? I told him the first thing he ought to do when he sits down with the Chinese is propose another meeting because this is not going to be one meeting and everything is over and everything is fine. This is going to take a while. This is going to take a commitment of China, a commitment of the Tibetan to try to look through a series of meeting, a series dialogue to find a way to address the problem. I really think that with that kind of approach, with a calm approach, there can be progress there. You know, I often go to Southeast Asia. Many people say to me, China looks like it really is very interested in this area. Where is the United States? Why aren't you present or something? Well, in fact, it's our view that more of China in Southeast Asia is a rather good thing. More of China does not mean less of the U.S. I think both there is plenty of room for China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia. You know, for years, for decades really, the world looked for a second engine of development. That second engine that is, there was the U.S. economy. Then you look around, there wasn't a lot else. Now we kind of have that second engine; it's the Chinese economy. It is clearly an economy that is helpful in Southeast Asia. But we don't want a situation where people feel they have to choose, that somehow someone has to be pro China or anti U.S. We feel that the U.S. has an important role in Southeast Asia. When I go to Indonesia, when I go to Singapore, when I got to any of these countries, Thailand, especially Vietnam, which is very interesting for an American, we see a real desire in all of these countries to have the U.S. very close to them. We feel that that is quite doable and quite doable in a positive way and not in a way that says, "If you want to be close to us you have to be distant from someone else." So I think we have to also have this kind of win-win approach in Southeast Asia. So I think we can deal with that. We can work through some of these issues. We need to be -- I think the United States needs to be very clear on our values, clear on what we represent. But I believe that at the end of the day we can find ways of talking to China. We can kind ways of cooperating with China. For example, one of the issues is that China has now become an aide donor. We need to coordinate how, you know, we're providing a lot of aide to countries. China's providing a lot of aide to countries. How is that coordinated? Is it going to be positive? I went to a country, for example, a very small county that had an enormous foreign ministry all built by the Chinese. Well, that was interesting. I've never seen a country build another country a foreign ministry before. That's something maybe worth talking about at a donor coordination meeting. So we need more of this type of coordination. We need more dialogue. We've got a lot of dialogue going on with the Chinese, and I'm very proud of that. We have some 57 varieties. I'm not talking about a ketchup bottle here. I'm talking about the number of dialogues that we have between the United States and China. We deal with global warming problems. We deal with transnational crime issues. We deal with trafficking problems, all kinds of issues. So, we're talking with them. One of the issues that I feel we have probably the best traction and the one that we're moving ahead the most is indeed one that I confess to say I probably spend more of my time on than any of the others, and that is the six-party talks, because all of the countries that have come together, but especially the chair of these talks -- that is China -- has seen the value of coming together on one clear objection, which is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. You know, we started off -- I remember the first meeting my Chinese counterpart. He was not really -- we hadn't really met each other. He said, well how would you like to proceed? He asked me questions. I asked him questions. We began to sort of understand that we better get some general thoughts here on a piece of paper. I had consulted very closely with the Japanese and the South Koreans on this, to some extent also with the Russians, and we were able to agree that maybe the approach from the start with the North Koreans was to come up with just a piece of paper on what it is we're trying to do here. So in the summer of '05 we sat together and we agreed that what we really need is a statement of general principles with the understanding that principles are not going to lead to necessarily get you to a denuclearization deal, but we ought to understand was it is we're all trying to do. Principle number one was denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Well that, for the first time, committed North Korea in a multilateral document, committed them to getting rid of all their nuclear programs and all their nuclear weapons. So we then took these principles and then on the basis of what was called action for action, we began a lengthy and rather difficult process of figuring out how to implement this with a series of implementing agreements. It took a while. You know, I used to have dark hair and more of it. But starting in February of last year, February of '07, we got the first implementing arrangement, which was we agreed to the other parties together agreed to give North Korea some 50,000 tons of fuel oil, and in return, the North Koreans would shut off their reactor and shut off their nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Well, a lot of people said well, just shutting them off doesn't really do anything. They can turn them back on. That's correct, and that's why they only got 50,000 tons of fuel off that, which by the way doesn't go very far. It doesn't go very long, and it's a very heavy viscosity type of oil. So you can't put it in a vehicle without reprocessing or a facility that they don't have. So the fuel oil could only go into certain heating plants and certain factories, which at some point in the distant past were the generous gift of the East German people. So we knew that 50,000 tons of fuel oil was really not going to give anything special to the North Koreans. On the other hand, they weren't giving us very much that was special. They were just shutting off the reactor. So then the next issue was it took a while to get there. We had some banking issues that, frankly speaking, I'm still in therapy over. But we go through those. So in the summer it finally happened on July 15. I was actually in a Japanese resort down in Mount Fuji area. A couple of Japanese journalists, who shall remain nameless but who've come to this room, knocked on my door at 6:00 in the morning -- Tomal [spelled phonetically], you don't have to admit you're here -- to tell me that they just found out that the North Koreans had actually turned off the reactor. So for the next few days we had the problem of people saying, "Well, that's nothing. They've just turned it off. But what you really need to do is to have them disable it." Well, we knew that. But you're not going to disable a nuclear facility unless you've turned it off first. If you think about trying to fix a toaster the first thing they tell you is unplug it, please. So we unplugged it, and we paid 50,000 tons of fuel oil. Actually, the South Koreans provided the 50,000. We then moved on the next phase. The next phase had to do with getting a series of disabling actions. It was kind of interesting because some people -- first of all people said to me, they said to us well, how can you trust anything they say? How do you know they've even turned off the facilities? Answer, we had international monitors from Vienna, Austria, from the IEA got on an airplane in Vienna, fly to Beijing, fly over to Pyongyang with a lot of equipment. They pitched up in Yongbyon at the guest facilities there. Then they began to install cameras and seals. So you bet we knew that the thing was shut off. By the way we have other means of knowing that as well. So the next thing was to come up with a list of procedures that we're going to do to disable it. Well, it was interesting because even before people would say to us, well, how do you know they're really disabling? The North Koreans then said, actually no one will believe us that we're really disabling. So we want you, the Americans to do it. So we didn't want just Americans to do it; we have a six-party process. So we sat down with our other partners. Our partners said, "Okay, you do it. Then at a certain point we'll have some delegations. So we'll have some representatives from the other partners Japan, South Korea, et cetera, to come and see that the work's been done." So we have had, since November, we've had four or five Americans at the Yongbyon nuclear facility -- that's Yongbyon nuclear facility, in South Korea there's a Yongbyon ski facility, very different -- so the Yongbyon nuclear facility, we've had four or five Americans there the whole time. They've been busy disabling this facility. At the same time, the facility has not had any maintenance. So when they took the reverse cooling loop and soldered off on both sides, the thing crashed down to the ground. That's where it stood ever since, waiting patiently for someone to some day pick it up and carry it away. So we felt that working on this disabling was really important because the way we termed it in the agreement was disabling for the purpose of eventual abandonment, that this was really the beginning of getting rid of this Yongbyon nuclear facility. We have had disabling activities, and the fuel fabrication facility where they prepare the rods we've had in the actual reactor. We've had disabling activities in the reprocessing facility where they take the rods from the reactor and they turn them into plutonium metal. All three of those are disabled. But, of course, we didn't get into this just for disabling, and by the way, the disabling cost us a lot more fuel oil. Again, we've divided the amount that it would cost. It was something like 950,000 tons because we knew that disabling it is a major step never been done before. So we felt that was really worth taking care of. So we've been shipping this fuel oil, 950,000 tons maybe would compute to being five months worth of fuel oil. If North Korea wants more fuel oil after this we're going to want more denuclearization. So we've tied anything we give them with things that we need to get from them. So now we are dealing with what we hope will be the final elements of this so-called phase two. That is now that we are well on our way to the disabling -- and they're pulling rods out of the reactors -- so the disabling is still continues. In addition to that, we wanted to get from the North Koreans, a very clear statement on what their nuclear programs are and how we would then proceed to what we want to see as the final stage of abandonment. Now, one of the key things we've had to do is to find out how much plutonium they have. The plutonium that they've already harvested from this reactor that they harvested in one campaign when they first started it up in 1990, in another campaign in 2003 when the previous arrangements fell through, in another campaign in 2005 and how much plutonium there was in the reactor in 2007 when it was shut down -- we needed a very clear statement on that. More importantly, since we're not just interested in what they say, we're interested in verifying. So we need the means to ensure that the figures they give us are figures that are accurate and we can be sure that they are accurate. So we're in the middle of that process. We believe we can come to an understanding of what that situation is. At the same time, there have been great concerns -- and I must say very valid concerns -- that North Korea, like other countries that have pursued nuclear ambitions, did not just do it through one means that is through plutonium, that they also were pursuing a capability in uranium enrichment. What we have needed to do on that is to establish with great clarity the status of that. Now the North Koreans have told us very, very clearly -- and they've spelled it out in an October agreement -- that they do not have any ongoing uranium enrichment program and they will not in the future. What we have had to do is to work with them on what has happened in the past to make sure that we have some clarity about what has happened in the past, and we have been doing that. Finally, we've also needed to know that North Korea, which has been proliferating a lot of military equipment, for example, small arms missiles, things like that -- we found that there was very convincing evidence for any of you who were not in a coma last week, you know that we have very convincing evidence of what they're up to in Syria. We need, they have told us they do not have an ongoing program with Syria or with anyone else. It's our assessment that that is true, but we need to verifying and to continue to monitor that they do not have ongoing or future programs with any other countries, that they do not have an ongoing uranium enrichment program and will not try to constitute one in the future. But just as with uranium enrichment, with Syria we wanted to have a discussion about what went on before, so that we can be sure as we go forward they don't have it now and they won't have it in future. So all of these elements together with a commitment from the six parties -- and we do have that commitment -- to monitor all agreements reached within the six parties, gives us some confidence that we can move forward and try to get to the end of this phase with the understanding that the next phase is one where we know that they have some plutonium. We will know precisely how much that plutonium is. What will try to do is sit down and negotiate with them to turn over to abandon that plutonium. Now this is the -- we believe should be the last phase in many respects. This is s the toughest phase because we want them finally to abandon these nuclear ambitions. When they are prepared to do that, we are prepared to do a number of things. We are prepared to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. We won't establish diplomatic relations with a nuclear North Korea. We will establish diplomatic relations with a non-nuclear North Korea. Now a number of people -- and quite understandably, quite understandably -- have said to us, there are many aspects of the North Korean regime that are difficult for people to take, to understand. One of these, for example, is their human right record. So I have repeatedly, continually talked to the North Koreans about their human rights record with the understanding that that is also not something's that's going to get better overnight. That's not going to change in one seating. But we've tried to acquaint the North Koreans with the fact that until they understand the need to improve that record, it is going to be difficult for them to join the international community. If their goal ultimately is in some way to be not only a member of the a state in the U.N., which they already are, but a country in good standing in the international community. They're going to have to upgrade a number of things including -- and I would say especially -- their human rights record. I don't think, I don't agree with the idea that this is some additional burden to the process. I think it's simply an additional reality to the process, that as we go forward if the North Koreans are willing to give up their nuclear ambitions and we are willing to help bring them into the international community, that they need to look ahead and understand that part of that is to have a -- part of that bargain is to upgrade is their human rights records. How that will be embedded in our process we need to work with them on. For example, the European Union has a human rights dialogue, a means by which to deal with human rights issues. Perhaps, we could look at a human rights dialogue. But one thing we need to do is look at it with clarity. I think we can do that. So we have a lot of work to do in this North Korean issue. It is truly one of the great challenges in the entire region. Fortunately we have friends and partners in this process. This is not just an American problem. This is a problem for certainly all of Northeast Asia. For that reason alone having this six-party process, having an ability to work closely with the Japanese, the Chinese, the South Koreans, the Russians, this has been so important as we've gone forward. Because, as I said earlier, we will get through this. We will succeed at this. We have some of the world's biggest, most powerful countries, countries that are not only the biggest and most powerful, but also can be the most generous. I think North Korea will come to understand that its interest lie in reaching an accommodation with us and trying to join the rest of the world. As we go forward with this, I think you will see that America will be even closer to Asia as ever before, that that Pacific Ocean that has really separated us for so many years will actually join us, and that in many respects through this six-party process, the U.S. will become a Northeast Asian county. So thank you very much for your attention to this long speech. I'm very sorry about the length. But I really enjoyed talking to you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you. [ Applause ] [ Inaudible ] Christopher Hill: Should I call people? Okay. Yes, gentleman. [ Inaudible ] Victor Kim [spelled phonetically]: My name is Victor Kim, U.S. Japan research. Ambassador Hill, to what extent the axis of evil, the concept, has helped your effort or hindered your effort. See how that affected in any way your tremendous effort bringing Korea out of that secluded nation. If you can just comment briefly, I appreciate. Christopher Hill: Look I'm just a simple diplomat. I'm looking at a problem here; I'm trying to deal with a problem. I look how to get the other guy to do something he doesn't' want to do. So I try to explain why it might be in his interest. You know, I know at time the North Koreans, their feelings get hurt. I know that. But, you know, we have feelings too. If you look at what the KCNA, the official news agency of the North Koreans say about the United States every single day of the week, even on Sunday, when you look at what they say about us, I think we can kind of get over some of the words and get on to the problem. So I don't have any problems with these sorts of things. I very much focused on the task. I'm very much focused on trying to get certain things done, because ultimately this is a process that if we can get through this with concrete results where we do things, the North Koreans do things, we're going to be in good shape. I would like to say that every step of the way I have had the support of my boss, Secretary Rice. She's had the support of her boss, President Bush. I have never shown the North Koreans a piece of paper unless it was approved by Dr. Rice, approved by the president. I've never come away and say we've had an agreement unless it was approved by Dr. Rice, approved by the president. They have been with me every step of the way. I would also like to emphasize that diplomacy is very much a team sport. We have some phenomenal people who are working on this issue including some Asian Americans. We have the director of the Korean desk at the state department. His name's Syong Kim [spelled phonetically], who came to the United States as a teenager. I don't know how good a baseball player he is, but he's a damn good negotiator. He has really played an important role. We have some other Asian Americans on this venture, a woman named Uri Kim [spelled phonetically], who works in the Korea desk. We have a number of people. This is quite a team of people we've put together. So, you know, I think like a lot of things life you'll got to do your best and just leave everything on the field. If you've done your best you really don't need to worry about other things. [ Applause ] Christopher Hill: Thank you. Yes, ma'am. Female Speaker: We spent quite a number of decades dealing diplomatically with the Soviet Union, whose human rights record was not a shining example. I was just wondering why we are having so much more trouble with North Korea. I mean diplomacy is simply a way of talking to one another and trying to solve problems. Yes, disapproving very much of a human rights record, but I just know -- Christopher Hill: I think you know every -- Female Speaker: I'm wondered about the comparison. Christopher Hill: Yeah. Every problem has sort of historic antecedents, I mean the history, rather. The Soviet Union was an enormous place, enormous, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. It saw itself correctly as a world power, and Russia is still a world power. I don't think the same can be said about North Korea. I think when you look at the history of the Korean peninsula, I mean you see a history of the people between two other larger countries, a people whose identity depended to a certain extent on toughness and to a certain extent on sort of inward looking way to approach things. Now clearly that has dramatically -- in the Southern part of the peninsula you see a truly remarkable story. I mean a county that is probably one of the most open countries in the world now. But in the North traditions continued. So I think they need to understand that their future, if they look over their southern border, which sometimes they don't like to do, but if they looked over there they would see the history of a people genetically the same as them who have managed to do extraordinary things. I hope that as they are exposed to the world they will understand that they can't stay where they are. They can't go back. They have to go forward. Look, the human rights situation there needs to be addressed. It really needs to be addressed. The purpose of addressing it is not to somehow to humiliate people there or say that they are somehow inferior, et cetera. Certainly, we're not looking to weaponize human rights. I mean we're looking to address people's needs there and always to keep in mind our concerns about the plight of the North Korean people. Yes, sir. Endo Wan [spelled phonetically]: My name is Endo Wan. I have a question related to the reunification of the two Koreas. Does the six-party talk accelerate the reunification process or in some way to hinder the process between the two Koreans? Christopher Hill: Well, I think my own view is that a North Korea that comes out of its shell and tries to join the world will accelerate the process. Certainly, the way it is going now I don't think is sufficient to get that process going. As for what kind of political arrangements the Korean people make on the Korean peninsula, I think that's up to them. I mean, obviously, we have security concerns about nuclear weapons, that sort of thing. But I think the Korean peninsula is for the Korean people. I think we need to be very respectful of what happened there in the mid 20th century, a terrible tragedy through no fault of the Korean people that the peninsula was divided. It was just by happenstance that U.S. forces took surrender of the Japanese below the 38th parallel. Soviet forces took their surrender north of the 38th parallel. To have seen that that's evolved into this divided peninsula is a great tragedy. So it's my view that we need to stand by the Korean people and allow them to do this peacefully. You know, I think I know what choice they would want Yes? Jenny Elurcerin [spelled phonetically]: Thank you. This has been very enlightening. My name Jenny Elucerin, [unintelligible] in the Philippines. My question is what is your view regarding the growing closer relationship or coziness if you will of the Philippine government with China including militarily operations. Christopher Hill: Well, you know, I know I've seen -- I think I know what you're referring to, but on the other hand we have a very good relationship with the Philippines. We continue to have really a very special relationship with the Philippines. Anyone who's visited the Philippines feels the warmth of the Philippino people toward America. I think some of what you're referring to, there are a lot of economic efforts between the Philippines and China. You know, we think if they make sense economically for the Philippines that is fine with us. We're not going to be telling the Philippines not to deal with China. So I think as long as we see, you know, that our relationship with the Philippines has not been affected by what you're referring to and as long as Philippine people support this, we support whatever actions people there want to take. I think it's been very important to get more growth, more economic growth in the Philippines. We've seen some of the economic growth in recent years. I mean obviously there's an issue right now with rice, with the rice stocks. The Philippines needs some more growth as do many countries in the world. I think China has been a factor in helping growth. So I'm not here to tell the Philippines who they should play with. I think they can figure that out themselves. Yes, sir. Oh, okay, and then I'll get t -- .all right. You first. Next. Mallory Star [spelled phonetically]: My name is Mallory Star. I'm on the board of the Asian Division of Friends Society here. My question is what do you see for the near-term future, meaning one or two years from now, particularly in light of the coming presidential election. Christopher Hill: I'm sorry. What do I see -- I didn't quite hear that. Mallory Star: What do you see for the relatively near-term future in terms of one or two years from now particularly in light of the near term coming presidential election. Christopher Hill: I see. Well, I make a practice never to interfere in my own country's internal political affairs. But I would say that, you know, I can't believe there's any new administration really wants this problem dumped in their laps. This is not a fun issue to see there on January 21st. So I think we got the right way to approach it. I can't guarantee a positive outcome, but I think we've, you know, I think we've got the right format, the six parties. I think we've got the right mechanisms, that is this step by step. Mind you, I wish they'd just give up their nuclear weapons yesterday and I could go back up to New England and watch the Red Sox. [laughter] But I don't think that's quite going to happen. So I think we have do this on a step-by-step basis. So I think we've got the right format, the right mechanism. As I mentioned earlier our relations with those countries, Northeast Asia are improving as a result of this thing. So there is this unintended positive value to this. Now, to be sure I would like to get this thing done. I really the problem, you know, if we press the thing it can get done. But I can't guarantee it, because it depends on other people. You know, it depends really on the leadership in North Korea. If they made the decision this morning they want to get this done, we can get this done. You know, a new administration obviously needs to decide whether they want to keep this approach. I certainly have a view, but the new administration might have a different view. If I were they, I wouldn't to see this rock go back down to the bottom of a hill. So we'll see what he or she thinks. So -- yeah. [low audio] Rama Deva: Mr. Hill, we want to thank you so much for a most interesting informative speech. Unfortunately, due to the limits of the time here we have to cut it short. I'm sure a lot of people have a lot of questions. But I'd like to invite Mr. Dizart [spelled phonetically] to make a presentation. Thank you so much. Christopher Hill: Thank you very much. Thank you. [ Applause ] Robert Dizart: Thank you, Ambassador Hill. One of the collections we have here at the Library is of a gentleman named Edmond Roberts, who was the American who negotiated the first U.S. treaty with an Asian nation, which was the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Siam in 1833. In Mr. Robert's personal paper is his copies of an introductory letter that he carried with him to the King of Siam. It was written by the president of the United States, Andrew Jackson. He had in his papers an English version and a Chinese translation. The letter from Andrew Jackson reads, "Great and good friend," addressed to his majesty, "This will be delivered to your majesty by Edmond Roberts, a respectable citizen of these United States, who has been appointed special agent on the part of this government to transmit important business with your majesty. I pray your majesty to protect him in the exercise of the duties, which are thus confided to him, and to treat him with kindness and confidence placing entire reliance on what he shall say to you in our behalf, especially when he shall repeat the assurances of our perfect amity and good will towards your majesty." It's signed, written at the city of Washington, the 26th day of January 1832 and in the 56th year of independence. It's signed by Andrew Jackson and Edward Livingston, the secretary of state. We wanted to present you with copies of the English and Chinese versions. [ Applause ] With our thanks for coming and our hopes that the expressions of encouragement and support given the predecessor diplomat many years ago will be yours as well as you continue your work. Christopher Hill: Thank you very much. [ Applause ] Robert Dizart: Thanks very much, and Judy, our acting chief of the Asian Division, is going to, is presenting you with a illustrated guide to our Asian collections. [ Applause ] Robert Dizart: Thanks. Christopher Hill: Thank you. Rama Deva: We will now have a musical epilogue to end our program. [ Music ] [ Applause ] Rama Deva: Thank you all for joining us this evening. We'd also to convey a very special thank you to Mr. [unintelligible]. Is he here? [ Applause ] Mr. [unintelligible] limited. He's also a member of the Asian Division Friends Society board. Just a bit of housekeeping, I've been asked to inform you that this building will close at 9:00 p.m. So please vacate until then. Thank you so much. [ Applause ] [ Music ]