My name is Leon Scioscia, and I'm with the Law Library of Congress and I'd like to welcome you here today. Before we begin the program I'd like to let you know that today's program is being recorded for later Web broadcast and to let you know that the opinions reflected on today's program are not reflective of the Library of Congress. It is my honor to present to you, to introduce to you, the Acting Law Librarian of Congress, Ms. Donna Scheeder. [applause] Donna Scheeder: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Law Library of Congress to an event celebrating the 60th birthday of NATO. It is fitting that we celebrate a successful collaboration between nations here at the Law Library as we ourselves are engaged and committed to collaboration projects among nations, as evidenced by the Global Legal Information Network. Lord Robertson, the 10th Secretary General of NATO, said about NATO, "Our unique partnership was born in common philosophies of freedom and democracy. It was forged during half a century's fight against tyranny. Now it stands as a beacon of democracy, toleration, plurality, openness and candor in a world menaced by extremism and instability." Today's program will explore some of the legal challenges facing NATO as a result of that instability. Before we begin, I want to thank a number of people for their contributions to today's program. It reflects collaboration between the Law Library of Congress and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Hung Xiao Lu, Director of Legal Research at the Law Library of Congress, as well as Ruth Labush [spelled phonetically] and Nicole Atwell [spelled phonetically], Senior Foreign Law specialists here at the Law Library, were instrumental in the initiation and the planning of this program and we thank them for that. The Law Library specialists provide research and analysis of foreign and comparative law to the Congress, government agencies and U.S. courts, so it is fitting that we share that expertise through programs such as today's. We are delighted to join with the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies to host this panel of experts to discuss the legal challenges facing NATO in the 21st century. It is my pleasure to introduce one of the two co-moderators for today's panel, Dr. Yonah Alexander, Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and director of its International Center for Terrorism Studies, as well as a member of the board of regents. Concurrently he is Director of the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and co-director of the Inter-University Center for Legal studies. In addition, he is the former director of terrorism studies at the George Washington University and the State University of New York, totaling 35 years of service. He has published over 90 books on the subjects of international affairs and terrorism and has appeared on many television and radio programs in over 40 countries. His numerous articles and interviews have been published in both the United States and the international press. Please join me in welcoming Dr. Yonah Alexander who will do the honors of introducing you to the distinguished panel. Dr. Alexander? [applause] Dr. Yonah Alexander: Thank you very kindly for your generous introduction. I would like to second your comment in regard to the work here of the Law Library. I think Professor Brenner and I, we deeply appreciate the co-sponsorship of this particular event and we are very grateful to the director of legal research and staff for their work and their support for our academic work many, many months. The staff participated, for example, in a number of our seminars over the years and we are grateful for the new opportunity. Now the academic work, if I may just relate a footnote in the field of NATO, the area of NATO, is not new as all of us know. Academics are involved. They simply reflect the situation on the ground. And clearly, during the Cold War we had to deal with many of the issues that, unfortunately, we have to deal with today such as weapons of mass destruction. Now, what I would like to do is for two minutes provide some sort of context to the event already referred to the 60th anniversary. The question is, what's the rationale really to have the event of today this time, and I think there is a very clear message. It's the question of the future mission of NATO. For example, next year, the year 2010, there is going to be a major study of NATO trying to deal with the mission for the 21st century; in other words, the new concept, the strategic concept. And the agenda is very broad, all the way from piracy to terrorism to NATO expansion, cyber defense, infrastructure protection, weapons of mass distraction, proliferation, the Balkans, Afghanistan and, additionally, there are some new vulnerabilities that I think we would have to consider and NATO is considering: for example, new challenges in the Maghreb in North Africa, not only discussing the role of the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, but also the role of Iran, for example -- or even Latin America. There is greater concern in NATO today of what's going on, for example, in Venezuela and elsewhere, so the key perception is the nature of the threat. If I may quote a famous Russian proverb that "even when the bear is gone, he left the place for the wolf." I might add also we have to be concerned about the mosquitoes in the swamps, meaning the terrorism. So, again, the current and future challenges of NATO require by definition an interdisciplinary analysis, a comprehensive analysis related, for example, to [unintelligible] power and self power and so on. Today's seminar, I believe, will focus on some of the legal aspects related to the policies and actions of NATO, the alliance for the 21st century. I would like to welcome my friend and colleague Professor Edgar Brenner with whom we worked for the best of a quarter century. We're not counting but at least we do have a record of work for many years and we are focusing on the issues of the legal perspective, the juridical status, for example, of groups and nation states. And we work through the International Law Institute, the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies. Professor Brenner is going to introduce our speakers. [applause] Edgar Brenner: I'm going to invite our panelists to take their places at the head table. The format today is I will briefly introduce each of the panelists who will make their presentation. Then we will have discussion and comment. And when you're recognized, in accordance with our normal procedure, please identify yourself and your affiliation. You might also be given some thought to asking succinct questions today because, for technical reasons, for the recording to come out correctly, I will probably try to summarize questions and comments for the panel so that the record is complete. The first presentation is by Richard Prosen. He's a foreign affairs officer at the U.S. Department of State. He is the counter terrorism coordinator in the Department of State's Office of European Security and Political Affairs. That office, by the way, provides oversight and guidance on NATO policy matters. Previously Mr. Prosen was posted to the U.S. Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina where he was the political officer responsible for all U.S. law enforcement assistance programs and, of course, the object of those programs was to assist the way Bosnian authorities build sustainable criminal justice institutions. Mr. Prosen has also worked in the aerospace industry and was an officer in the United States Air Force. He has graduate degrees in international affairs and business administration. Mr. Prosen. Richard Prosen: Thank you for the very kind introduction, Professor Brenner. It's a distinct pleasure and honor to be here today. I want to thank Professor Alexander and Professor Brenner for inviting me to speak and express my gratitude to the seminar's organizers and sponsors. NATO has entered a very challenging period of transformation, in adapting not only to the realities of a changed Europe, but also to those of a changing world. President Obama summarized the challenges facing NATO best by stating that, "The same forces that have brought us close together have also given rise to new dangers that threaten to tear our world apart: changes that cannot be contained by the nearest border or the furthest ocean." Among the challenges confronting NATO, as Professor Alexander has mentioned, are terrorism, regional conflicts and humanitarian crises while at the same time an increase in the pace and scope of global change. There is an emergence of new threats to our collective security. Also, as mentioned by Professor Alexander, such threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyber attacks, to name just a few. NATO, I would argue, is taking bold steps to complete its transformation from a once static, reactive alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, pro-active, global security provider, but there is much more transformational work that lies ahead. And as the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Ivo Dalder, recently pointed out, "NATO at 60 needs to be a mature, flexible institution poised for a new era. The alliance is at the epicenter of a changing dynamic in global security and politics, a dynamic newly marked by interconnectedness and international cooperation." In my brief remarks today, I will offer a policy perspective on some of the most pressing legal and institutional challenges facing NATO today at 60. After addressing NATO's upcoming strategic concept review; that was also mentioned by Aguillo Mardito [spelled phonetically] but briefly mentioned by Professor Alexander. I will touch upon NATO's Afghanistan and counter-piracy missions, discuss NATO's recent institutional reform efforts and conclude with a few suggestions relative to the alliance's future role in addressing the scourge of terrorism. In order to modernize NATO's mission, allies at the recent April summit in Strasbourg Kehl agreed to update NATO's 1999 strategic concept over the next year or so with the goal of having the document adopted at next year's summit in Lisbon. Our National Security Adviser General Jim Jones recently stated that, "If the common defense was the raison d'tre for the 20th century, common security should be NATO's mantra for the 21st century." According to General Jones, NATO's next strategic concept should clearly outline NATO's ongoing role in countering asymmetric threats, including terrorism, violent extremism, WMD and missile proliferation, energy and security, illegal shipments of weapons, narco-terrorism and cyber security. You may have heard that NATO kicked off the strategic concept debate just two days ago in Brussels. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as well as the next secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and a host of other senior diplomats and experts participated in the event podcast live on the Web, which is emblematic of NATO's, I would argue, of NATO's private partnerships and enhanced outreach. Next I would like to turn to the topic of Afghanistan. Nowhere is NATO more visible or more vitally important than in Afghanistan. With more than 60,000 troops from 42 different countries, the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, is the largest and most challenging operation in NATO's history. The main mission of ISAF is to support the Afghan Government in the maintenance of security throughout the country in concert with Afghan national security forces, while helping to develop the Afghan national security forces through mentoring, training and equipment. Our paramount objectives in Afghanistan are clear. We aim to disrupt, defeat and dismantle Al Qaeda and the Taliban and ensure that Afghanistan is secure for the Afghan people. Specifically, our near-term goal is to reverse the Taliban's momentum over the next 18 months. The international community has made an enormous commitment to our Afghan partners, and success is essential. Consistent with the Obama administration's diplomacy development and defense policy, the additional surge of U.S. resources, both military and civilian, is aimed at helping diminish violence and eliminating insurgent support while creating space for economic and social development in Afghanistan. The goal is to build up the Afghan's capacity to secure and govern their own country while empowering the country's leadership and helping develop the institutions necessary to do this. The upcoming presidential and provincial council elections in August -- the first elections in Afghanistan since 2005 -- might provide an early opportunity to gauge whether the new approach is beginning to show signs of bearing fruit for Afghanistan's citizens. Given the topic of this seminar, I would like to turn now to a few of the legal challenges NATO faces with its mission in Afghanistan. Due to, in part, uncertainties related to security within Afghanistan -- or sorry -- to securities within Pakistan, NATO has taken several steps to open a northern transit route through central Asia for the transportation of supplies into northern Afghanistan. At the April 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest, Russia offered to allow allies to transport nonlethal goods overland to Afghanistan. Earlier this year, the United States began to ship supplies to Afghanistan through Russia under this arrangement. The United States has also concluded several bilateral transit agreements with the relevant Central Asian countries, and NATO is also looking to finalize a similar set of agreements. Another issue regarding the war in Afghanistan is what to do with the insurgents NATO forces pick up during the campaign. NATO has an arrangement with Afghanistan based largely on the European Court of Human Rights standards that detainees can be held by ISAF forces for up to 96 hours before they must be turned over to Afghan authorities. The legal challenges to a developing country emerging from three decades of civil war are manifold; a lack of adequate criminal justice system facilities and resources certainly complicates even the best attempts to impartially administer Afghan law in a wartime environment. Moving now to [unintelligible]. Another critical NATO mission is its expanding role to thwart pirate attacks off the coast of Africa, the east coast of Africa. NATO has a significant counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia and is currently working with the European Union and other international actors to reduce the threats to the safe passage of commercial vessels in the Gulf of Adin. NATO's Operation Allied Protector currently led by the Royal Navy, the EU's Atalanta Mission also led by the British, and the multinational combined Task Force 151 lead by the Turkish Navy coordinate patrols and remain in close communication with USNavCent forces in Bahrain to ensure their collective efforts are complementary. Other nations' navies such as those of Russia, India, Japan and China are also active in helping secure the sea lanes in the region but, given the vast expanse of water to be patrolled -- some have estimated the region to be about 2.4 million square nautical miles -- the number and sophistication of pirate attacks has been on the rise in recent years. You may have heard of a pirate case just yesterday taking a Turkish vessel. That said, NATO and other international actors have successfully intercepted and continue to enhance their capacity to prevent future pirate attacks. The ensuing legal challenge for NATO is what to do with pirates captured off the Gulf of Adin. Some countries involved with the naval operations possess domestic remedies to address the legal issues stemming from their participation in the counter-piracy operations. However, the commercial ships that are targeted by pirates are often Panamanian or Liberian flagged vessels owned by companies based in other countries while operating with multinational crews and carrying cargoes that originate from, at times, multiple ports in multiple countries. As you can imagine, the counter-piracy legal matters can get complex quite quickly. One key legal issue is the transfer and prosecution of piracy suspects. U.S. policy is that the victim or affected states should prosecute the suspects in their domestic courts or should work out international agreements with a country in the region with that ability, such as Kenya, to permit them to do so in exceptional circumstances. NATO is currently looking into the issue of establishing a legal framework with Kenyan authorities. Faced with the mounting legal dilemmas, there have been cases where some captured pirates were stripped of their weapons and simply released in Puntland, free to return to their illicit activities the next day. Another legal issue facing NATO is that allies have divergent policies regarding whether offering ransoms is actually a viable option, with the U.S. firmly against rewarding with any form of compensation, those who brazenly defy international law as it will likely only contributes to future criminal activity. Last year in Germany present Obama said that "Now is the time to join together through constant cooperation, strong institutions, shared sacrifices and a global commitment to progress to meet the 21st-century challenges." Elaborating on the president's point about strength and institutions, NATO has recently embarked on a far-reaching, internal review exercise to modernize the way it conducts business. Reforming how NATO operates on a day-to-day basis is critical in order to help the alliance succeed in its most critical missions and implement the new strategic concept. The current reform work underway is looking to improve NATO's decision making processes, enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its institutional structures and allocate resources optimally. But administrative changes, however important, can take you only so far without equally significant changes in policy. And since I handle the NATO counter terrorism policy for my office, let me suggest a few specific changes that allies may wish to ponder to broaden NATO's overall contribution to fight against terrorism. I must say that these views are my own and not necessarily those of the State Department nor the United States government. Without prejudice to the just-launched strategic concept review, I feel strongly that the alliance could take a more pro-active and programmatic role in countering violent extremism and radicalization. As a values-based institution transforming to meet 21st century security challenges, NATO has an untapped potential to contribute to the war of ideas in both substance and message. Specifically, I recommend that NATO develop a series of soft power public-private partnerships with nontraditional partners such as academics, civil society, NGOs and international businesses to more comprehensively address the hearts and minds aspects of counter terrorism. For example, NATO's Allied Command for Transformation based in Norfolk, which has the mandate to enhance the alliance's inter-operability, relevance and effectiveness, could demonstrate leadership by developing such partnerships aimed at improving the education and training requirements for NATO military authorities and its agencies and academic institutions. France, when it assumes command of the ACT later this September, could, in point of fact, become a change agent for NATO's non-operational strategic command, otherwise known as ACT. More over, NATO's Center of Excellence in Ankara for defense against terrorism could add counter radicalization components to its ongoing training programs and further expand its civil society and academic partnership outreach. It has been suggested that NATO's Science and Peace for Security Program should reach out to leading scholars and mainstream religious leaders to seek fresh perspectives and develop best practices in countering the ideological support for terrorism. The NATO-Russia Council could also make a significant contribution in this area by fostering interdisciplinary efforts that build common ground in the battle to win hearts and minds. In an age in which individuals, money and ideas move internationally with increasing ease, environments in which conditions may be conducive to the emergence or spread of radicalization and violent extremism remain a concern, regardless of distance. In response, several countries, including the United States, have begun to work together with regional bodies and civil society organizations to support and help fund programs in third countries aimed at promoting political participation, civil rights, the rule of law and sustainable development. A U.N. report released last October recommended the following counter radicalization efforts. Some of these might be considered for possible NATO programs. These include training and vetting agencies involved in implementing counter terrorism and counter-radicalization policies, developing youth, education and Internet programs and conducting prison outreach and rehabilitation programs. I would like to underscore that there are several very successful partnership activities already established under NATO auspices such as the George C. Marshall Center's Partnership for Peace Consortium, a counter terrorism working group chaired by Dr. Jay LeBeau and its countering ideological support for terrorism study currently led by Dr. Cheryl Cross [spelled phonetically]. The ancillary benefit of such efforts is that when their output resonates at NATO headquarters Allied capitals or locations where NATO is conducting operations, it helps to further spur the alliance's adaptation to the new security paradigm of an increasingly interconnected world facing polymorphous security challenges. It has been suggested that the alliance lacks a well articulated counter terrorism strategy or organizational doctrine. In 2002, NATO established a counter terrorism task force, but thus far the CCTF or Counter Terrorism Task Force remains a body that meets monthly to hold coordination meetings. The United Nations, meanwhile, established its CT implementation task force in 2005 to ensure coordinated efforts across the U.N. system, and a U.N. global counter terrorism strategy followed in 2006 to help institutionalize the U.N. task force's practical work. NATO, in my view, should follow the U.N.'s lead and revitalize its CTTF, giving it a substantive mandate to produce a forward-looking review of NATO's institutional counter terrorism roles, functions and potential future contributions. The CTTF-led assessment would help shape the alliance's counter terrorism approach over the next decade and could serve as vital input to the Eminent Persons Group that will produce a report for the next secretary-general on the new strategic concept. NATO would also benefit from such a stock taking exercise that would look at updating NATO headquarters' institutional architecture relevant to 21st-century threats. Such an assessment would be consistent with the vision of the current and future NATO Secretaries General for NATO's institutional reform and may lead to, for example, the establishment of a new senior-level NATO headquarters post; perhaps a deputy assistant secretary general for asymmetric security challenges or threats to coordinate and contribute to NATO's counter terrorism policies and efforts. NATO's hard power contributions will remain the focus of its battlefield commanders, but NATO's headquarters needs to undertake, in my view, several institutional changes so the alliance can more effectively and efficiently contribute to non-kinetic, i.e. diplomatic and development counter terrorism efforts. One final point: NATO will continue to serve a critical role in fighting terrorism, but it also requires additional resources to un-leash its full potential across multiple hard and soft power counter terrorism dimensions. In conclusion then, NATO's role and credibility as a global security provider in the post-Cold War era will be determined by how the alliance performs against the full spectrum of 21st century challenges. As Ambassador Dalder also noted recently, "We live in extraordinary times. We're combating an economic crisis of historic proportions. We're fighting a war in Afghanistan 4,000 miles away from the core of the Euro-Atlantic area, and we are confronting threats that will define the 21st century, threats like violent extremism, proliferation, insurgency, piracy and cyber crime. Terrorists do not recognize territorial limits. Pandemics know no borders. Climate change does not stop at the polar ice caps. Hackers are undeterred by local firewalls." To meet these challenges, our goal must be to modernize and power and resource NATO so it is able to address the threats we face today and is prepared for tomorrow's uncertainties. In conclusion then, I would like to draw your attention to a critical observation made by former Secretary General Craddock who noted that, "Our adversaries in Afghanistan sustain their activities in the gap between the capabilities and the capacities that the international community and Afghan people have and need." In that same vein I would argue that our future opponents may benefit from the gap between the resources and structures that NATO and our partners currently have and need. Thank you very much. I look forward to our following discussion and your questions. [applause] Edgar Brenner: Thank you very much. The next presentation will be by Peter Roudik. He is an assistant director of legal research at the Law Library of Congress where he is responsible for managing the Eastern Law Division, which does research on the former Soviet states. He joined the Law Library in 1996 after a 10 year academic career, writing and lecturing on Constitutional law issues. He authored a volume on Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent states for the World Legal Systems Cyclopedia. He frequently testifies before the U.S. Congress and in the U.S. Federal Courts. Early in his career he served as a legal adviser to the Soviet Government. Mr. Roudik. Peter Roudik: Thank you, Professor Brenner, for your introduction. And following my colleagues on this panel, I have to say that everything that I will talk today is my own opinion and doesn't reflect the position of the Library. And today I will be talking about the challenges which are associated with the enlargement of the alliance and the impact of the enlargement process made on the legal development of the countries which are already admitted to NATO, those which are aspiring to be admitted and how the legal and political landscape of the region has been changed. Within the existing time limits, I will try to discuss NATO's open door policy and how it was modified depending on specific countries in question and what different legal instruments and political mechanisms were used to approach them. And finally, I am going to analyze how these bilateral relations between NATO and individual countries affect future prospects of the alliance. For 60 years of its history, NATO increased from 12 to 28 countries through six rounds of enlargement. The last one occurred this April when Croatia and Albania were admitted to the block, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is ready to join the alliance as soon as it will formalize some problems in Greece. Since 1997 the enlargement is going eastward involving-- in cooperation with NATO, countries of central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in addition to 12 countries which are already admitted to NATO, all of which represent Eastern and Central Europe, 22 official NATO partner countries have also: four formerYugoslav Republics and 12 from the former Soviet Union, those making all former Soviet countries involved through the right partnership ties with NATO. Immediately after the end of Cold War when the opportunity to build improved security in the entire Euro-Atlantic area became obvious, NATO initiated consultation, trust-building efforts and promotion of good neighborly relations among the alliance members in the aspiring countries. As soon as the Cold War ended, NATO became more than just a military block and successfully demonstrated its ability to change. For example, during the Cold War, NATO viewed the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe with some kind of suspicion because this organization was created to negotiate between the West and the East. However, in 1990, NATO Council recognized the necessity to adapt to new circumstances and started to cooperate, and in 1992 Helsinki declaration confirmed the view of the OSC member states that NATO is the leading component of the European security. That was the legal cornerstone for future cooperation between NATO and nonmember countries. In the early 90s, certain requirements were established for the countries seeking NATO membership. These countries were supposed to establish democratic governments based on market economy, civilian control over the military, transparency of military budgets, commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts and fair treatment of minorities and, of course, willingness and readiness to contribute to NATO's missions. As soon as they talk about admission of former communist countries started, the idea of enlargement had its own proponents and opponents. Those who were in favor of the enlargement argued that it will make our world a better and safer place with a guaranteed defense of life and values respected in the NATO core countries. The opponents thought that the enlargement will antagonize Moscow while the burden of sharing the responsibility for the defense of weak and not yet sustainable countries brings doubtful benefits and jeopardizes the security of people in Western Europe and in the United States. Today more than ten years after the enlargement process started, we can hear the same reasons for and against the enlargement, and it seems that both sides are right in their own. Without discussing political issues of the enlargement, I would like to assess major legal instruments which were used as a foundation to build relations with the countries in partnering with NATO. After the Cold War, the military component of NATO became less important while the role of organization's political function increased significantly. The change required some organizational novelties. In '91 the North Atlantic Cooperation Council was formed with the purpose to enable the former communist states to pursue much closer relations with the alliance. The council was not a legal instrument but it was a mechanism of teaching and persuasion in an effort to promote legal democratic values of government. Partnership for Peace followed in 1994. This program imposed on participating states legal obligations to develop professional militaries under firm democratic control and to prepare themselves in other ways for possible cooperation with NATO. Planning and review process was set as a component of Partnership for Peace to help aspiring NATO members to achieve optimum force levels and interoperability. These moves were initially modest and didn't affect the thinking of alliance purpose, but even they were significantly involved since countries in the activities which affected their development and turned them toward the west. This was true not only for those states which received full membership in NATO and later were admitted to the European Union. Other post-Soviet countries achieved substantial progress in their westernization efforts through participation in NATO cooperation programs. Let's look at Ukraine and Azerbaijan, for example, countries which had their own ups and downs in relations with NATO. In 1992, Ukraine became a member of the North Atlantic Corporation Council and [unintelligible] priority of European security granted by NATO. It was included in the document entitled "Basic Principles of Foreign Policy," adopted by the legislature of this country in '93. In '94, Ukraine joined the Partnership for Peace and the government approved its implementation strategy. Since then, about 250 programmatic events are conducted annually under the auspices of the individual partnership plan. The security agreement between the government of Ukraine and NATO was signed in Brussels in March of '95. This document was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament and became an act of domestic law, which regulates the protection of military information in Ukraine and also influenced the major principle of domestic legislation in regard to information policy. The next important event occurred in 1997 when the president of Ukraine signed in Madrid the NATO Ukraine Charter on Partnership. Even though the charter didn't require parliamentary ratification or changes in national legislation, this document contains political obligations which, according to [unintelligible] even being legally nonbinding create proper normative and institutional basis for actions in politically sensitive fields. The effect that these agreements are not binding doesn't mean that they don't create any rights and obligations for the parties. This is exemplified by joint programs aimed at eliminating Chernobyl catastrophe consequences, retraining demobilized officers, planning for emergency situations. In 1998 a program of individual cooperation was drafted, and since the year 2000 joint military exercises are conducted upon parliamentary approval. They will not be conducted this year because of changes in local politics. But strategic and midterm priorities for Ukraine's integration in NATO are defined in their major documents, and since 2005, intention of Ukraine to join NATO is included in this country's military doctrine. Because of strong regional divide, internal political struggle and strong Russian propaganda aimed at discrediting NATO together with the Russian blackmailing in regard to power supply, public opinion doesn't support Ukraine's admission to the alliance. And the government is slow with its cooperation with NATO and participation in some programs, but we have to remember that in 1997 and '98, even in the Czech Republic, public opinion didn't support joining NATO. And we have also to remember that today Ukraine is the only post-Soviet state which was able to maintain political stability by democratic means during the entire post-Soviet period. And I believe the participation in NATO programs contributed to this achievement. Another state which demonstrates positive impact of cooperation with NATO is Azerbaijan. Unlike Ukraine, Azerbaijan doesn't formally meet the mission requirements to date. Its government system is not fully democratic. The professional military is not created yet, and to even less degree, civilians can control the Army. And I even don't mention the requirement to resolve conflicts with their neighbors. In the meantime, Azerbaijan was among the first post-Soviet states to join the Partnership for Peace program in '94 and to have individual partnership action plan approved by the president of the Republic in 2005. Under this plan political dialogue and cooperative activities were conducted in order to reorganize armed forces, and forces of Azerbaijan are participating in NATO peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. And since 2002, Azerbaijan supported declarations in Afghanistan where it has about 45 personnel and is currently preparing to double its contingent. Usually cooperation is conducted in such traditional areas of defense and security as sharing intelligence information, increased air and military patrolling of the Caspian Sea zone, improving border and infrastructure security and counterterrorist training capabilities. Additionally, there are about 30 projects in the area of science and environmental protection aimed at improving water quality, protection of drinking water supply from terrorists, and better Internet access for academic and research communities. A summer school in Baku is sponsored by NATO since 2003. I have here also a list of 28 laws and regulations passed by the Azerbaijani parliament in support of cooperation with NATO. These documents relate not only to the military issues, but covers such subjects as First Amendment and environmental protection. Regional cooperation, especially with Turkey, was fostered through NATO channels also. Approval of NATO-related programs by the legislation indicates indirect popular support of NATO and openness of the country for future cooperation. Even though due to Russian pressure, Azerbaijani authorities shortened some NATO related programs recently, and NATO refused to be involved in the protection of the Baku-Japan pipeline. I wouldn't be surprised that because of a very cautious foreign policy conducted by the Azerbaijani government, its extreme geopolitical significance, Azerbaijan may become the next country whose membership in NATO will be seriously considered. Because NATO officials believe that the accession of Georgia is blocked now due to regional conflicts, and it is not known what government will have occurring in six months or in one year, Azerbaijan, although it didn't express its intention to join the alliance now, may become a good candidate country. Azerbaijan demonstrates its ability to change: to conduct independent foreign policy, to resist Russia's pressure, be effective in the Asian market. Nabuka [spelled phonetically] Project will increase international support for Azerbaijan and strong cultural ties with Turkey, which is a NATO veteran country, will help to resolve existing problems with Iran and Russia. During a discussion on NATO conducted a couple of months ago at the Brookings Institution, speakers agreed that NATO's dilemma is to go out of Europe or to go out of business. I don't think that the question is so straight. NATO still has many things in Europe to do. There are cyber defense, biodefense, improvement of the military of the newly accepted states, for example, and NATO is still the only institution to guard Europe and the United States from nasty things coming to our region. To fulfill these goals, the alliance must project force to crises that may threaten our security regardless of where they happen. In this case, involvement of countries outside of North Atlantic geographic region is important. It's also important that when the U.N. enlargement is practically limited, NATO enlargement will go further than just formalizing relationships with military capable and politically like-minded countries. Even though the European leaders like to repeat, "No more Yalta" today, today Europe remains divided between the European union members and the others and it is almost impossible for these outsiders to make holes in the [unintelligible] walls. In this case, NATO appears to be the best suitable institution to integrate those outsiders into the system of Euro-Atlantic areas. Countries outside the European Union don't want to be left isolated and don't want to be included in the Russian sphere of interest again. The recent defection of whose Uzbekistan and Belarus from the Russian dominated Collective Treaty Organization is indicative. It was reported that Moldova's leaders expressed the possibility to amend their constitution to declare neutrality status if relations with NATO will become closer. Next year at the NATO ministerial meeting in Lisbon, the idea of a new strategic concept will be discussed. Before that. many legal issues related to the enlargement and partnership shall be reviewed. The fourth annual NATO Legal Conference, which was held in Strasburg last month, discussed such topics as NATO's future involvement of international justice in NATO's activities, respect for human rights and limits and extensions of state's [inaudible]. Namely these problems has important legal challenges. The organizers of the conference said that today's soldiers are becoming more and more sensitive to legal approach because they are often confronted by conflict situations where their actions have legal implications. It is correct for military personnel to participate in [unintelligible] or peacekeeping actions as well as for those officials and civilians who, within the NATO framework, expand Euro-Atlantic borderers and bring other countries the hope of integration with the democratic world. A lot of work which takes a lot of time has to be done in order to meet these challenges. Thank you. [applause] Edgar Brenner: The third presentation will be by Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese. He is Commanding General, training in Education Command, Among his many accomplishments, he's a military freefall parachutist and a Marine combat diver. He's been awarded three Legions of Merit, the Joint Meritorious Service Medal, three Navy Commendation Medals and the Joint Service Achievement Medal. He earned a masters degree of science degree from the University of Southern California and a masters in military arts and science degree from the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He's been assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command serving as a policy officer, dealing with counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He was a seminar leader at the Advanced Military Studies Program at the U.S. Army General Staff College. He was director of Tactical Training Exercise Control Group, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center. In 2005, he was deputy director for Strategy Policy and Assessments, U.S. European Command. He also became commanding general Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command at 29 Palms California. And as I previously mentioned, his current assignment is Commanding General, Training and Education Command. Brigadier General Spiese. Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: Thank you, Dr. Alexander and Dr. Brenner, for this opportunity to speak at the seminar. First truth in advertising. I am not a lawyer, and I did not sleep at a Holiday Inn Express last night. [laughter] So I am not able to speak with any authority on legal considerations related to NATO. I am a simple infantrymen but, as a career officer in the United States armed forces, and having recently served as a deputy for strategy plans and policies at U.S. European Command, I can offer some observations regarding military considerations for the United State's role in NATO expansion, as well as expansion of NATO itself. U.S. European Command is one of the unified geographic commands of the Department of Defense. While not assigned to NATO, it is immersed in the NATO theater. It deals with all bilateral and multilateral matters with NATO countries. Its commander is both the commander of European Command and the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, primarily posted at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe in SHAPE, and European commands three primary component commands: U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Air Force Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Europe also serve as NATO four-star headquarters. The area of operations during my assignment went from Norway to South Africa, from Portugal to Russia, and I paid much attention to former Eastern Bloc countries and former Soviet Republics. My travels in my duties carried me to Poland, Russia, Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakstan. I worked issues covering the Baltic countries, all of Eurasia, the Black Sea and its latorals, the Czech Republic, the Balkans, Southeast Europe, Romania, the Caspian and it's latorals, and I worked some aspects of ballistic missile defense. Let me begin with some observation about how I, as a direct representative of the United States armed forces and the U.S. government, was received throughout the area of responsibility and, in particular, the region of NATO expansion and expanding influence in particular. I was in European Command at the height of the insurgency and the insurgent fighting in Iraq and at a point when we were told that United States influence and power was at its ebb. While I have no doubt the perception of and attitude toward U.S. policy was not popular with citizens and government, there were no doors closed or obstacles placed in our way. Beyond those we could expect with the far longer ranging geopolitical dynamics of the region. I'd like to focus on two genuinely remarkable organizations that will provide some insight into my views, as well as a critical role that NATO continues to play in keeping the peace and expanding stability in the world. Within two weeks of my arrival in European Command, I participated in a meeting of the chiefs of defense of the Adriatic Charter Group. The A3 group was formed between Albania, Croatia and Macedonia facilitated by the United States in 2003. This particular meeting was in the late fall of 2005, and in addition to the three participating nations, observers to the meeting were the chiefs of defense of Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. I found that to be remarkable. It was little more than a decade before that most of these countries were not simply at war but working on genocide against each other. The causes of that conflict run deep in the history of the region and each country, and many of the points of fissure still remain, such as ethnic and religious makeup. I am certainly not nave enough to know that may not only be just simply contained and not far below the surface but, nonetheless, the leaders of those five country's armed forces were sitting around a table led by one of the participants in open, friendly dialogue with primary discussion about forming a combined peacekeeping force similar to the Southeast European Defense Ministerial Brigade just as SEABRIG was preparing to deploy to Kabul in early 2006. That struck me as truly remarkable. The second organization is the Southeast Europe Defense Ministerial that I just mentioned. I attended a meeting of the chiefs of defense in Sofia, Bulgaria in early 2006 that both welcomed Ukraine as a full member and highlighted the deployment of the brigade to Kabul. SEEDM was formed in 1996 with the United States as a member and the only non-European, non-regional member. It was interesting to observe during the discussion and dialogue at the meeting Greece's references to the name of the Republic of Macedonia, or former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, something with which Greece has great difficulty. It is important to say, however, they are both members of the organization and they were both sitting around the table. I was speaking with the J5 of the Turkish General Staff after the meeting and we were discussing the remarkable achievement that is SEEDM. Not having the same sense of history of the region as he, he did comment that the last time all those countries had come together was around the year 1200 and that was to have a pretty widespread war. [laughter] It was remarkable that they had gathered for peace. These two organizations came out of the chaos and the brutality in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. It came about as these countries realized the necessity of a stable, peaceful way ahead and they saw NATO as a vehicle by which that could be done. What was essential for both organizations, as was essential for the successful NATO involvement to bring peace to the Balkans, was the leadership and the presence of the United States and the United States Armed Forces, and that was a revelation to me. As I saw in other efforts in our area of responsibility, the United States still drew great respect and was able to exert positive influence. In the case of these two organizations and in the case of many other European Command initiatives, the strength, capabilities, the professionalism of our armed forces and the general recognition of the United State's fundamental objectivity in this interest provided the forum around which others aspiring to expand relationships westward were able to gather. Every one is well aware of Russia's opposition to the expansion of NATO and the United State's influence, particularly into its former sphere, and the Russians worked to make that expansion very difficult. As a consequence, relations with the United States and NATO can be a delicate and tricky matter for many of those countries but as these two organizations demonstrate and others, such as the Vilnius 10 and the Partnership for Peace countries, there is a great desire to expand relations with the West, even while many former Soviet Republics work to balance regional pressure with national interests. It was fascinating to see Partnership for Peace countries that have no interest to join NATO work hard to meet NATO military standards and seek U.S. military assistance. It is the United States policy to see NATO expand. Despite it being an organization formed for war, it has brought and ensured peace for over half a century. NATO expansion has expanded into countries that were in open conflict or covert involvement in conflict, yet bringing peace through both the desire to draw benefit from the opportunities that flow from NATO and other European and Euro-Atlantic institutions and organizations, and the necessary reforms related to international relations, their government and reform of the Armed Forces necessary for membership. My time in European Command was marked with continuing that effort. The watch phrase of our thinking and our efforts, a phrase I did not fully grasp at first but became the driving force behind all that I came to do is, "The answer is Euro-Atlantic integration. It does not matter what the question is." NATO's expansion has brought challenges and, certainly, the final chapters of the effort are a long way from being written but the benefits have been huge. This expansion has not been just driven by the United States but in many ways could only have happened because of the United States. It is the credibility of the United States and its long-term strategic policies and the credibility of its armed forces that have provided the catalyst and forum for this to take place. My observation of the military chiefs, who not long before were fighting ruthlessly against each other, coming together around a United States conference table with a United States four-star general and countries who had never gathered in peace but pulled together around the United States, though being an ocean and a continent away, demonstrate what we are able to do, despite short-term unpopularity of some of our policies. I think it's important to understand this and use it wisely to continue the advance and stability and peace within the construct of a strong and growing NATO. [applause] Edgar Brenner: We will now open the program to comments and questions from the audience. I see Mike Noone [spelled phonetically] is getting ready to ask a question. I'll recognize him first. Let me remind you though that we don't have a microphone for the audience so it will be necessary for me to briefly summarize the questions and comments. Therefore, accordingly, I respectfully request that they be kept brief and to the point. Michael Noone. All right, let me see if I can summerize this. The question for Mr. Roudik deals with the sovereignty challenge of NATO. I think he's prepared to answer that. Mr. Prosen, the implications of the convention on human rights, and for General Spiese, the question deals with rules of engagement and I suppose that's partly a reference to the problems in Afghanistan where different countries specify different roles for their troops. If you could all share in turn the microphone, it won't be necessary for you to come up here to the lectern. Peter Roudik: [inaudible] I think the decision to join NATO is a strategic choice of each country. And making the decision, making this choice each country accepts obligations, political or legal but [inaudible], and probably political obligations are even bigger because NATO is growing up and is going out of the military sector. It accepts additional components such as security issues, police training, cyber problems, and also I think it is affecting its operations with -- Richard Prosen: Again, just like the general, I'm not an expert on legal matters but I'll try to attempt to answer a very good question. The 96-hour rule is an ISAF rule and it was decided by consensus so all ISAF countries are bound by that. There is another mission called OEF, which is not bound by that mission. It's a mission headed up by the U.S. authorities. Now General Crystal [spelled phonetically] just took over command of both OEF and ISAF, so he is responsible for both missions, but the rules of engagement are for ISAF forces; the 96-hour rule applies to anybody under the ISAF chain of command. I can't really comment more on the legal aspects of how the U.S. battlefield commanders but I think, you know, and I can't speak on behalf of the Defense Department, but I think our U.S. Defense Department would see things a little differently than our European partners yet as NATO is a [unintelligible] organization, the 96-hour rule applies to all ISAF forces. Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: The issue of national caveats, I think, goes further than just simple actions and operations on the ground but really to national policies, and that's one of the great challenges facing NATO today and probably the weak point, if there is a seam in NATO, I believe that's where it is. It handicaps operations. We recognize that. We see that on the ground today. It has certainly frustrated our operational commanders. We saw comments from our president in that direction as well. General Jones, as the SAC here, was not able to crack that one. Neither has General Craddock so it's a problem that is very, very difficult. I believe that has to be taken on as part of the strategic review. I think that's essential and to a large degree, may shape the nature of NATO as we go forward. No easy answers, but I think recently we've seen some momentum moving in certain directions, and it will be interesting how the new countries are able to influence the strategic review as we start that process in the next couple of years. Edgar Brenner: I now recognize the gentleman in the second row. Would you stand up so we can hear you better? And then I'll try to repeat your question. Male Speaker: [inaudible] Edgar Brenner: Can we let it go at that one right now and then we'll give you a chance later? Male Speaker: Okay, fine. Edgar Brenner: All right? You're talking about the different situation when NATO coordinates and has cooperation with other institutions in Europe and what is the challenge that that presents and how do you see that issue working out? Richard Prosen: Yeah, they're very two distinct organizations, as you know. The U.N. doesn't really have a military basis at all for operating, whereas the NATO alliance is a collective security military organization. You also note that recently the Secretariats of both U.N. and NATO got together and did form a little -- a minor agreement late last fall of enhanced cooperation between the two staffs of the organization but, again, back to your point that NATO, when it operates out of theater, definitely benefits from having agreements in place with the U.N. and has benefitted, and as the ISAF mandate clearly shows, does have quite close corporation with the U.N. on the ground in Afghanistan. Some people have said "out of the area, out of operation." A lot of people are looking at NATO and its future missions as being more civilian-military operations, or CivMil cooperation, or some people have -- or NATO has coined a phrase "comprehensive approach," and you really can't have a full, comprehensive approach to 21st century threats, counter insurgent, counter terrorism without having all aspects of this diplomacy available and the UN represents economic and social development on the ground. You have the UNAMA Mission in Afghanistan. The EU does a lot on police missions so I see a wide area of cooperation going forward between the U.N., the EU and other organizations and NATO if we are going to see some of these challenges thwarted in the future. Edgar Brenner: The essence of the question is do you need U.N. Security Council resolution for specific approval of a military proceeding to make it legal and give protection to the troops carrying out the mission, recognizing at the same time that seeking that approval might generate a veto by the Soviet Union -- or Russia, excuse me, or Russia, sorry. [laughter] Richard Prosen: Well, yeah, in the case of Kosovo there with was that situation where there was no -- Male Speaker: [inaudible] Richard Prosen: Absolutely, and so the -- and NATO not being an organization under the U.N. charter is considered a military alliance. There is that gray area of what would happen in the future. I'm not a legal scholar to answer that question. We could probably get some people back at the State Department who are legal experts to help you on that matter but, yeah, the Kosovo situation was different -- how things would be handled in the future. Most of our European colleagues would like a U.N. sanction prior to going to any kind of future operation but, again, the politics are the politics in New York and we don't always get U.N. sanction for our NATO operations. So it's a political as well as a legal challenge going forward, but I guess I can't comment in more depth on what the future might hold. Edgar Brenner: The gentleman in the first row here. I think the essence of the question here is a very profound one. It goes back to the origins of NATO and what is the legal foundation for its original existence and continued existence? Peter Roudik: Well, let's start with the 1949 Treaty and the union of the countries which created the North Atlantic Organization. To date and your question is, I think, in conflict with all other questions which were here before, I think definitely U.N. involvement is growing and probably will be needed because now, as I said, NATO is going further, going wider outside of its original mission, which was to defend Western world from the Soviet Union. We have to remember that before enlargement there was no single fired a shot, no single shot fired by NATO. After enlargement, today NATO is involved in five operations simultaneously and definitely military corps in the newly accepted countries. It feels or sees itself much -- it sees its mission more broader than just military involvement in [unintelligible] specific mission. They continue themselves to be responsible for peace operations, for fight against terror, for securing sustainable development inside its newly admitted countries and definitely U.N. should find some more way in relations with NATO. But originally it was a separate organization, a military alliance of democratically-minded countries. Edgar Brenner: Mr. Prosen, do you want to comment on that? Richard Prosen: Briefly, again, a layman's approach to how this is viewed. U.N. -- and has its U.N. Security Council, obviously. And NATO -- again, I don't recall the chapter and verse but there is a clause within the U.N. charter, I understand, for collective security treaties, organizations to actually exist, so there is kind of an opt out clause for NATO and NATO can act within its area of operations without U.N. approval because it's a collective -- it's an alliance. It's not beholden to the U.N. Security Council for operating within its original mandate, which is as Peter referred to the Washington Treaty of 1949. Edgar Brenner: The gentleman in the third row in the side gallery. Let's see how we can parse that. If NATO is going to be a security organization, what problems is it going to deal with when it confronts particular ethnic groups both in the European theater and in more distant locations? Mr. Roudik? Peter Roudik: Well, I think that there is not only a legal problem but a political problem also. [unintelligible] Are they joining NATO to send their troops to Afghanistan or just to get defense from the United States in case of their problem? I saw a report of a journalist who visited the [unintelligible] in the last war. I think it was mentioned in your article, Mr. [unintelligible], that when -- or maybe I'm wrong -- that when foreigners contacted [unintelligible] one of their first questions were, "Where's the United States? Where is NATO? Where are the NATO forces? Why they don't defend us?" And I think it is not dissident population. It is the official population: the military corps of [unintelligible] countries which are trying to become NATO members but their interest is very pragmatic and certainly a requirement to resolve conflict by peaceable means, the resolve to secure fair treatment of national minorities in the countries which are joining NATO. It's a requirement and it remains a requirement for those countries which were admitted to NATO to prove that they are able to maybe not solve completely but they are on the right track in the resolution of such issues, like Hungary for instance or Slovakia. Hopefully it will be a good example for other countries also. Edgar Brenner: Mr. Prosen? Richard Prosen: I will just mention that your question goes right to the heart of why we are doing a strategic concept review right now. The strategic concept review is -- the strategic concept is the senior-most document that NATO authorities, NATO military authorities, NATO political authorities use as a guiding document for the overall alliance. It sets the level of ambition. It's kind of like a quadrennial review analysis square. I mean, it comes around once every 10 years, but in 2006 -- a partial answer to your question -- a document that sits below the strategic concept is called the Comprehensive Policy Guidance. The CPG, or Comprehensive Policy Guidance, was updated in 2006 and it actually did start to talk about 21st century threats. Terrorism and weapons of mass destruction were actually seen in the next 10 to 15 years; the combination thereof, as being the principal or very grave threat for the alliance so NATO is getting its act together in addressing your very tough question. It will be a very serious debate, a very, I would say, a long-duration debate. It's going to take about six months or so for the Eminent Persons Group to produce a report to the next Secretary General, the former Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen, but I really can't comment on the specifics of it, but I would point you in the direction and I can get you a copy of the Comprehensive Policy Guidance. That does deal with both threats within Europe and threats that emanate from outside of Euro-Atlantic area but could have an impact on the area but, as I mentioned in my talk, one of the areas is radicalization happening within Europe. That's an area that I don't think NATO would have a lead on but it certainly could contribute to some of the items that -- areas where fostering dialogue amongst and within a country would help to diminish the radical threat, for instance, in terms of fighting terrorism. Edgar Brenner: The second row here. The question is, what is the principle allegiance of NATO, to its members or to the United Nations? Who would like to deal with that? [laughter] Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: I think that question, when you read the treaty and you look at the vehicle that drives NATO, it's certainly to its member states. We have seen, and certainly recent history points to NATO seeking U.N. approval, U.N. sanction for certain activities, but I don't think there's any question that the treaty and really the sense of the organization primarily is toward the member states. Richard Prosen: That's a very good question, in fact, a very timely question because our president is and his entourage were just in Moscow before they were in Italy for the G8 Summit meeting. And from what I'm hearing, the meetings went very well. President Obama met with President Medvedev as well as Prime Minister Putin, and they discussed the whole panoply of issues, in fact, issued a joint statement on very many areas where we intend to follow up on and have closer cooperation. Again, I'm just a junior diplomat. I'm not speaking on behalf of the State Department but it seems to me that there are very many areas where we can cooperate with the Russians. I focus on counterterrorism, so that's an area, weapons of mass destruction, the nonproliferation, implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Although, you know, again, NATO is not a U.N. organization, it does do a great deal of work on, say, 1540 which is the U.N. Security Council resolution for combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and missile parts and so forth to non-state actors. So we see a very wide plate, if you will, of areas where we can cooperate, including Afghanistan, counter-narcotics, which is a threat for the drugs flowing into and through Central Asia, in Iran and up into the former Soviet space and into Russia, so there's a lot of areas where we can see cooperation. I also cover the OSCE portfolio in my office and that is an organization where NATO is a member of something called the NATO-Russia Council so it's kind of a bilateral -- it's NATO 28 countries plus Russia, so NATO 28 plus one, and they just restarted talks and there's a whole program of cooperative areas, but within OSCE as well -- there's the U.S, there's Russia and 54 other countries. There's a wide area that we cooperate with the Russians on. Thank you for your question. Edgar Brenner: The question included as I recall the deployment of missiles close to Russia. Is there anything you'd like to comment on that subject? Richard Prosen: Yeah, that's a very -- all I can say is repeat what you may have heard our president say that it's under review and it's a two- to three-month study but -- more on that subject but that's not an area I focus too much on. Male Speaker: [inaudible] Richard Prosen: Sorry? Male Speaker: [inaudible] Richard Prosen: There's a component. NATO -- Male Speaker: [inaudible] Richard Prosen Well it's -- Male Speaker: [inaudible] Richard Prosen: It's debated, I mean-- Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: It has been worked to some degree within NATO, and we have sought dialogue with NATO in moving forward on what our bilateral arrangements with Poland and the Czech Republic. Male Speaker: [inaudible] Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: We are in dialogue with NATO. NATO has been considering and looking at missile defense for quite a while. They've not made the sort of progress the United States has made, so we have been talking with NATO. We certainly see that the presence of ballistic missile defense in Europe as providing security for NATO allies and NATO partners. And if there were to be a NATO ballistic missile system approach policy, ours possibly could be arrayed with that in some way, shape or form. Male Speaker: [inaudible] Edgar Brenner: Next over here. The question is what in your view is missing from the NATO treaty to make NATO more effective? Peter Roudik: I think in regard to enlargement, it's fine. It's a more open door policy. It is not limited to the North Atlantic area so, and, as I said during my presentation, I think it's great that it is probably the only for now way for integration for countries in promoting democratic governments there in the other regions. Richard Prosen: I would agree. I don't see a need for a constitutional change, but I guess it's more of a fine tuning of the strategic concept which, obviously, sits below the Washington Treaty. It's more of a -- the Washington Treaty is, I think, 13 paragraphs and very -- it fits on one piece of paper, maybe a page and the half and, like I say, I haven't committed it to my memory but I can say that having reviewed it, it does cover a very broad area. It was, as people know, established in '49 to impact or to address the Soviet threat so there are economic provisions. There are obviously defense provisions. It's quite a wide-ranging document that I wouldn't see that need to be changes. It's more how to fine tune it, how to fine tune NATO's approach to implementing the Washington Treaty which is done through this strategic review process. Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: I think from a military perspective I would agree with that. I think our observations over time and, in particular, maybe the last decade or so are the bilateral -- I mean, individual, national sovereign decisions as it relates to defense spending, defense appropriations, configuration of forces, capabilities, those sorts of things. I think we would like to see a little bit more robust NATO in that regard, but that's sort of difficult as we are talking about individual national policies and issues of sovereignty. And it really would have to be, I think, through the strategic review that the partners agree to certain policies or thresholds. Edgar Brenner: The gentleman back here in the second row. If your question is still relevant, you have your chance now. Male Speaker: [inaudible] The essence of the question is to what extent can NATO act without the consensus of its members and what issues does such action presents? Richard Prosen: A very complex and a very good question again. The NAC, the North Atlantic Council does operate by consensus, and again, speaking on my own behalf, I can't see that changing. It's the supreme decision-making authority for all allies. And if we're asking allies to expend life and limb and bring treasure to a foreign theater or intra-theater conflict, I can't see that being done by anything other than consensus. Now NATO is a very cumbersome organization. I think I reflected something about how the decision-making processes are trying to be addressed. NATO has something like 450 committees, some of which haven't met in two or three years, so they're looking at culling some of these committees, reducing the number of committees potentially and even if it's not a senior level position, you're not actually committing to fight a war or a high-level NAC-only decision, North Atlantic Council NAC decision. Some of these lower committees could potentially operate without consensus and I think some of the committees of the 450 committees do actually do that. It just depends on the makeup and the mandate of the various committees, so the consensus rule is being looked at but I personally don't see the senior level committees doing anything other than what they do now, which is build a consensus and build a strategic view on a problem and issue and deal with it as a whole, as an alliance. Edgar Brenner: Does any other member of the panel want Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: We've certainly seen countries act outside of the NATO alliance, yet being allies, as they believe their national interest dictates. We certainly saw that in Iraq. I think it, to some degree, works counter to the strength of NATO, so individual nations or groups of nations can make decisions as necessary and maybe not necessarily be limited, although there are certainly complications that arise from that. But I don't think we're going to see consensus decision-making depart in particular significant issues anytime soon. Edgar Brenner: Do we have additional questions? Professor Alexander? Professor Alexander: [inaudible] Edgar Brenner: The question is should NATO be expanded to include possibly Israel and Maghreb countries from the North African coast? Peter Roudik: Well, next month there will be another anniversary, anniversary of the war in Georgia. And what would be if Georgia were, if Georgia would be a member of NATO? Would be Article V also used and does it mean that the United States would have to fight against Russia? That's a question and the question is not answered. And as the question -- [laughter] And as it was said today during our discussion, the first loyalty of the NATO is for its alliance members and probably if NATO remains North Atlantic Organization and accepting other countries, it should think about security of Western Europe and the United States. It shouldn't -- the acceptance of other countries should not jeopardize security of people in the regional core member countries, and then acceptance of these countries should be related with true benefits which it brings to the alliance. But that's my opinion. [laughter] Richard Prosen: It's a very good question, too, and my opinion would be that NATO has conducted outreach to many partner countries. There's the Partnership for Peace organization. I think it's -- well, NATO is 28 countries and if you take all PFP countries, that's another 22 countries. NATO has outreach to the Mediterranean so-called Dialogue Countries and with the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries NATO has increased its cooperation through something called the Individual Cooperation Program. And I understand Israel has finalized its ICP program with NATO so it has submitted to NATO. NATO allies looked at it, sent back a few comments and it's now an agreed document. I think Egypt has an agreed document and Jordan is working on an agree document, so not to skirt your question because I really can't speak on behalf of all allies, but I can say that there is a very strong partnership between NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries of which Israel is a prominent country. Edgar Brenner: General Spiese? Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: Israel was one of the countries in our AOR and worked a lot of issues related to Israel, watched the Lebanon war very closely and did a lot of planning and consideration and thinking through what we might have to do. We certainly provided some support as required by our treaty and task given to the command. I was in Tiblisi the night that NATO announced advanced dialogue for Georgia, in fact, at the ambassador's house and the foreign minister was there and his team and there was great excitement but I-- even before the Russian invasion, my thinking was that expansion into countries that are still in conflict is sort of problematic and I just don't see NATO signing up to an Article V event with a new partner coming in. I think that's reality, but I also think it's -- one of the key aspects of NATO's requirements for membership are cleaning up international problems. And, again, I think when you look through the Balkans right now and you look in southeastern Europe, that has gone a long way to bring peace and stability, and it required certain nations to give up what had been long-standing claims in recognition of current orders and things like that. So it will -- it would certainly force a lot of internal discussion, both inside the NATO alliance, as well as, I think, a lot of decisions within the government of Israel as relates to its borders and things like that. Edgar Brenner: Do we have a question back here in the side gallery? What is the consequence of the feeling of isolation by certain Eastern Bloc countries, and where do they feel their principal alliance is, and what risks do we take if we try draw them away from what may be a natural affinity to Russia? Peter Roudik: I think [unintelligible] to be associated Europe. Europe for them is a symbol of better alliance and they want to be there. European Union is closed for them. They're just [unintelligible] NATO is another door which they can try to open in order to get access to all benefits which can be ascertained with participation in European institutions including development of the military staff. However, do they want to deal with Russia? Some yes, some not, some are forced and pressured by Russia. Will they -- as I said, they indicated some fear of Russia and, in some cases, obedience to Russian requirements like it was with Azerbaijan recently, and they slowed down their involvement in NATO program. In regard to whether Russia will respond -- I think war in Georgia is a good example. We can always say "what if," if we were there, if Russia would be more offended and what will be done by [inaudible] by neighboring countries also. It's a difficult question. Edgar Brenner: General Spiese, do you have any other comments or questions? Over here? The question is what gives NATO the legal right to impose its views both in Europe and in countries outside of Europe, and does that extend to a simple similar precedent that might recognize regional associations in such places as South America? Mr. Roudik. Peter Roudik: I think just the point of willingness and readiness of these countries to take obligations and contribute to NATO, to contribute militarily, contribute according to all other requirements. Male Speaker: So the South American countries could do the same thing and say we're going to enforce our values on the whole world, that would be ok. Peter Roudik: South American countries may -- Male Speaker: Or any area around [inaudible] -- Peter Roudik: -- may approach NATO and then it will be up to the NATO member countries to come to a consensus -- Male Speaker: A separate organization that states its goals that it's going to take action independent from NATO, independent from the United Nations, and enforce militarily its objectives around the [inaudible] -- Would that be in accordance with the same legal rights that allows NATO to do that? Peter Roudik: And then we have -- I think we have to bring again mechanisms of cooperation between this organization, NATO [unintelligible] and the United Nations maybe. Male Speaker: So there is no answer. Richard Prosen: I think -- yeah, there is no direct answer to your question, but there is the realization that there are threats across the world. Some people call them "glocal" threats; they're global as well as they're local threats that emanate from outside a region, that that can impact security within a region. I don't know of another alliance quite like NATO that exists. I mean, there is the organization -- there are different regional organizations within world bodies such as the OAS but it's not, as I understand how the OAS operates, it's more of under the U.N. charter. It's not a collective security defense organization like the NATO or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I think it comes down to, as Peter said, the collective will of the members of that body acting in accordance within the authority of their charter. Obviously, NATO actions are taken in the context of the global security and in accordance with international law but, again, not subordinate to or answering to the U.N. Security Council. Edgar Brenner: We have an additional question. Professor Alexander. Edgar Brenner: The question is, is NATO nourished by U.N. Article 51, which gives it a very high degree of legitimacy by virtue of its reference to the United Nations -- Peter Roudik: I think you asked that already. [laughter] Edgar Brenner: Do we have additional questions? The essence being that NATO draws authority, not just from Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, but from natural law which reflects the authority of sovereign states to act in their own self-defense. Additional comments? [inaudible] Was there one back there in the last row? Our question is: Are steps being taken to prevent NATO from becoming an intimidating factor to other countries either in the region or near the region? Peter Roudik: There is another opinion that which that with enlargement NATO is becoming more vulnerable. It weakens itself because of taking the weaker countries and taking responsibility to raise their military capabilities to the standards accepted by the alliance. And many of these countries are still provocative. They are still in kind of conflict with neighboring countries or may provoke conflict with others. And it's not becoming intimidating. It's, I think, for now it is a kind of finding the right balance for future development. Richard Prosen: And consensus is kind of an over all ameliorating factor as you bring countries together with different perspectives to the table yet they share their national -- they make their national interests known, yet they share a common bond by having joined the NATO alliance. I think it tends to not necessarily make NATO a more warlike organization but a more political-military, collective, security organization. You start to see more points of view and, yes, getting consensus at 28 is more difficult yet but it also is a way to share these ideas across countries, across cultures, across different historical perspectives, so my view is that NATO expansion has been a good thing. It's been a transformative engine for NATO. The new Eastern European countries that have joined NATO have been very active, engaged participants in NATO dialogue, NATO policies and procedures and have actually spurred NATO to take on issues where it may not have addressed these issues before if it was just kind of a Western European and Northern Atlantic organization. So it's, to me, been not only a ameliorating factor but also a very positive cross-cultural experience as well. Edgar Brenner: Second row here. What is the relationship between a possible creation of a joint European army and the expansion of NATO? Brigadier General Melvin G. Spiese: That's actually been kind of in existence for a number of years now, and it has forced dialogue between, in particular, NATO and the European Union in that regard, primarily because the forces that would be committed to European Union actions or a European response corps are also forces that are committed to NATO. I think the United States is the only or one of the few that has not -- doesn't have everybody completely totally committed into the NATO command structure. We obviously have forces in Korea. We have forces in Japan that could always be globally sourced into something but are not under the NATO command structure. I mean, that has been ongoing issue for years. I don't think our government sees that as a problem. Obviously, there are concerns about the availability of forces as NATO does have forces kind of on-call. I don't know that that's problematic. I think there were concerns when the issue first came up years ago. I don't think we're seeing that as an issue right now. I don't think NATO considers it to be a threat in any way, shape or form. Richard Prosen: I would agree with that. And just recently the French -- France as a nation, has re-integrated itself into the integrated military command of NATO as of the April Summit this year, so we only see going forward as France, as I mentioned, will take over one of the two commands. There are two strategic commands. One is Allied Command Cperations, SACEUR, and the other is Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, so the French will take on the leadership role there here in our country in Norfolk, Virginia. So we see that as a positive development. We see that as a bridge to the future and maybe enhanced rather than competing cooperation between NATO and EU but actually enhanced capabilities across Europe and increasing the defense expenditures as General Spiese said earlier, that we'd like to see more commitment to defense and some of these European allies increasing their level of GDP per capita spending on defense to go up. And we see this as a positive development. Edgar Brenner: [inaudible] to thank our panel for their participation and to thank the audience for their questions, comments and participation. I also want to inquire if anybody from the Law Library of Congress would like to make any closing remarks? Female Speaker: I just wanted to thank the panelists for a very enlightening and interesting discussion. I'm sure some of us in the audience are very knowledgeable. Some of us were less, and we are more knowledgeable after this discussion. We are here to continue cooperation with you, with the State Department, if necessary, on certain issues that are domestic, domestic foreign law. And we're very happy that we could collaborate with the Inter-University -- Edgar Brenner: Center. Female Speaker: -- Center. And thank you for coming. Edgar Brenner: Thank you all [inaudible].