>> From the library of Congress in Washington D.C.
[ Silence ]
>> My name is Mary Lou Rigger, and on behalf of the Library's Office
of Scholarly programs and the John W. Kluge Center,
I want to welcome you to a lecture today by Dr. Vanni Pettina entitled
"A Preponderance of Politics: The Impact of the Cold War
on US Cuban Relations 1946-1952".
I also want to ask you to please make sure your cell phones are off.
We're being recorded today and no lecture wants an interruption
from outside, but also I want to let you know
that should you ask a question during the question
and answer period that you're asking
that question constitutes permission for it to be recorded.
Dr. Pettina received both his MA in Latin American studies,
and his PhD in Contemporary History through the Institute of History
at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid.
A number of fellowship awards took him through the PhD,
which was completed in Magna Cum Laude,
and he has had short term visiting scholar positions to a number
of places such as Georgetown University, the London School
of Economics, and the Universidad Nacional Autonomo de Mexico,
also known as UNAM.   In 2011 his first book, "A Study

of US Cuban Relations 1933-1959" was published
by a Spanish publisher, Catarata Publications.
He has written chapters for books published
by both UNAM and Doce Calles Madrid.
He in also on the editorial board of a 5 volume collection
on the History of the West Indies.
Dr. Pettina received his Kluge fellowship immediately
after receiving his PhD.
His application proposed not just an assay concerning 2 nations,
but a presentation of much more complex picture linking global
issues such as decolonization with more local issues.
And I remember that the review committee was particularly impressed
by the complexity of his proposed study.
And of course the library was delighted
because it made extensive use of extensive collections
on Cuban American relations.
On a personal note, I remember that I had the opportunity
to make the phone call to Vanni to tell him
that he had received the Kluge fellowship.
And he was not in Madrid where I expected, nor at home in Italy,
but I found him buried deep in an archive in Russia trying
to enhance his Russian language skills for this study.
And there was this pause on the other end
and I never was quite sure whether we had a bad connection,
or he was kind of amazed he was going to move from a Russian archive
to an American archive to study the Cold War issues, like that.
And whichever it was, I've seen him for the last 8 months very busy
and I'm very eager to hear what the results of his research has been.
So please help me welcome Dr. Vanni Pettina.
[ Applause ]
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: Thank you for coming here, and good morning.
And let me start this presentation, obviously thanking the Kluge Center,
it's director Carrie Brown and all it's staff, Mary Lou, Elizabeth,
Joann, Elisha, and all the stuff.   Also my colleagues.

And really I had the briefest condition, or the possible condition
to conduct my research, to write, to think quietly, peacefully.
So I'm very grateful and thankful to them, to the Kluge Center.
Actually most of the time now I'm thinking how I get used
to another library, or another research environment
after being here for 8 months.   So thank you.

So today I'm not going to talk about Russia in spite of the fact
that Mary Lou called, found me in Moscow 1 year ago.
I'm going to focus on the different time period.
What I'm going to do is to divide this short presentation,
which I hope won't be too boring, into parts.
In the 1st part I will try to explain to you
where my research stands in terms of a general historiographical debate
on the history of USA Cuban relation before Castro revolution in 1959,
and even before Castro insurrection between 1956 and 1958.
So where my research stands in this debate.
In the 2nd part I will try to enter into the details of the paper
that I wrote here in these 8 months,
I didn't just write the paper during those 8 months.
I did many other things, but yeah mainly I focused on the writing
on this paper, which will be a new chapter of the book, of my new book
on which I'm working at this moment.
As Mary Lou mentioned I published a book 1 year ago
on basically the same topic, and now I'm working on an enhancement,
an extension of that book to be published in the United States.
So this is the paper, is a new chapter of that book.
So let's start with a general thought consideration
of where my research does stand in terms of historiographical debate.
Usually, generally the historiography on the history
of USA Cuban relation, both in Cuba and outside Cuba,
stands to a portrait to present Castro's revolution,
Castro's insurrection as a necessary reaction to 50 years
of Cuban history marked by a constant systematic frustration
of any attempts to modify, change Cuban, an equal social,
economic, and political structure.   So in 1950 Castro's movement,

Castro political phenomenon would present reaction
to these frustrations of any attempt to change the Cuban status quo,
who frustrated, according to this narrative,
this attempt to modify the Cuban status quo.
The main interpretation is this.
In 1898, which is the date of Cuban independence process,
or in 1933 which is the date of the Cuban first revolution,
a coalitian formed by Cuban domestic conservative forces,
supported by the USA foreign policy, coincidentally frustrated those kind
of attempts to change the oligarchy status quo in Cuba.
Castro revolution and the Castro insurrection would present the
reaction to this 50 year of frustration,
and the revolution would represent finally the liberation, the victory,
the triumph against the Cuban conservative domestic forces,
and the hegemonic USA foreign policy toward the island.
So the 1st point of my research is
that neither we should consider any attempt to change the Cuban social,
political, and economic status quo as failed, frustrated;
nor I think it's arguable to think
that the United States constantly oppressed those processes
of change in the island.
In fact if we look at the data of the 1940's we can see that we have,
in Cuba, democratic spring, especially between 1944 and 1952;
which is anyways the continuation of a long process
of democratic stabilization, and economic growth which start
after the revolution of 1933, and which start to blossom by 1940.
And especially as I mentioned, between 1944 and 1950,
so during the governments of the Cuban revolutionary autentico party,
which is a nationalistic party
in the Latin American sense of nationalistic.
So it's a pro-democratic party and it has a strong,
one of the strong points of this program is social reforms;
social reforms that in fact are carried out,
enacted between 1944 and 1952.
Now not only the United States is opposing,
is not opposing this process of changing Cuba,
but is actively supporting it; at least until 1948.
So going back to the general debate, I think it's not possible
to not consider this period, and the changes that took place in Cuba,
and the role that the United States played
in supporting those processes of political change.
Second point, when this support for...
it's noisy?   Yeah? It's my Italian style.

[ Laughter ]   So, yeah it's much better.

So the 2nd point of my research is that when these supports cease
and come to an end, the support by the United States,
it's not just because of the resurgence or hegemonic mentality
in Washington in this case, with the Truman administration,
but it's because of conjectural factors that,
in this case is the beginning of the Cold War
and it's rapid globalization.
That's, I think determined the end of this convergence
between a progressive USA foreign policy and a progressive project
of social change in Cuba.
So it's a hegemonic resurgence, but is the beginning of the Cold War.
So in my book what I try to explain is how the new global Cold War
distracted Washington political attention,
and Washington economic resources
from letting American Cuba towards the new frontiers
of the global Cold War.
Well Europe of course, in Europe there was the problem
of reconstruction, but mostly the problem quickly
after 1948 became decolonization and Soviet threat in Asia.
Washington was particularly worried
that the Soviet Union could take advantage
of the decolonization process in Asia, and expand it's influence.
Here I'm not entering the debate if it was another reaction,
I'm just telling you which are the thoughts
within the Truman administration at that moment.
So the main object is Asia,
is not anymore Latin America, is not anymore Cuba.
So politicalization and economic resources fled Cuba
and Latin America towards those new frontiers of the Cold War.
And this process determined the rapture
of this convergence, this seizing of...
let's say a hegemony that started in 1933
with the Good Neighbor diplomacy, which end in 1948.
So this is where my research stands in terms
of the general historiographical debate.
Now the paper.
In the paper what I've tried to do is to focus
on the economic negotiation...
economic negotiation between Washington
and Havana between 1946 and 1952.   Why the economic negotiations?

Basically because there...
on the results of those economic negotiations depended the Cuban
government capacity to enact, to carry out the program
of social reforms in the country.
From the results, or the positive or negative results,
that came out from those negotiations depended on the amount
of resources that the Cuban governments had at their disposal
to strengthen the democratization process
and the social reform process in the country.
What is really fascinating is that until 1948, as I mentioned,
and it's fascinating given the kind of image
that the historiography has given as the relationship
between Cuba and the United States.
So usually it's a much more conflictive image
that we have been given by historiographic.
By contrast the paper, and the work that has been done in the archives,
shows a quite different reality.
Until 1948 is a clear support from Washington
for Cuban democratization process, and social, and this program
of social reforms in the country.
These become particularly evident during the sugar negotiation
that took place between Washington and Havana between 1946 and 1947.
In this case Washington's role was crucial, was very important.
It was, as I've said, Washington constantly tried
to meet Cuban requests because the main logic was
that Cuba needed the economic support to get consolidated,
this democratic process in the island.
So what happened during this sugar negotiations, well Cuba by 1945,
1946 was facing the specter of an economic collapse.
Why? Because during WWII the island has dramatically expanded it's sugar
production to meet the ally war needs.
Why? Because Cuba became the main, and the only provider of sugar
for USA and ally troops fighting in Asia and in North Africa.
Well sugar production of course in Europe was distracted
by the beginning of the war, and the maritime traffic
in the Pacific Ocean was also interrupted because of the war,
so Cuba could not get, the United States
and their allies could not get the sugar coming
from the usual Asian provider.
So Cuba became the main sugar provider.
And of course it had to terribly expand it's sugar production.
What happened at the end of WWII, there is the problem of how
to readjust it's sugar economy to lower level
of international sugar demand.   And if there when?

Cuba immediately turns to Washington asking for help, and being supported
to enact as move transition to this WWII scenario, which is the risk.
The risk is economic collapse.
And of course with a very, very negative likely impact
on the democratic stability of the country.
The documentation is really fascinating because...
Washington policy maker and USA diplomats
in Havana are perfectly aware of the importance of giving support to Cuba
in this difficult moment, this difficult transition.
And they even fight against USA lobbyists belonging
to the sugar big lobby.
So it's quite curious to see a USA diplomat and policymaker siding
with a Cuban delegation, and fighting back the attempts
of the sugar big producer to exclude Cuba from the USA sugar market,
because which is the solution that is found
to avoid this economic collapse is to integrate Cuba into a system
of USA sugar quota according to which Washington commits itself
to buy every year in large fixed amounts of sugar, of Cuban sugar.
This of course would terribly,
dramatically stabilize the Cuban economy.
And in fact in 1948 a sugar act integrated Cuba in this new system
of quotas, and after a long fight against the USA lobby -
they don't want Cuba to become part of this support system,
because of course it would represent a competence for them.
And so yeah, the sugar act integrates Cuba in this new system,
and in fact the right media...   Cuba avoids the economic collapse.

n 1948 there are new election and Democratic president belonging
to the same party, to the Partido Revolucionario Autentico party,
is elected and is both economic transition,
is both democratic transition as well.
The problem starts now at this point, after 1948.
Washington institutes, after 1948, completely changes
from a comparative mode towards Cuba, it's switched very quickly.
The documentation is quite amazing in this sense
because it shows how quick was this process.
It switched to an uncomparative mode.
By 1948 there is no more attempt to meet Cuba requests to support Cuba.
There is no more dourness of how important is Cuba...
is basically giving to Cuba what Cuba wants in terms of stabilization
of it's democratic institution.
Again, the economic negotiation between the 2 countries are crucial
to understand this process.
So after 1948 we have this new Cuban president Prio Socarras.
Prio Socarras is the term to carry on with this program
of social reform that had been started by his predecessor in 1944.
Now of course again the problem is money.
The quota is has stabilized the Cuban economy,
but at the same time it does sort of establish a limit to the growth.
There's a fixed amount of sugar that cover more or less all the sugar,
the Cuban sugar production, which stabilizes the economy
but doesn't allow the economy to grow after that over [inaudible].
So of course, like many Latin Americans at that time,
the first thing that the new president tried
to do is start an ambitious program of economic diversification.
Not only new industries, but also diversification
of the agricultural sector
that obviously is too reliant on sugar production.
And as has been the cast until then, immediately turns to Washington
to get some sort of financial help
to implement this very expensive program of economic diversification.
And the reason this official meeting in Washington between Prio Socarras
and President Harry Truman, Socarras also held meetings
with other officials belonging to the Truman administration,
and the answer to any single one of Prio's requests is negative.
Prio basically asked for like a small increase
of the Cuban sugar quota because he argues that Cuba needs time
to carry on, to develop this plan of economic diversification.
So you ask...
yes, a little increase of the Cuban sugar quota to get time.
And once he asked for a loan by the USA government to be used
as an investment in new industries, in new agricultural production.
And again, Washington, not only Truman but all the policymakers,
the USA diplomats in Havana, they are quite, quite unfriendly
and they reject these requests.
And this all happens with the same administration
that they had supported, the previous government requested,
and that same administration,
every Truman administration has now completely rejecting.
The interesting thing is that...
the previous negotiation Washington really showed that it cared
about Cuban democratic stability, and it thought
that given economic help it would have also helped
and turn this democratic consolidation in Cuba.
At this point the documentation showed that the reason...
the reason anymore is political logic.
There is a clear lack of dourness
on how rejecting Cuban requests could badly affect the
democratic stability.
Really there is no interest toward strengthening this Cuban
democratic consolidation.   So what...

which can be the explanation of such abrupt change?
I don't think it's an ideological problem.
It's not that sadly Washington became opposed to the idea
of economic diversification in Cuba, of industrialization.
Why I'm saying so - because the at the same time what is fascinating is
that Washington is investing huge amount of USA taxpayers money
in Asia, in countries like Philippine, India, Pakistan,
Indonesia, and it's doing exactly what Cuba's asking for,
is putting money that is used to diversify the economy,
to modernize the country.
So the explanation I've found and I think that the communication...
I mean it would push me to think that this is the explanation,
is that these abrupt, quick globalization
of the Cold War really created a problem of capacity of giving
to Latin America the necessary political attention,
or at least the same political attention the continent had received
during the 1930's and the 1940's.
Now all the political resources are directed toward the new frontiers
of the Cold War, and also create a budgetary problem
because in this case the communication is super clear.
So the Truman administration is apt to use a huge amount of money
to foil what they think is a Soviet freed [inaudible] in Asia.
But not an infinite amount of money, so the reason the constant warring
about taking care of the budget.
The budget is not to expand over certain limits.
Why? Well because basically according
to the Truman administration, it will be the same
with Eisenhower administration clashes with the American perception
that a smaller state is better.
So the risk is that getting involved in too many places
at the same time will bring to an expansion of the role
of the state in the economy.
So the reason, the answer that the Truman administration gives
to Prio with...   this logic.

They say, no, I mean at this point you have
to get the money from private sources.
We won't use USA taxpayers money to fund your project
of economic diversification.
Now of course this change did not create Cuban problems from scratch.
I mean, the dependency on Cuban sugar,
on the sugar production is a Cuban problem.
It's not an American problem.
The fragility of Cuban democratic institution has to do
with a local domestic process, Cuban process.
It has not to do with the USA foreign policy.
But of course, the rejection
of prior requests clearly weaken the image of the President within Cuba,
and Prio's image within Cuba, it gets even more weak
when in 1951 Washington decides to reduce the USA-Cuban sugar quota,
which established only a few years' area.
Why again?
Because the reason is not dourness, there is no really...
there is not thought, there is not political thought
about the consequence of this kind
of attitude can generate within Cuba.
Even if Cuban diplomats argue that this kind
of decision will bring instability, and will bring perhaps,
and they use literally this word, they might bring to a thought.
Which actually happened in 1952, March 1952, Batista,
Fulgencio Batista steps in and gives a completely blotless quote;
blotless because the economic concernity and this lack
of legitimacy of the last Partido Revolucionario Autentico government.
It created the ground for a blotless quote
by Fulgencio, by Fulgencio Batista.   I think we get to my conclusions.

So this paper, my research I think shows that mainly the history
of USA Cuban relation is perhaps much more history of cooperation,
or at least it's not only a history of conflict.
As I've tried to show you in the 1940,
cooperation convergence was possible
and it was not possible conservative...
quite the opposite on progressive, progressive term.
There is a clear, there is a clear attempt in Cuba to improve the life
of Cuban citizens, to create, to expand social rights,
and there is a clear attempt by Washington
to strengthen this process.
During the 1940's absolutely everything, and in fact I would say
that the problem with 1940 that they do not fit the usual kind
of narrative that we find on history view of say, human relation.
In fact there is only 1 book published in English on [inaudible]
by [inaudible name] and it has been published like 10 years.
Nothing more after that.
And Cuban historiography has published little more thing
but very critical on that tier, but of course that tier doesn't fit
in this narrative that portrays the history that you count
as a continuous conflict, and which by the way also legitimate -
the Castro revolution from an historical point of view.
So yeah, the conclusion is that there is much more to be done,
much more study to be done on the history of this cooperation,
and also there is much more to be done
on why this cooperation came to an end.
I've tried to give an answer but of course
if we avoid the deterministic approach
and we stop thinking it went like intended, that what happened
in 1950 was absolutely necessary we can start to think
about alternative explanation of why the big 1950 crisis,
Castro Revolution, Castro insurrection, but this did happen.
And the 2nd thing, I'm sorry I'm a very present historian of many,
in fact this is one of those.   I think that this research has also,

like enormity of meaning I would say.
As I've said this research is much more about cooperation
than conflict, and I think
that it can perhaps also trace a different horizon,
a different future in terms of a USA Cuban relation in the future.
Let me say that I think this research is much more
about bridges towards the future than trenches
of the past, and that would be all.   Thank you.

[ Applause ]   [ Background speaker ]

Yeah.   >> If I understand you correctly,

you said that prior to 1948 as the Cuban...
as Cuba recognized the declining demand for sugar over the allies,
put Russia as a possible...
I was thinking that since the US is acutely attuned to the expansion
of the Soviet regime, since Cuba's so close, closer than all
of the European nations, why do you think that the US is knowledgeable
about that conversation, that sort of connection.
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: Not composition.
>> Not more of an effort and intent to try
to make sure we cultivate a closer relationship.
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: Yeah, I think it's a very interesting question.
What the part of all the stories that you know that the biggest,
like sugar contract with the Soviet Union is signed
by the Batista government by 1952.
So there is a purchase by the Soviet Union of sugar,
of Cuban sugar after 1952, quite big.
I think it's 500 tons of sugar.   It's just once but it happened.

I don't think that...   so until that contract, no.

There are talks but there is nothing,
there is no say there is no purchase of sugar by the Soviet Union.
I think that there are talks, but the Cuban government
at that time are quite aware that they cannot do
that thing, especially after 1948.
The only person that will be able to do that is Batista
because it's clearly so pro American that, like a commercial,
like interaction with the Soviet Union
by Batista is absolutely not perceived as a problem.


Cuba is still huge economic problem after 1952.
So the United States, as far as I could understand are quite happy
about the fact that Cuba under Batista can sell sugar
to the Soviet Union, because somehow it helped
to stabilize Batista's dictatorship at that time.
I don't think the same would have been possible after 1948 by 1
of those 2 democratic government I mentioned in my presentation.
So I don't know if I...   Yeah?

Is there a microphone, or not?   [ Inaudible speaker ]

During WWII and after WWII until 1948, so yeah.
[ Inaudible speaker ]
This is very interesting because it's something
that is not perhaps very well known.
So after 1937 the level of USA investment
in the Cuban sugar production constantly decreased.
Why? First of all because in 1937 is approved,
the called [inaudible], Sugar Coordination Law.
By the way, by 1 of the Batista's government of that time.
And that alone made much less profitable
because it regulated the Cuban domestic sugar market production.
It regulated that, and it made much less profitable
for USA sugar company, or multi national to invest money in Cuba.
So after 1937 we see a constant decrease, which doesn't mean
that there were not big huge, like USA sugar company in Cuba,
but I would say that their weight had substantially decreased
by the time of those negotiations between 1947 and 1952.
So again the interesting thing about the documentation,
the diplomatic documentation, is that when USA diplomats
and USA policymaker stepped in trying to support Cuban position,
was not because they were thinking
in that way they would have helped their national investor in Cuba.
There is not trace of all that.   There's always a political logic.

My impression is that there is a clear heritage of a FDR,
a Good Neighbor diplomacy way of thinking.
Before it's politics and then economy serves
like a tool to support your pose.
But it's not the other, it's not the other way around.
So yeah, it's a political logic that stands behind


[ Inaudible question from audience ]   Well, thank you.

Did you hear?   Yeah. Basically...

what's your name?
What David is arguing is that there might be also a role by the need
to expand consumption in the US involved in these positive results
of the USA negotiation on sugar and the establishment of the quota,
because of course if Cuba can sell sugar it can get also currency
and buy USA goods.
I guess that is the direction of the question.
And the 2nd one is if it's really their direct link
between the decision to support Cuban economy,
if this decision is linked also
to a broader consideration on democracy in Cuba.
And yeah, this would...
well anyway I will try to address that question.
So yeah, very good question.
Actually there is an active role by the USA Chamber of Commerce
of Havana in all the negotiation process.
The USA Chamber of Commerce in Havana is of course pushing
for integrating Cuba in this quota system,
because as they currently say that their thought is
that is Cuba can get currency then it will basically buy more
USA goods.
And this is quite clear in the document, so there are meetings
between USA diplomats and the Chamber of Commerce.
But let me tell you that, of course
in my presentation I couldn't clarify all the actors,
but this paper would be published in here.
It's everything clear.
But that is not the position of the USA policymaker, believe me.
It's a completely different culture from the USA Chamber of Commerce
and it's a completely different political culture,
the one that diplomat like Henry Norway have at this point compared
to the Cold War political culture.
They are interested in economy in this moment.
If they are it's because they think it's a tool for the USA for...
I know it's very hard to, perhaps to believe me, because I know that most
of the narrative says quite the opposite.
Actually I don't think Greg would like this work I'm quite sure,
and actually I've constantly always arguing with the kind
of interpretation of USA, like an American relationship he gets.
I don't really buy this idea of a continuity between the 19th century
and the 20th century as an old century of revolutions
and counter revolutions supported by the United States.
I think it's really hard to argue.   I think it's a...

we can debate now.
I think it's a problem related to US history.
In Europe we have a completely different perspective on...
and I guess the real problem is
that in many cases US scholar do not read books published
in Italian let's say, or French,
because in Italy we have a huge historiographical tradition
that started in the 1930's with [inaudible name]
that constantly argue against this kind of a one side interpretation
of Latin American history.
So I would say that my work stands in that kind of tradition.
So again, yeah at this moment they really give importance
to Cuban democratic stability.
I really think that there's a legacy of the Good Neighbor diplomacy
on the evolution of the Good Neighbor,
especially during the 1940's
when the anti totalitarian charge became even stronger.
So yeah, then we can discuss what is democracy.
For me the decade of the 1940's is a very new onset mode
of democracy, I would say.
So it's not just election every 4 years,
but I know that grows governments, and the Prio governments,
have been only considered like corrupted government.
But there is much more there.
There is a real social program that's absolutely real.
And also yeah, the thing is that the corruption issue,
I think it has been very banalized.
I mean, if we look at many other countries
that are starting democratic transition,
they're constantly marked by a high level of corruption.
There are works by James Scott, for example,
on the role of corruption during the early stage
of democratization process.
It's not just that Cuban thinks wrong
and they don't care about their citizens.
There is a political role that corruption,
I think, played during this time.
But there's been sort of characterized I think by,
usually by Cuban and international historiography.
So that would be my question.   [ Inaudible question from audience ]

Yeah, I've been traveling Cuba.   I think it's a trick question.

I don't think it's very, it's very easy
to get what Cubans really think in many cases.
At least that is my personal impression,
feeling about the relationship with the United States.
Of course on the 1 hand there's a sort of myth of the United States
which has pushed a lot of people to leave Cuba during 50 years.
But then there are other quite consolidate, like perception
of the United States as an aggressor,
and I wouldn't deny that, at least after 1960.
Of course from the attempt to assassinate Castro,
to the Bay of the Pigs, of course those are real signal
of an aggressive foreign policy.
So of course those kind of episodes generated a lot
of hostility towards the United States.
Again, I think it's a mix of perception, it's very high.
I don't think there is 1 Cuban perception
of the United States in Cuba.   [ Inaudible question from audience ]

I think in this moment most of Cuban population really wants sort
of normalization of everything - economic, political normalization.
Normalization with a relation with the United States.
Of course I think the people in Cuba doesn't want the United States
to go there and tell them how they have
to do the transition to whatever.   That is quite common.

But they want normalization, every kind of normalization.


>> One more.
You suggested that you don't have a lot of sympathy toward [inaudible]
that there's a deterministic results of this, and you thought
that possibly an open sense of choices that we made...
have outcomes.
I'm curious if you observed since 1940's to now in the US history

of foreign policy similar episodes of losing attention,
and because of focused...
there is only so much political attention being paid,
and then if there is a lesson learned


>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: You mean towards Latin America or in general?
If there will be like such dramatic shift of attention
in other places of the world.   Is that what...

>> Yeah, I mean I think about...
but I think about the places where we have gotten, in all honesty,
in China and more recently involved with like Serbia after some time.
And the efforts are kind of lurching about.
When things get really bad, we get involved,
and I'm just curious what you derive from this sense of rarely perceived,
that we might be [inaudible].
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: Part of my research actually is about that,
is about how difficult is the process
of becoming a global actor in this case?
The United States...
of course we think of the United States as granted, but the 1940's,
the end of the 1940's and the beginning
of the 1950's are real interesting because you can see which kind
of challenges the United States had to face to build
up this global capacity in terms of diplomatic resources,
of budget, of political structures.
Think of the building of the National Security Council,
then the OCB which is an internal...
they decided to establish because they needed
to better coordinate the National Security Council,
which is already an institution created
to get the better organization of USA foreign policy
in terms of internal security.
So I think there is a constant need to reactivate political structure
and political strategy, at least when you are up to this global game.
Yeah, that happened many times, but for example I would tell you
that I think that in the last like, 5, 6,
10 years Washington has not paid any attention to Latin America.
Now Latin Americans would say that it's better, that they prefer
to don't get any attention.
What I'm trying to say is that it's not true, not only the kind
of attention can lead to conflict, it might lead to cooperation,
it could lead to cooperation.   So yeah, it's constant.

It depends on local prices
that become particularly global international because they are close
to energy sources, for example, because this kind of prices happen
in places that are particularly meaningful in terms
of geopolitical location.   So yeah, that constantly shifts.

It happens all the time and it's happening.
Think about now where, there was an article yesterday saying
that at this point after all these new military deployment in Asia,
Asia really became, we all knew officially became the first
like top priority for the United States.


Another question?   Of course.

>> Are you proposing that this shift...
I'm guess I'm asking, what degree do you think this shift in US policy

from cooperative mode to an [inaudible].
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: Yeah.
The thing is that, so if we don't consider like the revolution
and reaction to this 50, 60 years of problematic relationship,
if we see the revolution as a reaction to the crisis
in which Cuba entered in the end of the 1940's
because of the failure not of the revolutionary attempts
to change the country, the revolutionary attempt of 1898, 1933,
but on the failure of the democratic transition.
Of course the USA played a crucial role because, for example,
the Truman administration supported the Prio government
when the Prio government requested the loan, or little increase
of the Cuban sugar quota.
I don't think we would have such a fertile ground for Batista Cuba
in 1952, and without Batista Cuba in 1952 I doubt
that we would have had Castro's insurrection
and Castro's revolution, because never forget in 1956
when Castro decide to take arms it was not the first time,
it was the 2nd time he decide to do that.
In his mind, in his program the main point is the restoration
of the 1940 constitution.   So there is even...

a link with the crisis of the failure of the democratic process.
Castro wanted to, apparently to follow,
to continue the path interrupted in 1952.
And since that part has also been interrupted
because of USA neglecting Cuba of course,
I can say that it's a missed opportunity
of course, of course it is.
But not because of a hegemonic mentality.


>> We have time for 1 more question.
>> Dr. Vanni Pettina: I don't know is there any?
[ Background speaker ]   [ Applause ]

>> This has been a presentation of the Library of Congress.