>> From the Library of
Congress in Washington, DC.
[ Silence ]
>> Today's lecture is presented
by the John W. Kluge Center
at the Library of Congress
in conjunction
with the National History Center,
and the International
Seminar on Decolonization.
Now in its 9th year,
the Decolonization Seminar brings 16
young scholars from around the world
to Washington, DC for 4 weeks
of research and discussion,
into the disillusion of
colonial empires in the period
after the Second World War, and
the emergence of new nations,
particularly in Asia,
Africa, and the Caribbean.
In 9 years the seminar has brought
more than 100 emerging scholars
from the Americas, Europe, the
Middle East, Asia, and Africa,
to the Library of Congress
to use the library's extraordinary
global collections in more
than 470 different languages,
as well as other resources
in Washington for research.
The transition from colonial empires
to nation states is an
extraordinary momentous period
in our global story, one that is
largely responsible for the map
of the world that we
recognize today.
The seminar has helped solidify
decolonization as a distinct
and emerging field within
the history of profession,
and the Kluge Center and the
Library of Congress are delighted
that our collections have
informed this scholarship.
Funding for the seminar
is generously provided
by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation,
and the seminar is organized
and administered by the National
History Center, whose mission is
to reinforce the critical
role that history
and historical knowledge play
in public decision-making,
and civic life.
I encourage you to visit the
National History Center website
to learn more about
their important work.
The successful collaboration for
the past 9 years is a testament
to the vision of the Kluge Center's
founding director, Prosser Gifford,
our recently retired
director, Carolyn Brown,
and Professional William Roger
Lewis, a distinguished scholar
of British history and the British
Empire, a member of the Library
of Congress Scholars Council,
conceiver of the International
Seminar on Decolonization,
and who has directed the
seminar each summer since 2006.
And to him we extend
our sincerest thanks.
A word about the Kluge Center;
the Kluge Center is a vibrant
scholar center on Capitol Hill
that brings together scholars and
researchers from around the world
to stimulate and energize one
another, to distill wisdom
from the library's rich
resources, and to interact
with policymakers and the public.
The center offers opportunities
for senior scholars,
as well as post-doctorate fellows
and PhD candidates to do research
in the Library of Congress
collections.
We also offer free public lectures,
such as this one, conferences,
symposia, and other programs, and
we administer the Kluge Prize,
which recognizes lifetime
achievement in the fields
of humanistic and social sciences.
For more information about the
Kluge Center, I encourage you
to visit our website,
loc.gov/kluge K L U G E,
or pick up some information
on the way out.
There's also a sign-up sheet so you
can sign up to receive email alerts
about upcoming programs,
as well as opportunities
to conduct your own research
here at the Library of Congress.
Finally, it's now my pleasure
to welcome Dr. Dane Kennedy,
the Elmer Louis Keyser professor of
history and international affairs
at the George Washington University,
also one of my alma maters,
and a longtime friend
of the Kluge Center's,
to introduce today's speaker.
Dane.
[Applause]
>> Thanks, Jason, and thanks to
the Kluge Center and to the Library
of Congress for sponsoring this,
and for all that they've done
for the Decolonization
Seminar over the years.
We're very, very grateful.
It's my real pleasure to
introduce Elizabeth Schmidt
of Loyola University in Maryland.
Elizabeth, or Betsy, as
she likes to be called,
is really one of the most
productive, interesting,
and wide-ranging historians
of Africa working today.
Her books include a social history
of women in colonial Zimbabwe.
The title is "Peasants, Traitors,
and Wives," showing women
in the history of Zimbabwe.
And really it is a -- I think
a seminal work of its kind,
and a study of the place of
Africa in global geopolitics,
the very timely for an intervention
in Africa from the Cold War
to the war on terror, which
was just published last year.
She's written about the
independence movement in Guinea,
from the ground up, in her book
"Mobilizing the Masses, Gender,
Ethnicity and Class and the
Nationalist Movement in Guinea,"
and from the top down in her book,
"The Cold War and Decolonization
in Guinea from 1946 to 1958."
Several of her books
have won prizes.
I think one of the things that's
perhaps most striking is the way
in which her work is
distinguished by several things.
One is by -- as I suggested at the
beginning it's remarkable range.
She's worked on Anglophone Africa,
she's worked on Francophone Africa.
She's worked on Southern Africa,
she's worked on West Africa.
She's worked in social
history, done social history
and done political history.
Also striking is the way in which
it's shown a real determination
to recover the lived experiences of
common Africans, peasants, women,
laborers, as they sought to cope
with the upheavals of colonialism,
of the Cold War, and of the
various other external forces
that have brought their continent --
have been brought to the continent
over the past century or so.
So I'm really delighted that she's
able to come here today and speak
to us on decolonization
in the nation state,
reflections on the 1958
referendum, and French West Africa.
So join me in welcoming Betsy.
[ Applause ]
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Thank you very much
for that incredibly
generous introduction.
I hope I can live up to it.
[Laughs] I'm not going to cover
a fraction of those topics
in my talk today, thank goodness.
But what I will focus on is
decolonization and the nation state,
and talk a little bit about the 1958
referendum in French West Africa.
But first I'd like to thank
you all very much for coming.
I'd like to thank the Kluge
Center, the National History Center,
the participants and faculty
in the International
Decolonization Seminar,
and the rest of the
members of the audience.
And I'm extremely honored
to be addressing you today.
So I've been told how to
work all these machines.
Technology is not my
forte, but here we go.
The focus of my talk will
be on the country of Guinea,
which was a French colony
in French West Africa.
But I will also talk about the
federations of French West Africa
and French Equatorial Africa.
So I'm showing you a slide
with those areas demarcated.
But as I said, the main
focus will be on Guinea.
And I'm going to read most my
presentation to instill discipline
on myself so I don't
go off on tangents.
I'm told I should talk
for about 45 minutes.
And so this is the only way I can
be sure that that's what I do.
So please bear with me.
"In 1958 the people of Guinea voted
no in an empire wide referendum
on a new French constitution
that would have perpetuated
colonial subordination.
The majority of electors in
the 7 other French West African
territories in metropolitan France,
and in the Empire more broadly,
endorsed the constitution,
and joined the new French
dominated community.
Guinea alone opted for
immediate independence
as a solitary nation state.
It chose those path despite
strong inter-territorial ties
and deep sympathies for federalism.
Some historians have argued
that Guinean political activists
abandoned a more difficult federal
project, despite warnings
that balkanization would jeopardize
African social, economic, cultural,
and political development, in favor
of the immediate gratification
of national and political
sovereignty.
This paper counters that
the French community,
as defined in the 1958 constitution,
did not offer the possibility
of a federation in which African
states would be equal partners.
The proposed constitution
undermined the great federations
of French West Africa and
French Equatorial Africa,
which many had hoped would serve
as the basis of large politically
and economically viable
African states.
Rather than abandoning federalism,
Guinean political thinkers
and activists who voted no
confronted the political reality
that metropolitan France
would thwart the establishment
of federations that were
not under its control.
Therefore, political independence,
even on a territorial basis,
became the precondition for
alternative visions of federalism
that were Africa centered, rather
than focused on the metro pole.
For Guinea, territorial independence
was not the first choice.
However, it was the best option
available in September 1958.
Historians have the
luxury of hindsight.
We now know which choices
were ill-fated.
From our perch in the present
we can castigate the choosers
for not having foreseen
the pitfalls,
for failing to anticipate
what would go wrong and why.
To avoid this sort of
a historical analysis,
we must now ask how the
referendum was viewed by those
who made the choices in 1958.
What was their understanding
of the options before them?
How did they weigh the costs and
benefits of a yes versus a no vote?
Excuse me.
[ Silence ]
In a 2008 article marking the 50th
anniversary of the 1958 referendum,
Frederick Cooper promotes
such a nuanced approach.
'To those championing heroism
and triumph in the struggle
for independence,' he observes
- - and here I quote at length,
'in the heady days after most
African colonies took the path
to independence as
territorial states,
it was easy to see the choice
made by the people of Guinea
as the radical one, a sharp
break with colonial rule,
and a promise to sweep away the
forces of reaction within Guinea
as much as those imposed
from without.
The choice of the other territories
was seen by some as a compromise
with the colonial rulers.
But many of the people
voting to remain
in the community thought their
own vision was a more progressive
and promising one.
They were voting to
retain an affiliation,
not just with France,
but with each other.
The French community, they
thought, offered a possibility
of building a federation
of African states
that shared a common colonial
experience in language,
a political unit large and populous
enough to exercise real power
in the world of inequalities,
an expression of an
African nationality,
rather than the colonial fiction
of territorial particularity.
An African federation
would in turn participate
as an equal member
alongside European France
in a super national
French confederation.'
End of quote.
In other words, according to Cooper,
to many the choice in 1958 was not
between independence and
continued subservience to France,
but independence on the basis
of individual territories,
versus membership in a
broader cooperative community.
[ Silence ]
I would not take issue
with these points.
I am not arguing that the rise of
the nation state was inevitable,
or that the nation was the only
way to imagine political space.
Alternative visions of
African sovereignty were
on the table in 1958.
However, he and I differ over what
was deemed possible at the moment
of the September 28th,
1958 referendum.
While Cooper contends
that an African federation
and a confederation of equal states
within the French community
were still viewed as possible
at that time, I have argued
that these possibilities
had been nullified
by the time of the referendum."
So here I'm going to delve a little
bit into the history of Guinea
in the second half of 1958.
"Spearheading the no vote
was the Guinean branch
of the Assemblement [phonetic],
Démocratique Africain, the RDA,
an inter-territorial
alliance of political parties
that championed greater political
autonomy for the French territories,
as well as equal political,
economic,
and social rights for all citizens.
Until September 14, 1958, that
is 2 weeks before the referendum,
the Guinean RDA was at the forefront
of promoting African federation,
and a confederation of equal states
within a Franco-African community.
During the year preceding the
referendum, the Guinean RDA leader,
Sekou Toure, was among French
West Africa's foremost proponents
of the federalist position,
which promoted confederation.
And one of the most vehement critics
of the territorialist position,
which advanced the cause
of individual states.
In 1957 he successfully lobbied
both the inter-territorial RDA,
and the Grand Council in Dakar to
support increased political powers
for the French West African and
Equatorial African federations.
However, the constitution
proffered by France in the summer
of 1958 did not enhance
African status
within the Franco-African community,
but rather diminished their role
in collective governance.
The proposed French
community would be subordinate
to the French Republic, which would
retain control of foreign, economic,
defense, and higher
education policies.
Africans would no longer
have representatives
in the French National Assembly,
and the Council of the Republic
and the Assembly of the French
Union would be abolished.
The proposed constitution
would further balkanize Africa
by dissolving the French West Africa
and Equatorial African federations,
and with them the elected
grand councils
that brought together
Africans from all
of the member territories
for consultation.
In response, the Guinean
RDA reiterated its demands
for an elected federal
executive and legislature,
and advocated the establishment
of a federal state responsible
for foreign and economic affairs,
defense and higher education.
In other words, Guinean political
leaders pressed French Prime
Minister Charles de Gaulle to revise
the constitution so that the choice
on September 28th was
between immediate independence
and a Franco-African community in
which Africans headed genuine void,
not between independence
and a French community
that expressed only
the will of France.
In August 1958, the
inter-territorial RDA did an
about face, disavowing the
pro-federalist position it had taken
in 1957.
The majority of the party's
leaders threw their support
to the territorialist faction,
which advocated the
abolition of federation.
The federalist versus
territorialist debate had much to do
with the rivalry between
Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire,
and between their respective
leaders, Leopold Senghor
and Felique Soufet Boune
[assumed spelling],
who was also the president
of the inter-territorial RDA.
Senegal had long dominated the
French West African Federation,
whose seat was in Dakar.
Senghor, a deputy in the French
National Assembly had staunchly
advocated more, rather than fewer
powers for the Grand Council,
and it was Senghor
who had first warned
of the dangers of balkanization.
The territorialists were led by
Hufwet Bonet [assumed spelling],
also a deputy in the French
National Assembly, and a minister
without portfolio in
the French government.
Hufwet Bonet had helped to
craft the French policies
that weakened federal
powers, and bolstered those
of individual territories.
Intent on remaining in France's good
graces and retaining the subsidies
that resulted, territorialists
adamantly opposed independence
in any form, and certainly
not at the federal level.
Hufwet Bonet's home territory,
Cote d'Ivoire had much
to gain from that position.
Cote d'Ivoire was the richest
territory in French West Africa.
An entrenched African
planting class,
of which Hufwet Bonet
was the leader,
resented the financial
assistance it was required to give
to poor territories through its
subsidization of the federal budget.
Far from the seat of the
federation of the Grand Council,
Hufwet Bonet opposed any proposal
that might strengthen the hand
of his rivals, notably
Senghor and Senegal.
On August 8th, Prime Minister de
Gaulle post 2 stark alternatives,
adherence to the French
community through a yes vote,
or succession from
France through a no vote.
Openingly threatening
those territories
that were considering
independence de Gaulle declared --
and I quote, 'It is well
understood and I understand it,
one can desire succession.
Succession imposes duties.
It carries dangers.
Independence has its burdens.
The referendum will
ascertain that the idea
of succession carries the day.
But one cannot conceive of an
independent territory and a France
that continues to aid it.
The independent government will
bear the consequences, economic
and otherwise, that are entailed in
the manifestation of such a will.'
During the month of August in 1958,
Prime Minister de Gaulle toured
French West and Equatorial Africa
to rally support for his
constitutional project.
On August 24th, the day before
he was to arrive in Guinea,
he announced 2 alterations
to the proposed constitution.
First, if a territory voted
yes in the referendum,
choosing to join the French
community, it could still
at some future date vote for
independence without risk or peril,
provided that France
and other members
of the community approved
the decision.
Such a vote, unlike a no
vote in the referendum,
would not be considered succession.
Second, territories
would be permitted
to join the community
individually or in groups.
However, de Gaulle refused
to accede to the demand
that the territorial
groupings be institutionalized
in the constitution, as for
instance, French West Africa
or French Equatorial Africa.
The next day de Gaulle
arrived in Conakry.
On August 25th, Sekou Toure
[phonetic] reiterated the familiar
federalist demands, quote,
'We wish to be free citizens
of our African states, members
of the Franco-African community.
In effect, the French Republic
within the Franco-African
Association, will be an element,
as all the African states
equally will be elements
of this grand multinational
community, composed of free
and equal states,' unquote.
Two days later Sekou
Toure informed France
that Guinea would support
the constitution
if 2 changes were incorporated.
First, the constitution must
provide for a confederation
of independent equal states,
rather than the inequitable
association proposed
in the current draft.
Second, the constitution must
establish elected federal executives
from both French West Africa,
and French Equatorial Africa.
The French government, however,
refused to negotiate further.
The French community, as
defined in the 1950 constitution,
thus did not offer the possibility
of building a federation of states
that would participate as an equal
member alongside European France,
as a super-national
confederation, as Cooper suggests,
rather the 1958 constitution
unambiguously shut the door
on that possibility.
It was in this context
that Guinea voted
for independence on September 28th."
[ Silence ]
Now, I have a few slides
about the referendum campaign;
this one promoting the no vote.
If you see the small caption
there, it does indicate
that this was graffiti in
Senegal, Dakar, Senegal,
as was this advocating the yes vote.
And this is a woman
voting in Senegal.
I do not have similar
slides from Guinea,
because the French burned
the archives when they left
after the referendum, and
few photographs survived.
"Even before the no vote, France
began its withdrawal from Guinea,
sabotaging archives,
infrastructure, and the economy.
In the aftermath, France severed
most of its economic ties,
suspending all bank credits,
development assistance,
and cooperative endeavors.
Within 48 hours of the
referendum, all French technical
and administrative personnel,
including doctors and teachers,
were ordered to leave the
territory, and to destroy or take
with them all materials
and archives,
including registers
of vital statistics.
Beyond these economic penalties,
technical services were
sabotaged and equipment destroyed.
Telephone wires were cut.
Cranes at the Port of
Connickery [phonetic] disappeared.
Military camps were
stripped of their equipment
and hospitals of their medicines.
Ships filled with medicines and
food were diverted from Connickery,
large sums of money,
both public and private,
were transferred out of the country.
The Bank of France
cancelled the old currency,
and the French Intelligence
Agency peppered the country
with counterfeit bills,
creating widespread panic.
By stimulating chaos in the
economic and administrative sectors,
the French government hoped to
demonstrate Guinea's inability
to assume the responsibilities
of independence.
On October 2nd, 1958,
the French territory
of Guinea officially became the
Independent Republic of Guinea.
Not a single representative
of France was present
at the independence day ceremonies.
France immediately began a
campaign to isolate Guinea,
pressuring NATO allies to refrain
from granting the new
nation official recognition,
and from engaging with
it economically.
Nonetheless, Guinea continued in
its attempts to establish diplomatic
and economic relations with
the former colonial power.
On Independence Day, Sekou Toure
proclaimed that the independent
and sovereign nation of Guinea
hoped to negotiate an association
with the French Republic
on the basis
of Article 88 of the
new constitution.
He later announced that Guinea
wished to remain in the Franc Zone.
Paris ignored his overtures.
The anti-Guinea campaign
was aided by Hufwet Bonet,
who pulled the inter-territorial
RDA in his wake.
Hufwet Bonet made it clear
that Guinea should be deprived
of all French aid, and a
vigorous propaganda campaign
against it should be undertaken.
On October 7th through 9th
at the behest of Hufwet Bonet
and the French government,
the coordinating committee
of the inter-territorial RDA
expelled the Guinean branch
from its ranks.
Although the federations
of French West
and Equatorial African had been
dissolved by the new constitution,
debates between territorialists
and federalists continued
with the territorialists
faction now in command,
determined to silence the
internationalist opposition.
Rebuffed by France and its
former Francophone allies,
Guinea looked elsewhere
for transnational partnerships
and alliances.
On October 2nd, the independent
African nations of Ghana
and Liberia became
the first countries
to recognize the sovereign
state of Guinea.
They were followed by various
communist powers, the Soviet Union,
the Peoples Republic of China,
Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany opened
a trade mission."
And here is Sekou Toure not
right after independence,
but as he's taking his campaign for
international alliances on the road.
"On October 19th, the Guinean RDA,
now called "the Parti
Democratique Gabonais," the PDG,
declared itself the ally of any
democratic organization that stood
for African unity and independence.
In late November Sekou Toure made
a state visit to Ghana, where he
and President Kwame
Nkrumah announced plans
for a Ghana-Guinea union, which was
officially established in May 1959
as the Union of Independent
African States.
The new union helped bridge the
Francophone-Anglophone divide
that had long plagued
pan-African aspirants.
After obtaining political
independence, Mali joined the union
in July 1961, whereupon
it was renamed
"The Union of African States."
The charter expressed the hope that
the union would serve as the nucleus
of the United States of Africa.
Guinea's vision of a broad
transnational federation
of equal states that
transcended colonial
and linguistic boundaries
encapsulated what Meredith Turetta
[assumed spelling]
has termed, quote,
'an extra metropolitan alliance that
has a global self-centered alliance
that deliberately bypassed
inclusion in or collaboration
with metropolitan political
institutions and frameworks.'
Several of the extra
metropolitan initiatives
that influenced Guinea's political
development predated World War II.
Five pan-African congresses had
convened between 1919 and 1945,
each including representatives
from a number of African countries
and territories, and
from the Diaspora.
Finding common cause in their
conditions, the delegates pledged
to work for racial equality,
human rights, economic justice,
and self-government in
Africa, the Caribbean,
and elsewhere in the Diaspora.
The Afro-Asian Conference
that assembled in Bandung,
Indonesia in April 1955,
marked a dramatic expansion
of the solidarity networked
the global self beyond the
African Diaspora.
Representatives from 29 Asian and
African states and territories
in a number of liberation movements,
met to develop a political
alternative
to the postwar world envisioned
by the old imperial and
new colonial powers.
The conference's final
resolution championed human rights
and political self-determination,
promoted economic
and cultural collaboration with
the global South, called for an end
to racial discrimination,
colonialism and imperialism,
and supported the freedom
and independence
of all subjugated peoples.
Christopher Lee and the contributors
to his recent edited collection
reevaluated the significance
of Bandung by departing from
scholars' longstanding focus
on the metropol colony nexus,
and by highlighting new forms
of political community
beyond the nation state.
'And Bandung,' notes
historian, Vijay Prashad, quote,
'the colonized world had now emerged
to claim its space in world affairs,
not just as an adjunct of the first
or second worlds, but as a player
in its own rite,' unquote.
The term 'third world,' first
used in 1952, came into its own
at Bandung, where participants
sought a third way
to distinguish the global South
from the first and second worlds
of the Cold War superpowers.
The Non-Aligned Movement, founded
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1961,
included many bonded participants,
and it was notable for its refusal
to take sides in the Cold War.
In the aftermath of Bandung,
important new associations
were established
that encouraged solidarity
among countries
that were neither the
first nor second worlds.
The Afro-Asian People Solidarity
Organization, founded in Cairo,
Egypt in 1957, comprised
political, cultural,
and civil society organizations,
rather than governments.
At the Tri-Continental
Conference, convened in Havana,
Cuba in January 1966, the
organization was expanded
to include Latin American nations,
and became the Organization
of Solidarity with the peoples of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
The new organization pledged
to support national liberation
and economic development
on three continents.
Meanwhile, African
governments continued to push
for transnational solidarity
and action.
The Conference of Independent
African States convened in Dakar,
Ghana in April 1958, and was
attended by representatives
of Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia,
Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia,
and the United Arab Republic, which
was a union of Egypt and Syria.
The leaders pledged to
assist African colonies
in attaining self-government.
Frustrated at the failure
of these leaders
to commit the necessary
human and material resources,
Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah,
Guinea's Sekou Toure,
and other nationalist leaders
convened the All African People's
Conference in Accra
in December 1958.
Unlike the April conference, which
had assembled only heads of state
in government, the December
gathering brought together
representatives of more than 100
political parties, trade unions,
women's, youth, and
students' organizations,
and liberation movements
from across the continent.
They declared their support for
African independent struggles,
their determination to fight
racialism and tribalism,
and their desire to work for the
ultimate achievement of a union
or commonwealth of African states.
The All African Peoples
Conference was followed by a Summit
of African States in Casa
Blanca, Morocco, in January 1961,
which included many
of the same nations.
The Casa Blanca group was central to
the organization of African Unity,
founded in Aza Abababa
[phonetic], Ethiopia in May 1963,
with 32 member governments.
Guinea was at the forefront
of African states territories
and political movements
that in Terreta's [phonetic] words
considered Afro-Asian solidarity,
Non-Alignment, and political,
cultural, and economic rupture
with colonial powers to be the basis
of an anti-colonial nationalism
that would open pathways to a new
extra metropolitan federation.
Indeed those activists who strove
to establish a United States
of Africa viewed territorial
independence not as an obstacle,
but as the prerequisite to inclusion
in a larger Pan-African framework.
To conclude, rather than abandoning
federalism with their no vote
in September 1958, Guinean
political thinkers and activists
who rejected the constitutional
project confronted the political
reality that metropolitan friends
would never tolerate the grand
multinational community
composed of free and equal states
that Sekou Toure and
others envisioned.
Instead, it would thwart the
establishment of federations
that were not under its control.
Therefore, political independence,
even on a territorial basis was the
precondition for alternative visions
of federalism that
were Africa centered,
rather than focused on the metropol.
The outcome of these efforts, most
ending in disappointment or failure,
was the product of complex
causes, both internal
and external to the alliances.
This topic, however, is
one for a different day."
Thank you very much.
[ Applause ]
>> So we will take
questions, will we not?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes, we will.
>> If you have a question,
raise your hand
so that you could get microphone,
and when you get the microphone,
please introduce yourself
before -- yes, go.
>> Thank you very much.
[Inaudible] of the
decolonization seminar.
I wonder if you could -- so
it was a fascinating talk,
thank you very much.
I wonder if you could say
something about the nature
of the electorate at this period.
What was striking, of course, of
your picture was a woman voting.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes.
>> And I'm wondering whether
this is universal suffrage
or what exactly the electorate
looks like at this point.
Afterward in France women had gotten
to vote I think in the 1940s --
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes.
>> -- if I'm not mistaken.
And I'm wondering what it looks
like in these French
colonies in this period.
So if you could say something
about the constituencies,
that would be good.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Okay.
>> Thanks.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Thank you; thank you.
That's a great question.
Right after World War II when
France had an earlier constitution,
suffrage in the overseas
territories was extremely limited.
It was limited to chiefs, certain
notables, World War II veterans,
and some highly-educated elite.
There was a constant struggle to
increase the range of suffrage.
And this was a battle that
was fought in the streets;
lots and lots of demonstrations,
lots of upheaval
from the grassroots in
order to obtain that.
And the arguments that were
made for universal suffrage,
as well as equal rights for
workers in overseas territories,
for veterans in overseas territories
was based on the notion that now
that everyone is a citizen
in the 1946 constitution,
the overseas citizens
should be treated
like those in metropolitan France.
And Frederick Cooper has done
amazing work on this in regard
to the labor question, and
Myron Echenberg has taken
up that question for veterans.
So by 1956 that had actually come to
pass, there was universal suffrage.
And this was critical in Guinea,
because Guinea had really mobilized
people down to the grassroots,
and women had played a major
role in mobilization in Guinea,
which was fairly unusual, compared
to the other French West
African territories.
And that effort was key in bringing
out the no vote in the referendum.
Also, Guinea and the other states
in French Western Equatorial Africa,
the territories, had obtained
local self-government in 1957.
And one of the first things the
local government of Guinea did
in '57 was abolish the
colonial chieftaincy.
That was the only territory
that did that.
The chiefs had a stronghold
in the rural areas,
and they had been thwarting
the Guinean branch
of the RDA for many years.
So in abolishing the
canton chieftaincy,
the RDA essentially had
free reign to mobilize.
But indeed, women were able to
vote in the 1958 referendum.
Thank you.
>> Question over here?
>> Thank you.
I'm Dave Rubinowitz
[phonetic], and I was wondering,
did Eisenhower make
any public statements
about the results of the referendum?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Oh,
that's an interesting question.
I have not explored that personally.
There may be someone -- now
Mary McDonald is saying no.
Do you want to answer that for me?
[Laughs] She's much
more of a specialist
in the foreign policy
aspect of this.
Do -- yes.
>> I'm just nodding -
>> Introduce yourself.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Yes; introduce yourself.
[Laughs]
>> Sorry, I'm Mary
McDonald, [inaudible],
and I actually have looked at
the American side of this story,
and I saw no signs of a public
statement from Eisenhower,
or from any of the
American officials
about the referendum itself.
Remember, as Betsy said, most
of the referendum votes ratified
the new French constitution,
and the issues from the
point of view of Eisenhower
and of the American government
were far larger than any interest
in Guinea, as a course -- and
in that they were also picking
up the line that was
being fed them by France.
All right; this was a
way to stabilize France,
and to stabilize it under
de Gaulle's control.
And the little concerns
of this little place
in West Africa really didn't
enter into their calculus
at all for a few months anyway.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Right.
And the United States was
delayed in recognizing Guinea
because France told them not to.
So it was a delayed
recognition; yes.
[Laughter] All right;
let's celebrate.
[Laughs] October 2nd, 1958.
>> [Inaudible Comment], for those
who want to delay [inaudible].
Is there --
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Oh, back there.
Oh, Frank.
>> Oh, yes.
He's back there.
>> Hey. I really liked your
talk, particularly because you --
>> Frank, introduce yourself.
>> Yes; I'm Frank.
I'm a part of the Decolonization
Seminar.
So I really liked your talk,
particularly because you look
at Cooper and you say, "Yes, you
have imagined political futures."
But there is a political
reality there,
an international political
reality, domestic political reality,
and you have to take
that into account.
I mean, I don't really
agree on Eisenhower,
but we still have a chance to
talk about this afterwards.
[Laughter] What I was wondering,
though, you seem to suggest
that 2 days' commitment to
Pan-Africanism wasn't tactical,
it was -- that it was
a genuine commitment
to building a different
type of construction,
which is very different from what
I got at least, I don't know,
maybe I'm wrong, but what I got
from the literature stating
things along the lines of, "Oh,
he wasn't really interested in
African unity; it was merely a ploy
to annoy the French,"
which is also what he says
to French representatives, he says,
"This is merely a piece of paper.
If you want to sign an agreement,
I will throw this paper out."
So I was just wondering if
you could expand on Toure's --
well on his commitment
to Pan-Africanism.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes.
>> Did he have an ideological
commitment to it,
or was it merely a tactical move?
Thank you.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Thank you.
Thank you.
That's an excellent question.
Well, I believe that
the evidence shows
that he really did
have a commitment,
and the commitment predated
French isolation of Guinea,
that he was a committed
federalist throughout the period
of the French West African
Federation, and was very aware
of the dangers of balkanization
as described
by Sangor [phonetic] and others.
And as for him saying -- I hadn't
heard that that he had said,
"You know, this is
just a piece of paper.
I'll throw it out if
France will help me."
That reminds me a little bit of
what state department officials said
of Patrice Lumumba of the Congo
after he visited that, you know,
he would -- you know, he seemed
to be very friendly to them,
and then once he left
he would be, you know,
spouting his anti-colonial
rhetoric, and, you know,
seemed very frightening to them.
And they finally determined
that he wasn't to be trusted,
he was a stooge of
Moscow, and helped to --
you know, the CIA helped
to assassinate him.
But I think that, you
know, a part of the culture
of the African leaders at the
time was to say, you know,
we want to be your friend,
but we want to be friends
of other people too.
And they didn't see those
things are mutually exclusive.
But the United States certainly
for its part was determined
that people had to choose sides.
If you're not with
us, you're against us.
You know, what's this
Non-Aligned Movement?
They must really be
aligned to the Soviet Union
if they're not willing to, you know,
embrace us totally and uniquely.
So I don't think that, you know,
the State Department's assessment
of him is one that
I would accept, yes.
Thank you.
>> Over there.
>> Hi, thanks so much for
your fascinating talk.
I'm Liz Finke.
I had a question about
putting Sekou Toure's decision
in the '58 vote more in the
context of kind of the evolution
of his political thoughts
since the passing
of the [inaudible] the
reforms that universal suffrage
and the semiautonomous governments.
One of the fascinating things
that I found was seeing Sekou Toure
really having very strong statements
of approval about [inaudible],
which was later the major act
that got condemned by Sangor
and others as balkanization.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Right.
>> And how kind of
late that happened.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes.
>> And I was wondering how you'd --
if you could talk more
about not just the analysis
of the draft constitution
when you could read it,
but that kind of evolution of
evaluating those possibilities.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Okay, okay, thank you.
Yes; I mean, I'm glad
you brought that up,
because while Sekou
Toure was viewed --
especially after 1958 after the
referendum, was viewed by the West
as being a real radical,
within Guinea he was viewed
as being very mainstream
and centrist.
And one of the things
that I argue in my books
about the Guinean Nationalist
Movement was
that Sekou Toure was pushed to the
no position by a lot of segments
in the grassroots, women's youth,
and civil society organizations,
teachers, that he was much
more willing to seek compromise
and accommodation with France
than many of his constituents.
And that there were other political
parties in Guinea, minority parties
for sure, but that had already
embraced the no vote before he did.
And if one's going to say that,
you know, he's a political being
and he's a strategist,
it was actually I think
in embracing the no vote feeling
that he was behind the curve,
and that if he was going to be where
the people were, he needed to get
out front and endorse it.
And he didn't officially do that
until the middle of September.
And this was at the Guinean
RDA's Conference 2 weeks before
the referendum.
So he kept hinting that, you
know, "It will be a no vote,
unless you do these things
to the constitution."
But the position was
not taken officially
until after the conference when
the conference voted no, and then,
you know, he kind of
got on the bandwagon.
So I think that if de Gaulle
had been more accommodating,
Guinea wouldn't have voted no.
And that the la cadre
[phonetic] compromises, you know,
might have played out a bit
longer; that I don't think
that he was someone who had always
been as radical as he later became.
Thank you.
[ Silence ]
[Laughs] Jason?
>> I wonder -- I'm curious
about the Bandung conference.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Yes.
>> Christopher Lee was actually a
scholar here at the Kluge Center --
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Oh, okay.
>> -- a couple years ago, so it sort
of rings some familiarity with me.
But I wonder if you
could talk a little bit
about were there actually
shared common values
and interest among all these diverse
states, or was it merely a chance
for those who had been colonized and
oppressed to sort of get together
and find some commonality?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Right.
>> And spinning that forward, you
know, using my limited knowledge
in this respect, it seems so hard
and farfetched to imagine Egypt,
Indonesia, and West Africa at
a conference today similarly.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: I know.
I know.
>> So what happened?
I mean, was there anything
that really held these
countries together,
or was it we were colonized,
we had a conference
and then we go our separate ways?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Thank you; good question.
Well, nothing brings people
together more than a common enemy.
And many of those countries
were still colonized,
or at least territories on
some of the continents were.
So certainly in Africa most
of the territories were
still under colonial rule.
So that was a real point of unity,
emancipation from colonial rule
and anti-colonialism, and
anti-imperialism, and anti-racism.
And all of those countries had
suffered from those things.
And, you know, the question
that I said needs to be left
for another day is why these
associations, alliances,
attempts at extra metropolitan
federations failed is
that once the common
enemy is no longer there,
the differences really emerge.
And it's much harder to keep
groups together after that.
So, you know, that's -- you know,
we've seen that in things like,
you know, South Africa, you know,
once apartheid is gone then
there are these other factors
to contend with, and they're much
more difficult ones to approach.
So I think that's kind
of the simple answer,
that there was a commonality,
it was enough to bring these groups
together, but then when the sort
of nuts and bolts reality
of establishing workable
political systems, you know,
the OAU wasn't able to do it.
The African Union may be stronger,
but has deep problems as well,
you know, that this is
still an ongoing issue.
Thank you.
>> Yes.
>> James Sang [phonetic].
This shows you how little
I know about Africa.
What was the nature of French
influence in the administrative life
of Guinea, i.e., what fraction
of the civil servants were contract
employees from France, and so on;
because about 2 years ago there was
a talk on this subject and pointing
out that many of the English African
countries a substantial fraction
of the military, for example, was
headed by English contract people.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Right.
>> And it also applied to France.
So was there any difference, for
example, in the other French --
from Guinea and the other French
colonies, and what fraction,
as I said, of the civil servants
were French contract employees?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Okay, thank you.
That's a good question.
I can't give you facts
and figures on that,
but I can give you some
sort of general impressions.
Guinea was not considered a
very important colony to France.
Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire
were much more important,
and there were far larger number of
metropolitan French citizens living
in those territories, and had
been for a long, long time;
so a lot more French businessmen,
professionals, et cetera.
And such remained the case in Cote
d'Ivoire after independence as well.
Thousands and thousands of
French citizens continued
to live there, work there.
In Guinea it would really
just have been the top tier
of the administration, the
governor, the district officers,
they were called "[speaks French]."
Beneath those district officers were
canton chiefs who were Africans,
and beneath them the village
chiefs, and so they were all part
of the colonial administration.
So it was, you know, a way of ruling
territories in the cheap to have,
you know, as few Europeans
on the spot as possible
because they also had expenses of
families and that sort of thing.
So it was primarily
an administration run
by Africans with French at the top.
Similarly, the French Colonial
Army, European officers,
but mostly African troops.
African troops were
fighting the wars.
So I can't give you numbers on
that, but there were fewer French
in Guinea than there were elsewhere;
some businessmen but not many.
>> Thanks.
My name is Jeff Burn.
I'm part of the seminar and I teach
at the University of
British Columbia.
Thanks for the talk, and I'm a big
fan of your written work as well.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Thank you.
>> But you spoke of Bandung
and the Non-Alignment Movement
and these sorts of movements
as I think you described them
as extra metropolitan
federalisms, or federal movements.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Alliances; yes.
>> Yes; because I wanted
to say that I would suggest
that they are emphatically
anti-nonfederal movements,
that they glorified
celebration, national sovereignty
in the postcolonial domain.
They talk about -- if you
look at what they say,
they talk about human
rights and issues
that subvert national sovereignty
in the imperial paradigm,
but completely the opposite
in the post-imperial paradigm
where it's all about noninterference
in international affairs
and so forth.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Right, right, right.
>> So I'd say in some ways -- and
well I wonder what you would think
about that, and also curious
about in the Guinean context
specifically what Sekou Toure
and other Guinean political leaders
and political thinkers are saying
about Bandung and Non-Alignment, and
perhaps specifically how it relates
to Pan-Africanism, which seems
to me has to be the one movement
that does have -- perhaps
unsuccessfully,
but there's a strong
federalist strain to it.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Okay, thank you.
>> Thanks.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Good question; thank you.
And I'm not going to keep
looking in your direction
because it's the light
is right there.
[Laughs] So excuse me, I'm
going to look this way.
Thank you.
Yes; I think some of
it might have to do
with sort of the periodization.
I think in the early years it
was safe to continue to talk
about the kinds of issues
that were uniting the groups.
The problem became once the
countries became independent,
and they began to prize their
individual state sovereignty,
national identity, the
principle of noninterference
in the internal affairs
of other countries.
And I think this really came
out with the establishment
of the Organization of African Unity
in 1963, where the charter indicated
that they would respect
colonial boundaries.
And in some ways that was an
attempt to say, "Look, it's a mess,
but imagine the mess
if we allow all kinds
of secessionist [phonetic]
movements, different ethnic groups
to begin to hive off
parts of the territory.
And so that was kind of
at least the rationale.
But there was also clearly the
sort of personal political interest
of the leaders, who wanted to
be heads of their nation states.
And if they were in
some large federation,
somebody was going to lose power.
And, you know, it should
be the other guy, not me.
And so this is where the
things began to break
down in the concrete reality
of okay, now we're moving
from the theoretical, "We're all
against racialism colonialism,
and imperialism.
We all want national liberation
for subjugated peoples.
Now we have to deal
with the reality."
And that's when things
did begin to fall apart.
And so that was, you
know, [inaudible],
"I'm leaving this for another day."
So that was in the idea
frame that there --
I think there was a belief that
maybe they could have some kind
of United States of Africa.
I think the people who
called for that were sincere
in their aspirations, but they all
did it in being able to find a way
to do it, not that anyone anywhere
else in the world has found.
I mean, look at the
European Union right now,
[laughs] you know,
having some problems.
So yes; so I don't know
if that really answers it.
I guess I sidestepped it a little
bit, but I think that, you know,
it's the difference between the
theory before they have to deal
with the harsh realities.
>> [Inaudible] one more?
>> I'm curious to know more
about female political
participation in Guinea.
Could you talk a little more
about why it was distinct,
compared to other countries
in the region,
and also what women's political
mobilization activity looked
like in this referendum?
>> Elizabeth Schmidt:
Okay; sure, okay.
Well, in the beginning it did
not appear that Guinea was going
to be any different than the other
French West African territories
in terms of women's participation.
When the Guinean branch of
the RDA was founded in 1947,
there were very few women members.
The men at the top said,
"Oh, no, this isn't good.
We should have a women's committee."
And so that was established,
and it was led
by the wives of the important men.
And that didn't really go anywhere.
But what happened in Guinea was
that during the general strike
in French West Africa in 1953,
and to some extent the French
West African Railway Strike,
which had preceded
that in 1947-1948,
women had played a major role
in sustaining the communities,
in sustaining the strikers,
mobilizing food resources,
using their market networks,
using women's associations
to communicate messages.
And Sekou Toure and some
of the other male leaders
were actually fairly astute,
and they said, "My gosh,
look at these women.
I mean, they are really
pulling this off.
We need to immobilize
them into the RDA."
And so they began to make explicit
appeals to women, based on issues
that they felt were
of concern to women.
And I'll explain some
of those in a second.
But women then picked up on that and
began to introduce their own ideas
to the RDA, and the RDA responded.
And I should say, this
isn't any different
from the way the Guinean RDA
responded to military veterans
and trade unionists,
that essentially I argued
that they were successful,
the Guinean RDA,
because they mobilized people
into the political party
who were already mobilized against
the state on their own issues.
And they just began to
respond more to those issues.
So with women it was things
like more healthcare, you know,
more clinics, more
dispensaries, more maternity wards,
better roads to market,
more marketplaces.
Market women were huge
in French West Africa.
In Connickery they began to put
out water spickets on the corners
of the capital -- streets
in the capital.
And we may say, "Well,
what's the big deal?"
Well, one of the most time-consuming
tasks women had was getting water
every day.
And if it wasn't the women
themselves, it was their daughters
who had to go out and get bucket,
after bucket, after bucket of water.
And when the spickets were there,
not only was their labor reduced,
but then the girls were
free to go to school.
And so the women said, "And our
daughters will now be educated."
And so the RDA was doing these kinds
of really important grassroots
efforts knowing which ones appealed
to women, and telling them, "Look,
this is what the party
can do for you."
And so once the women got involved,
the ones who were most involved were
actually not the western educated
elites, the teachers,
the midwives, the nurses,
but rather were the market
women, the cloth dyers,
the people who often didn't
have formal schooling.
And they were the ones whose
needs were really being met.
And they mobilized by singing --
composing songs, which they sang,
and they would go all over
the capital riding the taxi,
singing these songs that were
highly political and really,
really interesting songs to sort
of speak to what the RDA was doing,
and criticizing the rival parties
that were the government parties.
And they used the market
networks to mobilize
so the market women they had
the, you know, person in charge
of each section, and they would
spread the word to the women
who were selling that
particular kind of produce,
and they would spread
it to their customers.
And they acted as sentinels, and
messengers, and that sort of thing.
And some of the women I interviewed
said, "You know, one of the things
that the RDA did for us
that we thought was just
incredible was they treated us
as if we were equal to men.
And we were allowed to go and
mobilize around the country,
and we spoke to mixed
crowds of people."
And that was really unusual.
And so I guess I'd say some
of it was just astute leaders
recognizing what women were doing,
what appealed to women, and saying,
"Hey, this is half the population.
We need to sort of
speak to them," so.
>> Well, thank you very much.
>> Elizabeth Schmidt: Thank you.
Thank you.
>> This has been a presentation
of the Library of Congress.
Visit us at loc.gov.