>> Announcer: From the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. [ Silence ] >> Jason Steinhauer: So it is my great privilege to welcome you to the Library of Congress for Scholarfest. Hopefully many of you participated and sat in on our morning sessions from 9 until 10:30. Welcome to Sessions number 2, from 11 to 12:20. Today's event is a celebration of 15 years of outstanding scholarship at the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. Over the past two days, we have welcomed back more than 100 of our outstanding scholars, 70 as speakers, and dozens more as guests, and we are so grateful that they have taken time to be with us today, and we are so grateful that you have taken time to be with us today to celebrate 15 years and to look forward to the next 15 years and beyond. Today we are showcasing the great minds, ideas, and the work of our scholars who have been in residence at the Kluge Center through this first-ever Scholarfest. AS you have seen, it is a series of 10-minute lightening conversations, you've heard of lightening talks, well these are lightening conversations, pairings of scholars speaking across generations on topics that are interdisciplinary, interrelated, sometimes not related, and the topics have been chosen by the scholars themselves. So we have put them in touch with each other by e-mail in advance of the day, and they have worked on these topics among themselves. So in terms of the format, we'll have five lightening conversations in this session, ten minutes each, after which we will have a Q&A with the audience. And so I hope all of you have received an index card and a golf pencil, and so if a scholar, during the course of his or her conversation, says something of interest to you or you want to followup with a question, or you just want to respond to that, please make a note on the index card or in your program, and during the Q&A, you can address your question to the specific scholar or scholars. Bios of all of the speakers are in your programs. We have asked these scholars, when they take the stage, to launch right into the conversation, they will not be introducing themselves or telling you about their work, so that is in the program, and they are listed in the program in order of their conversation. Finally, I just want to reiterate, reiterate again our thanks to you for being with us today, our thanks to you for joining us in this experiment, if you will, of a new type of format, and we'd love to hear your feedback on this event, after it concludes. We'd also love for you to stay in touch with us to learn about future events at the Kluge Center, as well as opportunities for you to conduct your own research at the Kluge Center, so please do sign our e-mail list on the way out to get future updates from us. I think those are all the announcements that I'm required to make. I'm going to now kick us off with Scholarfest, Session number 4, featuring Kissinger Chairs who have been in resident at the Kluge Center, and fellows who are working on related topics who have been in residence at the Kluge Center, and I invite our first pair, Jim Goldgeier and Mario, to take the stage. [ Applause ] >> Jim Goldgeier: I'm Jim Goldgeier from American University. >> Mario del Pero: And I'm Mario del Pero from [inaudible]. >> Jim Goldgeier: And I just learned that this was set up across generations, so I'm the old guy on this [laughter] conversation. We're talking about war and peace and the International Order, and I just turn to my colleague, Mario here, to ask what keeps you up at night as you think about this subject? >> Mario del Pero: Well I have a tendency to oversleep, so... [laughter], but when it comes to war and peace, there are, I mean, several issues I have been, you know, thinking about. Someone earlier on was referring to the messiness of history, history's messy, complex, contradictory, and there are a couple of contradictions I see now when we look at the many wars. We have been, we, the EuroAtlantic [phonetic] group has been waging in the past few decades. Let me, very briefly, mention two contradictions which don't keep me up at night, but concern and worry me a, a lot. The first one is the connection between democracy and, and war. Democracies at war, they face many, many constraints that limit their ability to wage a, a war. They have to reduce casualties almost to zero, they have to make wars almost invisible, the horrors of war being more and more unacceptable, and they have to consider collateral damage and try to limit civilian causalities on the other side. These democratic constraints, paradoxically, however, tend to make these wars less and less democratic. War, wars have to be...invisible, as I said. They tend to be low intensity, and they tend to be almost perennial, perpetual. And wars are less and less accountable, the way in which wars are waged, they are outsourced and so forth and so on. That's the first contradiction. And the second, and then I stop, is that wars have been used, historically, to reorder the international system, to produce a new order. Whereas, nowadays, this kind of perennial, invisible, as I say, low-intensity wars, they seem to me to [inaudible] the International order, or, at best, to contain these order. They are unable to produce a new order. >> Jim Goldgeier: So I have two concerns about the International Order. One is just how much harder it is for the United States to lead, United States still is the leading global power, but when I think back to the mid 90's, I worked in the government on Russia issues in the mid 90's, it was very different. The government of Boris Yeltsin was trying to look for ways to integrate into the west, was looking to the west for advice on democracy and market economy. Russia's very different today, and only one of a number of countries challenging the United States' vision of an international order, China and South China Sea, Russia, of course, we've seen the invasion in Ukraine, Iran, whether there's a nuclear deal or not, is challenging the U.S. vision of the international order. And so, that greatly concerns me, and then the second part that concerns me is the capacity of traditional U.S. allies. Japan, of course, has struggled economically for the last two decades, and Europe, right now, very inwardly focused, I'd be interested in your thoughts Europe as a partner for the United States, because we see the complexities of what's going on in the EU, and, of course, from the standpoint of traditional allies, the United Kingdom, which has long been the leading global ally of the United States, is, is going to have a decreasing capacity to work with the United States globally, given its domestic challenges and its declining military budget. >> Mario del Pero: Well, when I look at Europe, I see several problems. Again, down to the essential, I think we have a potential hegemony, a natural hegemony, which is Germany, unable to do hegemony, unable to, to play the hegemonic role that history, nowadays, assigns to it. I also see, and it's fairly paradoxical, a lot of ideology going on, for example, in the way the Greek crisis is, is managed. And I, when I say ideologies, this propensity to stick to old orthodox's, whereas the new situation and the dramatic past 2008 recession, would call for, you know, new pragmatic ways of thinking. Now as Europe more and more divided, and these divisions within Europe, they have a huge impact on the transatlantic relations, on the relationship with the U.S., and, therefore, on the liberal order you were referring to. So Europe divided is a Europe which is unable to fulfill its historical role within such order, and we see that over Ukraine, nowadays. There is a lot of, you know, cosmetics in this kind of Transatlantic unity and the divisions, the officials, within Europe, on that are very, very strong, as a matter of fact, Putin was in Milan two days ago, and we was welcomed almost as a star, so. >> Jim Goldgeier: Well we also have the problem, of course domestically. I mean, here in the United States, I mean one of the big challenges to the U.S. ability to, to maintain its leadership role, and here we are on Capitol Hill with the dysfunctionality that we've seen in the Congress and between Congress and the Executive Branch on really foraging ahead, hopefully for those of us who are free traders, the House vote, will vote today to provide President Obama with fast-track authority and we'll actually see movement on a major issue that will be a sign, at least, that the United States can still play that major role in the world, even with the domestic divisions. But, it also has, poses a challenge as we think about these issues of war and peace and the, and the international order for...for our ability to make this claim that this is a, you know, the democratic system is a system that countries should wish to follow. If we're unable to, to achieve our goals domestically, if Europeans are having a hard time moving forward with policies because of dysfunctionality domestically, it makes it harder to make the claim to other countries around the world that they should be following this path, and I think, you know, from a U.S. standpoint, it's one of the real legacies of the financial crisis as well. Again, going back to the 90's, United States sort of, you know, was out there in the world saying, this is the, the way to do market economics, and it's hard to make a claim out there in the world that we have a monopoly on an understanding of the proper way to promote a market economy. >> Mario del Pero: Now you mentioned trade, which is, again, extremely problematic. I believe you need transparence in order to build the necessary consensus on, on such a policy, and that transparence has been kind of missing in the entire Transatlantic dialogue, recent Transatlantic dialogue, on trade, and this leads me back to the question of how to do hegemony. I mean, the U.S. is still the hegemonic actor, but the hegemonic actor, in a, when it, when it is a democracy, it addresses two publics, and it needs to build a dual consensus, one domestic, one international. It seems to me that making these two consensuses complimentary, has been quite difficult for the U.S. You build consensus for a proactive internationalist policy within the U.S., where you build a domestic consensus often through a kind of nationalist discourse, which is more and more rejected outside the U.S., and that's, I think, one of the major problems for the U.S. and Germany, and, again, for the International Liberal Order, which is built around, and on that of Germany. >> Jim Goldgeier: Well I think part of it is for the United States, in terms of building a consensus internationally, is that it's such a new period for the United States, for policymakers going into. When we think about the Cold War period, the United States dominated the, the so-called free world in terms of, in terms of policy. Again, the aftermath of the, of the Cold War, the United State's ability to dominate others was, was just extraordinary. The United States can't do that anymore. Countries are going to push back, and I think it's, it's, it's a really new terrain for U.S. policymakers going into. They haven't experienced it before, it requires a lot of listening to other countries and getting, getting a better understanding of, of what, how the Chinese and the Indians and the Brazilians and the Russians and the Turks and Indonesians, and others, view their interests, and trying to forge common approaches to, to major global challenges, I just think it's a very different world for U.S. policymakers moving into and, and I think we've seen the struggle in the United States as we've tried to, tried to go into this new world. >> Mario del Pero: Well, true, at the same time, there are some continuities. Every year the German marshall found, runs this huge poll called Transatlantic Trends, mainly how Europe and European countries view the U.S., and, and you see there is still a desire for America, which was reflected in the huge popularity of Barack Obama, still very, very high in the U.S., in Europe. So, yes and no on what, on your last point. >> Jim Goldgeier: Right, but I, I, I think you can, we can see the, the, that in Europe, but again, Europe's capacity is diminishing. [Applause] >> Benjamin Fordham: So anyway, I was saying that the work that I did when I was here at the Kluge Center, unlike my other work, had focused on the period before 1914, and if you think about current world order in the perspective of what things looked like before 1914, the current world order for all of its problem, and there are many, actually doesn't look that bad! U.S. foreign policymakers, before 1914, expected to have hostile relations with other developed states, because they were planning to exclude their products from U.S. markets, and also to try to exclude them as much as possible from Latin America, and perhaps from parts of East Asia as well. And with those kind of uncooperative premises, barely any other cooperation was possible, and they didn't expect to have it. So, the post '45 period looks a little better. I think there are at least some opportunities for other states who want to participate in world order, rising powers like India and China, to gain something from their participation. They don't have to look to carve out their own regional sort of zone of control or empire or anything like that. >> Johanna Bockman: Yeah, I mean it's really great to have this conversation, because we're really on the same, we're doing the same kind of projects, but from a very different locations. He's doing the real work of thinking about economic ideas and economic interests in the U.S., and that, that drive in U.S. foreign policy, and I'm doing economic ideas and ideas about globalization coming from the, outside of the United States. I particularly look at, when I was here at the Kluge, I did work on the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and what were there economic ideas and what where their ideas about globalization? They were very, very global. And so, also in addition to that, I was, I am looking currently at the non-aligned movement, the non-aligned movement was the group, what we call the Third World, or countries that were originally India, Egypt, the Yugoslavia, and other groups that formed in the 1950's, to try to create another economic order, the new international economic order. And this order was saying that the U.S. and the Soviet Union weren't helping us at all, we're going to invest each other, we're going to build a new economic alliances, new trade, and we're going to, we're going to build corporations together, and we're going to have, build our own markets. So I think this is an interesting thing, it kinds of goes against, and I won't know, like this, I, I was wondering, this idea that America started the idea of globalization, America started the idea of free trade and global economy, doesn't seem true. But do you see this in your work, that it's, that it's more true at your time periods? >> Benjamin Fordham: Well, I do think that many of the institutions that help to promote globalization after World War II, that the U.S. took a lead role in establishing those. I'm not sure that the, the way globalization has shaped up in the post World War II period has looked exactly the way that American policymakers envisioned it in 1945, so I wouldn't say that they, they designed it, or that it's entirely their doing, or anything like that, you know, the [inaudible] a product of a lot of give and take from different states. So... >> Johanna Bockman: But I, but I wonder though if, if the U.S. was really interested in globalization, were they interested in another form of international interaction? The reason I say this is because the U.S. imposed treaty restrictions, restrictions on trade, to all the socialist countries, and any country trading with them could not, you had to stop that trade. This ended globalization that was forming at this time. And so, there is actually, the U.S. being, maybe, possibly, from my research in the UN archives, the U.S. was the biggest obstacle to globalization, if we think about globalization as truly all countries being interlinked together. >> Benjamin Fordham: Yeah, well, that, clearly to me, U.S. didn't want globalization on any possible terms. Also, the term globalization's pretty vague, so you can talk about different kinds of globalization, and some of them, I think you'll find U.S. policymakers favoring and others they'll oppose. But, yeah, I mean, clearly they did want to exclude certain states from participating in, in the, the system, and there's, there are a pretty elaborate set of rules now for how the, the international economic system runs, and it's, it's hard for states who came late to the table, states that became independent after 1945, for example, they don't have as much say over what those rules look like, it's states who were there beforehand, and they certainly don't have as much say over it as states like the U.S. that have really big markets have. >> Johanna Bockman: Right, and I think that the, the non-aligned movement, what their, their economic ideas were that we don't have, because of colonialism, we don't have developed markets, and we would like to develop free markets, but in order to do that, you actually have to do some work. And the thing that was interesting to me was that the U.S. perspective was, let's just have a laissez faire, we'll just do this. But if you have laissez faire, you actually can't build a market. You can't, you can't actually reorient trade and create free trade. It's actually, so like, the laissez faire aspect maintains the current order that is not particularly free trade oriented and not particularly free market oriented. And so that. it's a, it's a funny contradiction, is that the non-aligned movement, and also the socialist countries, [inaudible] comes out and said, we should have real free trade, is what he said. That seems so strange to us today, right? Unusual. >> Benjamin Fordham: Yeah, well it was never free trade in everything. I mean, free trade is pretty circumscribed. [Inaudible] were the biggest problems that the international [inaudible] order today had to do with places where there isn't free trade, in, in agricultural products for example, that puts less-developed countries at a real disadvantage . And there are other areas like that, that have been sort of carved out of, of broader fabric of free trade, [inaudible] set aside. Maybe those are the areas where the biggest improvements could be made. Do you think there are recommendations from the stuff you read from the 70's and 80's that still apply, things you'd still like to see change? >> Johanna Bockman: Yeah, because one of the things is is that you see that there's a non, a lack of desire for free trade on the U.S. front, about agriculture as you just said, but also in, in the realm of financial services and intellectual property. So the funny thing is they want free trade in everything except for the things that really matter to the economy, and this goes with your research, right? That's the economic interest of the U.S. government. But also, in addition to that, some of the things that the non-aligned movement wanted was that it, is that it wanted to actually have structural adjustment of the whole world, and that that meant that industries would move out of the U.S. and our of Western Europe and out of Japan, and they would be distributed around the world, so that every country would have a strong industry, or several industries. And that this would allow for free trade to actually exist, rather than there being these powerful nodes that were controlling the whole game is what they were seeing. >> Benjamin Fordham: Yeah, well you could still have free trade with, without redistributing where all the industries are located, it's just that maybe the gains from trade would be higher to people who are in some industries more than, than others. So the system's kind of unfair, broadly speaking. >> Johanna Bockman: And so I guess they wanted equal returns from trade in some way, some, and that's what I think a lot of economists envision in some way, that assume that is the case, which is not true. >> Benjamin Fordham: Yeah. Well it is true. I mean, the, the gains from trade are unequal across countries depending on what sort of industries you have. I don't know, the, the, we need to think about realistic things that could be done around the edges of the current system, to make it more fair without trying to overturn the whole thing. I mean, because the whole thing does have some, some real value, and I wouldn't want to see that go away, I certainly wouldn't want to return to something like what existed before 1914, I know that's not what you have in mind, but are there other specific narrow things you think we could do that would make things better without having to overturn the system, or is some more fundamental kind of change required? >> Johanna Bockman: Well it's, it's, for me, I have to say that my, I think my purpose as my scholar is, because there's a whole policy, policy scholars, and that's a very important field. My field is actually to just to refind the things that have been forgotten. And that there was this...and so I sort of tried to explain, well, what is the thinking involved with, with the non-aligned movement? It isn't just that they were out of it, they were like, you know, they were, had no ideas about the economic future, and also, I think, really importantly, we often think, well the third world must have been just Marxist, and actually this is not the case. This is a, they had a very developed ideas about free trade and other things I've just said, so, I think that...my role is to describe a world that has been forgotten, and, and I cannot say if there's any way, like for example, I did work on Yugoslav worker self-management, I can't say that that would work today, but that was what was wanted in the Eastern Europe, the hottest topic in 1989 was how to have worker self-management in Eastern Europe. So that these are, it's a different project, but maybe then you, what would you say your policy suggestions are? >> Benjamin Fordham: Well, like you, I mean, my, my scholarship has mostly been about explaining why policy choices got made as opposed to which ones should have been made, though I, I do have opinions about that, I mean, I guess everybody does. What I'd really like to see are incremental changes to specific things, like agricultural tariffs could be reduced across, not only in the United States, but, but elsewhere too, and I think if we could identify specific things like that, that the possibilities for change are greater than if you imply or suggest to people you're trying to overturn the whole system, because that, that probably won't happen, but there are specific things to be done, and maybe some of the stuff that you've rediscovered could be looked at anew now that the Cold War's been over for awhile and, perhaps, some of these earlier plans don't have the scary-sounding ideological resonance that they would have had 30 years ago. >> Johanna Bockman: Yeah, that's great. Well thank you very much! [Applause] >> Balazs Szelenyi: My name is Balazs Szelenyi, I work on genocide studies. >> Klaus Larres: Hi, I'm Klaus Larres, and I'm at UNC, Chapel Hill, and I had a great time at the Kluge Center when I was here quite a few years ago. >> Balazs Szelenyi: Klaus, some would say that Reagan was responsible for defeating the Soviet Union. >> Klaus Larres: Well, as you know, Europe, Europe and America have been very close allies for quite some time. They are still very close allies, they often agree on things, but often they also disagree about important issues. One such issue is Ronald Reagan [laughter]. For, for many Americans, not in this room, but for many Americans, Ronald Reagan won the Cold War kind of singlehandedly. Most Europeans would say that this is utter nonsense. Being a good European, I have to agree with that. What really was decisive from the end of the Cold War, I believe, was the policy of [inaudible] between the West and the Soviet Union, which began in the 60's, but which came to full fruition in the 1970's and 1980's. It undermined the Soviet grip on their own population of the Eastern European...grip on the own population. Then, it softened them up, if you like, by western intellectual ideas. Then, of course, the disastrous economic situation in the Soviet Union was decisive, and also that the [inaudible] movement from below, which made life very difficult for the governments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Then, of course, Ronald Reagan's rearmament in the early 1980's did put additional economic pressure on the Soviet Union. So it did help, definitely, but I wouldn't say it was decisive. I think what was much more decisive, regarding Ronald Reagan, was his insight that, as Margaret Thatcher said, you can actually do business with Mikhail Gorbachev, you can actually negotiate with him and have relations of engagement with that Soviet leader. I think that actually is a Ronald Reagan's real credit, which should be given for ending, or helping to end, the Cold War. >> Balazs Szelenyi: So we're, we're talking about world disorder, world order, leadership styles, when we have a crisis, do we engage it, do we boycott it, do we intervene, or do we have a, a different form of engagement? And, and collapse of the Soviet Union was one such issue. The other issues, of course, is, is what's happening now in the Soviet Union, if there's any place in, in the world that's causing a lot of world disorder, it's obviously what's happening in the Ukraine. And, and let's visit this issue. The, the, the, some would say that what's happening in the Ukraine is not too dissimilar to what happened in Europe in 1919, when you saw the, in 1919, the collapse of the German empire and the creation of German ethnic minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and the rise in Germany, over, over political right-wing extreme nationalists party, that sold itself as a liberator of the Germans who were being oppressed abroad. You have similar issues today with, with Russia, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the creation of Russian minorities in Ukraine, Belarus, Baltic, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. The, the issue is what is the best way now to kind of...put, put out the fire? Is, is the, is the best way to put out the fire, in, in, in the Ukraine now, to do what Reagan did? Let's, let's scare them, let's build bombs, let's boycott them? Or is there, is there a different type of leadership style that, that may resolve this conflict? >> Klaus Larres: Yeah, thank you. Of course there are plenty of Russian ethnic minorities in Ukraine, of course, but also in all over the Eastern, former Eastern bloc like the Baltic. That, that is an important issue, but I don't think it's the decisive issue. What Putin seems to have in mind, and it's, of course, guess work [phonetic] and the least resort, but what he seems to have in mind is the recreation of a Great Russian, and influential sphere of influence around Russia. I don't think he wishes to recreate the Soviet Union, but he certainly wants to create Russia as a real global player, and, of course, himself as a global statesman, and in Italy he seems to have succeeded as we heard, but in many countries he hasn't. They have chucked him out of the G8 as you know, now it's only the G7, and at the moment, we see a policy of toughness, of sanctions against Russia, and a much more cautious policy of reengagement with Russia, and here we, again, have, perhaps, a difference between a European and an American approach. I think the American approach of the current administration and, particularly, also the many members of Congress, is to be tough, to be tougher than most Europeans would sign up to, including the German Chancellor, Merkel. While so far transatlantic unity has been maintained, it is a little shaky, and recently there were reports that the G7 meeting was actually successful because that unity could be maintained, and that, of course, tells you how shaky it is. And I think it goes back to that policy of [inaudible] I mentioned before. The Europeans, particularly the Germans, feel one has to engage Russia. No one approves of the annexation of Crimea, but it's happening in Eastern Ukraine, its aggression, it's terrible, but we still have to deal with it. And to use just toughness, just sanctions alone is not sufficient. You have to reengage with Russia, including with a man such as Putin. That seems to be the only way forward, to have both sanctions and continue the sanctions, but also start with a policy, restart a policy, of engagement. We have to ask ourselves, chucking out Russia from the G8, apart from symbolism, what was the point of that? If Putin had been there in that nice, little town in Bavaria, that cozy get-together we saw a few days ago, people could have talked to him, could have put additional pressure on him. Putin wasn't there, what's the point of that? You know, it's just symbolic, it doesn't help to actually talk to each other, to resolve an international crisis. So I think, you know, both sanctions, the continuation of sanctions, and an enhanced policy of reengagement with Russia would be the solution for the current crisis. It probably will still take a few, couple of years I would say. >> Balazs Szelenyi: So we're, we're talking about [inaudible] the role of Germany and, and it's leadership role in Europe, as well as what's happening, the crisis in, in Russia, and I want to get to an unusual turn of events that has happened, which probably many couldn't have predicted 40 years ago, the rise of kind of the ultra extreme right-wing nationalism in, in France. We've all followed what's, what's been happening there, and this kind of exclusive, blood-based nationalism against immigrants, and this hostile anti-Muslim rhetoric that's coming out of there. And ironically, what's, what, this is paralleled by kind of Germany emerging as almost like a moral leader in, in how to deal with...right-wing extremism, extreme nationalism. How, how do you see the role of, of, of nationalism in, in Germany today. Is, is, is Germany a sleeping giant? Is, is this sustainable, will we ever see the rise to, to power of, of what's happening in, in other countries, even, even Hungary, my home country, seems to exhibit some very...fearful tendencies. >> Klaus Larres: Yeah, thank you. Sleeping giant, that's a good question, and many Germs say that Germany should be more active on the global stage. Politicians in the United States definitely say that. Fortunately, I believe Merkel plays it cautiously, she knows that turning Germany into a real hege, hegemony in Europe, would be very contentious on the European continent, in Britain, in France, and in many other countries, in Europe. She is, of course, the most powerful woman in the world, perhaps. She is certainly among the most powerful leaders in Europe. That is mostly due to Germany's economy, which is doing relatively well compared to the other European economies. I, I would warn against painting the German economy in too rosy colors. If you compare the German economic performance with the Greek economic performance, yes, then the Germs are doing great! You know, but that is not that difficult. I think, you know [laughter], one percent economic growth is not, not to be compared with the Chinese rate of growth for example. Merkel plays it cautiously, and she follows a policy of engagement towards Putin, but also tries to very stay close to the Obama administration. And she does not pretend that she wants to push Germany into a new hegemony on the Europe continent. And within [inaudible] structures, that is also very difficult to do. If you want to get through [inaudible] legislation, you really need the cooperation from other big states in EU, for example, France and hopefully also Britain. >> Balazs Szelenyi: Thank you very much. [Applause] >> Mikhail Alexseev: Hello, I am Mikhail Alexseev, a political science professor, San Diego State University. >> Alexander Evans: Hello, I'm Alexander Evans, I'm the, I lead the UN Security Council Expert Team on Al Qaeda, ISIL, and the Taliban. >> Mikhail Alexseev: I was the Kluge Fellow here in 2003/2004 academic year, so I'll take the long perspective on world politics, and it's actually interesting to ask, where do some of the hottest news stories about war and peace in the world today fit into some of the long [inaudible] of world politics conceptualized in different ways. If we look at, I, I would argue that three developments actually have a lot of significance. In the same, in this order, ISIS, China expanding in Spratly Islands, [inaudible] and Russia expanding into Ukraine. The first one, ISIS, presents a rather old challenge, harkening back to the formation of states. The 19th century and even earlier battles, the failed states, indeterminant states, a lot of communal conflict evolving into this. The China issue relates to challenges, one of the foundations of peace in the international system, identified by hegemonic stability theorists, the long-cycles theory, that after world wars, you have the power that has the preponderance of global reach capabilities, which today are naval power and air power, and then as these capabilities erode, the power becomes delegitimized, challenged, and new international conflicts emerge, and, and the key nodal points, in the naval arena, would trigger such kind of conflict, which would lead, could conceivably lead to, again, realignment of challenges, such as Russia, China, versus the defending world order state of [inaudible] powers, and you almost have the [inaudible] kind of conflict between Eurasia and Oceania emerging in the future. And the third one, Ukraine issue, actually, one, the reason why I put it last and I think it's more important is because it challenges one of the possible solutions to both types of return to history, either to fail state's challenge or to hegemonic stability challenge. Because it undermines the hope that world politics is evolutionary learning. That as wars are being fought, humanity develops some kind of institutions, rules of the game, that prevent future wars, such as the United Nations, for example, being an advancement on the league of nations and through the [inaudible] of Europe. And, so we have the Budapest memorandums of 1994, which was signed by the United States, Britain, Russia, guaranteeing Ukrainian sovereignty, in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons, and saying that Russia would not use, not just military force, but not even the threat of force, and not even economic pressure, in any dispute with Ukraine, right? So these kinds of things challenge these foundations, they challenge the European Union as a blueprint and the United Nations. And, and I will now go. >> Alexander Evans: Well, thank you. And, and I mean I think one of the, I'm a recovering diplomat, which means, of course, history is reserved for my vacations in Norther Michigan, and, and one of the things that I think that's a challenge in diplomacy is diplomats think short when historians and academics can think long, and that's one of the tremendous benefits of Kluge Center [inaudible], Kluge Center. I think, you know, what, what's, what self-evidence, if you look at the world from the chamber of the security council right now, is that geopolitics is back. You know, the state is back, and it's bigger than ever. And we see both the 15 states of the Security Council speaking like states, and we see 193 states in the general assembly speaking like states as well. But I think the, the more interesting question about order and disorder, and war and peace, is, is one that we may ask if we all assemble here in 15 years time for the next Scholarfest, which is what will we actually call this period in history? We don't yet know what this era will be called. Now, you know, a pessimist or a cynic might say that the, the era will be dubbed the interwar years. And I think one of the things that is striking is notwithstanding the focus on ISIL, and that's my day job, spectacularly unsuccessful two and a half years today, sorry about that [laughter], but, but I think is, is the fact that actually interstate war I think should trouble us more than terrorism. And that's one of the benefits of a long view of history. But actually the real danger to international order comes not from people, however terrible, however revolutionary that violence may be, but it comes from when states in the international order are split apart by war. >> Mikhail Alexseev: And I would actually even add to that, that when interstate rivalries emerge, they often galvanize internal rivalries. If you look at the so-called internal wars, or civil wars, you will find out that very few of them are purely internal. They have to do with big configurations. And I also think that you're absolutely right, you know, what we call a certain age, how we conceptualize it, matters because it shapes our thinking, it shapes the prism through which we notice the world. So, and I clearly think that these developments we discussed mean that the idea that the Cold War was the clash of ideologies, then we move to the clash of civilizations or something like that, it's really simplistic. Perhaps a more interesting idea is going back to, going back to Michael Doyle's, 1986 piece on the Pacific Union, kind of [inaudible] and, and realist [inaudible] of, of views, where, where you see that the biggest challenge in world politics is how to deal with a clash of political, institutional values. So, and it's also about ISIS, about who institutionalizes power in different states using what kind of ideologies. >> Alexander Evans: And this is why, it'd be very interesting because you were a journalist before you became an academic. I'm, I'm a diplomat who would, you know, sort of, is a sort of an academic [inaudible], but what, what advice would you give to policy makers? If you're looking at the world, you know, what, what, what can academia bring to the policy-making process? Particularly around these central questions of war peace? >> Mikhail Alexseev: You know, for that, my, my central insight still goes back to [inaudible] work by [inaudible] on evolution of corporation, which showed that islands of niceness can emerge in the sea of meanies, and I think the job is to expand the islands of niceness. So in addition to the United, if the United Nations doesn't work because Russia and China have veto power, then democracies should build more international institutions of their own that would, that, where they can come in and decide [inaudible]. So the U definitely, the [inaudible], there should be more investment in these issues. WE cannot just let these things go adrift. >> Alexander Evans: Well, I mean, of course, there's always going to be a pessimistic rejoinder to that. I take a slightly gloomier take on the world, but I, I, I like the idea of small pockets of optimism and I think there was a European novelist who once said, but we need to celebrate, that small [inaudible] of victory and what will be long years of defeat, and that sometimes I think what diplomacy feels at the moment, given the nature of division in the world, both in the security council, and, of course, in the very real conflicts that we're seeing both in the Middle East and, and in Ukraine and Syria. >> Mikhail Alexseev: Although the, the optimism, pessimism [inaudible] multicultural, you know, the Russian perspective on optimism and pessimistic, that's the joke when somebody says, the, the, the person who is the optimist, the, the pessimist says, oh, it can't get any worse, and the optimist says, yes it can! [Laughter] >> Alexander Evans: Well I think, I think that maybe then leads to this, again, this question of, you know, how do institutions like Kluge play such an important part? Because this is, this is institution that was founded to bring together scholars thinking about international affairs, from history, from political science, from internation relations, but also with some practitioners and engage with Congress, engage with others here. Can I ask one other question then about ideas, because, obviously, the challenge is translating, you know, articles in, in academic journals into talking points for congress, congresswoman, or, or principles in government, is a tricky business. What's the best way to communicate what is often complex and ambiguous ideas about international order into the digestible for policymakers? What, what tips would you have, particularly thinking about your journalistic experience as well? >> Mikhail Alexseev: Well I think part of it, maybe, is, is having more interaction between policy community and the academics. In fact, I'm a member of one such community that, that has been, I think very successful over years, the program on new approaches to research and security in Eurasia [inaudible] George Washington University [inaudible] associated with it too. So, it, it, we do have people coming to, to the meetings, and, and I think the best way to do it is to bring these people together more often. >> Alexander Evans: I would very strongly agree with that, and I mean, that's, that's why I've tried to sort of bridge these two worlds. You know, I think, you know, the, the the 21st century version of Cold War [inaudible] that, I think it's probably sending, we should be sending subscriptions to the New York review of books, to random policymakers, and sending, perhaps, subscriptions to policy memos to random academics and seeing if the two might, the two might meet. But thank you, thank you very much. >> Mikhail Alexseev: Thank you too. [Applause] >> Melvyn Leffler: Hello everybody. I'm Mel Leffler. It's wonderful to be back at the Kluge Center. Obviously, this place has inspired some wonderful scholarship and also some wonderful collegial relationships amongst us. I was not fortunate enough to know Robert Mason until last night, and it's been a great pleasure to meet you Robert. Robert and I have overlapping interests dealing with the origins of the Cold War, and with the nature of international order. And one of the things that most Americans believe is that the early Cold War was the hay day of bipartisanship, there was sort of an organic consensus, grew out of the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, right after World War II, and that containment was an inevitable policy involving economic aid, the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrine and military assistance, and perhaps most of all, the creation of the North Atlantic treaty and subsequent alliances. Yet Robert has done a lot of scholarship on internal politics in the United States, in the early Cold War years, and subsequently, as well, and I'm thinking, Robert, that you, you're of the view that key leaders like Robert Taft, really did offer alternatives to the policy of containment in the early Cold War years. What were those alternatives, and did the alternative really inspire an alternative concept of world order, or simply an alternative concept of American self-interest? >> Robert Mason: That's a, that's a, that's a big question to think about, and the ways I, I've been thinking about some of those questions really influentially shaped by the work that I did at, at the Kluge Center, it's a great opportunity to meet people of [inaudible] Mel and I didn't quite overlap, but it's been great to meet him. Now, and it's such a, such a privilege, such, such a luxury to, to spend time here and, for me, I spent an awful lot of time in a manuscript reading room, and one of the collections I spent a lot of time with 10 years ago was the Robert Taft papers, an enormously rich collection in, in all, all kinds of ways. A towering [phonetic] figure really of post World War II American history, but somebody who's often a little bit forgotten about, although he is memorialized over here on Capitol Hill, and one of the things that that collection does is to document this debate. This, this very significant debate about how the United States should respond to the Cold War, you encounter these competing conceptions of world order at that time, and, and you do find that kind of conflict instead of consensus. And Taft was at the heart of that debate because of what he thought about, about foreign policy. Really he was a politician who didn't want to think about foreign policy. His project was all about domestic politics, it was about America at home, but after World War II, it was inescapable that Taft got involved with those issues, but he got involved with those issues in, in a way that reflected his, his concerns about America at, at home. He was very worried that engagement in, in the Cold War posed threats to American values. He thought that the protection of liberty globally could endanger Amer, American liberty back, back at home, and, and, more tangibly, he was worried about things like the cost of the Cold War, and he was worried about the expansion of executive power in, in particular. So on the basis of, of, of those concerns, he tried to develop a, a vision for, for foreign policy, which was sort of distinctive from other people here on Capitol Hill and at the White House at, at that time, which led to that kind of conflict, a lot within his own party, amongst republicans as well as with, with democrats. The problem for Taft maybe was that he knew what he was concerned about, but he wasn't quite sure how to convert that into reality. That was kind of a puzzle for Taft. He had an idea about law somehow, of trying to think about world order in, in the context of law, but again, he wasn't sure how to translate that in, into reality, and his critic said he was out of touch, but he was also in, kind of incoherent in his approach to foreign policy, which kind of encourages me to, to, to wonder what, what you, you make of, of this debate, Mel, and, and those people who are criticizing Taft, whether they had a, kind of a more robust and more thoughtful take, on, on world order than, than he did. >> Melvyn Leffler: Yeah, well I've always thought that one of the most interesting things about the debates during the early Cold War years, between Taft and some of his adversaries, for example, after World War II, actually relate to many of the controversies between isolationists and internationalists on the eve of World War II, 1939, 1940, and 1941. And one of the interesting things that I think is often obscured in the scholarship is the degree to which so-called isolationists, who were really unilaterists, but were termed isolationists, and internationalists had a broad consensus about preserving what they like to call the American way of life. So isolationists and internationalists, Taft and Truman, would all have said that the basic preoccupation of American foreign policy is to preserve, you know, private property, free speech, an open marketplace, freedom of religion, things of that sort. The key differentiation was that Taft's opponents believed much more strongly that world order of a certain sort was indispensable to preserving the American way of life at home, and so they believe Truman and Marshall and [inaudible], and the people who really scorned Robert Taft, believe that configurations of power in the international arena were essential to preserving freedom at home, freedom of speech, freedom of the marketplace, and that if any adversary, whether it be the axis [phonetic] in 1940, '41, or the Soviet Union in the post World War II years, gained control over the preponderant resources of Europe and Asia, it would have huge implications for the domestic political economy at home and for the American, and, and the American way of life. And eventually, those proponents who ultimately supported what we then came to call containment, were able to convince their adversaries, most of their adversaries, to sort of buy into this consensus. Why did most republicans, like Vandenberg, why did it become a bipartisan policy, you know, why did the Cold War policies that were aimed at designing a world order, sort of amenable to American interest, become the broad consensus of, of American politicians, at least in the 1940's and 50's. >> Robert Mason: That's, that's one of these questions that [inaudible] looking at the Taft papers, and other collections as well, that, that, that I really struggled with. In 1952, you see this huge conflict between Taft and Eisenhower in, in the Republican Party, that Eisenhower won, though Eisenhower continued to face a certain degree of, of opposition to, and some things that I, I've remained curious about and puzzled about is kind of what happened to that sort of Taft division, sorry, that Taft vision beyond, beyond Taft who disappears in an untimely way from the political scene, but those ideas... >> Melvyn Leffler: Yeah, well I think, I think one of the things that, that many historians who look at American political culture have shown, is the degree to which anti-Communism, which supported America's Cold War policies abroad, also served domestic political constituencies at home. So corporate leaders or business leaders who wanted to fight unions could use anti-communism, racists in the south who wanted to stifle an incipient civil rights movement could use anti-communism against their adversaries. So a broad consensus in America sort of, you know, revolve, evolved around anti-communism containment in Cold War, because it served both a conception of international order and it also served domestic political interests at home. Well thanks for the discussion.! >> Robert Mason: Thank you! >> Melvyn Leffler: Thank you! [ Applause ] [ Background Sounds ] >> Jason Steinhauer: Please join me in thanking all of our scholars. [ Applause ] So we have a lot of time for question and answer. And, as mentioned, there were some index cards at the front with golf pencils that I hope were passed out, and you also have your programs of course. So, how we'll handle this is that we'll call on someone from the audience, if you could please specify to whom you are addressing your question, either a scholar or a pair of scholars, then ask your question and then we'll hand the microphone to one of our panelists here in the front to stand and address it. So we're happy to take questions for the next, oh, 10, 15, 20 minutes. There's one in the back. >> Audience: Thank you, I asked a question at the last panel, so my name is John Dale [inaudible], again. Some talk was here about, today in the session, about sort of the long view of history, also how much things change and don't change, and I kind of a question I guess in a way, after I read this quote. Some of you may know this quote or not, it was written by Winston Churchill. It was actually written though in 1931 as the intro, part of the introduction to My Early Life, well before the start of the war. Anyway, I just wanted to read it because I think it's very relatable to some issues we're dealing with today. "When I survey this work as a whole, I find I have drawn a picture of a vanished age. The character of society, the foundation of politics, the methods of war, the outlook of youth, the scale of values, are all changed, and changed to an extent I should not have believed possible in so short a space without any violent domestic revolution. I cannot pretend to feel they are in all respects changed for the better. I was a child of the Victorian era, when the structure of our country seemed firmly set, when its position in trade and on the seas was unrivalled, and when the realization of the greatness of our Empire and of our duty to preserve it was ever growing stronger. In those days, the dominant forces in Great Britain were very sure of themselves and of their doctrines. They thought they could teach the world the art of government and the science of economics. They were sure they were supreme at sea and consequently safe at home. They rested therefore sedately under the convictions of power and security. Very different is the aspect of these anxious and dubious times. Full allowance for such changes should be made by friendly readers. I have thought that it might be of interest to the new generation to read a story of youthful endeavor, and I have set down candidly and with as much simplicity as possible in my personal fortunes." So my question is simply is, regarding some of the things that are considered almost [inaudible] here, yet at the same time things are not. What are some of the thoughts given press by, regarding Russia or regarding China, how much is actually [inaudible], one or two people, such as Mr. Putin versus in the Cold War, Mr. Gorbachev was not like that, and that's how the war, Cold War ended. >> Jason Steinhauer: Great, thank you very much. I guess that was a question to all of the panelists, so does anyone want to volunteer to respond to that quotation from Churchill? Mikhail, I saw you nodding your head, you recognize that quote, or...? [Chuckling] >> Mikhail Alexseev: Well I thought one of the things you may say was Winston Churchill liked to say that the person with the longest, the best profit is the one who as the longest memory. So that, it's important, therefore, to look, you know, incisively back, and the period that you mentioned, the 30's, from the standpoint of long cycles of hegemonic stability would be the period of delegitimization and the concentration of power based on British hegemony. So the question is, can the world avoid the repetition of that as the U.S. hegemony erodes? And basically, the, the more I think about it, you know, the more I believe that institutions would be the only conceivable answer to preventing these kinds of vicious cycles repeating themselves. In one aspect, precisely because we, we have a new dynamic, countries have developed democracies and, as an adaptation to, because, because it can be argued that democracy is one of the most efficient way to adapt to the international system and succeed in it, but we now see the adaptation of autocracies [phonetic], who figured out that if you adapt to the markets, you can preserve autocracy and you can still defy the basic freedom rule of law etc., etc., and yet be an accepted, effective player in the international system, for which reason, by the way, I totally support excluding Putin from the G8 because I don't think, I think it is not simply, shouldn't be simply the collab [phonetic] of rich nations, but of rich and free nations. And Russia is not a free nation, unfortunately. So, if Russia and China are the challengers, it is hard to imagine who may replace the United States or what kind of combination of states may replace the United States as the new hegemony. Even if there is a global war. In the past, the new hegemony always came from the coalition of more progressive, more free states. You know, Netherlands, then Britain, then the United States, but we don't have any other country like Australia perhaps. I don't know, but, but, but it's a long shot. [Laughter] >> Klaus Larres: Thanks a lot. Just a word about Churchill. Churchill wrote that in the early 1930's when he was actually a failed politician, out of office, he needed the money, so he, he had to say something profound in the introduction to sell the book. You know, one shouldn't overemphasize his, you know, his, his, his deep thought. He had a, an idea behind it, he wanted to make money, he actually lived on being an author before he then was successful as a politician during the Second World War. Secondly, I would fully agree regarding the importance of institutions, and when we think of Europe, that it is a totally new Europe, what we have in front of us today. It's not Europe of the past [inaudible] individual nation states being all important. Nation states haven't gone away, that is very true, but the European Union is an additional new factor, which is very important, something which often gets overlooked in the United States, including among American diplomats who seem to have that European concert of nations still in mind. The European Union is a very strong factor in world affairs, particularly, of course, in economic and trade relations, but it is not unimportant in political issues either, and keeping the European Union together is probably something which occupies European leaders much more than Putin does. Preventing [inaudible], preventing [inaudible], the exit of Britain or Greece from the European Union, probably takes up more of [inaudible] than dealing with Putin. Whether that is good or not is a different matter. And then my very last point, of course, I profoundly disagree. The, the G8 or G7 should be a club to talk and engage. You should not judge who is a member of that club, whether you like that person, whether it's a bit more democratic, a bit less democratic. You know, look at the United Nations, look at, even at the Security Council. It is, has good purpose to talk and engage it to resolve crisis. You can't just let countries in which are free and democratic, you would have a very small United Nations. And the, it wouldn't make much point. We have organizations, like NATO or the European Union for that sort of thing. So I think the G8 should be inclusive, including Putin, in order to overcome a very dangerous crisis provoked by Putin, but still is a sense of having these organizations in order to engage and resolve and overcome crisis, thank you. >> Jason Steinhauer: Okay, additional questions? Yes? >> Audience: Yeah, my name's [inaudible] Eastman, with regard, I have a question for any of the panelists regarding self-understanding and self-awareness of ourselves and our country. The question is, what can be done to reduce the risk of conflict, or even war, initiated by the U.S. itself based on false information or false claims, as with Iraq? [ Background Sounds ] >> Alexander Evans: Well as tempted as I am to get into [inaudible] Iraq/Afghanistan debate, I might pass on that one given I'm still, still on, in suspended animation as a British diplomat. But let me at least talk about the lessons of intervention, because I think these are important lessons, and it, it relates, again, to this question about the gap between policy and scholarship, and I think there is a task about thinking about policy failure, and about policy success, and, and if one of the challenges of practice is that the principle's committee and the [inaudible] committee and the United States, is frequently focused on the crisis at hand. You know, a disease which afflicts all countries, a disease called recentism, of, you're focused, if you like, on the most immediate crisis, and then the crisis to come, and you don't further into the future, and you don't think necessarily further into the past. I do think there is a really important task for all governments to be intelligent and reflective about the consequences of foreign policy, and that includes the unintended consequences of foreign policy, and, and here I can do a delicious shout out to Ricardo Luna [phonetic] who is not here, but is also somebody who is a former Kluge, Kluge fellow and alumni here, and, and Ricardo, who's a former Peruvian diplomat, came up with the importantly trademarked phrase of, the iron law of proliferating unintended consequences [laughter] and I think this is a, a delicious and insightful law, I agree with it wholeheartedly, and I think one of the challenges in terms of policy is how you then try and institutionalize mechanisms within government and international organizations, to actually make that, that insight real in terms of a policy process and policy reflections. >> Benjamin Fordham: I'd just add one thing to that. If we're talking about what we can do to reduce wars based on false information, I think we could do with quite a bit less secrecy in the making of policy in the United States. I think there's an assumption on the part of policymakers that secrecy is necessary for operational purposes, and it probably is in a lot of ways, but I think having secret policy-making processes, where you're talking about these large, big-picture issues, keeping that hidden from the public carries real cost and can pose actual problems for what kind of policy you end up, and I think those are underappreciated when people focus only on the operational gains from having things be secret. [Applause] >> Jim Goldgeier: So we're sending more troops back into Iraq right now. We've had no debate in this country. There's no public debate, there's no congressional debate, I mean, there's no idea of what this strategy is, people feel, you know, there's sort of this visceral reaction, you see people being beheaded by ISIS, you see the taking of territory, and, you know, we should do something, but we've had an escalation, since last summer, without any debate whatsoever. [ Background Sounds ] >> Melvyn Leffler: Well one of the keys is to revitalize the War Powers Act, and, you know, as we convene in the Library of Congress, right next to Congress, I think it is, today, that Tim Kaine, and his republican colleague, are submitting a new war, War Powers Authorization Act that should be considered, and if you think about the degree to which there has been an absence of debate, about American intervention, over the last 10 years or so, you'd know that, exactly what Jim Goldgeier just said, if we're going to have a serious engagement about what constitutes vital interests, what constitutes security, a key way of doing that is through intensive congressional hearings, as, in fact, you know, was the case during the acrimonious days of the, of the Vietnam War, that led to the, you know, to the passage of the War Powers Act to begin with, but which has atrophied over the last decades. >> Jason Steinhauer: We can take a couple additional questions. Let's take two more, if there are some. There's a question here in the front. And we'll do one in the back and then one in the front. >> Audience: A question to Alexander Evans. You stated that the role of the state has, the state has come back as international actor, and, at the same time, you specialize in, in Al Qaeda, ISIS, etc., do you think that in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the identity of people now belongs more to the state or is it more associated with religion? [Inaudible] >>Alexander Evans: Well, I mean, you know, this may sound curious, I'm a secure, I'm a self-denying securocrat, you know, the, I still think that states play a, a very large part in [inaudible] affairs, notwithstanding the pressures and realities of globalization, the hollowing out of a state, transnational movements, cosmopolitism, ideas, the internet. And, and, and, for me, you have one of the scholars whose work I, I respect greatly is a guy called David Miller in the UK, who writes a lot about liberal conceptions of nationalism and nationality. And I think one of the challenges is that if you, you know, even for people in states where they may be questioning about the nature of their government, there may be doubtful about whether the state is delivering for them, then they have no voice in the state whatsoever. I think the persistence of state identities, even in a world in which religion is becoming more salient again, is, is striking, and I, I think this is why, you know, this is why, again, taking the long view is important to not getting [inaudible] up by, you know, the sort of Instagram view of international affairs, which I think is then very much fixated on the latest trend, the latest technology, and we sometimes lose sight of these longer-term persistences in international affairs. >> Jason Steinhauer: And we have a question in the front: >> Audience: Hi, thanks for hosting this today, this is fabulous. My question is really for all the panelists, but Mario, you mentioned that the domestic financial crisis in the U.S. poses some challenges to the U.S. promoting its own vision for the new world order, and I think that there are some other social and cultural things happening in the U.S. that also pose challenges, are in equality, academic and opportunity gaps by race, some of those things, so my question is, is how much is this a challenge to the U.S.'s legitimacy as sort of a leader in promoting freedom and democracy, should we be looking at a broader definition of what that self-determination looks like, or should we maybe step back and let somebody else step up and take the lead, and where do you see that role going and who else could fill it? >> Mario del Pero: Thanks a lot. No, I didn't mean, to imply that it's just post 2008. If I look at the many contradiction of U.S. leadership, I prefer to call it hegemony. It's the old [inaudible] still with me I guess. If I look at that, I see contradictions and attention, which dates back to the 1970's, the late 1970's, early 1980's, were somehow the hegemony of the U.S. was rethought, relaunched, through the American market which we have not discussed, but the American market has been the engine of global economic growth, [inaudible] spoke of empire of consumption, American military preponderance, and also this kind of new internationalism, I don't know if you, we can call it that way, given that U.S. leadership has been justified, and sold through what I consider to be, sometimes, some high internationalist, very [inaudible] kind of narrative and discourse, which is not well received, so there are tensions and dilemmas in the ways in which the hegemony has been played out in the past, let's say three decades. I still believe there is no alternative, as of today, although then the problem is how to adopt this liberal international order to new actors and new subjects, China in particular, without having this order destroyed, and that's the basic challenge of today. [ Background Sounds ] >> Jason Steinhauer: Okay, and with that, please join me again in thanking all of our scholars. [ Applause ] >> Announcer: This has been a presentation of the Library of Congress. Visit us at loc.gov.