>> From the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. >> Jason Steinhauer: Well, good afternoon. My name is Jason Steinhauer. I'm a Program Specialist at The John W Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. Before we begin today's program, please take a moment to check your cell phones and other electronic devices. And please set them to silent. Thank you. I'll also make ou aware that this afternoon's program is being filmed for future placement on the Library of Congress website as well as our YouTube and iTunes channels. I encourage you to visit our website, loc.gov/kluge to view other lectures developed by current and past Kluge scholars. Today's lecture is presented by the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress and cosponsored by the Embassy of Sweden as part of the 2016 European Month of Culture celebrations. I wish to express our thanks to the Swedish Embassy and the EU Delegation to the United States for their collegiality and collaboration this month, and mention that in partnership with the EU, we are featuring on our blog all month the stories of European scholars who have conducted research at the Kluge Center. To learn more about the European Month of Culture, please visit their website or search the hashtag EUMC2016 on social media to learn about events occurring over the remainder of the month. The John W. Kluge Center is a vibrant scholar center on Capitol Hill that brings together scholars and researchers from around the world to stimulate and energize one another, to distill wisdom from the Library's rich resources, and to interact with policymakers and the public. The Center offers opportunities for senior scholars, post-doctoral fellows, and PhD candidates to conduct research in the Library of Congress collections. We also offer free public lectures such as this one, conferences, symposia, and other programs. And we administer the Kluge Prize which recognizes lifetime achievement in the humanities and social sciences. For more information about the Kluge Center, please visit our website loc.gov/kluge, K-L-U-G-E. And I invite you to sign up for our email alerts to learn about future programs as well as opportunities for you to conduct your own research here at the Library of Congress. Today's program is titled "Profiles in Statesmanship, 20th Century Breakthroughs, 21st Century Challenges." It features scholar Bruce Jentleson, who holds the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations here at The John W. Kluge Center. While at the Library, Bruce has been working on a book project that examines transformational leaders of the 20th century who made major breakthroughs for peace and security. In an interview on our blog I asked Bruce why this project now? And his response was the following, "It's a lot easier to name a global problem that's been growing worse than one which progress is being made. There are many aspects to meeting these and other 21st century challenges, but much must come top-down from global leaders able and willing to be transformational, to break out of the tunnel vision of thinking narrowly about one's interests and the myopia of focusing on today but not tomorrow." We hope that Bruce's work will reveal what lessons may exist for us to solve our 21st century problems. A word about the Chair position which Bruce holds, the Kissinger Chair is made possible by the generous donations of the friends and admirers of Dr. Henry Kissinger. It establishes a nonpartisan focus in the nation's capital for discussions of key issues in foreign affairs and acts as a catalyst for the fresh analysis of foreign affairs in this global era. One distinguished senior scholar is appointed annually to be in residence at the Kluge Center, and the research may be on any aspect of foreign policy or international relations involving the United States and using the Library of Congress collections. Our past chair holders have included an ambassador who researched the evolution of the relationship between India and the United States, a member of the British Diplomatic Service who researched Pakistan's strategic culture, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who researched the growing divisions between the EU, NATO, and the Former Soviet Union. Our 16th Kissinger Chair will arrive later this year, and we are eager to hear from you with nominations for our 17th Kissinger Chair. So please visit our website to learn more about the program, and note that applications and nominations for this position may be submitted through November 1st. And now to introduce Dr. Jentleson. As mentioned, Dr. Jentleson is the 15th holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations here at the Library's Kluge Center. Bruce is Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University where he previously served as Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy. From 2009 to 2011 he was Senior Advisor to the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Director. In 2012 he served on the Obama 2012 campaign, National Security Advisory steering committee. He also served as a Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Vice President Gore in his 2000 presidential campaign, in the Clinton Administration State Department, and as a Foreign Policy Aide to Senators Gore and David Durenberger. He has served on a number of policy commissions, most recently the Responsibility to Protect Working Group, co-chaired by Former Secretary Madeleine Albright. And his books include "American Foreign Policy, the Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century," "The End of Arrogance, America in the Global Competition of Ideas," coauthored with Steven Weber, and "With Friends Like These, Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982 to 1990." He has published articles in numerous journals, academic and policy, and for leading sites such as Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations, Huffington Post, The Hill, and Washington Post. His current book project is "Transformational Statesmanship, Difficult, Possible, Necessary," which is under contract with W.W. Norton and is the subject of his work here at the Kluge Center. So without further ado, please join me in welcoming Bruce Jentleson. [ Applause ] >> Bruce Jentleson: Thanks very much, Jason. And thanks to the Kluge Center. I've been here for the full academic year. It's been a fabulous place to be and to work. I particularly want to thank Jane McAuliffe who was the Director of the Center during my period of application, Bob Gallucci who was the Director during my period of residence, and really all my colleagues here at the Kluge Center, both present and those earlier in the academic year. I also want to acknowledge the Wilson Center where I also worked on this book a couple of years ago when I was a Distinguished Scholar, and still am affiliated as a Non-resident Global Fellow. And my various RAs who worked on this [inaudible] one of whom is here today -- so thank you very much -- in the years of doing the research. The Kissinger Chair is really a great honor. And as part of this project I actually got to interview Dr. Kissinger in January. It's the first time I had actually had a one-on-one with him, and I had interacted with him in groups in various times before. In fact, there was one time where I was invited to go with a congressional delegation to a conference in Germany, and Henry Kissinger was part of the delegation, along with a number of congressmen and senators who were flying out of Andrews Airforce Base. And so it was one of these overnight flights, and I said to my wife, I said, "You know, normally I'd just sort of wear like a running suit." She said, "You can't do that. You know, you're going with Kissinger and these senators. You've got to like wear, you know, at least a sport jacket and a tie if not a suit." So I show up at Andrews dressed like this, and who's greeting people when you get on the plane but Kissinger in a running suit, right? You know, of course, he had a compartment on the plane to change into, and so when we came back, you know, I said to Barbara, I said, "You see, you know, Kissinger was wearing a running suit." And she said, "Yeah, he's Henry Kissinger. You're Bruce Jentleson," right, so you each get to dress accordingly. And so the book, as Jason mentioned, will be published next summer or fall by W.W. Norton. The working title -- everybody knows published books it's really up to your editor what the title is, but this is the title we've been using, "Transformational Statesmanship, Difficult, Possible, Necessary." And it's really a book that, as Jason said -- and I'll talk some more about it -- about breakthroughs in the 20th century for global peace and security, broadly defined. Not a book about perfect achievements of peace and security. Indeed, that would be a very short book to write, unfortunately. One wouldn't need a full nine months of residence to do it. But I realized the other day that this book serves a number of purposes for me. In fact, this morning I was on a panel at the Holocaust Museum -- I do a lot of work both as a scholar and in my policy roles on mass atrocities and genocide prevention. We had a panel with Senator Ben Cardin and a number of other people over at the Holocaust Museum. And I also have been doing a lot of work lately in a very immediate sense on issues in Syria. And those can be rather depressing subjects. This book is a little bit about hopeful achievements, so I realize that I may not ever finish it, because it's really my mental health therapy that keeps me thinking about what actually may be possible in the world. It's interesting, so this book actually started with some ideas from my students. In the early 1980s, toward the end of a U.S. foreign policy course I taught when I was then on the faculty at the University of California Davis, I had asked the students their thoughts on the future. "Well, Professor Jentleson," one earnest young student said, "I think the Cold War will end" -- this is the early 1980s -- "and end peacefully." And from another bright-eyed one I got, "Apartheid will end in South Africa, and South Africa will transition to a black-majority democracy." My responses at the time were along the lines of, "It's nice to be young, naive, and California dreaming, but let's be realistic." The Cold War did end, and without a nuclear or other U.S. /Soviet war. Apartheid did end, and the political transition was impressively civil. While many factors came into play, the extraordinary statesmanship provided by Mikhail Gorbachev and Nelson Mandela were the crucial ones. So in one of those gratifying examples of the two-way street of professors teaching and also learning from students, and teaching and research cross-fertilizing, I got thinking about two other questions. Who else in the 20th century was a profile in statesmanship, shaping major breakthroughs for peace? The leaders I include in the book were not totally successful. Gorbachev and Mandela were not, either. But they were transformational, making breakthroughs on issues that have been marked by deep tensions and intense conflict, which made possible, although did not guarantee further progress. And secondly, what can we learn from 20th century transformational statesmanship for the 21st century? A while back, in the late 1980s, early 1990s, it sure seemed like the world was going in a good direction. The Cold War ended peacefully, dictatorships were falling to democracies, globalization was spreading the wealth, history was said to be over, world affairs becoming so harmonic as to be downright boring. As Jason said in our interview, things have not exactly worked out that way. The end of the Cold War has not meant the end of war. That democratic wave has broken up on some rocky shores. Globalization has had losers as well as winners, downsides as well as upsides. History has come roaring back with ancient hatreds fueled by modern venoms. Climate change is speeding up. Global health pandemics are spreading. Cyberwar and other technology-driven emerging areas in need of rules of the game aren't getting them. Indeed, it is a lot easier to name a global problem that's been growing worse than one in which progress has been made. So as I thought about these two questions and started to develop my thinking on it, they really bring you back to one of those questions that's been debated forever, you know, does history make statesmen or do statesmen make history? You know, at one end of the debate is Thomas Carlyle's heroic conception of history that, quote, "The history of what man has accomplished in this world is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here. All thing that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result -- the practical realization embodiment of thoughts that dwelt in the great men sent into the world." The other end of the debate is Herbert Spencer who derided the universal love of personalities, going back well before "People" magazine and TMZ.com to when, quote, "Round the campfire assembled savages telling the events of the day's chase, and he among them who has done some feat of skill or agility is duly lauded." The truth lies in between. Carlyle is too much the romanticist, overstating the roles of individuals and undervaluing conducive conditions creating opportunities for leadership. Spencer is too much the sociologist, overstating societal processes and contexts, and undervaluing what, as many people find, and Isaiah Berlin said, "At crucial moments at turning points, individuals and their decisions and acts can determine the course of history." My perspective, based on experience in the foreign policy world as well as an international relations professor, puts me in this history of great leaders' middle ground. The academic literature digs deeper than just the latest who's up and who's down, but too often stays at a level of abstraction that glosses over the impact that leaders do have. The talk here inside the Beltway and among journalists can get too caught up in personalities, but often does focus in on critical decision making and strategizing. The analytic balance is in recognizing that history and broad social forces create constraints as well as conducive conditions, shaping the range of available choices. But they don't determine what choices get made. No individual is so extraordinary that he or she would have transformational impact, irrespective of the context in which he or she ends up operating. But it's also not a given that just anyone could have pulled off the statesmanship that the particular leader did. It's man, woman, and moment, fit, and timing. And so as I've thought about this in the book, I think of it as a framework of what I call the three Cs, the constraints that limit the choices that leaders have, the conducive conditions that help make it possible to make certain choices, but ultimately really about choices being made. The -- Fred Greenstein, who was a noted political scientist at Princeton, in his worked talked in more formal social science terms about actor indispensability, that the leader in question responds significantly differently than another leader in the same situation would have. And Greenstein says this is especially true in situations like transformational statesmanship when, as he puts it, quote, "The more demanding the political act, the greater the likelihood that it will be influenced by personal characteristics of the actor." So yes, there are systemic forces at work at many levels, but choices that are made. Another way of thinking about this is in baseball moneyball terms, right, the statistic of wins-against-replacement, which calculates how much one player contributes to team victories over alternative ones at the same position. And one gets into very complicated sabermetrics on this. So while there is no neat diplo-ball statesmanship against replacement leader sabermetric, or SARL, evidence can be marshalled to make the same point, who the player or statesman is makes a big difference, and frankly, it allows me to connect my passion for baseball and my work in foreign policy, which at least two people in the audience will know is something I try to do as often as possible. So we can think about this in the broader sense of leadership as genus leadership, species statesmanship. And there is a huge literature on this. James MacGregor Burns, very distinguished scholar on this, called leadership, "One of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth." Noted author and public intellectual Walter Isaacson calls it an "elusive quality." That's not for a lack of trying. Books abound. Some are about political leadership, some about business leadership, some philosophical, some how-to. And an Amazon search brought up 173,164 books for keyword leadership, 79,455 for political leadership. Nor are there a shortage of university-based leadership programs. Harvard has its Advanced Leadership Institute. At Duke we have our Hard Leadership program. The University of Virginia has the Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy, and many others. In the corporate world an estimated $14 billion has been spent over the past two decades on leadership development, twice as much as before. Yet 75% of respondents deem their programs ineffective. Indeed, as we know in many context, people talk about leadership all the time, but with the same mantra of we need leadership, and how do you get it? And there's a sense of both fascination and frustration. Fascination in how time and again explanations of success and failure in such a range of professions and pursuits hone in on leadership as a key factor. Frustration in how difficult it is to find the elements of leadership with any degree of consistency, let alone teach and cultivate them. My intent in this book is to tap the fascination and at least try to reduce the frustration. So in working with this literature on leadership broadly defined, I've derived and I use in the book a four-part analytic framework which has the who, why, how, what questions. Who were these leaders as individuals? Why did the make the crucial choices they did? How did they pursue their goals? And what was and wasn't achieved? Let me talk a little bit about that framework before getting into the profiles of who I focus on in the book. Who were these leaders as individuals? Here we kind of want to get to know them a little bit as people without putting them on the couch and doing sort of a deterministic, psychoanalytic analysis. "A man's rootage [sic]," as Woodrow Wilson once said, "means more than his leafage." But it's not about being a born leader. Rarely is there a statesmanship equivalent of Mozart the five-year-old prodigy or LeBron James with NBA superstar skills coming out of high school, or a perfect person, Nelson Mandela in his own personal life was -- issues with his own family, with is wives and his children. There are, though, some certain personal qualities that do bear heavily on leadership capacity. One is what is called by some in the literature moral capital, which is a little different than political capital. It's a justness of what you stand for, and of you as the leader of that cause and for that purpose. And so legitimacy is perceived by those to whom you would provide the leadership. One of the factors that goes into this is personal courage, the sacrifices endured, the hardships suffered, in many cases prison sentences, the willingness to take courageous stands. As two scholars on leadership at Harvard put it, they said, "Transformational leadership is not a safe path. It is indeed a dangerous activity. You appear dangerous to people when you question their values, beliefs, or habits of a lifetime. You place yourself on the line when you tell people what they need to hear rather than what they want to hear." Gorbachev got killed politically, some of the others in the book got assassinated. Charisma is an interesting quality, which is sort of what people always point to, sort of the John Kennedy charisma. But -- and again, I'll talk some about this now, and I'm happy to go into more detail when we have discussion -- in some ways it's backward. I mean, Nelson Mandela is the iconic case of a charismatic personality. But to jump ahead a little bit, one of the people in the book is Yitzhak Rabin who hardly fit the Kennedy image, this gruff old grandfatherly guy who wasn't very good at being -- giving speeches. I was in Israel about three weeks after his assassination, and I wasn't surprised by friends and colleagues who were all broken up about this. But when I went down to the square where he had been killed and I saw 16-year-olds lighting candles and playing guitars for this gruff old guy who didn't have Kennedy-esque charisma, it really affected me even more profoundly than my own friends and colleagues. And so some ways charisma is a product, and ultimately you see it, but it's not the kind of thing that, you know, sort of consultants and others look for. We also get into some negative qualities, because the point here is admiration, but not hero worship. And the point being many imperfect people can be very effective statesmen. Political skills of a variety of kind also were important in terms of these two profiles. Why really gets into the vision, why did these and others develop their guiding visions beyond the way the world is to how it could be? Being able and willing to push beyond standard analysis and see the need for profound change was a key. What was the basis for that insight? I looked for turning points, decisive moments when key choices were made, and ideas and strategies started to develop. A vision is really a story, a political one. It's akin in form and functions to what we think of more broadly as narratives that provide the why for the transformation. And while it varies in different cases, you'll find that it always has three elements. There's a normative element, the values which the present is violating and the alternative future will affirm; the symbolic, tapping deeply-rooted cultural beliefs and mores, and avoiding taboos that infuse judgments of the legitimacy of the vision; and a cognitive element, the key substantive points, and the critique, and the alternative. How is really a question of politics and strategy, what Joe Nye in his work on this quotes, "The means to achieve the ends in one's vision." Robert Rotberg, who's written a lot on leaders in the developing world says leaders -- transformational leaders can't just be visionaries. They have to be navigators. Nan Keohane, President of Duke for many years and a political theorist in her own right, talks about not just making decisions, but devising and implementing strategies with the right combination of incentives. Heifetz and Lipsky at Harvard talk about controlling the temperature, keeping the opposition close. And in deed, in the stories that I tell, when these have been violated it also points to ways in which some of these leaders have not achieved the full transformations that they've wanted. The what did and what didn't they achieve, to quote Machiavelli, "There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle than to initiate a new order of things. And here I take the transformational balance sheet, and sort of net assessing in each case what was lessons and what was and wasn't achieved. Recall that Isaiah Berlin quote in which he talked about individuals that can determine the course of history, not necessarily they do, which comes back to the three Cs, constraints, conducive conditions, and choices. Breakthroughs also have backlashes. And here it's important to draw the lessons, as I said, between what was achieved and what wasn't. So that's the [inaudible] framework. Quickly sort of the criteria for choosing the cases in terms of the research design, I focus on 20th century cases, which is really more my own expertise than prior historical periods in a sense of what's most pertinent for 21st century lesson drawing. Transformational statesmanship and the work of people like Janet Berger Burns [assumed spelling] and Joe Nye is distinguished from transactional diplomacy. Transformational being efforts to make major breakthroughs in global peace and security as distinct from diplomacy geared to managing and resolving issues in the normal course of events, which is not to belittle importance of transactional diplomacy. It's very important on a day-to-day basis, but it's just not my focus in this particular book, trying to look at those breakpoints. Third is the impact had, not so much the position held. Typically when we think of statesmanship we turn to presidents and prime ministers, secretaries of state, ministers of foreign affairs, and other leaders of nation-states. While I emphasize national leaders, I'm also inclusive of transformational leaders for international institutions, from social movements and NGOs who did for peace and justice what governments were unable or unwilling to do. This is the sense of statesmanship less strictly in terms of the position held than the impact had on global peace and security. Twentieth century breakthroughs, 21st century lessons based on these profiles, not so much to point at this or that leader floating around the 21st century world. Indeed, if someone tried to do that with many of the 20th century profiles, we would miss quite a few. But drawing lessons for different areas, for overcoming the difficulties, maximizing the possibilities, and achieving what is necessary. And when I think about global peace and security, it's a rather large subject. To get a handle on it, I break it down into five different dimensions, and then I choose representative cases for each of these areas, by no means the claim of being comprehensive. Five dimensions are major power geopolitics, managing major power relations for cooperation more than conflict; building international institutions for conflict prevention and collective action; fostering reconciliation of peoples who have been looked in conflicts rooted in historical hatreds; advancing freedom and protecting human rights; and promoting sustainability, including poverty and equality reduction, environmental protection, and global public health. As I said, I look at representative examples. In fact, you know, maybe when we publish we will develop a social media game of who people would nominate in their own sort of set of leaders. But I choose at least leaders that I think really represent important breakthroughs. Okay, so who are they? I'm going to run through them really quickly, and then I'll say a little bit about each ones. Terms of major power geopolitics, the two cases I focus on are Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai -- and I had this focus before I got the Chair -- and the opening of -- between the United States and China in the early 1970s, and Mikhail Gorbachev. For building international institutions, little bit on Wilson actually in a way that I didn't expect to be talking about Wilson, FDR, and particularly focus on Dag Hammarskjold, the most effective Secretary General in the history of the United Nations. And again, that was before knowing that our Swedish colleagues were coming. Reconciliation of peoples, the cases here are Nelson Mandela, Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin, and the Northern Ireland Women for Peace, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan. Freedom and human rights -- and I'll go through each one, explain the basis for choosing them -- Gandhi, the founder of Amnesty International, a British lawyer named Peter Benenson, Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel, Aung San Suu Kyi. And for sustainability Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former Prime Minister of Norway, Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the Gates Foundation. Let me give you a little bit of an explanation of the choice for them and a little bit of what I see coming out of them. But I'm going to be very brief in some of these remarks in order to leave some time for questions and discussion. The opening to China was really Kissinger's best. It entailed realpolitik strategizing, or great power politics. It required the face-to-face diplomacy that his persona so well suited. It worked through back channels and secret meetings as was his want. It maneuvered the superpower triangle in ways that reinforced Soviet incentives for detente. Zhou Enlai was very much the equal partner. He was that extraordinary mix of committed revolutionary, pragmatic diplomat, and what some would call the last mandarin bureaucrat in the Confucian tradition. Had Las Vegas bookies known about the secret Kissinger-Zhou meetings representing two countries that have been enemies for 20-plus years, that regularly demonized one another politically and culturally, that had burning issues like U.S. support for Taiwan and Chinese aid to North Vietnam, no doubt the betting odds would have been on breakdown. One of the keys was making the transactional serve the transformational. Compromising on issues like Taiwan and Vietnam, conscious of the larger strategic stakes, recognizing that, as Zhou put it, "Only the settlement of fundamental questions first can lead to the settlement of other questions." And I think that's a very significant statement that relates to any number of issues one can think about today, U.S. /Russia, U.S. /China, perhaps U.S. /Iran, only the settlement of fundamental questions that can lead to the settlement of other questions. It's true there are other players in this, President Nixon and Chairman Mao were of course also major players, and they did get the opera. But Kissinger and Zhou were the statecraft strategists. Gorbachev made the key decision to bring the Cold War to an end. And while he gets the bulk of the credit, some also goes to Ronald Reagan. It wasn't as essentially equal a role as Kissinger and Zhou, so I do bring Reagan into the analysis more than some, less than others. I focus the profile principally on Gorbachev. As bad as things were for the Soviet Union, the Afghanistan War, the economy, restiveness all over Eastern Europe, it wasn't a given that another Soviet leader would have made the decisions that Gorbachev did, thus the statesmanship moneyball. While Gorbachev acknowledges his own leadership failures, as he says in his memoirs, quote, "Looking back, on can see blemishes and mistakes that could have been avoided," and while he ended up eliminated from the Russian political scene, his impact endured. The Cold War ended. It ended peacefully. And Vladimir Putin notwithstanding, today's tensions are nothing like the competition between nuclear arms superpowers with global ambitions and competing ideologies that largely define the world scene for the second half of the 20th century. So when you hear people talking about the New Cold War, I think what we're seeing is a major power -- a classical major power competition between the United States and Russia. But we shouldn't forget what the Cold War was really about. And so my argument is that endured despite the current state of relations. For a while, of course, it seemed like the great game of major politics might be a thing of the past. Russian and American leaders were embracing, Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin. Peering into each other's eyes and getting a sense of his soul, George W. Bush after his first meeting with Putin. Declaring a reset to get relations back on track, Barrack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev. The interweaving of China into the global economy was supposed to temper its rise. The United States claimed to be playing its leadership role in ways that were in the interest of the overall international community. But again, it hasn't worked out that way. Russia has been more aggressive than at any time since the Cold War; China has been flexing its muscles in Asia; and the Bush Administration went to war in Iraq over the opposition of much of the world; the expectation that greeted Barrack Obama that all will be fine with a more multilateralist American President was not met in any enduring way over the course of his presidency. And what comes next in the United States? Separate conversation [chuckle]. But as we try to get U.S. /Russia/China relations on a better track, there are a number of lessons that I try to draw out from the Kissinger/Zhou relationship and the Gorbachev breakthrough. Building international institutions, when I was first thinking about the book I really had Wilson very much in mind for the main focus of international institutions, you know, making the world safe for democracy, international cooperation through new League of Nations, Wilsonianism as an enduring school of thought. But the more I dug into the reading, much of which I actually did at the Wilson Center on this part, in research about Wilson, the more the limits of his transformationalism became apparent. The standard view that Americans were just bent on retreating into isolationism after the Great War is actually much too knee-jerk. When you look at actually the politics of the moment, Wilson could have gotten the Versailles Treaty and U.S. League membership ratified, but he hugely mismanaged the domestic politics. And for all his high-mindedness, the design of the League was fundamentally flawed. So it's the limits of Wilson's transformational statesmanship that's instructive and that I use as sort of an initial mini-profile. FDR as the principle architect of the U.N. succeeded where Wilson didn't. While designing an international institution is its own active statesmanship, his untimely death meant that he never got to play a direct role in bringing it to fruition. Had he lived, his imprint on the U.N. may have been even greater. Another we'll-never-know is whether FDR's musings about resigning the presidency and taking up the leadership of the U.N. would have come to pass. As things turned out, the first U.N. Secretary General, Trygve Lie, had such a difficult time in the position that he left, calling it, quote, "The most impossible job in the world." Lie's successor Dag Hammarskjold would prove differently. And he more than any other leader showed how impactful an international institution the United Nations could be. He made the position a genuine leadership one, a secular pope, as he and others called it, and showed what the U.N. could contribute to building global peace and security. This comes through in his overall effort to strengthen the U.N. institutionally, guided by a conception of the international public servant, and especially in his handling of three crises that I focus on in the book, American/Korean War POWs held by the People's Republic of China in 1954, the 1956 Suez Crisis spurred by the British/French/Israel invasion of Egypt, and the 1960-61 Congo Crisis. At a time in which the world needs a more effective U.N. -- other international institutions as well, but the U.N. having the most bearing on global peace and security -- there is much to be learned from someone who was eulogized by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson as, quote, "A brilliant mind, a brave and compassionate spirit. I doubt if any living man has done more to further the search for a world in which men solve their problems by peaceful means and not by force than this gallant friend of us all." The final part of this chapter lays out what I call the job description for a 21st century Hammarskjoldian Secretary General. While this is not the only element of making the U.N. more effective, and while a more effective U.N. is not the only international institutional reform needed, a more effective U.N. won't happen without a Secretary General with the statesmanship qualities Hammarskjold had. And without an effective U.N., other international institutional reforms won't suffice. So the way I'm doing this is I'm writing a variety of offshoots. I'm writing an article this summer for more of a policy journal as we go into this search for a new U.N. Secretary General in which there is much emphasis on gender and geography, and appropriately, but making the argument about why it's really about the job description. And I'm going to do that with a lot of pieces of this to sort of get pieces out along the way to the book. But I think as we move toward September when I think this decision gets made, there's enormous lessons in the role that Hammarskjold played. Mandela, of course, is the iconic case of reconciliation among peoples, leading the fight to end apartheid through peaceful means, and the global icon that he embodied. The dignity with which he endured his nearly three decades as a political prisoner inspired so many people around the world, as well as in his own country. His commitment to reconciliation fathered the rebirth of his own nation and presented the world with a very different model from those seeking retribution and revenge. His moral capacity to differentiate between hatred of the system and hatred of whites was a statesmanship contrast to the demagogic leaders in so many other parts of the world fomenting identity-based killings. For Sadat, who had built is career quite conventionally through the Egyptian military and was generally seen as a placeholder until a stronger successor to Gamal Abdel Nasser rose, it was a long and surprising journey. It ended with an assassin's bullet, but before then along with U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin -- who again are prat of the story, but not the crucial focus -- he forged the first piece of Arab/Israeli peace. And so, too, with Rabin who had been the top military commander in the 1967 war that had conquered the West Bank and other Arab territories. And as Defense Minister during the 1987 Palestinian Intifada allegedly [inaudible] of breaking bones, became the Prime Minister who in 1993 shook hands with PLO leader Yasser Arafat and signed a series of peace agreements until he, too, was struck down by an assassin. True, the pieces of peace they laid were partial, but without them there would be even less chance of ever getting to a full Israeli peace -- full Arab/Israeli peace. And in the spirit of the impact held, not just the -- impact had, not just position held, I'm trying to bring in others to demonstrate how in this particular case of Northern Ireland, Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan who in 1976 founded the Northern Ireland Women of Peace at the height of the violence of the troubles as everyday people who in their own ways demonstrated transformational statesmanship. The troubles had taken the death toll from about 16 in 1969 to 500 by 1972. And while there was never only one factor, these two women and the organization they formed got a great deal of credit for the steep decline to 111 in 1977, 82 in 1978, and never reaching those levels again. They inspired people to speak up, stand up, and turn out against the violence. They catalyzed outrage from the people in whose names the violence was being perpetrated, yet who were paying the price, Protestants and Catholics together to a greater extent than ever before. Not a full resolution of the conflict, but a seminal breakthrough. Indeed, George Mitchell, the principle negotiator of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, would later write the foreword for a book about Corrigan and Williams, recognizing their contribution to what ultimately became the agreement that he helped negotiate. These politics of identity, which we were talking about at the Holocaust Museum this morning, who I am versus who you are, are even more prevalent today than in the 20th century. They have been much more the continuation than the end of history. But history shapes, it does not determine. When demagogic leaders -- political leaders intentionally fuel identity-based conflicts, hatreds become all the more visceral, the killing wanted and massive. When statesmen like Sadat, Rabin, and Mandela and everyday people like Corrigan and Williams provide more positive leadership, reconciliation is possible. And I draw lessons here for our era's identity-based conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere. In terms of freedom and human rights -- and I'm going to run through this quickly so we can have some time to discuss -- if you think about the 20th century freedom agenda, there are three main elements. One was decolonization and independence, and here I use Gandhi as the principle profile for his nationalism and passivism that not only shaped India, but resonated globally as the world transitioned from the Imperial Age to Post-Colonialism. It had democratization both from communist rule and Soviet imperial control. And here there is similarities and contrasts between Walesa and Vaclav Havel that are very interesting. And also, by the way, in the spirit of imperfections, there are more positives about the role of leaders of the Liberation, and less so in terms of the roles they played once they became President. And also democratization in terms of freeing from military [inaudible] dictatorship. And here I include Aung San Suu Kyi for her courageous defiance of the Burma military dictatorship. And again, this is an absolutely fascinating case, because those of you who have been following Burma now know that while she's played this extraordinary role in bringing back democracy to Burma, there is this huge issue of the Rohingya Muslim minority in Burma which is -- there are 135 -- 136 minorities in Burma, 135 are recognized. They don't have other rights, but the Rohingya are not even yet granted status as state citizens, and they've been persecuted by the previous governments. And so the question of what her policy would be remains uncertain. She is now Counselor, quasi-President. And so far -- I mean, just this one example that happened the other day, the American Ambassador to Burma made a statement of condolence for these Rohingya families that had drowned at sea on these makeshift boats, simply a condolence, and she called him in and told him that he really couldn't use that word, because they were not a recognized state minority. So as I write the book I'm trying to bring out the tensions in these breakthroughs, and again, away from the perfect people. And you know, I've got four or five -- I've got a few more months to publication to see where this goes. And the great debate is whether or not she is sort of doing a walk-before-you-run, you know, trying to keep the military contained and will ultimately move to this core set of values, or whether her advocacy of freedom and human rights really pertain more to political prisoners. And the other profile is the founder of Amnesty International, a British lawyer named Peter Benenson. And I include them because Amnesty International really launched the contemporary human rights movement. Benenson himself was a bit of an odd duck. He was actually kicked out of Amnesty International about five or six years after he founded it. But I think it's very important, and what I try to get out here is this lead role for social movements, NGOs, and other unofficial groups, which is increasingly a part of our 21st century world that we see even in the 20th century. And here starting with the Amnesty International, which opened up the door to Human Rights Watch, Humanity United, all these other groups that are very much a part, I think, of the efforts to make transformations on human rights in the 21st century. Last category is sustainable development. It was only in the late 20th century that sustainability finally started to be recognized as a priority. Gro Harlem Brundtland, who is three-time Prime Minister of Norway, is really included principally for her work in the international arena first as Chairwoman in the early -- in the 1980s for the World Commission on Environment and Development, which coined the term sustainable development. And then as Director General of the WHO, the World Health Organization, 1998 to 2003, in which she sort of rescued it from a period of corruption and inefficacy and brought it back -- something that hasn't that -- as much continued by her successors. But one of the things she did was he made health an integral component of four of the eight United Nations millennium development goals that had guided policy from 2000 to 2015 for the overall global antipoverty agenda. And so I talk here, too, about the role of another international institution, and her particular role and the leadership that she provided that I think was quite unique. On the environment -- and as Jason said, you know, transparency here, I for many years worked in a variety of capacities for Senator and Vice President Al Gore as one of his former policy advisors. I did not work on climate change other than when he first started out being, asked to hold up these giant posters until he got his Apple slideshow going. But I think that Gore represents an interesting case both in his political successes and failures, with lessons from both to be carried forward. And I think I try to draw those out, where he succeeded in making it an issue, and where he didn't during his political career, and then the career that has come after. The IPCC is also included both for its particular work on global environmental issues and as an example of the role of multilateral independent expert commissions. The Gates Foundation I include for similar reasons as the Amnesty International, both for what it's done, but for this broader notion of social entrepreneurship in this area of sustainability as playing a crucial role. It's also the case that is with said back in 2005 before our World Health Organization meeting in Geneva, a Swiss newspaper ran the headline, "The health of the world depends more on Bill Gates than on the WHO." Though in exaggeration, it made a point about the role of the Gates Foundation and more broadly about NGO's and social entrepreneurs and issues of global health and other aspects of sustainability. In his very powerful book, Collapse , how societies choose to fail or succeed. Jared Diamond poses the star question about how could a society fail to have seen the dangers that seem so clear in retrospect? Then he talks about Easter Island and others. He also says, "Globalization makes it impossible for modern societies to collapse in isolation." You know, so we think about security, we put much emphasis duly on things like weapons of mass destruction and a variety of things. But I think we also live in a world in which climate change and these other issues, sustainability, are not something out in the future, but they're very much here today. There was an article in the paper the other day; it was called the "First climate refugees in the United States." And so I'm trying to get at this issue as an increasingly important issue. So I'm going to stop there, hopefully giving you an overview of the book and how I'm both using the cases and trying to draw out the profiles. Let me just close by going back to John Kennedy's Profiles in Courage . It was about American politics, not world affairs, U.S. Senators, not world leaders, but in rereading Profiles in Courage , I was struck by the concern that today, that is 1956 quote, "The challenge of political courage ludes -- looms larger than ever before. For our everyday life is becoming so saturated," this is 1956, "With a tremendous power of mass communications. Our political life has become so expensive, so mechanized and so dominated by professional politicians and public relations men, that the idealists who dream of independent statesmanship is rudely awakened by the necessities of election and accomplishment." Many say that if he thought it was hard then, he should see what it's like in our 21st Century media environment with the logs and the iPhone cameras and social media, cable TV, multibillion dollar political campaigns, etcetera. Indeed there's been spade of books telling us, quote, "Historical greatness in the American presidency has gone the way of the dodo." It is quote, "The end of power from boardrooms to battlefields and churches to states, that it's the end of leadership, that we're just sending in the global anarchy." There's a little bit too much woe is us-ism for my taste in this. The problem of bold leadership has always been there in every era, in every area of societal life, in every country internationally. Transformational statesmanship is difficult, we've seen that, but it's possible we've also seen that. If we're to meet the challenges of the global peace, security and justice here in the 21st Century, it is necessary. Standard statesmanship just won't fill the bill; it can't just be all transactional. And my goal in this book is to show what has been possible when thought impossible in the 20th Century and to propose ideas and strategies for our current global agenda, to help get from how the world is to how it can and needs to be. Thanks very much. [ Applause ] So, Jason has a microphone and welcome questions and comments from anyone. >> Let me first say that I find it to be a very incredible, interesting summing up of very complex issues. I'm not from this spot of the world, I'm from the Caribbean, so you know, I studied in Netherlands, America, but I'm from the Caribbean, so I'm just saying that so that you understand where I'm coming from too [inaudible]. You know, some of the people you are summing up here, I mean, they are big and important people. You talk about Al Gore and the IPCC, I mean, I'm wondering about Jimmy Carter and his -- his role. I mean, he's played a tremendous role. I mean, to a certain extent, I think an even more important than Al Gore, but be that as it may. And what I see is that really much more kind of radically leaders from the third world. I'm talking -- I mean, this is a huge problem, but what is happening in Cuba now, obviously, [inaudible] or, I mean, whatever one might think of as undertaking of trying to come up with a different way to integrate the Caribbean in a much more independent way [inaudible] United States of America, right, which I mean, what's happening in Venezuela, what happening Bolivia, a lot of these different places, it is run to ground. In the Caribbean are much more positive one, or maybe somewhat less controversial [inaudible] to a certain extent, still controversial would be the leader of Jamaica. Now, I forgot his name, in 1980's -- what's his name? [ Inaudible Speaker ] -- right, right, you know? I was in Netherlands there, I was a law student at university [inaudible] those days and I remember going to England and everybody would come and hug me and say, "You guys have the spokesman for the Third World, right." So, I was wondering, I mean, a lot of this takes place in kind of, you know, liberal internationalism, etcetera, etcetera. But what do you see of the other attempts by other leaders, right, to as the world change and as the -- as the power in the world clearly shifts away -- start to shift away from the United States of America. >> Bruce Jentleson: Right. >> How do you see and potentially, how do you see these other leaders trying to be transformation leaders in this new [inaudible]. Thank you. >> Bruce Jentleson: So, I think your comments point to my -- two things I said. One is I -- I, you know, I've tried to choose representative examples of each type, not necessarily comprehensive. And secondly, the great social media game that can come out of this. I've given a couple talks in these other places and, you know, people always have their own lists and stuff. And, I mean, I can make arguments about some of the people you mentioned, pros and cons, you know, that sort of way. But I think -- but the last point is what I really want to focus on, which in the last chapter, you know, I talk about the shifts. When you look at the 20th Century and you look at breakthroughs for global peace and security, it tended to be very western because of the nature of the system in power. I think what's interesting about the 21st Century and I've written on this in other places, what I call the pluralization of diplomacy, right. Indeed even in my undergraduate days at Cornell, there was a great course called astronomy for nonmajors taught by a not -- a guy who wasn't yet famous called Carl Sagan. And so I always loved these astronomy metaphors and if talked about how to a certain extent, the Cold War was a era like [inaudible] era, you know, [inaudible] had the earth at the center and everything revolved around it. [Inaudible] the U.S. saw itself at the center of that world, ideologically, economically, military. Copernican comes along many centuries later and says, "Actually, every planet has its own orbit and there's something called the sun in the middle." I think the 21st Century is a Copernican world, you have many countries that have a sense of what their interest priorities and choices are. And I think what we'll see, you know, over the next decades is -- is more of these kind of initiatives that broadly effect global peace and security coming from nonwestern leaders. In fact, it's my hope. But, you know, empirically looking at the 20th Century, it tends to tilt in that direction. So, yeah I mean, there could be plenty of discussions and debates about choices and there's some people, you know, that I haven't included because, you know, I'm under -- you know, it's got to be a certain length for my publisher and everything. But -- but that's really where an interesting question is. And part of my goal in writing the book whether it's for people in scholarly circles or people in book clubs, you know, to have these kind of discussions. Who would you put in those categories? >> Hi, thank you so much for your talk. So, I'm a history major, so I probably have like 20 different questions for you, but I'll limit myself to one. I really appreciated that you ended talking about climate change refugees. And one thing I was actually, like a couple days ago, just reading the UNHCR sort of stipulations for how we should like treat climate change refugees. But then, it makes you wonder, so all of those NGO's, all of these things, like the UN and human rights council, everything -- to what extent do NGO's that were created in the 20th Century, now in the 21st Century, just serve to sort of like benevolently like sort of perpetuate the status quo where the west is sort of controlling things, creating stipulations, creating sort of our definition for what rights are, for what is a refugee, what isn't a refugee, how should they be treated, etcetera. And so, like I guess with that considered, like how is that then a model for a more just world? >> Bruce Jentleson: Yeah, I think -- I think, you know, NGO's is a large category and when I teach my course at the university on globalization and governance, I try to give the students of a couple cases of NGO's as "bad guys" and companies as good guys because everybody, you know, usually assumes the opposite of them. Just to sort of mix it up. So, there's no question that there's differences in NGO's. The climate change issue to me, you know, when I talked about the three C's -- conducive conditions, constraints and choices, it is so ripe for some -- various kinds of leadership statesmanship. I mean, here you have the private sector, you know, if you're an insurance company and you own hotels on Miami Beach, you know, you're actually really beginning to think that climate change might be a problem, right. So there -- there's a shift from the classical, and that's where I try to talk about with [inaudible] and Gore and the IPC from the binary zero sum, you're either for the economic or for not. But it hasn't gone far enough -- I mean, even the Paris Agreement, you know, is not really keeping up with the pace of climate change. So -- so what I'm going to, you know, try to say, that you have a lot of conditions there, you know -- you know, Pope Francis has spoken to it now, that it's really ripe because you have more conducive conditions I think in fewer constraints. I know there are some people that still deny that it's happening, but that's another subject. But I'm just talking about things happening and there are different issues here, you know, if you're in Micronesia, you know, it -- I mean, talk about climate refugee. So -- so, I guess I would say, I'm not trying to glorify NGO, I'm trying to say how they're part of the statesmanship mix in the 21st Century and then people will make judgments and analysis about where they think their playing, you know, [inaudible] a positive role and we're not. >> Thank you. Firstly, just to say thank you so much for your amazing insights. I very much look forward to reading the book. I represent the European Union, which is a set of [inaudible] institutions which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 in recognition of six decades of peace on a continent that had had two fairly nasty wars at the first half of the 20th Century. That's the breakthrough. The challenges we're facing in the 21st Century, I think are fairly self-evident, we don't need to talk about them too much. But just be really interested in your assessment of the role of the likes of Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer. And you can -- the list goes on and on and on, but some of those. >> Bruce Jentleson: Yeah, I actually -- I've -- I at one point had Monnet and the whole group, Adenauer, Schuman in the book. And I've been wrestling with that, actually I've done a lot of the research on it and I've been wrestling with it. And I don't like to be too newspapery, headliney, you know, about [inaudible] refugees, euro, etcetera. So I'm still wrestling with that because I do believe it, because I tried to -- you know, my own sense is that in -- in the 21st Century world, regional organizations are extremely important, African Union has been very important [inaudible] in Africa, [inaudible] and Asia, and that the EU is really the -- the -- yeah, I mean, you know, blaze the trail. And as you said, and we Americans don't give enough attention to, stopping major power wars after -- over a century of them in Europe was really a big deal, right. Whatever else is happening -- so you're exactly right, I've been wrestling with that and trying to decide whether or not to put it back in and say the same kind of thing. Whatever else has happened since then or happens in the future, this was really a big deal. So you -- you -- you nailed me on that one and I'm still mulling it over, hearing you raise that maybe be a reason to, you know, try to put it back in, so yeah. >> Thank you, sir. Do you think that Detante, if it would have continued, could have had the same results that Reagan got in the 80's, in terms of Soviet -- the fall of the Soviet Union? >> Bruce Jentleson: Do I think what, I'm sorry? >> Do you think Detente, if it would have continued in the 70's, could've achieved the same results that Reagan got in the 1980's? >> Bruce Jentleson: I think Detente collapsed before -- before Reagan's election, I mean, I think Detente collapsed because of policies on both sides and a whole variety of things. And I think that the, you know, on the Soviet side and the U.S. side and I think some ways Detente was put together that created expectations on both -- on both sides that more had been worked out than before. I think that in the Gorbachev era, there are many who argue that, you know, Gorbachev had no choice, it was all about Star Wars, etcetera. And I go into some detail in the book, you know, making the case why there were plenty of choices that he had. They might not have been good choices, but he had plenty of choices. He could've, you know, sent the military into Poland just like they did in Prague in 1968 and Hungary in 1956. And there were unusual aspects, you know, of him as a leader. And Reagan, second term Reagan, much to the chagrin of some of his own hawks, you know, developed this partnership, you know, with Gorbachev. And so there is some credit to be given there even though, you know, on the liberal side people don't always acknowledge that. Now there's a -- there's a, sort of a hero worship of Reagan on the other side says it was all about Reagan and if we hadn't, you know, pushed them [inaudible] have it, so I really do focus a lot on Gorbachev, but bring -- and I bring de Klerk a little bit into the story of Mandela, but he doesn't really in my, you know, my diplo-ball -- I make an argument that I think other South African leaders would have made the same choices that de Klerk did. And -- and that Reagan wasn't as unique whereas Gorbachev and Mandela were unique. But I think Detente collapsed for some of its own, you know, own internal problems and contradictions. [ Inaudible Speaker ] By 1980, between the, you know -- you know, issues on [inaudible] Afghanistan, issues in the Third World where both of us, you know, were still prepared to look for -- for unilateral advantages in the Third World. Those were contradictions never worked out by Detente, so. >> Thank you very much for your wonderful talk. I wanted to ask a question about a subset of your cases because when I think of statesmanship, I think of statesman who hold the risk of the survivability of their populations at stake and the horrible choices involved at -- on the cusp of war, for example, where they have to risk everything. So FDR and Gorbachev, people who rise above and take major risk and the consequences are so huge, are almost a case apart. And I was wondering if you could talk a little bit about what in your research has come up about the -- the character of those visionaries that allow them to overcome that huge hump. And when we look back at somebody like Sir Edward Grey at the cusp of World War I, in the July crisis, he seemed to stall out. And he could have been there except for what? What are those character traits in your view of the people who take the huge risks, like the Gorbachev? >> Bruce Jentleson: It's a great -- it's a great question, and I you know, in that -- it's a great question in that who/why framework. So I actually start with the why part, I mean, you know, you see this progression of a vision. I mean, Rabin is a good example, right, here was somebody who was a general and who came to the realization that there was no guarantee that peace would bring Israel security, but Israel could have -- never have security without peace. And he got there through experience -- and so some of the qualities that people have like that Gorbachev had them too, some others did, Mandela had it. I mean, really, you know, we take it for granted, 27 years political prisoner and you come out thinking reconciliation, right. So there was an ability to have a sense of society, you know, that understood the other side was receptive in some ways to without totally accepting, but receptive to the narrative of the other side. A little bit of a flexibility of mind and, you know, and so the -- and sort of this -- this -- and then this moral capital that gave them, you know, the standing to make the case. And when they didn't fully succeed on that, you know, with the -- particularly the symbolic parts, you know, like Gorbachev, it brings you down. And the political skills -- and the political skills they try to trace earlier in their careers, you know, some of it is, you know, the ability to build coalitions and certain kinds of leadership skills. So there's no one model, but there's a general sense, you know, you get into some of this literature and it's almost like there's a template and sort of the good news is we're not waiting for the perfect person. If there were really opportunities [inaudible] issues whether it's climate change or others, for all sorts of pp to step forward, you know, so I mean, actually I'm probably going to talk about the Pope in the last chapter, because what he's had is a deeply held spiritually, but vision of commonality in many respects, right. And that can come from a lot of places. And so that's really an important quality, but you find this in different combinations, you know, sort of a -- there's not a rigidity of thinking. There's a certain receptivity to, you know, new information and there's an ability to question your premises when you see a need to question a premises. And those are somewhat generic, which is the good news I think, you know, but they're not too general, but they're somewhat, you know, they're not -- they're not the LaBron James or the Mozart, you know, you find somebody out there and, you know, that's the person, so. >> Why don't we take one more. >> Bruce Jentleson: Okay. >> This man, gentleman right here in the back. >> You talk about global peace and security, but it seems to be your cases are somewhat light on people who have done the simple thing, the most obvious thing about peace which is stop being an armed conflict. Is there any reason -- am I reading that right, is there any reason for that, that they're not terribly well presented? >> Bruce Jentleson: Well, you know, the Northern Ireland case in some ways tries to get at that as an example of people who, you know -- one was a secretary at the Guinness Brewery, right, who were just everyday people and they had this personal experience with it. And they, you know, sort of woman in moment in that case, they came out at a point where Northern Ireland, you know, had really sort of their hands up. Some ways the human rights community, I think to the extent that it's been involved in that. They're probably some peace movement ones, John, that I could think of that might be interesting to include. You know, we thought about having sort of a appendix of lots of other cases that might bring in, you know, without [inaudible]. But I'd be interested to talk with you more about ones you might -- you might think about. I mean, you know, you could talk about the Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980's, but -- but I don't think it made its breakthrough, you know? >> But that didn't stop arm -- an armed conflict that tried to keep them from happening, but that's a -- >> Bruce Jentleson: Right. >> -- different issue than stopping it, making peace in other words. >> Bruce Jentleson: Are you thinking of any particular cases, or -- >> No. >> Bruce Jentleson: Okay. We'll have to talk more. >> Maybe it has something to do with a category that -- >> Bruce Jentleson: Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think I try to get at the global peace -- I mean, there are many different ways and at the beginning of the book I say -- I say there's a little bit, you know, that this kind of change, it's top down, middle out and bottom up, you know, there's the people power, there's the [inaudible] square and there's the people power that brought down Marcos in the Philippines in the 1980's. And all of those are important in global change, I'm just trying to focus on the particular role of leaders without saying it's the be all and the end all. And some of our political science colleagues, of course, want me to get a larger end and build a model and do the regression analysis, but neither you nor I go there in that, so. >> I think we'll stop there, so please join me in thanking Bruce. >> Bruce Jentleson: Thanks very much. Thank you. [ Applause ] >> This has been a presentation of the Library of Congress. Visit us at Library of Congress.gov.