>> From the Library of
Congress in Washington, D.C.
>> T.J. Halstead: Good morning.
I'm T.J. Halstead,
the Deputy Director
of the Congressional Research
Service, and it is my pleasure
to welcome all of you, our
distinguished panelists, guests,
and friends of the
Library of Congress.
And to thank you as well
for joining us today
as we celebrate Human Rights Day.
Human Rights Day is officially
observed every year on December 10th
to commemorate the adoption
of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights by the General
Assembly of the United Nations
in Paris, on December 10th of 1948.
The Declaration was designed
to provide a global framework
for human rights following World War
II and the end of the Colonial Era.
The Declaration can be
accurately characterized
as the first truly global
enunciation of human rights
and is considered the
most translated document
in modern history.
It's available in more
than 360 languages
and new translations are
added on a regular basis.
Given the status of the document,
its history and its impact
on legal systems around the
world, I think it is very fitting
that my colleagues at the
Law Library of Congress,
the world's largest law library,
and a leading research center
for foreign comparative
and international law are
hosting today's event.
Today's program, the Impact of the
Miranda Warning on Human Rights
in Eastern Europe will address how
American laws have affected human
rights developments in Romania
and the former Soviet Union.
Before I introduce my friend
and colleague, Mr. Peter Roudik,
who will serve as today's moderator,
I kindly ask that you switch your
mobile devices to silent mode.
And please note that this
program is being videotaped
and will be presented later as a
webcast on the library's website.
At this time, I welcome
Peter Roudik,
head of the Law Library's Global
Legal Research Directorate,
to the stage.
Who will share more details
about today's program
and introduce our distinguished
panelists.
Peter. Thank you very much.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you,
T.J. As T.J. mentioned,
today we are celebrating
the adoption
of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948,
which provides a global
framework for human rights.
But today's event also
marks the 50th anniversary
of the 1966 Supreme Court
decision Miranda versus Arizona.
Which the library has been
commemorating throughout this year.
This landmark Supreme
Court ruling requires
that criminal suspects
will be informed
of their constitutional rights
at the time of their arrest
and before interrogation.
[ Inaudible ]
Who discussed with us
procedural protections afforded
by the United States Constitution
and safeguards by the courts
and how they're essential
to our liberties.
Then in July we hosted
the law and film event
which highlighted how the
[inaudible] the Miranda Warning has
evolved over the last fifty years.
[ Inaudible ]
And that is why today we conclude
our commemoration of Miranda
by examining how this ruling
and American legislation
in general has served as an
inspiring example for those
who fight injustice
in other countries.
Also it is not a coincidence that
today is the Anti-Corruption Day
which is celebrated on
this day since 2003,
when the U.N. declaration against,
convention against
corruption was adopted.
Also the issues are interconnected,
and all of those issues will
be discussed today during
our discussion.
And that's why I'm honored to
present our distinguished speakers
to you who will discuss
the Miranda Warning
and human rights in other countries.
Today we are joined by Kyle Parker,
Senior Professional Staff Member
of the United States House
of Representatives
Foreign Affairs Committee.
Dr. William Pomeranz, Deputy
Director of the Kennan Institute
for Advanced Russian Studies
of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
Honorable Monica Macovei, member
of the European Parliament
and Former Minister
of Justice of Romania.
She just came from Brussels
to participate in this panel
and [inaudible] really
thankful for that.
And the Russian journalist,
historian
and [inaudible], Natella
Boltyanskaya.
Of course you are waiting to listen
from our speakers, not from me.
So I'm really honored
to present them for you.
We have partition of scholars,
academics, politicians,
and we will hear [inaudible]
from each of them individually
and then to have a discussion.
At this time, please join me in
welcoming Kyle Parker to the stage.
[ Applause ]
>> Kyle Parker: Thank you, Peter.
It's, it's an honor to participate
in today's discussion here
at the Library of Congress.
My first job in Washington
was actually helping
to start the Library of Congress'
Open World program back in 1999.
A program that was conceived
by Dr. Jim Billington,
and academician [foreign
language] in, in Russia.
It began as a high-level exchange
between Russia's Federal Assembly
and the United States Congress.
And now as a Congressional Staffer,
I regularly rely on the expertise
of the Congressional Research
Service as well as the attorneys
at the Law Library to do my job.
And frankly, one of
the best perks I feel
of being a Congressional Staffer
is the ability to go online late
at night at my house
and order a book
from the largest collection
in the world.
And have it sitting on
my desk the next day.
So it's good to be here.
As, as you mentioned,
Peter, our conversation is,
is especially timely in addition
to marking 50 years since Miranda
versus Arizona and Human Rights Day.
Yesterday marked 25 years since
signing of the Belavezha Bill
of Accords, which dissolved
the Soviet Union.
So it's as good a time as any to
take stock of where we've been
and where we may be headed as a
new Administration takes power here
in Washington.
Now under the new rules of
the House of Representatives,
all legislation we
introduce must be accompanied
by a statement naming
the relevant parts
of the U.S. Constitution giving
Congress the authority to legislate
on the subject of the
bill to be introduced.
So let me start off with what
I consider to be something
like a constitutional authority
statement for U.S. advocacy
on human rights in Europe.
It comes from the organization
For Security and Cooperation
in Europe's 1991 Moscow Document.
And states that, quote, "The
participating states emphasize
that issues relating to human
rights, fundamental freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law are
of international concern as respect
for these rights and freedoms
constitutes one of the foundations
of the international order.
It categorially and
irrevocably declare
that the commitments undertaken in
the field of the human dimension
of the CSCE are matters of
direct and legitimate concern
to all participating states.
And do not belong exclusively
to the internal affairs
of the state concerned."
End quote.
This unambiguous declaration
was reaffirmed
at the most recent
OSCE summit in 2010.
And the commitments referenced
happen to be the richest body
of human rights commitments
that bind all
of the OSCE's 57 participating
states which of course includes all
of Europe, the countries
of the former Soviet Union
as well as the United States.
Obviously, there are many other
reasons for the United States
to care about rights that are
universal and inalienable.
But this is a pretty
good one to cite to those
who would dismiss our
concerns as meddling
in others' internal affairs.
In fact, during my time at
the U.S. Helsinki Commission,
I used this declaration
as my email signature.
Now, I was asked to give the
American perspective and will do
so today as a practitioner of
human rights policy in Congress.
And as far as human rights in
general and human rights in Europe,
Congress leads the United States
government in advocating for
and legislating on
fundamental freedoms.
As the branch of government
closest to American civil society
which cares a great deal about human
rights, Congress often sees merit
in ideas and causes that bureaucrats
and experts may find inadvisable,
unrealistic, or even impossible.
But it's precisely this
institutional tension
that produced monumental human
rights legislation addressing abuses
in Eastern Europe since Miranda.
These are the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment of 1974,
the creation of the U.S.
Helsinki Commission in 1976,
and the Magnitsky Act of 2012.
And most recently the Global
Magnitsky Act which is on its way
to the President's
desk for signature
as we speak here this morning.
I spent nearly a decade
covering human rights in Russia
at the U.S. Helsinki
Commission which in the 1970s
and '80s was the lead
U.S. agency for advocating
for Soviet dissidents, Jewish
refuseniks, and the captive nations.
But during my time
on the commission,
we focused on corruption
instead of communism.
And while fighting corruption
and promoting human rights
is not the same thing,
there's enough overlap to at least
allow the casual use of one term
to also include the other.
In early 2009, I reluctantly
accepted a meeting
that would dramatically change how
I viewed human rights advocacy.
Set a new precedent for how
the United States responded
to human rights violations
in Russia,
and now offers a powerful
new mechanism
to address human rights
violations around the world.
And one that happens to be
uniquely suited for this current era
of shrinking budgets and
extreme transparency.
This meeting was with Bill Browder,
who previously managed the best
performing hedge fund in the world
and was for a time the largest
foreign portfolio investor
in Russia.
I didn't know him personally, but
remembered him as being a champion
of Vladimir Putin's
early economic reforms
which made Browder's
expulsion from Russia in 2005,
all the more notable and perplexing.
Bill came to tell the story of
his tax lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky,
who was in pretrial
detention in Moscow
for having exposed the largest
tax fraud in Russian history.
And was being subjected to
increasingly torturous conditions.
Sergei's story was remarkable
in that it was a departure
from the usual tale of wealthy
Russian businessmen who had fallen
out of favor with the Kremlin
and then were facing something
that might charitably be
called "selective justice."
But Sergei was a young, middleclass
Muscovite who was not involved
in politics, whose
client lost no money.
And was seeking only to
understand what we now know,
thanks to Magnitsky's
heroic efforts,
to be an elaborate scheme involving
senior officials, organized crime.
And the offshore zone to steal
at least a half a billion dollars
from the Russian Treasury
and launder it abroad.
This fateful meeting with Bill was
the beginning of efforts outside
of Russia to save Sergei and later
to honor his commitment
to the truth.
Now it's easy to get jaded on
the human rights beat in Russia.
And work at the Helsinki Commission
in the Putin era was frustrating,
low profile, and with
few visible successes.
The North Caucuses simmered
with low intensity conflict,
creating a long list of victims of
forced disappearances and torture.
Russia's free media
and civil society were
under increasing pressure.
And the United States was
making a concerted effort
to improve relations
despite these obstacles.
I speak in the past tense because
I no longer work at the Commission,
but as we all know, the
Putin era continues,
and the situation has worsened.
At the Commission, I saw my job
as scanning the horizon for cases
where our attention might be
able to make a difference.
And for cases that would be of
particular interest to our bi--
our bipartisan Congressional
leadership.
Not always an easy things to do.
Whenever I learned of a case
that met these criteria,
our usual approach was to try
and get a senior US official,
preferably the Secretary of State or
even the President to raise the case
with their Russian counterparts.
Frequently, we would only
learn if the case was raised
in the broadest possible terms,
and usually from a response
from some lower ranking
official we didn't even write to.
Thanking us for our
concerns, and assuring us
that they share the same concerns.
Basically, the sort of mealy-mouthed
letter that makes you even angrier
than had you been completely
ignored.
And the Russian government
never paid any attention
to these interventions,
nor did the press.
And then another journalist or human
rights activist would be killed,
with little hope of ever
finding those responsible.
And we dash off yet
another press release,
condemning the latest
human rights outrage.
It was all very unsatisfying,
but it was what we did
because we had to do something.
In an attempt to be fair
and spread our attention,
I had a few active files on my desk.
And if I had been focusing
on one for a while,
I'd try to focus on another.
And somehow the sense that
there were probably thousands
of cases much worse than the ones
we were aware of was strangely given
as an excuse for not doing something
on the cases we did know about.
In the summer of 2009,
human rights activist,
Natalya Estemirova's
bullet-riddled body was found
on a roadside in Ingushetia.
She had visited our Washington
offices not long before her death.
And it felt entirely inappropriate
to merely condemn her brutal murder.
The time had come for action,
but again, what could we do?
At the Commission, Estemirova's
murder would be the last death
of an activist where our
response would be limited
to the same old ineffective tools of
pleading for high-level US attention
and calling for investigations
that are unworthy of the name.
A few months later, on November
16th, 2009, Sergei Magnitsky,
whose plight we learned about
earlier that year, was handcuffed
to a bed in an isolation
cell and beaten
by prison guards until he died.
His torture and ultimately
murder was rigorously documented
in his detailed and
voluminous legal complaints.
And by the bureaucratic
and authoritarian system
that killed him.
Sergei was a young, idealistic
Muscovite who placed great hope
in then-President Medvedev's promise
to end what Medvedev himself
had called "legal nihilism."
Only to become its
most emblematic victim.
At the Commission, we
began work immediately
on assembling documentary
evidence of his false arrest,
illegal detention,
torture, and murder,
as well as on the massive tax
fraud against the Russian people
that he gave his life to expose.
We also combed federal
law for precedent
on how we could address his
case in the United States,
given that a cover-up was
gaining speed in Moscow.
We found a Bush-era executive order
called Proclamation 7750 giving the
President authority to bar foreign
persons engaged in corruption
from entering the United States.
Losing a visa seemed a ridiculously
small strike at impunity.
And we weren't even sure if any
of those involved planned --
visited or had planned
to visit our country.
But in April 2010, Senator
Cardin, who was the Senate Chairman
of the Helsinki Commission,
and now the ranking member
of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee,
decided to send an open letter to
Secretary Clinton, including a list
of 60 Russian officials complicit
in Sergei's false arrest, detention,
torture, and death as well as those
involved in the crimes he exposed.
And asked that she
use this authority
to publicly ban their entry.
Given our previous
experience of sending letters
into a non-responsive void,
we didn't expect much.
But after releasing this
letter late on a Sunday night
as Moscow was waking up on
Monday, we awoke in Washington
to fireworks in the Russian press.
Dramatic headlines
in the Western press,
and Secretary Clinton
wanted to see the Senator.
If we can gauge our
effectiveness by their reaction,
this list was a direct hit.
In fact, I think it was
Newsweek that ran the headline,
"Cardin Drops Bomb on
Russia's Corrupt Elite."
And Russia's leading anti-corruption
activist, Alexei Navalny,
posted the list on his website
with a one-word headline: Wow.
The [foreign language]
had become a rallying cry.
We had finally discovered the
Achilles heel of corrupt officials
in Russia and around the world:
their exposure to the West.
Having trashed the
rule of law at home,
they stash ill-gotten gains abroad
in countries where due process
that -- in countries with due
process that respect human rights.
They also keep passports
with multi-entry visas handy
in case they fall out of favor
and need to make a quick exit.
Moreover, ours was an
asymmetric response
that couldn't easily be countered.
The Kremlin tried banning US
officials and freezing their assets
and were met by jeers
from their own citizens.
They also tried banning
US officials they viewed
as having violated human
rights only to be drawn further
into a public conversation
on the importance
of protecting those rights.
This new technology for
keeping human rights
on the agenda was also
a fairer response.
It shamed individual violators
without saying anything
about their country as a whole
or blocking any business
deals or trade.
Further, it was an
approach that cost nothing
and was easily replicable
in other countries quietly
or with public debate.
In fact, this week Estonia
became the first European country
to pass a Magnitsky-styled law and
similar proposals are now pending
in the United Kingdom and Canada.
In the coming months and years,
we fought an uphill battle spanning
two Congresses to take this idea
that had the proverbial snowball's
chance into a new section
of the United States code.
Throughout the campaign,
our greatest support came
from Russia's besieged civil society
and from the International
Human Rights community.
While our greatest resistance
came from the Administration,
the Kremlin, and the trade
lobby, in that order.
In fact, it was the Administration's
proxy blocking in Congress that led
to the Magnitsky Act being tied to
Russia's Jackson-Vanik termination.
And it was the Administration's
desire to spare Russia that led them
to propose that Congress make
the act explicitly global.
They later reversed course and
joined the House leadership
in insisting that it
be limited to Russia.
The original Magnitsky Act also
set the stage for our response
to Putin's unprovoked and
illegal war in Ukraine.
With many of the early targets
of the Magnitsky legislation
being added
to Treasury's specially designated
nationals' list by executive order.
Should those sanctions ever
be removed prematurely,
here or in Europe, I suspect
that the Magnitsky Act will stand
as the most prominent rebuke
to the violent kleptocracy
currently ruling Russia
and menacing the entire region.
The new global Magnitsky Act builds
on the successes of the original act
and they prove a valuable tool
for the new Administration
to target human rights abusers
in China, in Iran, in Cuba,
or anywhere in the world.
I hope they implement it
vigorously and I'm confident
that the Human Rights
community as well
as Congress will be
encouraging them to do just that.
Thank you.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you, Kyle.
Dr. Pomeranz.
>> Dr. Pomeranz.
Well, thank you very much, Peter.
It is always a pleasure to be at
the Library of Congress and to walk
by the Law Library of Congress.
A brief story: I did a
Ph.D. for five years,
but I always like to say I have
five days I remember the most.
And one of those five days
took place at the Law Library,
and this may date myself, where I
was given a stack pass and allowed
to go into the depths of the Library
of Congress, press some buttons
that I couldn't quite understand.
But nevertheless, books began
to appear, and all of a sudden,
there in front of me was
the largest collection
on the pre-revolutionary Advocatura,
the legal profession,
in Czarist Russia.
And I smiled because my Ph.D. had
gotten a huge lift that morning,
and it was all thanks
to the Law Library.
And I proceeded to spend a
good three months digging
through what was available.
And it was just a tremendous,
a tremendous opportunity.
I'm going to follow on Kyle, but
take a little different approach
to the discussion of Miranda.
Because as was mentioned at the
beginning, our, our goal is not only
to look domestically but
also internationally.
And looking at how US
law impacts foreign law
and influences human rights.
I'll focus primarily on Russia
but I'm also going to talk
about other post-Soviet
countries as well.
And in the spirit of the Miranda
Warning, I'm actually going to delve
into criminal procedure within the
Russian criminal justice system,
but then expand to talk
about broader issues
about how the United States
promotes legal reform abroad.
And at the very end, a general
discussion about the direction
of Russia's legal trajectory.
Now to do so, I want to issue
one caveat at the beginning.
I just finished reading
a fascinating
and in many ways upsetting
book called Just Mercy,
by the lawyer Brian Stevenson,
who details the problems
of wrongly condemned people
in the US justice system.
Suffice it to say, when you have a
chance to read about the underbelly
of the US criminal justice system,
it has its fair share of problems
and unpleasantness as well.
So I want to emphasize that the
Miranda Warning is always the
beginning of the process.
It does not eliminate
necessary long-standing biases
within a legal system that
can lead to unjust verdicts.
And that is true of all legal
systems and not just to Russia.
But as I mentioned, I'm going to
begin with criminal procedure,
and I'm going to start
with the passage
of the Russian Criminal
Procedure Code in 2001.
Now, I was doing the math, and I
realized that was just 15 years ago,
but it really hearkens to another
era in Russian and Russian history.
Because the Criminal Procedure Code
was signed by one Vladimir Putin.
And at the time, it was
perceived in many ways
as a very important liberal reform.
Transforming the Russian criminal
process and holding out the promise
of reforming the corrupt
Soviet legal system
that was still in place
inside Russia.
Now, the 2001 Criminal Procedure
Code does possess a Miranda-style
warning stating that when a suspect
is detained or is in custody,
that that person has
the right to know
of what he or she is suspected of.
He or she has the right to
obtain documents related
to the instigation
of the criminal case.
And that person has a
right to avail themselves
onto the advice of legal counsel.
Yet 15 years afterwards,
few would argue
that the Russian criminal justice
system has lived up to that warning
or indeed to Western standards.
And the question is why is this so?
Or to ask the question another way,
why has a Miranda-style
warning become superfluous
within the Russian legal system?
And the answer can be found in a
fascinating statistic inside Russia,
and that is the conviction rate of
Russian criminals who go to trial,
and that statistic is 99%.
Similar percentages exist in other
post-Soviet republics as well.
And the question, when you look
at that, is how can that be?
Why is, why is it that
99% of all people
who go before the [inaudible],
face --
inside the criminal justice
system end up being convicted?
Now, on one hand you might think
that maybe Russia has some
outstanding criminal investigators
who are diligent and impartial and
always are able to get their man.
But that really isn't the case.
You also might think that it's
because of rampant corruption,
and in certain economic cases, there
are plenty examples of corruption.
But the average Russian criminal
defendant is male, poor, uneducated,
and without any resources
necessarily to bribe a judge.
So it's not really
corruption as well that,
that explains the 99%
conviction rate.
The major problem, as
I would put forward,
and as Russian scholars
have themselves argued is
that the incentives are all wrong.
What do I mean by that?
Because when you look at how
certain legal institutions
and practitioners are
evaluated, they're evaluated based
on convictions and acquittal rates.
So for example, if I'm a prosecutor
in Russia, and I want to get
on in the system, I will be judged
by how many acquittals have
resulted in my prosecutions.
So in other words, acquittals work
against me if I want to advance
within the Russian
criminal bureaucracy.
Similarly, if I'm a judge, I will
be evaluated by the percentage
of cases that are overturned.
Again, most of the cases
that are overturned
in the Russian criminal
justice system are acquittals.
So again, if I'm a part of the
legal, Russian legal bureaucracy,
I have certain incentives
not to break the system.
And that is really not to
somehow challenge this fact
that Russia has a 99%
conviction rate.
Now Russia has adopted
an adversarial system,
at least a trial, where a defendant
is represented by a lawyer,
and the state is represented
by the prosecutor.
But as I noted above, by
the time one gets to trial,
the decision essentially
has been made.
I once talked to a Russian defense
attorney and asked them, "Well,
what do you tell your client
before you go to trial?"
And he informed me he tells
them that they have a one
in 100 chance of getting off.
Again, you can imagine
that, you know,
how that goes down with the client.
But nevertheless, they, there
are people who are still willing
to fight within the system.
But if you are somehow going to get
the charges dropped against you,
the crucial time to do it is
in the investigation process.
And during the investigation
process,
the Russian legal system primarily
retains the inquisitorial system
that has so long prevailed
not only in the Soviet period,
but even in the Czarist
period as well.
And during, under an inquisitorial
system, it is the investigator
that controls the investigation --
investigation, and
the course of inquiry.
And in many cases, the advocate or
the lawyer, the defense attorney,
is appointed and paid by the state.
And in order to keep
this steady stream
of appointments going is
unwilling to challenge the state.
Now, criminal procedure code
does allow defense attorneys
to interview witnesses
and submit evidence
into the case file during the
preliminary investigation.
But that evidence is assumed
to be bias in many cases
because it is submitted
by the defense attorney.
Now you may ask, "Where is the
Russian judiciary in this process?"
Which is the logical
check on potential abuse
by investigators and prosecutors.
And not surprising, the
judiciary is part of the problem,
not the solution, as well.
In the US and in other legal
systems, a appointment to a --
to the judiciary is really the final
step in a career whereas in Russia,
one can become a judge
at the tender age of 25.
Now, the also important aspect
of the Russian judiciary is
that it is drawn mainly from the
judicial bureaucracy prosecutors,
court secretaries, and so forth.
It is not drawn from
the defense attorneys,
the people who have the most
kind of practical experience.
And that is for a variety
of reasons.
But it means that the
judiciary is kind of overflowing
with people of the system.
And so the long-standing biases
against the criminal defendant
perpetuate themselves.
And limit the impact of any
Miranda-style warning to defendants.
And this leads to my second point.
One that is well known but also
deserves to -- deserves repeating.
And that is promoting human rights
and legal reform is not just
about establishing new
procedural guarantees
of what is written in the law.
It also requires the
reform of institutions.
And as we have learned
that post-Soviet legal institutions
have proven highly-resistant
to change.
This is not just true
of the judiciary,
but also true of the
prosecutors' office.
And the legacy, the Soviet legacy
that has affected prosecutors
and the position of prosecutors
in the post-Soviet space
has best been seen recently
in Ukraine and not in Russia.
And the assumption is again that
the prosecutor resembles an American
prosecutor or at least a prosecutor
in the continental system.
Where their primary
responsibility is
to represent the state's
interest in court.
And the answer in the
post-Soviet space is no.
A Ukrainian prosecutor,
like a Russian prosecutor,
possesses far more administrative
and supervisory responsibilities
than his or her Western counterpart.
And the institution of the head
of the prosecutor's office is
also tied to a political leader.
It is no accident that the
prosecutor's office has been known
as "the eyes of the state."
For almost three centuries
in post-Soviet Russia,
the Soviet Union, and
in the Imperial period.
So when Ukraine began to
reform in the aftermath
of the Euromaidan Revolution
two years ago,
it gradually became
apparent that one
of the main stumbling blocks was
the prosecutor's office itself.
The prosecutor's office
stood at the nexus,
and in many ways successfully
blocked three reform processes.
Anti-corruption, the division
of powers, and the rule of law.
And it was no accident that a
very frustrated Vice President,
Joseph Biden, felt necessary to
call the President of, of Ukraine
and demand that the head
prosecutor be fired.
Now, Poroshenko was very reluctant
to do so in part because his ability
to control the head prosecutor, who
reports directly to the President,
under the Ukrainian Constitution,
was one of the few sources
of leverage that the President had
within the Ukrainian
political system.
But even though Poroshenko was
ultimately agreed to fire the Head
of the Prosecutor's Office,
he wasn't in a position,
was not in a position to
fire 18,000 other prosecutors
who were also tainted
by the previous system
who are also part of
the Soviet legacy.
And that is the other, the --
the dilemma of the reform process
that the United States tries to deal
with because the United
States prides itself
in evolutionary reform.
But it's much more difficult
to pursue this notion
of evolutionary reform in a legal
system that is still weighed
down by Soviet legal institutions.
Now what is required in order
to address this problem is political
will, and we are still waiting
to see to what extent the
political will exists in Ukraine
to transform its legal system.
Such political will is
noticeably lacking of course
in the Russian Federation.
That is not to say that Russians
have necessarily abandoned their
legal system.
One of the fascinating things about
Russian law, if you follow it,
is the increasing number of civil
cases that take place in Russia,
and the willingness of average
Russian citizens to turn
to the courts to address
everyday complaints.
A leaky pipe, common spaces,
all these types of issues.
And so the fact that so many
Russians are willing to turn
to the courts for everyday
civil suits is really one
of the under-appreciated
aspects of legal reform.
And, and the nature of the
Russian legal system itself.
People don't go through
the, the difficulties
of pursuing legal cases unless they
have, believe, they have some chance
of resolution at a certain level.
Nevertheless, Putin's return
to the Presidency in 2012,
has been accompanied by
a dramatic deterioration
in the human rights
situation in Russia.
And Kyle has highlighted some of
those in terms of the legislation
that has been passed,
the foreign agents law,
the law restricting the right
to protest, freedom of assembly,
anti-gay legislation, anti-blasphemy
legislation, and so forth.
We've also seen the
politicization of the legal process
since Putin returned to office.
And again, there is a growing number
of cases that can be cited there.
And finally, in the
aftermath of Crimea,
we now have the human rights
disaster in, in Crimea as well
as in Eastern Ukraine where
we really have seen kind
of the deterioration of any
sort of legal decisions.
All those issues impact
human rights in Russia today.
All of them need to be followed.
All of them need to be included in
any assessment of the rule of law
and Russia's legal trajectory.
But as, as, as I draw to the end of
my, my comments, I'm going to focus
on another alarming development
in Russia's legal devel--
, legal evolution over
the past year.
And that has been a decision by the
Russian legislature to pass a law
that allows the Russian
Constitutional Court
to overturn decisions by the
European Court of Human Rights.
Now one cannot underestimate
how important Russia's decision
to join the European -- to
sign the European Convention
for Human Rights.
And become a part of the
European Court has been.
It has allowed Russians to
appeal human rights infractions
to Strasbourg.
It has allowed -- Strasbourg in
turn has imposed significant fines
on the Russian government that it
has, that is has to pay in order
to address human rights violations.
And finally, Russian courts
have referred to the Convention
and to individual European Court
rulings when making their decision.
So if you want to look at
the evolution of Russian law
and how foreign law has been
able to penetrate Russian law,
one of the best examples to date so
far has been the European Convention
and European Court decisions.
Now, as I mentioned in 2015,
Russia established a mechanism
whereby the Russian Constitutional
Court can overturn
European Court decisions
that violate the Russian
Constitution.
Now, admittedly, European countries
have been very good at finding ways
to avoid implementing European
Court decisions themselves,
but they have never gone so far
as to establish a specific
legal procedure
that allows a domestic court to
overturn a European Court decision.
The Russian Constitutional Court
has already done so in one case,
in a prisoners' voting
right, rights case.
And it looks like it's
going to do so again
in a upcoming [inaudible] decision.
So therefore, as someone who
monitors human rights in Russia,
I will be paying strict attention to
how the relationship between Russia
and the European Court
of Human Rights evolves.
It has been severely tested in the
past, but Russia has never been
so bold as to leave the European
Convention or to walk away
from Europe, but it will
come under increased scrutiny
and pressure going forward.
I should add that the Constitutional
Court in Russia will also be coming
under increased scrutiny.
One of the first reforms that
Vladimir Putin did when he came
to power was abolish one of
the high courts in Russia,
the higher commercial courts, and
rolled it under the Supreme Court.
I think there's a genuine fear that
Putin will take a similar approach
to the Constitutional Court and roll
it under the Supreme Court as well.
So in conclusion, I think we
are as again, Kyle mentioned
and I'm sure everyone is aware,
we are really entering a new
period of US-Russian relations.
And it, it remains unclear
in many ways what role
human rights will play
in US-Russian relations
going forward.
Part of the challenges,
challenge will be to focus
and to highlight those human
rights abuses inside Russia
and around the world as well.
The other part of the
challenge, however,
is to live up to our own ideals
which are in so many ways symbolized
by the procedural protections
and guarantees articulated
in the Miranda decision.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you, William.
Miss Macovei, please.
>> Monica Macovei: Do
you mind if I speak here?
>> Peter Roudik: Yes, please.
>> Monica Macovei: I'm
used to speak standing.
Are they working?
Yes. I used to speak standing.
Hello, everyone.
And I'm happy to, to make,
have made such a long travel
to be here with you today.
And I also am happy that about this
coincidence that we celebrate the,
the Anti-Corruption Day,
International Anti-Corruption Day
and the International
Human Rights Day.
One is today; one is tomorrow.
Today is Anti-Corruption Day.
Tomorrow is -- is Human Rights Day.
And maybe that's not
the coincidence.
We can't talk about civil
rights in a corrupt country,
in a country where the, that
the state [inaudible] captive
to corruption.
Now, listening to my previous
speakers, to the previous speakers,
I see some common background.
I also served as a member
and then as a President
of the Romanian Helsinki Committee.
I know is different than your
Helsinki Commission in the Congress,
but it deals with human rights
and I took to the European Court
of Human Rights to which you last
referred as a civil rights lawyer.
I took about 20 cases all
for Romanians whose rights have
been violated by the state.
And I won them all, and that was one
of the happiest period in my life,
to, to write these applications.
Most cases referred to people beaten
up by the police or even killed
after being beaten up by the police.
Also property cases and
generally it's being imprisoned
for criticizing political figures.
Imagine at the beginning
of ninety, we ratified --
the [inaudible] ratified the
European Convention of Human Rights.
Ninety-four, politicians
didn't like, didn't want,
didn't accept that they are
criticized by, by journalists.
So we had criminal offenses
to take them to prison.
They were called "offense
against authorities."
So a politician was the
authority itself of the state,
so if you criticize the
politician, insult the politician,
then you insult the authority of
the country and you go to prison.
Okay, this time are gone,
but this European Convention
of Human Rights helped a lot
and all these case helped a lot
to change the country and I
assume not only in Romania,
in all these countries in
Central Eastern Europe.
On Miranda Rights,
yes it also helped --
I am supposed to speak about this
in, in Central Eastern Europe
and in the Balkans but I will just
-- one significant difference.
We informed the accused people of
their rights, including the right
to keep to silent, including
the right to have a lawyer,
including the right that anything
you can say can turn against you.
But it happens not the moment
you are taken from the street,
if you are taken from the street.
But the moment when you are
interrogated as a suspect.
So because you consider a person to
be arrested after he's kept a number
of hours during interrogations.
Or it could be one hour and then
it's a, it's an arrest warrant.
But not when you are taken from
the streets, from the barbershop,
from your house, and so on.
So we apply it but not
the same moment as you.
In the European Union, we
have a, human rights charter,
and also we have minimal
standards for the defendants.
And informing the defendants or the
accused people about their rights,
it's one of this minimum standards.
And also referring to foreigners
we have to do it in the,
in the language they understand.
Now I said at the beginning
that it's not a coincidence
that Anti-Corruption Day and
Civil Rights Day are so close,
like in one because in a
corrupt society, we cannot speak
and we cannot [inaudible] there
are civil rights respected.
Corruption creates a double
reality like, like those mirrors
in which kids look and the,
the reality is different.
And their, their bodies
are deformed.
I don't know exact word in English,
but that's what corruption creates.
Because if you have a, a judgment
of a judge based on corruption,
then you create a parallel
reality, another reality
which is determined by corruption.
If you have a government
decision based on corruption,
then again, it's another reality.
If you have a building
permit based on corruption,
then it's another reality.
All of these are legal
reality, but they're realities
because they happened in reality.
That's what I'm saying that it's
a parallel reality determined
by corruption.
And that we can't speak
about civil rights.
In the [inaudible]
countries, we all have politi--
high-level political corruption.
And I'd like to defer to this.
And looking back, looking
back, I'm sorry --
I have flu, but I think
you can understand me.
I said in the former
communist countries,
we all have high-level
political corruption.
Thank you.
But it's very cold.
You use a lot of ice.
[Laughter] A [inaudible]
would be better.
It's fine.
A thing that in 1990,
we had to move from,
from a state which was
dominant by the government,
the communist government
to democracy.
And from the state economy
to the market economy.
Do you want some water with ice?
[Laughter]
>> I have some as well.
>> Monica Macovei: Now, this,
this means that we had to,
that a lot of money, large
amounts of money had to move
from state hands to private hands.
Think of privatizations.
Yes? We all said the state
is a bad administrator.
We need to privatize.
So huge, huge values moved
to the private hands.
Then we need to redo the
infrastructure again, by whom?
By private companies
which were just forming.
And again, large amounts
of money moved
to the private companies,
to the private hands.
Now these were opportunities which
were taken right away by the people
who didn't think of freedom, of
democracy, but they thought how
to make money in these
[inaudible] times.
And we did privatizations and
all these public procurement
without even, at the beginning,
without even having laws.
It was just a law for this
case, and then another law
for another case of privatization.
Or the laws were in
continuous changing.
So in a way it was
inadvisable to reach this point.
Also the judiciary was very,
was afraid, was, was poor.
The law enforcement was even, the
police officer were even afraid
to go on the streets for not being
-- I can't say killed, but --
but being molested by
the, by the people.
And the also the judiciary
was not trained.
No one knew at that time what was
money laundering, for instance.
Or many other crimes
which exist today.
Also the, the accountability
of the politicians in front
of the population was very low
because people didn't know
what accountability was.
Yes, they were used that what
politicians do and say, that's it.
It took time.
All this took time, but during this
great time, we got this oligarchs.
We call them the same like in Russia
which means you get political power,
then you also are a businessman.
And then you realize
that you need the media.
And so they bought
the media as well.
And now we have not only Romania
and all countries in the region,
we have oligarchs owning the media.
And they all declare
their activities,
like the most independent
news [inaudible].
They don't have at least the
honesty to say, "Okay, this belongs,
this TV's broadcasting for this
party," for at least the people
to know to what they look.
Now, all, all television, all radios
are the most independent news post.
So that's a problem we have.
I'll come back to and I'll
give you some examples
of fighting corruption
in this countries.
Now when, when you say,
"We, we fight corruption,
political corruption," it means
you have corrupt politicians.
So fighting political corruption
could be a contradiction in terms
because if you have
corrupt politicians,
you go to this corrupt politicians
and ask them to adopt legislation
which would go against themselves.
Yes? Which would take
them to prison,
which would confiscate
their assets and so on.
No. I succeeded to do this in
Romania when I was a Minister
of Justice two years before
Romania's accession to the EU only
because it was pre-accession.
Otherwise, I wouldn't have done it.
And I was fired after the accession.
They said, "Enough anti-corruption."
It's -- so politicians, if they
have to choose between the good
of the country, the public
good, and their own freedom,
assets and their wellbeing, no doubt
that they will choose in that area
of the world, they will choose
their personal interest and freedom.
And not the, not the big good,
and not the good of the country.
And they don't even care what the,
you know, what ambassadors say,
what the EU says, what NATO says.
No, they care about themselves
to not go to prison or to,
to keep their assets out,
outside any confiscation.
And I'll give you an example.
So I became, I came
from the civil society.
I [inaudible] the civil telephone
from the then-elected president,
and I became a minister without
being part of any political party.
That's possible in Romania.
And the argument was if
we really do the fight
against political corruption,
then the Minister
of Justice should not
be a politician.
Okay. This convinced me.
And so -- sorry?
So here I was with a
political government.
I was supported by
one of the parties,
four parties in a coalition, but
I had my objective and my way.
And I remember the first -- I set
up the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's
Office, and I said, "You know,
you investigate anyone
based on evidence.
It doesn't matter if it's the person
is in power or in your position."
Which never happened before.
And it happened that
the first person
to be investigated was a Vice Prime
Minister of the government I was in.
So the news appear in the newspapers
and then had the government session.
And the Prime Minister
said, "Monica,
I thought we were after
the opposition."
So I said, "We don't
go after anyone.
We are not hunting here.
It is based on evidence.
And my understanding
is that I joined a team
where anyone is investigated
from this government or
from the opposition."
And you know, in time things
will, will be balanced
because it's a trans-party,
trans-party organized
crime or corruption.
Now who is first or who is second,
you know, it is based on evidence.
Well anyway, all these government
look at me like a twin enemy.
They said we have the Minister
of Justice in the government
that we are investigating?
I said, "Yes, that's life."
And then the Prime
Minister tried to --
I'm telling you this story just to
realize how, how the history goes.
And the Prime Minister
didn't give up.
And he said, "Okay, but maybe
you find the channel a way
to build the channel between
the prosecutors and me,
the Prime Minister, and I
would know before anyone else
who is investigated from the
Parliament or from, you know,
high position level
in that administration
or from the government."
And we all know that there are
periods of civic surveillance, yes?
So I said, "No, you will not know.
I don't know, and you
will not know."
And you know what?
It's shock -- it's funny to say no
to a Prime Minister or to your boss.
They never expect that.
They don't know how to behave
because everyone said,
"Yes, Prime Minister.
Yes, Prime Minister, yes."
And [inaudible] and I said, "No,
you'll not have such a channel.
No, I'm not signing this,
or no, I don't do this."
And I realized that the
beginning, it's a shock.
They don't know what to say.
And it's in your advantage.
So I, in a way, now we do very well
with anti-corruption in Romania
because we have this anti-corruption
directorate from the prosecutors,
and they are embedded in a, in a, in
the body with financial specialists.
They do financial [inaudible]
for money laundering.
Also, also [inaudible] experts
of [inaudible] judiciary police.
It was very difficult to keep
this body alive and not being,
and avoid being dismantled
by politicians.
But we have so far succeeded.
We use the American Embassy,
we use the European Union,
use to a different [inaudible]
factors to keep it going.
And the people have trust
in this institution.
It's about 80% trust.
In the political parties, it's 10%.
But still people don't
go on the street,
you know, to defend institutions.
They don't have [inaudible]
to, to, to go to demonstrate.
But it's there.
What I noticed is that I --
okay, I expected the day in which
politicians told the judiciary will
say, "Okay, it's time to stop.
They catch us.
We did it, now we stop."
No, this day don't
come, doesn't come.
And I'm sure it will never come.
What I notice is that for
the last over ten, ten years,
they tried to find more
sophisticated ways.
And I give you an example.
We had the last year
a Minister of Finance
in office was taken by,
from the barbershop.
What he was doing, he was buying
paintings, and he built in one
of his many houses
double walls to hide them.
Or we had judges who stopped the
elevator between two floors thinking
that interceptions -- they thought
they could be intercepted, so they,
they thought they could
be investigated thinking
that their [inaudible] would
not pass through the walls.
So they just can't
refrain from being corrupt.
Or we had another judge who got
21 years in prison for instance,
last year, or this year -- 2016.
Was calling the clients in
his cases in the toilet --
I'm sorry, but that's how
it happened, in the toilet,
flushing the water, hoping that the
interception could be, you know,
his voice could be covered by this.
It's incredible.
But all these people are caught.
And I'm just telling you how, you
know, how their brain functions not
to stop, but to find
different ways to escape.
So they're caught and they are --
they, they are sent to [inaudible].
We have a lot of Ministers
of Finance, of --
of Finance, of all
sorts of Ministers.
Foreign Minister, Foreign Prime
Ministers, Sitting Ministers.
We have four sitting
Finance Ministers arrested
and in different stages of the,
of the judiciary procedure.
We had to appoint the, this
year when the one wanted --
last year when the one wanted
to be the Finance Minister
they are all afraid.
Because all were taken for --
[inaudible] one of them and another.
Now we have corruption, but
we fight it efficiently.
My problem is that the countries in
the region, Central Eastern Europe,
they have corruption, the same level
of corruption or they
don't fight it.
They don't have efficient
institutions.
Now -- and I'm finishing right now,
I want to say looking
back how we succeeded.
One single person can make it.
You don't need -- you can't
do it through the system.
The judiciary system in
itself will never change.
People don't like the change.
They don't like to change their
habits to learn new legislation,
to change their [inaudible]
friends, you know.
They don't like change.
They don't -- they like
their old, nice, good life.
So don't expect the professional
category to come and to say,
"We want to change ourself," no.
You need an agent of change
like, like an engineer would,
would explain you how your
system is, is broken by small --
Help me. [Laughter] Okay, small
holes done by sharp instruments.
So this agents of change
come from outside.
So it's enough, one.
Then you find someone in the
system because you find one or two
or three people in the
system who are good
and professional and
really independent.
And that's enough.
And then they bring
other people like them,
and the system will build by itself.
It's just need the
first one who has the --
who should have the
power to do it, yes?
The political power and
the stubbornness and the --
to take the risk because
you have to take the risk
to do it, to do it, to start it.
And then it, it, it works by itself.
As, as you say, you know, the
-- the ball is, is rolling.
And I'd like to, to quote
something which I like very much.
One or it is said by more people,
one of them was Mark Twain.
He said that two categories
of people on this earth.
The first category are the people
who adapt themselves very easily
to the surrounding world.
The second category is
formed of the people who want
to adapt the surrounding
world to themselves.
Who do you think are the
people who bring the progress?
Those from the second
category who want
to adapt the world to themselves.
Like I have a dream --
Martin Luther King, yes?
It is enough one person
with a dream.
And then more and more and
more people so the same.
We have to look for this one,
for this individuals who want to,
to adapt their world to themselves.
And that's the only way to
make progress in civil rights,
in anti-corruption, in democracy,
in anything we want in our life,
in our cities, in our countries.
Thank you.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you so much.
[Inaudible] game changers.
But it's good, even better
when those game changers
are supported from outside.
And that's why I would
like to invite our next
speaker, Ms. Boltyanskaya.
>> Natella Boltyanskaya: My good
luck is to speak about good people
because the gentlemen
and ladies were speaking
about the corrupted people.
I want to tell you about Americans
who supported human rights
movement in the Soviet Union.
It started in the middle of fifties
because before Stalin's death,
it was impossible to
support human rights movement
because it was impossible to
find any human rights movement.
Every -- resistance was
suppressed very harsh.
So at my first picture, you
can see faces of the persons
who [inaudible] they
were outstanding persons
in the supporting of human rights
movement in the Soviet Union.
Between them you can
see some Presidents,
and of course Congressmen
and Senators.
Of course they are not all of them.
I think that during my study,
I will try to complete
the list of those persons.
So let me start with the
support of American legislators.
What did they do?
They attracted public
attention to the numerous cases
of the human rights
violation in the USSR.
Of course, they used mechanism of
economic and political pressure.
They, it was going far beyond
the political confrontation
with the Soviet system because
of course American legislators
and America itself had some wish
to restrict the Soviet Union.
But when we see, for
instance, that picture.
It is small picture,
but the picture --
we can see Senator Kennedy who
was meeting former refuseniks
at the board of their plane
which came to Boston from Moscow.
And it was not obligatory
for him to do it.
It was just his wish to do it.
And of course this support
of American legislators,
it was dictated by
the fail of the spread
of communist ideas in the USA.
I read some investigations, some
hearings, Congress hearings in 1934.
It was conversation with
leader of American communist.
"Guys, I am afraid of him
because he was very --
he was ready to do
every cruel things
that Russian communists
have already did."
What was the origin of idea?
I think that I can speak about
National Security Council report.
United States objectives and
programs for national security.
It was the first time when
they mentioned that they want
to find some groups of people in
the Soviet Union and encourage them
to initiate some national movements.
There were two persons whom
I should mention, obviously.
First of them is George Kennan.
He was a diplomat and historian.
His first action was famous long
telegram which was sent from Moscow
to America in 1946, in which
he was talking about need
to resist the Soviet propaganda.
But he speaks that all Soviet
propaganda [inaudible] is basically
negative and destructive.
It should therefore be
relatively easy to combat it.
When second his big deal was
a political warfare in 1948.
It was the idea of public
committee working closely
with the US government to
sponsor various activities.
And in 1949-1950, he
started two committees.
It was Free Europe Committee, and
American Committee for Liberation
of Nation of Russia from Communism.
[ Inaudible ]
And East European people.
So we can show the first step,
it was [inaudible] radio in 1947,
Voice of America begins
Russian broadcasting.
It was not political radio.
The goal of it was to
show the political --
the cultural and eventual life
of America to Russian listeners.
The other, from the other hand,
Soviet Union perceived every foreign
broadcasting in Russian as trying
to influence to their
internal affairs.
In 1950, a Radio Free
Europe goes on the air.
It was the radio from the
countries of Eastern Europe.
And in 1953, Radio Liberation.
Later, Radio Liberty.
It's interesting that the
first broadcasting day
of Radio Liberty was that
very day when Stalin died.
And at that very day, it
was Representative Kersten
who first told in Congress
that we should support
Russian civil [inaudible].
But first I will tell you about
national intelligence estimates.
Anti-communist resistance potential
in the [inaudible] Soviet bloc.
Unbelievably interesting reports.
Believe me: 1955, 1958 and 1966.
What do they do?
What did they do?
They tried to eliminate ability to
resist from inside the Soviet Union,
from inside the China,
and some other countries.
Now let me tell about my
favorite gentleman, Mr. Kersten.
So he not only told about ability
of resistance, in 1951, him --
it was Kersten Amendment which
directed Congress to appropriate
about 100 million annually
to support resistance
behind the Iron Curtain.
And to support their refugees who
would come to other countries.
In 1953, it was creation
of the Select Committee
to investigate the
incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia,
and Estonia into the USSR.
In 1954, this committee replaced
by the Select Committee
on Communist Aggression.
Of course they investigated not
only penetrating of the Soviet Union
to the Baltic States, but also
to the states of Eastern Europe.
And committee's activity.
Public hearings in the United
States and many other countries.
Testimony of many witnesses
and approximately 1500
[inaudible] investigations.
And after the committee
completed its study,
its findings were presented
in 27 reports.
I think that the activity
of Mr. Kersten
and his committee was
some kind of [inaudible]
because between his
Congress activity,
he worked with Mr.
[inaudible] and he,
it was he who also investigated
cases of internal communist problems
in the United States of America.
Up to me, maybe could be very cruel
because the real people
were in prison.
But again, I will repeat that
America was scared by spread
of communist, communism
inside the country.
Some facts about this committee.
The committee was assisted
by Department of State,
United States Information Agency,
Committee for a Free Europe
and [inaudible], [inaudible]
administrations,
and the Legislative Research
Service of the Library of Congress
in Georgetown University.
First, investigation was
about the Baltic countries.
If you look at the left part of
the picture, you can see very back
of Congressman Kersten and
there you can see some woman.
She doesn't wearing hijab.
It's Lithuanian woman who is giving
her testimony and she's afraid
because her relatives could
be suppressed in Lithuania.
So there were many hearings,
there were many witness.
I read the book.
It was really outstanding book.
Beginning of the page, you can
see the report of New York Times
about the Soviet invasion to the
Baltic countries in 1904-- 40.
The second topic of Kersten
Committee was Soviet Jewry,
and I think that he
just opened the way
to the other numerous
commissions and committees
which supported Soviet Jewry.
Because in 1955, it was hearings
and investigation treatment
of the Jews by the Soviet.
There were two resolutions.
And after Mr. Kersten, in 1963,
many American Jewish organizations,
they pushed Congressmen and Senators
to do something to
support Soviet Jewry.
And if you will look to the list
of emigration, Jewish emigration
from the Soviet Union, you see that
only after America participated
in this fighting, this
number increased a lot.
So in October 1963, just [inaudible]
17 requests to the Secretary
of State from different
Congressmen with the questions
about the plight of Soviet Jewry.
And ever request is accompanied by
a lot of requests from the people,
from the residents of different
Congressional districts
and they are asking Mr.
Congressman, help us.
Help them.
Help them.
And I saw also three requests from
senators to the Secretary of State.
They speak about the sale
of grain to the USSR.
We see economic [inaudible],
and they ask if it is possible
to underline that the
[inaudible] would be available
for making [inaudible].
It's 1963.
Some quotes, I [inaudible]
will not repeat them.
They are quotes about the
plight of Soviet Jewry
from President Lyndon Johnson.
There was a Senator, Jacob
Javits, who he did a lot
and he told a lot about
Soviet Jewry.
And there was Senator
Robert Kennedy.
I know that there was
several members of Congress
who visited the Soviet
Union a bit later.
And some of them were really
expelled from the Soviet Union
for their support for Soviet Jewry.
Why attention was focused
specifically
on those groups of people.
I mean, Baltic States,
Ukrainians and Soviet Jewry.
First they started to show their
potential earlier than the others
because after the Second World War,
big groups of resistance were both
in Baltic States and Ukraine.
Of -- after the Israel's state
appeared on the map of the world,
many Jews, Soviet Jews, they
announce that they want to emigrate.
So those people, they started
the activity earlier than others.
They have some contacts with their
communities outside of the USSR.
It's really so.
And their resistance both
[inaudible] if we speak
about Baltic States' and Ukraine's.
And peaceful if we speak about Jews.
It didn't stop despite suppressing.
I think it's important.
So now Senate, April 1964, there
were three persons, Senator Javits,
Senator Abraham Ribicoff
and Judge Goldberg
who made another investigation
about the Soviet Jewry's plight.
And there were three, three
important things they said.
We must give them to
the Soviet Jews voice.
We must rise to their
defense, and we must cry
out for justice and justice.
Reasons of the activity.
Of course, I told about
danger of communist influence
around and inside of the USA.
Of course it was attempt to
weaken the USSR by all means.
And of course there
were supporting forces
that could do it inside of USSR.
And I think that it
was some moral act
because they were really
sympathizing
for the suppressed
categories of citizens.
In 1955, as I have already told
you, was the first evaluation
of dissident potential in the Soviet
Union, and it was rather poor.
Last of those reports was in
1966, and I make a quotation.
"Intellectual discontent in the
USSR doesn't threaten the overthrow
of the regime, nor is
it likely to do so."
So we can see that they were not
looking for some [inaudible].
They were not looking
for some persons
who will overthrow the regime
from inside of the USSR.
It was moral supporting.
And now I'll tell you about
some different forms of support.
Financial support for
dissemination of information.
Voice of America, [inaudible]
of Liberty.
In 1972, it was a big scandal in
Congress about [inaudible] Liberty
because they were financed
by the government
of the United States but secretly.
But after it, everything went
outside, and they continued.
Investigations: I know
several of them.
Baltic countries, Soviet
Jewry Ukraine, prison --
labor camps in the USSR it's a
very interesting investigation.
And punitive psychiatry, abuse of
psychiatry in the Soviet Union.
I cannot enumerate hearings,
records, and resolutions,
many of them in Senate and
Congress from 1950 to 1990.
These are some meetings in the USSR.
Of course, they started
from refuseniks.
And it was the most
famous group of people.
Many Congressmen, Senators, and
even just simple tourists came
to visit those people.
I know that one of
the gentlemen spoke
about the Helsinki
Commission in the Congress.
It was the lady who
invented this idea.
Her name was Millicent Fenwick.
She was very extravagant lady.
She came to the Soviet Union,
and after it, it was her idea
to create such a commission.
And the first chairman of this
commission was [inaudible].
So I know that many America
Congressmen and Senators met
with dissidents, and it was
Millicent Fenwick who also met
with dissidents because she
didn't know about their existence.
It was some Jewish activists who
leaded her to [inaudible] who was
at that time the chairman
of [inaudible].
Another point of interest is
legislative [inaudible] economical
and other relation
with the countries
where human rights
were being violated.
You mentioned Jackson-Vanik
Amendment, but it was not the first
and not very sensitive
for the Soviet Union.
The first of them was Foreign Trade
Act Amendment, and another thing
which I should mention
was Stevenson Amendment
which restricting giving loans
to the Soviet Union for
mineral exploration.
And it depended also from
the freedom of emigration.
Other public laws we can remember.
Kersten Amendment which
also directed some money
to support people behind
the Iron Curtain.
Negotiations between the USSR
and American governments,
about exchanging suppressed people.
It was favorite Soviet
dissident [inaudible].
It was Natan Sharansky
who was exchanged
for some other people,
and it was [inaudible].
He was exchanged not
for American citizen
but for some Chilean communist with
participating of the United States.
And of course there were
meetings in the USA.
There were [inaudible] who
met with different Presidents.
Here you can see some pictures
with Presidents and dissidents.
They're right side, the
upper part of pictures --
lunch which President Reagan
gives for the Soviet dissidents.
Lower, you can see President Carter
who meets with Mr. [inaudible].
The left part, there is
not only President Reagan
but there is Senator Moynihan,
there is Congressman Thomas Lantos.
There was also Senator Kennedy,
and they meet step-daughter
and her [inaudible],
academician [inaudible].
So the world was pondering,
the USA was acting.
I tell about first public
law which was telling
about President should deny any
economic or military assistance
to the government of
any foreign country
which practices the
internment or imprisonment
of that country's citizens
for political purposes.
It was before Kersten [inaudible].
It was before many other acts.
As a result, I can speak about real
help for many suppressed people
and their families, really.
I can speak about monitoring
of visitation
with political prisoners
in the USSR.
And there were two Congressmen,
at least two Congressmen,
who visited [inaudible]
political camp in 1988.
It was Chairman of Helsinki
Committee, Christopher Smith,
and it was former Congressman
from Virginia, Mr. Frank Wolf.
They visited [inaudible]
political prison,
and I heard that there
was some scandal.
Some of prison-- the prisoners
tried to give them some note,
and they were, they couldn't take it
because there were a
lot of guards there.
And of course it was some kind
of protection for many people
because as far as the world knew
about some political prisoners,
I have watched many hearings
in Congress about the plight
of political prisoners --
[inaudible] or some others.
So it meant that those people there,
they couldn't do everything
they wanted
with them during their
being in prisons.
Overall, American support was useful
for the Soviet citizens
who wanted to emigrate.
Potentially useful for the
Soviet political prisoners.
I think that it's my opinion that
it was more moral than tangible.
It was known by actions
that couldn't be explained
by only political goals.
And it was sort of a matter of honor
for many Americans, and I thank --
my thanks to them for that.
We'll talk about, talk about
[inaudible] work today.
I think that modern Russia is very
different from the former USSR.
From their -- though
there are many cases
of violating international
laws as well
as human rights inside the country.
One of the main Soviet
problems, freedom to emigrate,
is not topical for modern Russia.
At least now.
Because I know that they are
making some restricting laws.
Political confrontation between the
two countries is not so harsh today.
The threat of international
terrorism is common
to Russia and America.
Restrictions against
the Soviet system
if we'll compare Jackson-Vanik
Amendment
and the list of [inaudible].
Jackson-Vanik Amendment was
against the whole country.
List of [inaudible], it tries to
persecute the country's persons.
It's personified.
But of course both restrictions
of that time and the modern time,
they influence the entire country.
And I think the idea of
pushing another country
to respect its own constitution
and international rules also
without military aggression
is very relevant today.
At the end of my speech, I
should say my special thanks
to my sources of information.
It's of course Library of Congress,
Library of the Kenan Institute,
Woodrow Wilson Center, and I made a
documentary about Soviet dissidents
and during that serial, series,
I made a lot of interviews.
And it's also my source
of information.
So thank you.
Here are my contacts if you
need, and thank you very much.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank
you to all our speakers
for your valuable presentations.
Would you like to make
any additional comments?
No, if not, then let
me ask a few question.
For example, in the years Miranda
and [inaudible] court rulings
were able to strike [inaudible]
between two major goals:
promotion of law enforcement
and securing civil rights
and interest of individuals.
Why doesn't work in other countries?
What can be done to [inaudible]
diametrically opposing interests
in other, in the countries
we are talking about?
>> Monica Macovei: You ask me?
>> Peter Roudik: [Inaudible] anyone.
Okay.
>> Monica Macovei: I
would say it starts
from the different criminal system.
It's true that, that as we speak and
for many years ago the difference
between the continental system
which means the law is important
and not the jurisprudence,
and the common law system
which is specific to US and UK.
Which means the judicial
precedent is very important.
Now this difference is not,
is not divided strictly
as it was ten, twenty years ago.
Now we have the European Court
of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
We have the Court of
Justice in Luxembourg,
the Court of European Union, and
they both rely on jurisprudence.
Totally and fully.
So it's, it's a mixture.
However, as I said, there
are differences between the,
the, the way we see things.
As I said, the main
difference starts from the point
that in many countries, the arrest
of the person is not the moment you
deprive him of freedom physically
and you say, you know, "You have
to come with me to the police."
That's not the moment when
we consider that it's arrest.
If it's, if he's kept at the
police for two, three hours,
then yes, you can say it's arrest.
But that was again taken,
taken by winning a case
at the European Court
of Human Rights.
It's not, it doesn't in the law.
So that, that's, that's
a difference.
Otherwise, the informing of the
people is [inaudible], otherwise,
the informing of the people
comes when the person is, again,
before he is interrogated
as a suspect.
Not even arrested.
Maybe we'll not arrest him.
We just interrogate him
[inaudible] he will be [inaudible]
and still being free.
So that's the difference.
Since I have the floor, I'd
like to say something else.
But not related to the question.
>> Peter Roudik: No, [inaudible].
>> Monica Macovei: The
Russian Federation danger
which I'm very much concerned
of today, and we are all
in the post-communist countries.
And I speak of Poland, of
Baltic Countries of Romania.
I don't, I strongly believe
that Soviet Union leaders
of the political establishment
in Russian Federation today
and yesterday [inaudible].
They never gave up.
The corrupt politicians,
they never said, "Okay,
the Soviet Union is
over, and that's it.
We let these countries go."
No, they don't.
And as we saw in Crimea and as we
see in different other countries,
they want, they think in long terms.
That's the difference.
They think in hundreds of years and
they make plans, long-term plans.
And they want all these countries
to come under their influence.
And because you spoke today,
you referred to the role
of Radio Free Europe.
I can tell that now --
so Radio Free Europe
and BBC left these countries
Central Eastern Europe
because we joined the
European Union.
We are democratic and
free and so on.
We don't need them.
Well, that was a mistake.
What happens now is the, the Russian
Federation replaced the Radio Free
Europe and BBC and they
bought, for instance in Romania,
they bought licenses to open a TV.
They already have a radio.
Russia Today, and a lot
of blogs in Romanian.
And now they will, they broadcast
in Romanian as Radio Free Europe did
and BBC did for the Romanians
to understand what's happening
in the big world, yes?
The same are doing the Russians.
They broadcast in Romanian.
They, they bought in
Crimea and then in Ukraine.
And then Ukraine gave
them and withdraw them.
Baltic Countries refuse to sell them
on the frequencies and the licenses
to broadcast in, in their
language in their countries.
In the Republic of Moldova,
they broadcast freely and they,
they, they have the license.
I don't know why Romanian all your
visual body sold them the, the,
the license even to open a
television, but they did.
So my appeal is Radio Free
Europe and BBC, please come back.
And the more than that.
More than a radio, also television
because it's, it's a danger.
And I can see in the last
five years the anti-American,
the anti-European Union, the
anti-democracy speeches and blogs
and you know, leftist, leftish
people and groups who, who, who,
who [inaudible] the
mind of the people.
>> Peter Roudik: Well,
you are at the point,
you may ask you another question.
>> Monica Macovei: Sorry, thank you.
>> Keep the platform.
>> Peter Roudik: When you
conducted your reforms in Romania,
you used human rights
mechanisms and principles to help
to fight corruption
like nondiscrimination,
transparency, accountability.
And to thanks to your reforms,
the country was admitted
to the European Union.
Their judicial system was
rid of political dependency.
Now it seems that some
countries in the region are --
or leaders of some countries
are less interested in develop--
in fulfilling their
human rights obligations.
And there is a general opinion
that human rights is a
by-product of democracy.
What can be done to
fight this approach?
>> Monica Macovei: To
elect other politicians
than the ones we have today.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you.
>> Monica Macovei: Politicians
form the state bodies, yes?
They don't like civil rights.
And they don't like anti-corruption.
I couldn't have done
it in my country
if another country would
have done it before
because then you know
what to expect.
Even if it was pre-accession.
Now anti-corruption is
wanted by Slovenias,
by a lot of people not politicians.
People see what happens in
Romania, and they want it.
But their politicians, because
they see what happened in Romania
and that they go to prison,
they will never adopt it.
They will never adopt
such legislation.
So basically, what,
what, when I did it,
they didn't imagine
what will happen.
They thought, "Okay, we
make another institution,
make some other legislation."
So now it's much more
difficult to do it
after we have this, this results.
>> Peter Roudik: Thank you.
>> Monica Macovei: But I want to
-- just an example to [inaudible].
For instance, if you go to
Prague, the tourist agencies,
they offer you the
Tour of Corruption.
Just to realize the, the, the,
the dimension of this phenomenon.
Or in Slovenia, after
they joined the EU,
they try politicians'
opposition power three times
to dismantle the anti-corruption
agency.
And I can give you more examples.
So that's another thing of
the honor of the politicians.
You know, we join the club, we've
made promises that will go forward
that the reforms are reversible,
and then we do everything
we can to go back.
>> Peter Roudik: Anyone
would like to add?
[ Inaudible ]
>> Kyle Parker: Well,
just to follow up on the,
the question, "What can be done?"
A proverbial Russian question
is that the, we often ask.
Again, in terms of what can be done,
and our colleague has
mentioned this as well.
Really the push has to also come
from, from within the country.
From within civil society.
You can't assume that the
institutions themselves will reform.
That's the lesson so far of Ukraine.
That the institutions and indeed the
political leadership have been less
than thorough in terms of
pursuing Ukraine, pursuing reform.
Yet the public -- the civil society
has continued to demand reforms.
And that is one of
the crucial aspects
of keeping the process going.
The other really depends
on pressure from outside.
I mean, again, would Ukraine be
reforming if the United States
and the EU weren't demanding
that certain reforms take place?
And that requires that the United
States and the EU have the courage
of its convictions and to uphold
its belief in human rights.
That's what came through
so prominently
in Natella's presentation.
That in the 1950s and '60s, you
had the series of politicians
who not necessarily
pursuing political advantage,
but believed that they were
doing something that was right.
And that's something that
we have to maintain as well.
>> William Pomeranz: Yeah,
on that point I would just --
I would just also add you, you
had those behind the Iron Curtain,
as it were, also very much
poking the consciences of those
in the West to get even louder.
And I'm not sure I completely
understand your question, Peter,
but I think some, some of it has to
do with balancing security and, and,
and liberty, and, why some of this
has been so difficult in the region.
I know one thing related to, to
Monica's comments as getting rid
of the politicians we have,
certainly that mood is,
is quite strong, I think.
Not just in the United States
now, but, but in Europe.
It's a populace mood.
And I've often wondered if,
if the way to solve what is really
the classical problem of politics
of how do you get the
right people to serve?
It, it because presumably the people
who would be best would never want
to drag themselves through
the mud and serve is, is, is,
is exploring the idea of a jury
duty sort of process for certain,
for politicians or for certain
societal boards or things where you,
you, you draft a group of peers and
say, "It's your turn this year, to,
to, to make these laws and
reviews, review this question."
But on the, the, the question of you
know sort of security and liberty,
I think it was FBI
Director Comey who's had,
who's had a difficult year, has
said that this was the problem
that he found the most challenging
in his entire government career,
and, and it, and it's only
gotten more challenging.
From my persepctive as a citizen, I,
I think balance is
really the wrong word.
I, I, I, you know, I feel like
in the human rights field,
my assumption is that human
rights is the perennial underdog
and that our work will
never be done.
And therefore it's impossible for
us to have too big of a success
to really do too much in this area.
And thus, whenever it's tried,
you know, whenever it's, you know,
people talk about balancing
it, I get worried.
And I, I also think that, you know,
it's -- when I hear politicians,
you know, nothing to me is more
annoying than the usual drum rate,
sort of, of politicians talking
about how their top priority
is the safety of the citizens,
or the American citizens
when I as a citizen, again,
would rather hear them say that
their top priority is the liberty
and freedom of the society.
And I haven't heard a whole lot
of that in the past decade or so.
And I think it's understandable why.
And one last thing on,
on perhaps the confusion
between the two systems as
we look at, you know, Miranda
and our jurisprudence and that in
Eastern Europe, particularly Russia.
Is the reality of very strong
informal practices in Russia.
And so I think where, where
we're talking about what --
and we don't have this as much here.
So whatever we have, you can
actually read in the book, and, and,
and you know, that
exists in Russia, too.
But it's only part of what
is, what is the reality.
And that there are
vast informal practices
that are sometimes realer
than, than the legal framework.
So in, in addition to legal
framework, political will,
institutional reform, there's
this question of, you know,
should you move those
informal practices into law?
Is it culturally appropriate?
How do you, how do you look at
the two and balance the two?
>> Peter Roudik: So there
is a lot of work to do.
There are -- one.
>> Natella Boltyanskaya: Can I -- ?
>> Peter Roudik: Just
very brief, please.
>> Natella Boltyanskaya:
Yes, of course.
I think that it doesn't work
because it's too much political
correctness in the world.
When we speak about for instance,
[inaudible] list, we don't mention
that Russian president
would also be on that list.
I think that if we contact with the
people who violate the principles
of political correctness and
laws, we should not follow them.
That's it.
>> Peter Roudik: Thanks.
Monica, you wanted to say something?
>> Monica Macovei: Yes, I
said elect other politicians.
If a politician is corrupt and
he's from, from our, from the focus
of its citizens, we don't have --
they can't be called politicians
who love their countries or
politicians who love the people.
And if I give you an example, we had
local elections in June this year.
And one mayor of a big city was, was
in prison, arrested for corruption.
And he was elected 70%, he won 70%.
Again, as a mayor of the city.
Now we have parliamentary
elections starting in two days,
and there are tens of people of
candidates who have been convicted
or are under investigation.
So it's out of my understanding.
That's why I'm saying we need
the, we need get new people in.
We need -- it's time, I think it's
time the history of our country
or of the world when those
who, who never thought of,
of getting involved into the
politics have to do it, you know?
It's -- when you start stay
aside in times of moral crisis,
that's the worst crime [inaudible].
You go in to relieve [inaudible]
most difficult inferno.
And I think that's such
of what I want people,
some individuals should, should
leave aside their personal comfort.
Well, [inaudible] I don't criticize
that, and should get involved
in the politics and replace them.
Because otherwise, they keep,
they keep replacing each other,
and we'll never go ahead.
Thank you.
>> Peter Roudik: Okay, thank you
so much for joining us today.
Thank you for your presentation.
We really appreciate
having you here.
And [inaudible].
Thank you.
[ Applause ]
>> This has been a presentation
of the Library of Congress.
Visit us at loc.gov.