>> John Haskell: Good afternoon, everybody. I'm John Haskell, Director of the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. We're proud to be partnering with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for a timely panel discussion about the sharp jump in tensions between the Kremlin and the West amid a growing threat of renewed Russian military action in Ukraine. We've assembled an eminent panel from Russia, Europe, and the United States who will assess President Putin's goals in fomenting a showdown over Ukraine and his desire to exploit the crisis to create leverage over the US, NATO and the European Union. Thank you so much for joining us. Our panelists today include Alexander Gabuev, a Senior Fellow and the Chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia's policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China as well as China's relations with its neighbors, especially those in Central Asia. We also have Oleksandr Danyliuk, former Ukrainian Minister of Finance and former Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. In addition, he had several other previous posts in the Ukrainian government. In 2020, he founded the nonprofit Center for National Resilience and Development. And also joining us is Kadri Liik, a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Her research focuses on Russia, Eastern Europe and the Baltic region. Before joining the council in October of 2012, Liik was the Director of the International Center for Defense Studies in Estonia where she also worked as a Senior Researcher and Director of the Centers of Lennart Meri Conference. Today, our moderator is Andrew Weiss, who's the second Library of Congress Chair in US-Russia Relations. He's also the James Family Chair and Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington and Moscow on Russia and Eurasia. This event is live and will be taped and posted by the Library of Congress in early February. Again, thank you so much for joining us. Let me turn the program over to Andrew. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks so much, John. And it's really just been a great privilege to me to become part of the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress for the current academic year. And I'm really delighted by the chance to partner with Kluge Center and the Carnegie Endowment on today's session. And so my hope is we're going to really be looking a little bit past the immediate set of issues that are now being covered on, you know, cable news in major international media in sort of like minute-by-minute form and look a little bit past that lens. And I really can't -- without any exaggeration - think of three better people to do it than Oleksandr Danyliuk, Kadri Liik, and Alexander Gabuev. So just to give everyone a 10-second recap of what happened, in the autumn foreign governments in the West detected unusual Russian troop movements and concentration forces in what looked like a replay of war scare in March and April of last year, which put Western governments really on edge that Vladimir Putin was poised to launch a large-scale military operation in Ukraine. That operation was exposed by Western governments. And since then Moscow has been sort of scrambling trying to explain why it's doing this. And there's a sort of lack of sequence or proper alignment between Russian public explanations and military buildup which is ongoing. And Western governments, which clearly don't want a military intervention in Ukraine, have tried to launch a diplomatic dialogue with the Kremlin to try to address whatever underlying issues Moscow is trying to achieve through its military buildup, as well as to just kind of kick the can on this crisis. Until recently, the crisis was deadlocked. I think few analysts ever really expected that we would get to this point. That certainly was not a mainstream view that there would be a conflagration looming of this scale. In the autumn, my Carnegie colleague, Eugene Rumer and I published a paper called Putin's Unfinished Business that looked at the strategic rationale that we believe was driving this change in Russian behavior. So in many respects, the drama that people are focused on is a performance. It's a performance of Western governments who are trying to kind of pour as much foam on the runway and try to drag this thing out. And then on the other hand, you have Russian demands, which are largely performance art themselves in the sense that they're goals that no real Russian official could believe in their hearts a Western government will grant them. For example, a blanket declaration or a treaty, as the Russians are demanding, that would somehow prevent certain countries from joining NATO like Ukraine or Georgia, as well as sort of winding the clock back to the mid-1990s and acting as if NATO enlargement never happened in the first place. So the question is, what is it? Where are we going? And added to this, and there's where I'd like to bring in Oleksandr Danyliuk, who served in a series of key policy positions under the current government led by Ukrainian President Zelensky as well as in the previous government -- is the Ukrainian government's approach to this crisis is actually not to scream for help. But to keep insisting that this is all no big deal, and that there's nothing new going on. And you see a kind of divergence between the concerns that are being raised by President Biden and other major Western leaders, and the rhetoric coming out of the Ukrainian leadership, which is much more saying, This is more of the same. We've done -- we've been dealing with this problem for eight years. No need to panic." I'm just curious, Oleksandr, if you can explain -- because I'm honestly puzzled myself -- why is there such a big disconnect between what Western leaders are saying and what Ukrainian leaders are saying about this crisis? >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Yeah, so that's actually a very good question. It puzzles -- it puzzles not only you, but puzzles a lot of my friends and colleagues here in Ukraine, as well. And I think the splits come from, you know, if you speak with regular Ukrainian, the majority of Ukrainians just don't believe in aggression, right? Because they don't hear it from the government itself. But those who have like constant contacts with Western partners -- with British colleagues, you know, with American colleagues -- they actually concerned and they concerned for already three months. And this is a huge discrepancy between what we hear from our colleagues from the West, and, you know, what is -- you can hear here domestically. The question is why Zelensky and the government take this position, not just denying the threat, but basically saying that this is nothing new? There is -- there are several explanation to this. First, is Zelensky, he became a President on the wave -- basically, on the promise that he will bring this. And that was his key, you know, election promise. And for him, it is, you know, very detrimental to actually recognize that we're at the edge of war with Russia. And so he still believes that, you know, if he had missed this, that would hit him seriously. Second explanation is that the government, Zelensky and his team, they don't feel kind of they're part of a solution. They see that the dialogue is actually despite the fact that, you know, nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine, and all of this. You know, despite that, still, the old negotiations and real kind of discussion are happening without participation of Ukraine and the government [inaudible] and the Ukraine government. So as a result, you know, a logical defensive position is just basically say that "I don't know, but, you know, everything is clear to us, everything is normal." And this is just a way to kind of -- to justify why Ukraine is not on, you know, at the table of negotiations, because, you know, if you see something new, we don't see something new. So this is -- this all comes from the, you know, the domestic interest of the landscape. I think that's his main priority at the moment, to preserve, you know, the kind of acceptance of his, you know, strong position. That's, I think, what explain this difference. I know it doesn't help. It doesn't help especially, you know, for example, for American partners, is when there's so much efforts, political efforts is put actually to communicate the danger of the war, to consolidate resources. It doesn't help that the current leadership actually, you know, pays so little attention to this, but I think it's important for our partners to understand why is it happening. And it is important also to actually to find way to actually involve Ukrainian government deepen the process, because otherwise this behavior will continue. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thank you, Oleksandr. So let me bring in Alex Gabuev, my Carnegie Endowment colleague from Moscow, who's joining us as well, and ask him about the Russian performance that we are witnessing, which is, you know, presenting treaty drafts in public. It's very intense public rhetoric from Russian government officials about a new missile crisis. There's a comment earlier today from a senior Russian diplomat suggesting that Russia may respond by deploying missiles. And, you know, sort of bringing out the images of the Cuban Missile Crisis yet again to show how dangerous the situation is. I'm just curious. Is this again -- is it a performance? Or is this a prelude to something much more serious and dramatic? >> Alexander Gabuev: I think, unfortunately, it's both. We see that the diplomatic engagement is not an attempt at diplomacy. People who are in charge of the Russian diplomatic machine are professionals. Sergei Lavrov, Deputy Minister Ryabkov know the West well, and they clearly understand that any hint or shadow of new Yalta deal, that Joe Biden or any Western leader goes out and says, "Oh, no, Ukraine NATO membership is off the table." And if Russia was to dominate this part of Europe or southern Caucasus, it has freedom of maneuver here. So this will not happen. Going back to 1997 lines will not happen, too. And Russians know that clearly. We also know that they are very skilled if they want to negotiate something, and it's done in secrecy and following all of the diplomatic protocols. So starting from mid-November, when Lavrov published his confidential exchanges with his French and German colleagues, and then launched this diplomatic offensive that basically, we did everything for the West. We drafted two treaties, and all you have to do is just put a signature, and then Europe is safe and secure. It's definitely not diplomacy. It's not the way Russia does diplomacy. So this is something else. And it's a distraction. And unfortunately, the other real part of this is the massing up of troops on Ukrainian border. That's what we can observe real life through open sources. And this is not something that Russia talks about a lot. I think that if the military technical response for Russia's demands not being met, would be missiles in Cuba or Venezuela or new weapons systems in Kaliningrad, we would see that on the Russian TV, and that would be paraded a lot. Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, former President [inaudible] said that putting Russian missiles in Cuba and Venezuela is off the table because these countries won't allow that to happen. So this technical military response is something else. And judging by the moves on the ground, unfortunately, it's very hard for me to imagine that it's not -- that doesn't involve troops on Ukrainian border that Russia has massed up. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thank you, Alexander. So let me now turn to Kadri Liik who is based in Berlin and is one of the, I think, sort of world's best analysts of understanding how German foreign policy towards Russia has evolved and how Europe's foreign policy towards Russia has evolved in recent years. So Kadri, I'm curious. Where do you think -- if you had to put a value on it -- how seriously do you think the new German government led by Chancellor Scholz, which has only been in power for a couple of months, how seriously do you think they are prepared to respond to all of this? Or is this a kind of crisis that's catching them in a very delicate place where -- and let me just explain what I mean. Up until now, for the last eight years, the United States and Germany were the two sort of fulcrums for dealing with Russian behavior in Ukraine. And Germany really led both the European response and led the diplomacy with Russia, based on Merkel's unique relationship with the Vladimir Putin. Scholz doesn't really have either of those things, and he's too new. And it's possible we'll get there, but he's certainly not there now. So I'm just sort of curious. Where does that leave Germany, and where does that leave Europe? Are we rudderless? Are we leaderless? Like what -- where does this -- where does the European response come from in a sort of transition moment like we're facing right now? >> Kadri Liik: Good question, Andrew. And thanks for inviting me. I think Europe is certainly not prepared for the crisis. I don't think it even can be bit prepared because Europe has been living at peace for the past 30-plus years and under the illusion that this peace will be bad to stay. Let me remind you, European Union developed its foreign policy ambition in a world that was benign and very European values seem to be expanding endlessly, and expanding its rules and norms was also the chief tool of European foreign policy. So that should give you an idea of how difficult the situation is for all Europeans because not only is the crisis in our neighborhood, but we really don't have means to tackle it. And it has sort of transformed the world in ways we were not prepared for because in order to, you know -- you cannot handle it by expanding rules and norms. So you need totally different foreign policy tools. And I don't think we have those. Europeans also read the situation differently. Some of us think that, yes, a big war is imminent; others are not quite certain. People have questions about Moscow's aims. People also have questions about the nature of the talks between United States and Moscow. Some ask if there is more there than meets the eye. And, of course, people understand that the whole issue boils down to the European security order. And I think Europeans are deeply divided, not just between countries, but also inside countries as to whether the order should be defended at all costs. Should it be adapted? Can we defend it? What is our leverage? All these questions are coming upon us like an avalanche. So in that context, Germany's place is not so different from the others, even though you're completely right. It has a new government that hasn't properly settled in. Angela Merkel was chancellor for 16 years. Now she's gone. Of course, it is hard to replace her and settle into that role overnight. Germany is trying to find proper tone, proper style, contacts, who to talk with, how to get its act together. I think it is fair to say that they are not there yet. At the same time, I think their instinct is right. I mean, in English-language media, I can see lots of takes that Germany is the weakest link. Germany is happy to sacrifice Europe security for gas trade with Moscow. I don't think any of this is true. I mean, Germany believes in dialogue with Russia, Germany believes in cooperation, economic cooperation, and that risk gives political results. That is Germany's experience. That is how the country was united in the end, in early '90s. But all that said, Germany has very strict principle. And when it comes to annexation of bits of other country's territory, launching wars in outskirts provinces, they take it very seriously. And I have no doubts whatsoever that this would be the case on the [inaudible] government, too. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Well, thanks for that, Kadri. And I'll just put my analyst hat on and just say that from Washington, this is a major crisis that is really, I think, you know, demanding huge amounts of bandwidth from President Biden and his entire National Security team. And it's a crisis that no one in Washington wanted. People, I think, really were hoping that they could, you know, focus on the pandemic, they could focus on economic recovery, all of the key issues that Biden came into office planning to address. Russia was not in the top four or five lists of priorities. But it has taken advantage of the opening caused by what you just described, the sort of drift in Europe, as well as the sense that there's the Biden administration is either off balance, or that, you know, as President Obama said in 2016, that Russia cares more about this issue. And so it will basically always be able to out-escalate and dominate in any crisis. The question, I guess to Alexander is if war comes, and it looks like D-Day in 1944, a lot of what Kadri is describing will, you know, crystallize in the minds of the West. But if we stay instead in a more murky situation where there's lots of things happening, but no images of tanks going across the border or shells falling on cities or on military units, and instead, we see something similar to what's happened in the last 10 days, major cyber-attacks, American and British announcements that there are Russian plans to create a puppet government and to install pro-Russian leaders that would replace the Zelensky government, any number of these other aspects of something that looks less than a full scale war? I guess my question for you is, can you talk a little bit about, first of all, how equipped is the Ukrainian government to manage a chaotic situation like that? That's the first question, knowing that the war has been going on for eight years now. And the Ukrainian government has already dealt with a lot of serious problems. But second, what kind of aid would Ukrainian government be looking for in the event that this elevated level of tension stays with us for several months? And it's not necessarily going to culminate in a month or three weeks in a full scale Russian invasion? >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Yeah, first of all, yeah, obviously, we learn a lot since 2014. We went through several cyber-attacks. And I remember when I was the Minister of Finance, I experienced larger cyber-attack in the, you know, in our history. It was actually quite devastating. We learn a lot. You know, obviously, not enough to avoid new attacks. But you know, we learn a lot. So when you say like how prepared we are, I think we're relatively prepared, and thanks to Russia aggressive behavior since 2014, but we are relatively - well, kind of ready for that and prepared for that. Having said that, if that is -- drags for long time, obviously will have some negative impacts. And first of all, it impacts, you know, when it affects stability, it affects the ability of the country to attract investments, to attract external financing. That's already happening; that's already happening. And, you know, we can, you know, we can actually deal with this for once or two, but if it's longer, that will have a very significant impact. And I'm not sure that our government is actually ready to deal with that. So this is something that could be a big concern. Second, what is happening? You ask whether this government is happy to, you know, is ready to handle this chaos or to say. If you would ask me like a month ago, I would say no, it's not capable. But what I see now is due to decentralization, you know, a lot of mayors including Mayor of Kiev, for example, they already took the initiative of, you know, of doing something which central government is not doing. For example, organizing the, you know, reservist - >> Andrew S. Weiss: Territorial defense units. >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Territorial defense. So this is, I think, the reform that, you know, was started since 2014 that actually work, especially decentralization. So the country is -despite of the fact that the central government is relatively weak, but because of decentralization is actually what I see if the country is more resilient than other may think it is. So that -- and when I said that Ukrainians don't believe in, you know, in the war, a majority, despite that, what we see is that still the territorial defense is built -- is being built. There is certain drills happening, you know, in schools and in different infrastructure objects. So, the country is gradually admitting that the war is possible. And that is very important, because those who wants to say and defend, they getting ready for this. Those who wants to leave, they just leave. As a result, country is like more resilient because you see this, and that is -- that gives a lot of hope. But if that's the plan of Putin to drag it for a long time, we will need a significant support from the West just to go through this difficult period of time because instability, it's bad for the country, for country's economy as well. It also could destabilize the political situation. That is, unfortunately, also true. And especially given that the support level for Zelensky and his team is going down quite dramatically, clearly, it opens the opportunity for some political destabilization. And Russia may play here aggressively as well. The good thing is that they could not find the proper agent, because they used to have [inaudible], but [inaudible] cannot perform this function anymore. So then constant search in 2019 for this agent who actually could be able to kind of play this pro-Russian game, but they could not find any credible at the moment. But they will continue doing so. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks. So let me drill down on a separate, but related issue that I think doesn't get enough attention. Could you describe to people the level of collaboration and interconnectivity between the US government and the Ukrainian government that existed before Zelensky took power and what that looks like today? Because it's noticeable to outside observers that the two governments are not as closely in sync as they could be and as it was in earlier stages of the conflict. And I'm just curious if that perception is overly critical, and everything is, you know, like, 80%, 90% okay, or if there's a little more kind of drift than is good in a situation like this kind of crisis? >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Well, clearly in you know, '14, '15, '16 when we had the active phase of war, their cooperation was very, very deep. I remember we were receiving, for example, first, like, was the energy crisis of 2014 where the big US-supported team of experts that help us to actually to go through, you know, energy crisis in Ukraine. And then there was a big financial support. There was -- I was, as a minister, for example, in communication with several ministers, my colleagues, in the United States, so we have constant and very close cooperation on many issues. Vice President Biden was very actively involved here himself, starting from the, you know, overall, like on the oligarchic agenda, [inaudible]. He understood what were the issues for the country. And clearly, it was a different dynamic, right? What we -- we had the ambassador as well. You know, not the [inaudible] thing, actually, when you have the ambassador in the country. You know, when you see what is happening at the moment I think you see -- although you have a lot of people who were working with Ukraine in 2014, they kind of now again in the government, right, on US side, but you would expect that you would have like much closer cooperation now, but no, that's not the case. Unfortunately, that is -- my logic is that I think there is a quite correct assessment on the US side, the ability of Ukrainian government to deliver. So this issue of trust is actually is not there. Because even, you know, if you're talking [inaudible] who is head of presidential office. This is the guy who got into political scandals in 2018. Then he was negotiating with Russia. Then he actually -- he was all over the place. And there are some other people very questionable reputation is currently in, you know, on Ukrainian government site. So, I would understand why there is no direct communication. My question is basically, for Zelensky, if that is the case, maybe, you know, if he wants to improve cooperation, he -- when he -- why he doesn't have, you know, other people on his team who has better relationship with US, and especially with current administration. But Zelensky doesn't change this position. He offers the same people who are discredited. And that explain, I think, why there is very little communication going on. And also, I think the model of the way it works now -- Zelensky administration reminds a little bit of the way Trump used to work, right. And I think there's a clashes of two systems. Ukrainian when there is like one person president, Zelensky, who knows -- he believes he knows what needs to be done. And there is really no people on the lower level who have enough authority to negotiate with their counterparts. So everything is linked to one person. And this system works with President Biden system, like more developed bureaucracy, so to say, and there's these two systems just cannot work together. Because if you want to work with Ukraine, you need to work on it with one person, Zelensky. And that's it because everybody else doesn't have any authority. >> Andrew S. Weiss: So that's a natural segue back to Alexander Gabuev. I, you know, traditionally get tired of the Putin-centric sort of pop culture way of analyzing Russian foreign policy. But it's clear that the Russian foreign policy apparatus is guided by one person. And I'm curious if you can talk about not Putin himself, but what's changed about Putin during the pandemic? And what is it that you think explains the willingness to take such tremendous risks over Ukraine at this particular moment? Is it because he's an opportunist? Is it because he's -- there's something about him that's very emotional about Ukraine? I would argue it's a combination of those two things, more than it is all this kind of, you know, psycho, you know, stuff about -- psychobabble stuff about Russians and Ukrainians being one people and all this kind of, you know, willful distortion of the history. But I'm curious what your assessment is. >> Alexander Gabuev: I would agree with you that it looks like a combination. And I would also echo Oleksandr that if Ukraine is kind of presidential-centric system, Russia definitely is the same when it comes to national security. So you can talk exchange rate, you can talk financial policy to various people in the Russian government. But when it comes to national defense and overarching national security priorities, there is one person to talk to. And that's Vladimir Putin. And I don't think that the West is doing a good job to establishing a channel between the supreme leaders. So President Biden was well advised and smart following the April war scare to meet Putin in person, because his agenda to stabilize and bring the relationship into a more secure and predictable place in order to focus on other priorities should start with President Putin. But since then, like they had two or three phone calls and video conferences, but that's definitely not sufficient for the level of crisis we're having. We have a channel between Jake Sullivan and Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev that is kind of working every two weeks. We had a visit of Bill Burns, our former boss at Carnegie, now Director of the CIA, who is very well regarded in Moscow, but that was one visit to town with no face time with Putin. And I don't think this is sufficient. And then I think that I totally share it with Kadri. We don't have an Angela-Merkel-like figure in Europe to be this link. So talking to Putin is essential. But then in Russia, there are much fewer people who talk to Mr. Putin because of the pandemic. What we know is that over the last two-plus years, Mr. Putin has been in self-isolation in Sochi, and in Novo-Ogaryovo, his residence near Moscow seeing very limited number of people. In order to see Mr. Putin, you need to quarantine for two weeks. Like I know a prominent Russian scholar who moderated his talk at Valdai, and they were sitting three meters apart from each other, and he still needed to spend two weeks in quarantine. So there are very few people who have face time with Mr. Putin. And his social circle has shrunk to basically five to 10 people he sees on a daily basis. They are like-minded like him. And based on what we know, these are all people who share his obsessions with Russia and Ukraine are one people. We know that he spends a lot of time of reading archived material on history of World War II, history of Ukraine and Russia. It's a very selective reading. He's not a historian. He doesn't go to archive and reads them. Like he probably cherry picks of what he wants to read. And there are some people who bring some files to his desk and shape his idea about the outside world. So unfortunately, we all know how tough the pandemic is if you're -- is if you are locked in at home with your loved one and don't see colleagues and other people, right? So Mr. Putin is no different sitting at the top in his Kremlin tower for two years. All of the distortions might just intensify. And my fear, again, I don't have a crystal ball to look into Mr. Putin's mind. But as an analyst, if I look at the kind of reasoning for Russia being scared about Ukraine build up, I don't think that this is real. Like all of the missiles near [inaudible] that might eventually pop up there ten years down the road first will not [inaudible] there, then what's the difference between the current missiles on US ships or Riga? Right? It's not really about security only. It's about the stuff that he talks about constantly. We are one people. Kiev is the cradle of Russian civilization. So there is this deep emotional attachment to the core of the kind of historic Russian lands that might be driving his foreign policy. And that's scary because there is no amount of security guarantees that the West can provide that can cure this emotional thing rooted in his understanding of Russian history and his place in Russian history, as he is on his way out in probably 10 years. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks, Alexander. So let me bring Kadri back in, andp let me just say we're going to try to get to questions that are coming in from people who are watching this event and are in the Zoom with us. But I am conscious of the fact that everything we've been talking about if you were to think about it in Pentagon terms, is left of boom. It's all we're sort of talking about things before a conflict has erupted. And if you study what Joe Biden said in his press conference last week, he used the word that he's feeling "fatalistic," and he's almost accepting that we are going to very soon be right of boom, and there will be an all-out conflict that he was saying could be one of the biggest things that's happened in Europe since World War II, if I'm not mistaken. So the question for Kadri is, as you look at the response that the West needs to put together, and I'm sort of now going to ask you to put your prescriptive hat on, what are the kinds of measures that you think matter -- knowing Russia very well, and knowing what Europe is prepared to do -- that might both have an impact on Russian activities now, or would serve as a proper cost -- to use the term that everybody in American and European governments keeps using -- for an -- how is this? A completely avoidable conflict over Ukraine? >> Kadri Liik: To be honest, I am not as fatalistic as President Biden. I mean, I don't want to explain at length because Sasha is here. And I don't want to compete with his views on how our situation looks from Russian side or what Russia's motivation would be. But I think there are still diplomatic options to resolve it. Even if just -- if you think of Russia's previous wars, you know, when Moscow wants to go to war, it goes to war. It probably creates some pretext as an excuse, but that can be quickly done, quite clumsy, and then they act with no big rounds of diplomacy beforehand. But now, the demands are seemingly mutually exclusive. It would look like no compromise can be achieved. But for some reason, diplomacy is continuing. And to me, that tells with actually both sides, and that includes Russia are hoping to gain something from it. So I think diplomacy is certainly something that I wouldn't consider hopeless. Apart from that, I think, yes, beefing up NATO defenses in countries that border of Russia, that would definitely be something and not because I would think that after attacking Ukraine, Russia will move on to Estonia. I think NATO countries are in the category of their own, also in in Putin's eyes. But still, any sharp raise of tensions between Russia and the West in any corner of the world actually puts the Baltic States in some danger as a place where Russia might signal its pleasure with some of Washington actions emerging somewhere else. So very certainly something to do, I think spelling out sanctions and preparing, reviewing what kind of sanctions we could impose, reviewing our own vulnerabilities and resilience because, you know, sanctions would not just hurt Russia. Many of them would hurt the West, too. They would hurt disproportionately some countries more than others. So I think collectively, and that concerns, especially the European Union, it would be good to have an overview of what would hurt Russia more than us. Because these things also change over time. I think in terms of energy supplies, Europe is not in a good place right now. Things have got significantly worse over the last winter, gas crisis, energy prices, all of that. So I think energy supplies also definitely something that one should think through, take care of. If there is gas cut off from Russia for the Ukrainian pipeline, for whatever reasons, Russia hitting back with sanctions of its own or pipeline destroyed in war. I mean, many things can happen. So what would that mean for Europe? Where would alternative gas supply come? What are the alternative fuels to be used instead of gas? I think these sort of contingency issues should be thought through very well. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks, Kadri. That's very thoughtful. Let me bring Alexander Gabuev back in and talk a little bit about the kind of support that Washington and a handful of other key countries are going to provide to Ukraine in the form of military aid, in the form of emergency cooperation if war comes. And I'm just curious, if you had to tell me what you think the most important things are, is it sanctions against Russia? Is it more military assistance? And then what are the capacity constraints on the Ukrainian side to absorb certain types of qualitatively greater Western assistance in the event of a war? >> Alexander Gabuev: Very good question. You phrase it, "if the war comes." I think when we're talking about military support, we need it now in order for war not to come to Ukraine. Because obviously, if we talk about sophisticated military support, right, when it's time to, you know, to deliver the certain weaponry, we need to have time to train our military to use it. This is not what you usually do when the big war starts. And I'm very happy that US understand this, and it's already providing, you know, military support, you know, the anti-tank missiles and the rest of it. So that needs to be done. I think, if we're talking about what is needed is like, is a significant military support now, in order to prevent the war. This is my view. Where are the weak, you know, our weak spots? Well, obviously, one area is anti-aircraft defense. This is -- we acquired -- unfortunately, Ukraine military is quite weak on this side, and Russian capacity, actually quite a threat is quite, quite serious. So this is the area where I think we need the significant support, and we still don't get it. In terms of the sanctions. Look, you're sanctions -- sanctions are important and [inaudible] instruments, right? Unfortunately, it's also Russia would use to it as well. Russia could use it as well. And I don't think sanctions will act as an effective preemptive mechanism. Especially what we see now is that the position of sanction is actually softening and softening. For example, a discussion about Swift you know, cutting Russia from Swift, it's not discussed anymore, right? So there is, overall, when we're talking about sanctions, the position is getting softer and softer, although at least there is some, like, you know, there is there is a common position between the EU and Europe, which is built on those -- even on [inaudible], but there is at least, you know, joint position on it, which is helpful. But I think that sanctions itself will not, will not prevent Putin from starting the war. It is actually supporting our military is much, more important. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks. So Alexander Gabuev is sitting in downtown Moscow, and I'm curious. There's a lot of talk in the West about how fragile Putin's leadership position is in the event of a war, and there's a lot of commentary -- I'm sure you've seen it -- about how strong sanctions or other types of Western pressure can potentially destabilize Russia's political regime. And that there might be - if, you know, for example, there was a costly military conflict, God forbid, and there's a lot of soldiers killed, that this also could create more unhappiness than already exists with the status quo. I'm just curious if that line of analysis, which I know you're well familiar with, what's it -- what does it get right? And what does it get wrong? >> Alexander Gabuev: So I think when it comes to military casualties, if it's going to be like a D-Day, like, Operation, God forbid, it won't be a fair fight. And despite all the progress in Ukrainian army that Oleksandr has mentioned, Russia was also not sitting idle. We had Syria campaign, we have significant beefing up of the force, and then Russia is far more ready because of this scale and size of the build-up than it was in 2014, 2015. Unfortunately, so if that stays below this threshold of what you implied something similar to what we have seen over the course of the last 10 days with cyber attacks and various other forms of sabotage, the [inaudible] on the right, so Russian people don't care about this. Then when it comes to economic pain, the Western toolkit is limited. And to not a small extent, it's limited by the current energy crunch in Europe. It is a source of inflation that is an enemy to Democratic victory in the midterms, that is definitely a big risk factor for many Western governors. So note buying oil and gas from Russia, or [inaudible] is a no-go zone for sanctions policy. That also means that you need to leave a channel in the Russian financial system to pay Gazprom and Rosneft for Russian oil and gas. No matter how you hate Mr. Putin and the Kremlin, how much you want to show middle finger, I'm sorry. So that limits what you can actually do. And then for the rest, Russia was also not sitting on his hand. And if you are see, looking forward, most capable people in the Russian government is definitely the Minister of Finance and the central bank were preparing for this day with the exchange rate, with a very conservative fiscal policy. So Russia has the record high level of gold and currency reserves. It is far less dependent on invested capital markets. Its debt has been paid down significantly. So Russia is not sanction-proof. And definitely they will be paying to be absorbed. But Russia is far more resilient. And then very final note on the political organization. There used to be some political machinery of forces opposed to Mr. Putin and their embodiment was [inaudible]. Over the course of the last year, the regime has very skillfully eliminated this machine. And now there is no organization for the kind of parties outside of the political spectrum. And then all of the oppositional parties are in line with Putin's thinking. So I don't think that there is also the political organization to cause the frustration of the Russian people to demonstrate any threat to the regime. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thank you, Alexander. So let me come back to Kadri, and I'm going to bring in questions now for people who are watching this online. There's obviously a huge political issue in transatlantic relations, particularly US-German relations, having to do with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which is a -- I guess, by my count, the fifth natural gas pipeline that's been built to circumvent Ukraine, which was a key transit state for bringing Russian natural gas to Europe. And I'm just curious, can you talk a little bit about Berlin's view of the importance of that deal, and particularly the people like the new Chancellor's view? Is this being set up as the -- I don't want to say the key proof point, but maybe that's the best way to say it -- that there will be consequences in the event of a war, and that we will see the German government and the United States and the European Union all basically point to the end of or at least the freezing of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as the most demonstrable pressure point on the Putin regime in the event war comes? >> Kadri Liik: Yes, Nord Stream 2 is uncomfortable issue in Berlin. It's a little bit like suitcase without the handle. You cannot take it with you. You cannot leave it behind, uncomfortable either way. Why cannot we just not ditch it? It is legally complicated. I mean, and Germans are very law abiding, and they are legalistic and Nord Stream was really initiated before [inaudible] came into force. So it's not obvious how you can impose that conditionality on it. Secondly, there is also thinking in many circles, and I think that is correct too, but its importance in the current conflict is totally overblown. I think, you know, Putin might want Nord Stream 2, but he doesn't want it so much. I mean, he definitely wants Ukraine more than that pipeline. So it's not something you can use to tear Putin. There is some argument that the Ukrainian pipeline serves as a deterrence because when Russia would not launch at all. They need the pipeline. I have always been very skeptical about that. I mean, first I wonder if that is the case. Secondly, pipelines as deterrents -- that's a very unorthodox approach. You should invest in proper deterrents. But that risk for the moment, of course, there might be something in it, in that argument. Maybe it is good. But the [inaudible] regulator didn't certify Nord Stream 2, but it's not yet operational, which it could have become in autumn. But I don't think we can really use it as a leverage for very much longer because once it becomes operational, then you cannot fret and close it down. That would not be under - that would not be realistic. So in any -- it can serve as political leverage of any kind just for a very limited period. And even then it is not a very strong leverage. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Thanks, Kadri. So Oleksandr Danyliuk, I want to -- there's been some questions that came in on the chat about the original source of -- the original locus and key place where the fighting has occurred in the corner of southeastern Ukraine, in two parts of two Ukrainian or [inaudible] or provinces, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. And I'm just curious. There was, on the one hand, there's this very long and complicated diplomatic process that began in 2015, in 2014, known as the Minsk Agreements that we don't need to go into all the details there. But were basically intended to create the basis for a long-term ceasefire, and ultimately some form of decentralization that will give those parts of Donbas that are controlled by Russia and its proxies, some level of self-government within the existing Ukrainian state. And what has happened in the subsequent stalemate, which has now lasted, you know, going on eight years, is the clear sense that what Russia wants is to federalize Ukraine, and to basically get a permanent veto over major foreign policy and major internal policy decisions. And that's not going to happen under any normal Ukrainian government or with any normal Western government. No one's going to give Moscow those things. So if that's all off the table, which I assume is the proper response to these kinds of demands, that's my personal view. Is there also a possible scenario for the way this crisis plays out where Moscow basically de-escalates and says, "We're not going to have this huge war, but we're taking a big bite out of Ukraine." And I do remember from previous visits to Ukraine, that there was sentiment in the Ukrainian government to basically say, "They can have it, you know. If they want this territory, we're using it mostly as leverage to keep Russia in the penalty box". But there wasn't a lot of expectation that those territories could be successfully reintegrated into the existing Ukrainian state. So I'm just sort of curious. Is there an outcome here possible that's short of a full-scale war where Moscow basically takes a big bite out of Ukraine, and people kind of go, "oh, that's not so bad," even though it would be quite bad? I think - I'm curious how you -- how you're thinking about possible ways this could play out? >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Sure, well, first of all, in 2015, the real goal of this Minsk Agreement, at least from the Russian side, was to, you know, actually find way to federalize Ukraine. And also find ways to block the, you know, some strategic of this -- the European integration, integration to NATO. Basically have the different -- the new tools to stop Ukraine on its western integration. That was really real ambition of Russia. And the way this Minsk Agreement was structured, they were unimplementable since day one. It was clear in 2015. And it was absolutely clear that if Russia doesn't get what they want, they would be, you know, they will be using this Minsk Agreement, blaming Ukraine for not fulfilling them in order to basically keep the, you know, keep the pressure. And that's what is happening. Now, I can say a couple of things. First of all, I disagree that Russia lost hope on Minsk Agreements. As you see, there was yesterday there was a meeting in Normandy, and I believe that Russia, actually saw the opportunity to actually given the, you know, the weakness of certain players in this particular political situation externally, right, in Europe, actually to get some, to get something in the Minsk Agreement, right? Something that they failed to get since 2015. I think they've seen this opportunity, and they will be pressing hard. And this is very important, you know, how Zelensky would behave in this occasion, whether he would behave like [inaudible] at one point of time, trying not to accept any compromises or he might, you know, for some reason decide to go for compromise. And if you go to compromise of Minsk Agreements, that will be extremely, extremely, extremely risky. Now, in terms of a second part of my answer, it will be look what Putin is talking about now. His ambitions is much bigger than Ukraine. Right? Let's just be honest, much bigger, and definitely much bigger than eastern part of Ukraine. This is not, you know, if the goal of Putin is to take part of Donetsk and Lugansk regions to Russia, I don't think that Russians would consider it as a trophy. You know, that worthwhile all this mess and that was happening at the moment, just Russians will not accept this. It just, you know -- for them, it will be just a disconnect. Because don't forget that because of this -- of the wars in 2014 - these territories economically damaged -- the ecological damage they -- because of Russian actions, they actually, it's a liability. So how how Putin is going to use this as a trophy? I think he won't be able to do it. He would rather now try to, you know, to push it to Ukraine, but under very severe conditions that would allow him to basically block accession to NATO, block accession to, you know, to European Union, to block some other strategic decision of Ukrainian government. That's -- I think he's back to the logic of 2015 when he first started to work on Minsk Agreements. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Okay, well, look. I'm conscious that we're about out of time. Let me ask a final question to all three of you. And I know none of us is in the business of making predictions. If this panel gets together in three months' time, what is the percentage likelihood that a large-scale war will have erupted between Russia and Ukraine in the next three months? Out of -- if you had to put a percentage value on that? Is it 100% or something less? Let me start with you, Alexander Gabuev. >> Alexander Gabuev: The cautious answer would be 50/50 either or not, but I would say I would say over 50%, probably 60%. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Kadri? >> Kadri Liik: The opposite. Definitely more likely that it will not -- at least not a big war. Not the sort of war which Russia seems to have mobilized for. Something more limited I don't exclude >> Andrew S. Weiss: Oleksandr Danyliuk? >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: Sorry, I don't want to put any probability. But I can say that I don't believe in small adventures of Putin, because they will -- they will bring the sanctions and in other reactions of the West, while too little value to Putin himself. So unfortunately, although it's less, much less probable, but I think, you know, if something is, you know, considered, it could be a large-scale aggression unfortunately for Ukraine. This is what I believe. This is my personal impression rather than smaller operations. And I hope the probability of this is quite low. >> Alexander Gabuev: To be on the record, I wish Kadri to be right rather than me. >> Andrew S. Weiss: Yeah. And we always try to end on a positive note at Carnegie, so I should have [inaudible]. >> Oleksandr Danyliuk: For the record, me too. [Laughter] >> Andrew S. Weiss: So look, the three of you have been great. I hope I can bring the three of you back together in a few months' time. It's just great listening to you. I've learned so much. Thank you all, and I'm just grateful to the Library of Congress and the Kluge Center for partnering with us on this very important event. Thank you all for watching.