>> From the Library of
Congress in Washington, D.C..
>> John Haskell: Well,
thank you all for coming.
I'm John Haskell.
I'm the Director of
the Kluge Center here
at the Library of Congress.
And we together with
the Center for the book,
represented by Guy Lamal-- I
can never pronounce your name.
[Laughter] Help me with this.
[Laughter] Guy, anyway,
is his name.
Is, he, he and us
worked on this project,
and we're glad you came
to see the program.
The Kluge Center is, our mission
as established in the charter
in 2000 is to, quote,
"Reinvigorate the
interconnection
between thought and action.
Bridging the gap between
scholarship and policy-making."
To that end we, we have
programs like this one.
Where we bring, in this case,
one of our former chairs,
former Kissinger
Chair, Bruce Jentleson.
To talk about a book
that he was working
on while he was at Kluge.
We'll get into that
more shortly.
Let me tell you a
little bit about Bruce.
He's Professor of Political
Science and Public Policy
at the Sanford School of Public
Policy at Duke University.
Bruce's degrees,
at the bachelor's
and doctoral level are
from Cornell University.
And he has a master's degree
from the London School
of Economics.
The current book
is The Peacemakers.
Which is what we're going
to talk about today.
Lessons in Leadership from
Twentieth Century Statesmen.
That is coming out right
now, essentially, right?
Like today.
You can get one afterward.
And Bruce will sign it for you.
He has a textbook called
American Foreign Policy that's
in its fifth edition.
Probably some of you have
had that assigned to you.
And I'm sure you
read it carefully.
He also wrote The
End of Arrogance:
America in the Global
Competition of Ideas.
And With Friends Like
These: Reagan, Bush,
and Saddam: 1982 to 1990.
Bruce is one of those
academics who, in his career,
has done a lot in
the policy side.
Which informs and, and,
and most of us think,
here at the Kluge Center,
all of us think here
at the Kluge Center makes
one's scholarship better.
He was Senior Advisor
to the State Department
from 2009 to 2011.
For the Obama Administration.
And he served on
the 2012 campaign,
National Security Advisory,
Advisory Steering Committee.
He was a senior foreign
policy advisor
to Vice President Gore
during the 2000 campaign.
And he served in the Clinton
Administration State Department.
And he also worked in
the United States Senate,
both for Senator Al Gore,
when he was in the Senate.
And also for Senator David
Durenberger who was a Republican
from Minnesota many years ago.
Bruce is co-founder with a
gentleman, Jim Goldgeier,
who will be Kissinger
Chair come this fall.
Of Bridging the Gap, which is a
policy promoting greater policy
relevance among academics.
We'll talk a little bit
more about that later.
But let's dive into the
first question, Bruce.
And I just want to know
why you wrote this book.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Well first of all,
let me say thank you for the
invitation to be here today.
To the sponsors.
Special thank you
to the Kluge Center.
I spent the 2015-'16
academic year here
as the Kissinger Chair.
There would be no book if it
was not for the opportunity
to do research while I was here.
Thanks especially to Jay
McCullough who was head
of Kluge at that point.
When, when I applied
and was gracious enough
to accept my application.
So I, I really appreciate that.
So you know a lot of the
work I've done, as John said,
you know, in the policy world.
As well as my academic
world work has been
on you know deeply
intractable foreign policy
international problems.
I spent a number of years
working in the Middle East
on various peace talks and
a variety of other issues.
I worked on so-called
responsibility to protect
and genocide pre, prevention.
And this book deals with you
know many intractable problems.
But I tried to focus on ones
in which major breakthroughs
were made during the 20th
century by a variety of types,
by a variety of leaders.
So at one point I was
beginning to think
that I was writing this book
as mental health exercise.
To keep me thinking
about the positives.
It's not about any
perfect pieces.
None of these were, you
know, absolute piece
that was fully enduring.
That book would be very,
very short and thin.
But I did decide
to finish it and,
and then enjoy the mental
health benefits of talking
about it to, to people.
But it's very important,
I thought,
to talk about when we see
these very difficult problems
in the world.
A variety of types for
both practical strategy
and inspiration.
To see where leaders
really were able
to make major breakthroughs.
And learn from that what we can
for the 21st century agenda.
>> John Haskell: So
you have experience
in both academics and in policy.
How did that influence
the writing of this book?
I mean, in, in the sense
of how did you bring those
two together in this book?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
So it's interesting.
Those, you know, you know
John and others who have been
through [inaudible]
and political science.
You know, there's
very little emphasis
on what they call the individual
level of analysis on leaders.
It's about institutions.
It's about processes.
When you study international
relations,
it's about you know
enduring concepts.
Like balance of power,
national interest.
As much of it should be.
Indeed, put a number on it.
Seventy to eighty
percent of what happens
in international affairs, who
the leader is matters a little.
But, but not fundamentally.
In Washington, having spent a
lot of time inside the Beltway,
not just Kluge Center but
the other positions I've had.
Sometimes there can be like
too much emphasis on leaders.
Who did what?
What's the chemistry?
You know, who winked at whom?
Et cetera, et cetera.
And so I was looking for sort of
a balance point between those.
And, and one of the ways
I, I thought about it.
I use an epigram from Isaiah
Berlin to start the book.
Which is always a good
idea to quote Isaiah Berlin
when you start a book.
You can't go wrong.
And, and he said, "At crucial
moments, at turning points,
individuals in their decisions
and acts can determine
the course of history."
And that's really
what I look at.
Crucial, crucial moments,
at turning points.
Not day to day.
Why I call the book
transformational moments,
not just the transactional part.
And I actually got a little bit
of inspiration from an article
that some colleagues wrote about
so-called "bad guy leaders."
And in that article, they, they,
they looked at for
example Germany and Hitler.
And said there's no question
that Germany was going
to be unstable after
World War I.
But the particular form
that instability took
had an awful lot to do
with Hitler as the leader.
Similarly with Napoleon
after the French Revolution.
France was going to be unstable.
And so I tried to flip that
around and, and look at it
from a positive point of view.
And so I was really trying
to find a middle ground there
about where leaders matter.
And then to flesh out, you know,
a little bit of a framework
of how they really matter and
what we could learn from that.
>> John Haskell: So that when,
when I just saw the title,
before the book was even
available, I thought.
"I wonder what the criteria
are to be a peacemaker."
I mean, like is there like
an entrance requirement?
You know, what's
the, what's the,
what are the qualifications?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: So one
of the fun things in the book.
It's written very
much as, in the,
in the publishing [inaudible]
they call it "trade book."
It's not just written for
academics and policy wonks.
But it's really for broad
audiences who have interest
in what's going on in the world.
And so if I was really savvy,
I'd have a social media game
out there now with
the book, right?
For people to choose their
own 20th century peacemaker,
peacemaker.
So we do say, so I, I, when
I thought about what I mean
by peacemakers and
global peace and security.
I break it into five
different categories.
One is the major
powers, geopolitics.
Because conflicts by major
powers historically have been a
principle cause of war.
And rapprochement between
major powers has been crucial
to peace.
Secondly, building
international institutions.
Third, reconciling the
politics of identity in terms
of conflicts that are core.
Based on issues of identity.
Fourth is advancing
freedom and human rights.
And fifth is fostering
global sustainability.
And so at each of those areas,
I try to have representative
cases.
And the criteria
that I use are one,
that it's about transformational
statesmanship.
Not just transactional.
It's efforts to really make
a breakthrough in the trans,
in the intractable problems.
Secondly, and here I
confess as I was coming in,
I saw that there's a
Baseball Americana exhibit
in the Jefferson
Building in June
which I've got to come back for.
Because I'm, I'm a
total baseball fan.
And anybody that you know
follows the Moneyball,
there's this statistic
called wins
against replacement
player or WARP.
Which is how many wins does this
particular shortstop contribute
to his team.
You know, calculated
against every other shortstop
in baseball, and
there's a fancy formula.
And so I call mine
"statesmanship Moneyball."
Alright? And I don't really
have a statistical formula.
I just base it on the basis of
the argument and the evidence.
And, and try to say that
this leader made choices
that another leader in that
situation wouldn't have made.
For example, Gorba-- there's
a chapter on Gorbachev.
And I strongly argue
against those
that say any Soviet
leader would have had
to make the choices he did.
And so that's the
second criteria.
Is it really something that,
that the particular had a set
of choices and political skills?
And the third one is what I call
impact had, not position held.
And there I broaden the
concept of statesmanship.
So it's not only, we'll
see as we go along,
about presidents
or prime ministers.
Secretaries of state,
foreign ministers.
There's some chapters in there
that are about leaders of NGOs.
There's some chapters in there
that are about social movements.
In which they did things
that governments were either
unable or unwilling to do.
And again, as we think
about the 21st century,
we're going to see
even more of that.
So those were kind of
the criteria I used.
And you know we have a
discussion, I'd love to hear,
"why don't you have
so-and-so and so-and-so?"
And that, that's what kind of
makes, but, but I was very clear
that these were representative
cases.
Not necessarily comprehensive
in closing the book so.
>> John Haskell: It's
funny, there's, you know,
sometimes statesman
are considered
to be Commissioner of Baseball.
Like George Mitchell.
Might not have peace in
Ireland if he had gone
that route, I don't know.
But so the one of the ones that,
that, that you, that you count
as a peacemaker who would
certainly be controversial
in some corridors would
be Henry Kissinger.
So you know as the
former Kissinger Chair,
perhaps you could speak to that.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
There are no strings tied
to the Kissinger Chair that
are to be included in the book.
[Laughter] I had a
distinguished fellowship
at the Woodrow Wilson
Center, too.
In fact, my chapter on Wilson
is highly, highly critical
of Wilson in ways that I didn't
even realize before I started
doing the research.
So another criteria is it's
not about the overall record.
It's about particular
areas of statesmanship.
Kissinger is in the book
along with Zhou Enlai
for the U.S.-China opening.
Not for Vietnam or for other
things that I acknowledge
that these are areas that.
You know, that I
personally disagreed with.
But I feel like we need to learn
things from leaders, you know,
in, in, rather than everybody's
in this basket called
"a great leader."
And this basket called
"a flawed leader."
We need to try to
learn from a variety.
And so that, that really
looks at the breakthrough
that was made in
U.S.-China relations.
Sometimes when we look
back at history, we say,
"Well of course they, they
made a breakthrough back then.
You know, they were all, they
had a mutual sort of enemy
or adversary in the
Soviet Union."
But if you go back, and if
you had gone to Las Vegas
or [inaudible] if
you're in London.
In early 1971 and said,
"I'd like to place a bet
that the United States and,
and Red China," as we used
to call it in those days.
"Are going to you
know have some sort
of rapprochement sort
of relationship."
We all could have been
wealthier than we are.
And so, I, I look into that.
I did have the opportunity
to interview Kissinger
for that research.
And one really, when you
do this kind of research,
a lot of the documents
are declassified.
So I had the documentary record.
I had work that was
done by other scholars,
a whole variety of things.
But you get the color when
you do the interviews.
And I'll give you
one example of that.
There'd been, when Kissinger
first meets Zhou Enlai
in July 1971.
And what was called the
secret Operation Marco Polo.
They had this great name for it.
[Laughter]
Although you would have thought
if somebody heard the name,
they would have thought
it might have something
to do with China, right?
And the first thing it says
is he walks in and he puts
out his hand to shake
Zhou Enlai's hand.
So I asked Kissinger about that.
Because he couldn't quite tell
from the documentary record.
And he tells this story.
He says, "You know,
in back in 1955.
At the Geneva Convention
after the French were
defeated in Vietnam.
And Vietnam was being broken up
and the rest of Southeast Asia.
John Foster Dulles, you know,
very hawkish American
Secretary of State.
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov,
you know, he of the cocktail.
And Zhou Enlai, the Chinese
Foreign Minister were there.
And Dulles showed up and
he shook Molotov's hand,
but he wouldn't shake
Zhou Enlai's hand.
Again, this was Red China.
And you read some of
the things at the time.
And we thought they
were much worse
than even the Soviet Union.
And so Kissinger, and
he says, "It wasn't me."
It was some China experts
he had on his staff,
said that this is a real
gesture of building trust.
And it really meant a lot.
As they got to know each other,
Zhou Enlai at a later meeting
told Kissinger how much
that meant to him.
You know? And that had really
stayed with him for what?
Sixteen, seventeen years.
And so this kind of thing that
is in the book that you pick
up the color from
the interviews.
That gives you a sense of
this really being Kissinger
at his best.
You know, great power
of statesmanship
which was very different
than some other eras.
>> John Haskell: So
you know, you can get,
you can see why he was,
why this, you know,
can be considered
transformational.
What, what happened with China.
Why was Kissinger, you know,
in your Wins Above Replacement?
You know, comparison.
Why was he important here?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: So
I talk about it, you know,
why not Nix-- , Nix-- , I mean.
And every story I tell's not
just about a single individual.
Others come in.
It's not hero worship, but
I focus on the individual
that I think was that
statesmanship Moneyball.
So my little one-liner is
Nixon and Al got the opera.
And Kissinger and Zhou
Enlai did the statesmanship.
The statesmanship
was very intricate.
And they spent seventeen hours
in those first set of meetings.
Basically in one-on-ones
with translators.
And maybe with one aid.
And they had an enormous
amount to work through.
And the essence of it was one
of the United States' main
motivations is we wanted more
help from China on Vietnam.
Because the Soviets
weren't giving it.
And China wanted a
lot from us on Taiwan.
That was the transactional
point.
We got less on Vietnam
than we wanted.
But we got some.
They got less on Taiwan
in the moment they wanted.
They got some.
And there's a statement
that, that Zhou Enlai makes
in which he basically says,
well, I'll interpret this.
He says, "Conventional thinking
about statesmanship
is you've got to work
out the transactional.
And sort of the aggregate sum of
this deal and that deal is going
to lead to change in
the relationship."
And he actually says you
know, you really need to start
with the transformational.
There needs to be a sense
that the relationship
is transforming.
The trust has been building up.
Whatever concessions
were made that will lead
to other progress
in the relationship.
And that the transformational
actually has to precede
or at accompany the
transactional.
Which we can talk
about in relation
to any number of things.
You know, U.S.-Korea
or Iran or whatever.
But and so the way they
worked out the statesmanship
and I go into some detail.
Not as much as if it was
a straight academic book.
There are any number of points
where it could have broken down.
Nixon and Mao were absolutely
necessary for the politics.
But I felt like that, that there
was more of a story to tell
about the statesmanship.
And so make them, and
that's the pair chapter.
Where if you like, it's a
50/50, you know, giving credit.
Because the both of
them were, were crucial.
Not just Kissinger.
>> John Haskell: So how did
Aung San Suu Kyi qualify?
How did, how did
she make the grade?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: That's
really an interesting story.
That chapter's titled
"A Cautionary Tale."
And we, I'd started writing it.
Actually, I working it
out when I was here.
About the role she
played in Burma,
Myanmar, from 1988 to 2015.
Which again was quite
extraordinary.
An enormous amount of
personal and moral courage.
A leadership that pretty
much only she could provide
with her heritage being
the daughter of one
of the founders of the country.
And a whole variety
of other factors.
And then as we were finishing
the book last summer.
There were Rohingya
genocides taking place.
And you're getting articles
like from Nicholas Kristof
about you know seeing a Nobel
Peace Prize winner you know not
necessarily doing
this military-wise.
But at minimum, being complicit.
So my editor [inaudible] and I.
I called him.
I said, "I wonder if we
should pull the chapter."
We actually had a couple other
chapter, couple of chapters
that we didn't include because
we were looking at length.
And I give him credit.
He said, "You know,
let's think about this.
The whole theme of the
book is draw lessons
from where leaders had skills
and where they didn't."
And there actually was
a pattern emerging.
There's a chapter on Lech Walesa
who was a terrible
President in Poland.
But was an extraordinary leader
of the Polish Revolution.
There's a chapter on Gandhi.
And his role in,
in anti-colonialism
and Indian independence.
He was assassinated.
But nobody ever thought
he could be a leader
in government, right?
And so the pattern that was
emerging was certain skill sets
helped bring certain
kinds of change.
And they don't necessarily
carry over to,
to consolidating,
institutionalizing.
So you know, did a little
bit of reframing it.
And, and made very clear what we
were saying and what we weren't.
We were concerned
some people might say,
"How could she possibly
be in the book?"
And I, I understand that
opinion and respect it.
[Inaudible] Roger Collin,
New York Times columnist wrote
a column that also came out.
And I've known him for a while
while I was thinking about this.
And he said, "We in the West
have a tendency to either idol,
idealize or demonize people.
And we need to break
out of that."
And so that's the essence
of that chapter is
the cautionary tale.
Of both dimensions.
And we felt it was
important to keep it in.
And the same way
of Woodrow Wilson
in for what his failures
were, not his successes.
Even with what was happening.
>> John Haskell: So,
so you touched on this,
the next question
I have for you.
You touched on this
a minute before.
So I'm going to try
to pin you down.
What's your position
on, you know,
people have the age-old
question.
Is it that leaders make history
or history makes leaders?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Yeah, and that's-- .
>> John Haskell: It's
hard to say, you know.
But, but you brought
it up so I want to-- .
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: I did.
And, and going back
to the academic train.
I, I'd given a couple papers
you know related to this
where I fleshed this out more.
And there's a lot of
footnotes in there,
some of the literature on this.
The basic formulation I use
is what I call the three C's.
The constraints that any
leader faces in making change.
The conducive conditions
that they may have.
But then the domain of choice
that's with the leader.
And so that's that
middle ground.
It acknowledges that there
may be conducive conditions.
Like in the Kissinger Zhou Enlai
case, the fact that you know,
Sino-Soviet relations
were deeply strained.
And we were looking
for leverage as we went
into the detente negotiations.
So this was a conducive
condition.
The same time there were
enormous constraints.
The China lobby was hugely
powerful in this country.
And China had just come out
of the cultural revolution
and Mao wasn't convinced
he wanted this.
But that domain of choice.
And when that domain of
choice really is decisive is
where I feel the focus on
leaders is, is really helpful.
And, and so everybody
in the book.
And I, I kind of taken on about
the whole you know, you know,
was this really inevitable,
if we get academic with,
the dependent variable,
you know?
But that's really, I think
there's a middle ground there.
That goes on.
And again, I think we inside
the Beltway maybe get too much
into the, you know.
Everything about
you know the leader.
And the academic world so,
so that was the effort.
And you know bringing
some of the work back
into the academic world.
I'm trying to get
people to start thinking
about how they can
pay more attention
to the role the leaders have
and not just the broad
things that you can model.
>> John Haskell: Yeah, and,
and you know presidential
historians the,
maybe the greatest one, it's
about persuasion and choice.
And you don't ex-- obviously,
I mean, persuasion's a part
of what you're looking at
with these people as well.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
I do, I do.
The framework I develop is what,
what I call the who,
why, how, what?
Who are these people
as individuals?
You know, not getting
super Freudian,
but what were their
qualities as individuals?
That, that led them.
Yitzhak Rabin is in the
book in a chapter called
"Soldier's Peacemaker."
You know, what were
his qualities that led
from his transformation of
the Minister of Defense?
Who as he said was breaking
knuckles during the First
Intifada to somebody that
really had a vision for peace?
With the Palestinians and
took it pretty far before he
was assassinated.
So who are these individuals?
And many of them, you don't
really see these leadership
qualities from the beginning.
At the end I talk about you
know kind of runs against the,
you know, the resume,
the political consultant.
Let me look at the
things on the resume.
They, you know, it's sort
of person and moment.
Why did they do what they did?
What was the vision
that brought them to try
to take the risks
of these changes?
And that they used to get
people to buy into it?
Change is a scary thing.
And how did they
provide people a sense
of that the current context
needed to be changed.
Whether it's Mandela or Rabin
or [inaudible] or others.
And then how did
they go about it?
And that's where
there's this mix
of ideas and political skills.
And some of the limits, Rabin,
for example [inaudible] both.
I give him an awful
lot of credit.
But I talk about where his
political skills failed him.
Same with Gorbachev.
You know, that he didn't, he,
his political skills
were really failing him
in those last couple of years.
And consolidating and
taking care of his base.
But it's, so it's
a mix, I think,
of the two biggest
qualities of personal capital
that people bring to this.
That gives people a sense
that they are authentic.
In Aung San Suu Kyi's case
and Mandela's case
and [inaudible] case.
And political skills.
And the what is what did they
achieve and what didn't they?
And again, what can we,
what can we learn from both?
>> John Haskell: So you
mention there, you have to,
a leader has to adjust
to change.
Change is inevitable.
But the communications
change is radical these days
with social media.
Is, is what does that do
to a leader's capacity?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: So let
me just really quickly pull
out something I start
the epilogue with,
if I can find it quickly.
It speaks to that.
So this is a quote that
I'm just going to read.
"For our everyday life
is becoming so saturated
with the tremendous power
of mass communications.
Our political life is becoming
so expensive, so mechanized,
and so dominated by
professional politicians
and public relations men.
That the idealist who dreams
of independent statesmanship
is really awakened
by the necessities of
election and accomplishment."
That's from John Kennedy and
Profiles of Courage in 1956.
And, and the book is actually
a little bit [inaudible]
than Profiles in Courage.
But it's, you know, not
just American Senators.
It's international
leaders, it's not domestic.
And you know so he's writing
that in 1956, you know.
So it wasn't just today.
There's no question
that social media--
I know from my time you know
in the foreign policy
world in Washington.
You know, the, you know the, the
need to make decisions quickly.
You know? God only knows
if the Cuban Missile Crisis
had occurred with social media.
And their ability to keep
control of information
to a great extent then.
That has complicated it.
But I, I, I try to do a
push, not only in the book
but in some of my other work.
Against too much presentism.
You know, there are things
unique about our era.
But in some ways,
they're, you know,
other leaders have faced
the same kind of problems.
And here's Kennedy
writing about them in 1956.
Without social media, without
the internet in a different age.
So it has changed
it, but to be honest
with you, I say in the book.
You know, we've seen the
emergence, for better or worse.
Of very powerful,
strong leaders, you know?
I mean, saying this as
a purely analytic point,
but there's no question
that President Donald Trump
has demonstrated the impact an
individual can have in the
position of the Presidency.
So the notion that
the Presidency can't
provide leadership.
Putin and others and
maybe I'm giving examples
that maybe aren't on
the constructive side.
But I think that you
know that it shows
that leadership is possible.
Even in this environment
and you know there's a lot
of bottom-up that happens.
The Arab Spring was bottom-up.
There's a lot of
middle-out that happens
from science, technology.
There's some work here where I
draw on the business literature.
And the challenges
of transformation
in the business community
or the higher-ed community
are in some ways similar.
But I, I don't think that,
that, I think you have
to you know take into account
certain characteristics
of today's political and
communications environment.
But we still, it's not
totally unique compare,
compared to others.
>> John Haskell:
Of course people by
and large haven't
had an opportunity
to read the book yet.
Here and lest anybody
get the impression it's,
that you're doing a
great-man theory of history.
There, there are chapters in
there about social movements,
NGOs, that kind of thing.
Do you have, do you want to
say a word, too, about those?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: Sure,
so two, three of the chapters
that relate to that, I'll
make mention here briefly.
One is on Northern Ireland,
and two Northern Irish women:
Betty Williams and
Mairead Corrigan.
Who are everyday folks.
And the story starts in
19-- so from 1969 on,
what's called The Troubles,
the level of violence
and killing was rapidly
going up.
And in 1972, Mairead
Corrigan's sister was walking
down the street in
Belfast with three
of her, four of her children.
And an IRA getaway car, driver
lost control, smashed into them.
Injured her seriously, and
killed a couple of the children.
And it was being chased
by a British police car.
And so Mairead Corrigan
who was a secretary
in a Guinness brewery
goes to the hospital.
And this actually relates to
your, to your previous question.
And comes out, and the BBC
reporters are all out there.
And she makes a statement
along the lines of--
I have the exact
quote in the book.
Of you know, in only less than
five percent of the people
in Northern Ireland really
want these things to happen.
The rest of us are tired of it.
And as we would say
today, it went viral.
It went all over BBC.
It went all over the world.
It was a person and moment.
Betty Williams, you know,
it was another person
in, in Northern Ireland.
They come together,
they organize the Northern
Ireland Women for Peace.
And they bring in some
political organizers.
And the level of violence
never goes up to that level.
It takes another 20-plus years
and our friend, George Mitchell.
And the, the, the you know,
and the negotiator skills
to bring the Good
Friday Agreement around.
And in fact Betty Williams and,
and Mairead Corrigan win the
Nobel Peace Prize I think
in '76 or '77.
And they reached the limit
of their political skills.
They kind of get pushed aside.
There are a couple small
scandals that get pushed aside.
And others take it over.
But, but they were
transformational
for that moment.
You know, there are
all these marches all
over Northern Ireland.
It really changed the dynamics.
I was in grad school in
London at the, at that time.
There were bombings in Harrod's
and other sorts of things.
So that's one of the stories
that shows how, you know,
civil society, if you will.
Can, can, can transform
the moment.
Again, can't make
the peace agreement.
And whatever else is happening
in Northern Ireland today.
It's hardly total peace,
but it has not gone back
to the violence that it was.
Second story is about
the rise of the,
of the contemporary
human rights movement.
And I start it with, and
it's again, contemporary.
It goes back many centuries.
In 1961, a British lawyer by
the name of Peter Benenson
who was sort of an odd duck.
Had run for the House of
Commons three times and lost.
But had been involved actually
through his mother and others
in protecting children
in the '30s and '40s.
Not only from Hitler, but
from Franco and Salazar
in Spain and Portugal.
And so he begins to think
about what he calls
prisoners of conscience.
And he writes an op-ed in
The Observer of London.
And again, it goes viral.
I mean, you know, I've written
a lot of op-eds in my life.
And you always hope
they go viral.
You know, you know,
maybe a few Twitter,
Twitterings, but not a lot.
And, and it's picked up by
newspapers all over the world.
And it's this new concept
for a grassroots human
rights organization.
Within three years, you know,
donations are coming in.
And you know, the
number of chapters
of Amnesty International
increases exponentially.
By 1967, he's actually kicked
out of the organization.
And political skills took
him to a certain point.
And others take it
over, and it grows
as we know Amnesty
International today.
But, but, but it really seeds
the human rights movement.
Human Rights Watch, you know,
all these groups we know today.
That in many ways you could
argue are more prominent.
But they really kicked
it off, and,
and they do in many respects,
what governments are
unable or unwilling to do.
And so that's one of the
other stories that, again,
you know, non-obvious.
He wasn't somebody
that you saw coming.
And the third one is about the
Gates Foundation and its work
in global public health.
And what I call the rise
of philanthropy statesmanship,
you know?
The Gates Foundation is
the second-largest budget
in the world today for
global public health,
next to World Health
Organization.
And what they have
done in that sector.
And it's not, I mean,
there are criticisms
of the Gates Foundation
and I address those just
like with [inaudible] Kissinger.
But I do believe I'm balanced
that they've made an
enormous difference there.
And that they exemplify
this emergence
of philanthropy statesmanship.
The role of philanthropies,
you know, Bill Gates
and Warren Budget, Buffett
now have this giving pledge
where they're getting.
You know, very wealthy people
around the world to commit
to not just foundations that
spend at their five percent.
But to give away 50% of their
wealth in their lifetime.
So those are three examples
that complement, you know,
the Kissingers, the Rabins,
the Mandelas that I think are,
really are statesmanship
in their own way.
And again, in the 21st
century I think are trendlines
that are going on.
>> John Haskell: Let's
talk about the 21st century
and sort of draw some lessons.
Because you know
your peacemakers,
among many other things,
contributed to the
end of the Cold War.
But things aren't great
right now, some would argue,
between the U.S. and Russia.
And what kind of
lessons do you draw from,
in the book about that?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: Yeah,
I've been really pushing back
against people calling
this "new cold war" stuff.
You know, it's an
easy little one-liner.
But if you think about
it, it's not global.
It's not ideological.
And we're not on the
brink of nuclear war.
As I look around the room,
those of us who lived
through the Cuban Missile Crisis
can remember that all too well.
It's classic major power
you know competition.
U.S.-China has an
element of that.
The case I've actually been,
been in the process of trying
to write something to
make, make the linkage on.
Is looking at the summitry
from those and how it relates
to the U.S. perspective.
U.S.-North Korea summit.
And the pattern that I trace
in both the Gorbachev
chapter and Reagan.
I, I give more credit to Reagan
than probably some
other academics do.
Maybe less than some people that
are on the conservative side.
But he was a crucial partner.
My argument is really
Gorbachev was the absolutely
indispensable one.
And the Kissinger is, there
were three elements that make
for successful summitry.
And this could apply to
U.S.-Russian, U.S.-China.
But I think you know North
Korea's on our mind a lot.
And I, you know, I guess I do
alliteration on my three C's.
This is the three P's.
It's the personal, the
policy, and the political.
That, that in the
cases we looked at.
As I talked about
with the handshake,
personal trust was developed.
Reagan and Gorbachev
developed an enormous amount
of political trust.
Actually to the consternation
of some
of Reagan's hawkish advisors.
That makes possible
concessions and the belief
that your partner is
being straight with you
and will lead to other things.
Policy which is based
on a mutuality.
Just like I said about
Taiwan and Vietnam.
We each got some.
You know, that there's
a mutuality
and not one side
thinking they're coming
out with everything.
And then the politics which is
managing with constituencies.
If we look at, and every day we
hear whether the summit's going
to happen or not.
But let's just assume it does.
You know, I actually think the
politics is my least worry.
You know, the whole Nixon
goes to China, you know.
Conceivably, Trump could
manage the politics of backlash
about a deal with North Korea.
And, and presumably Kim
Jong Un can do it at home.
The policy I worry
about a lot you know.
I don't see a lot
of mutuality there.
It would have to be
you know, policy change
and that regime change.
North Koreans are interested
and part of their motivation
for nuclear weapons
is an insurance policy
against regime change.
They look at what Libya
gave up in the early 2000s.
They look at what Saddam
got taken away by the UN.
And, and I think there really
has to be a lot of mutuality
and reciprocity in there.
I'm not optimistic about the
way that pre [inaudible].
And then the personal.
And again, I'll be honest.
I'm not sure either of these
leaders has any experience
or the temperament that's
conducive to the kind
of relationships and
trust-building that we saw
in the other, other two cases.
So I feel like there's a
little bit of a formula there.
Personal policy and politics
for successful summitry.
And I'm in the process of
trying to write something
for you know the blog world
or the op-ed world now.
Laying these out and
kind of giving a sense
for what we need
to happen on them.
One I'm confident about.
The other two I'm not.
Which, which I don't say
is a political statement.
I try to say is an analytic
statement, again drawing lessons
from how you do successful
summitry among countries
that are, between countries
that have been adversaries.
>> John Haskell: So, and, and
you, you mentioned Yitzhak Rabin
as one of the peacemakers.
We draw lessons for
what's currently going
on between the Israelis
and the Palestinians.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Yeah, this is really,
I get asked at a
talk I gave you know.
We've been having, you know,
little bit of a book tour.
Not on the scale of Jim Comey.
But a little bit of a book tour.
And I give talks in New York
and I'm going to Chicago,
and Atlanta, Denver, a
bunch of other cities.
And, and in fact C-SPAN, if
you're really interested.
And this is [inaudible] C-SPAN
2 is showing one of my talks
at 5:45 Saturday night
that they filmed.
They do it now at bookstores
when you give talks rather
than just sitting you down.
And somebody at that talk asked
me or someone in New York,
which chapter you know was
the most personally best.
And it really was
the Rabin chapter.
Because I worked on the
peace talks a bit when I was
in the Clinton Administration
'93, '94.
Worked on Middle East issues
before that and ever since.
And.
You know, I really felt
like Rabin was the
right leader, you know.
Can't go into any detail
on the conversation.
I believe that there was a good
chance the [inaudible] would
have succeeded had he survived.
It was a tragedy that he didn't.
His own intelligence people told
him to wear a bullet-proof vest.
And he could not imagine
that a countryman
would try to kill him.
Was out of his mindset,
you know?
And, and I think today.
You know, there's no, and no
peace would have been perfect.
But I feel pretty confident
making the argument there would
be a lot better for Israel
and for the Palestinians,
the United States
and for the world.
Had the Rabin process
gone forward compared
to what's happening today.
>> John Haskell: And let's
talk a little bit about the UN.
Because you had Dag
Hammarskjold,
who you say was the most
effective Secretary-General.
Why do you make that claim?
And what lessons of his
leadership do we take for today
for the Secretary-General
and for the UN more broadly?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
So [inaudible] I titled
that chapter "Hammarskjold
the Secular Pope."
When he came in, he was seen as
a nameless, faceless bureaucrat.
Who, but and his predecessor,
the first Secretary-General
described the job
as the most impossible
in the world.
Hammarskjold had a
huge impact on a number
of issues before he died
in a plane crash that's,
once again, being investigated.
And let me just tell one of
the stories because it relates
to today particularly.
In 1956 and the Suez Crisis.
When Britain and France
and Israel invaded Egypt
because of Gamal Abdel
Nasser's nationalization
of the Suez Canal.
So you had two permanent members
of the Security Council
invading another country.
And you had the United States
and the Soviet Union looking
at it from a Cold
War perspective.
And so you had the
coming together
in this crisis anti-colonialism.
The Cold War, the Middle
East, all of these issues.
And Hammarskjold was the
one with some assistance
from the Canadian Ambassador,
Lester Mike Pearson,
who managed the crisis.
He went in and did
the diplomacy.
Got the British and the French
and the Israelis to withdraw.
He-- .
Went in and negotiated
with Nasser.
He and Pearson formed the
first major United Nations
peace-keeping force.
That went into Suez
that was successful.
And he did everything that,
that, you know, both the,
the strategy and the
ideas to the practical.
Oh my god, we've got to deploy
these countries' peace-keepers
right away.
But we don't have helmets.
So they took some
American surplus helmets
and they painted them blue.
You know, that's
the blue helmets.
So he, he really
resolved the crisis.
And so in the latest
you know couple weeks,
month or so ago,
a little more now.
Crisis in Syria.
It's always been a crisis, but
the U.S.-Russia confrontation.
I was talking to some reporters.
I said, you know, you know,
we need to empower the
Secretary-General the way
that Hammarskjold was empowered.
And it may not be the
first-choice strategy
for either the United
States or Russia.
But it's probably a pretty
good second-choice strategy.
And there is a UN negotiator,
but he's not empowered.
I was actually involved in
this very issue when I was
in the Obama Administration.
And, and, and, and
said look, you know,
all the major powers
say oh my god,
we can't have a powerful
Secretary-General.
You know, you have to
give up some prerogative.
Right? All, China would, Russia
would, the United States.
But no Secretary-General's
ever going
to tell the major
powers what to do
on an issue that's
absolutely crucial
to their vital interests.
But what you gain for
the prerogative you give
up is you know a
better strategy.
For, for, for crises that
affect your own interests.
And so you're making
that gain there.
And so there's an
argument in the book
about why we need
a Hammarskjold-ian
Secretary-General.
It's not so much a direct
criticism [inaudible].
It's really more you know
how the job is defined.
And until then, and the UN
has a lot of other problems.
This wouldn't solve them all.
But what organization do we
know, whether it's a government
or large organization that
can deal with its problems
if it doesn't have
a CEO, in effect?
Who people respect
and is powerful?
And so I really think
that that's crucial.
If we want the UN
to be effective,
we really need a more
empowered Secretary-General.
And I kind of take on
the political arguments
and push back against them.
Why, why this is
actually in our interest.
It's not a concession.
>> John Haskell: Okay,
well we're going to,
going to go to questions
in a second.
I just wanted to ask Bruce
something apart from the book.
He, I mentioned that,
that he is the cofounder
of Bridging the Gap which
is about something that,
that they call public
scholarship.
And maybe you can say a word
or two about what that means?
And some, something that you
all have accomplished in this,
with this organization?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: Sure,
I mean, as someone who's,
who's spent most of the
career as, as a professor.
But has also ventured
in the policy world.
I know how much I've
learned from being
in the policy world that's
made me a better scholar,
a better writer.
And a better teacher.
And what I think I
brought, you know,
as being somebody who's
largely been you know in,
in the academic world.
Not, maybe smarter than people
whose careers are [inaudible]
but a different kind
of expertise.
And when you learn
to work together.
And it's been a little
frustrating
to see the academic
world increasingly,
not just in my discipline.
Kind of going into
its ivory tower.
Not just today, all
the problems we face,
but this is something we've
worked on for 15 years now.
So with some support from
the Carnegie Corporation
of New York, one of
the major foundations.
We created this program with my
colleague Jim Goldgeier who'll
be here at the Kluge Center in
September for one of the chairs.
And a couple of other--
Steve Weber from Berkeley
and some other, you know, to try
to help bridge the two worlds.
We run programs for Ph.D.
students in political science,
international relations who
may want to be academics.
So they may want to get
into the think-tank world.
But to develop the skill
sets you know that come with,
you know, being able to
speak to both worlds.
We run a, in a couple of weeks
we're running a training program
for faculty.
You know, who really want to
be able to connect to, to,
to the policy world more.
We started a book
series with Oxford Press
in which we've got our
first books coming out now
that are books by
academics that.
You know, at, at the
end of turning 20 pages,
it's not just three paragraphs
on what the policy
implications are.
And, and so there's really been,
in fact tomorrow we're
having a meeting in New York
of all the programs that
the Carnegie funds on this.
But it's really been an
effort of, of mutuality.
And for universities.
Even if we have nothing smart
to contribute to policy.
It, in universities as
institutions in society have,
you know, huge roles to play.
We get a lot of benefits.
I've stayed in universities.
And not gone totally [inaudible]
because I really love what we
do working with the students.
Having the freedom to write
and, and that sort of thing.
But the worlds need
to be bridged.
I was saying to Jay before
I just finished hearing a
committee at Duke this semester.
Reviewing our tenure
standards for a variety
of factors including
public scholarship,
far beyond what we're
talking about.
But for the sciences
and for the humanities.
For the divinity school.
For, for math and stuff.
And I may have more wounds on
my back than I did from working
in the Middle East from that.
[Laughter] But I think
you know we're still
in the process of doing that.
But I, I think it's an
issue of you know call it,
you know, interconnection.
Or cross fertilization
or whatever.
So we've built up this
particular program in our area.
And, and you know,
it's sort of one
of those bottom-up strategies.
A lot of people have come
through our programs now who are
out there building
their careers.
And hopefully universities
will change
to make the top-down
meet the bottom-up.
>> John Haskell: Yeah.
So let's see what folks can--
signal to me if you
have a question.
Gentleman right up here.
>> Audience Question: Yeah, you
were talking about the, the,
the effectiveness of the UN.
And I was wondering, do
you think the legitimacy
of the UN's moral like authority
has been hampered recently?
Especially like I'll give an
example off the top of my head.
The Human Rights Council
having countries like Russia
and Venezuela on their board.
Do you think that hampers
the effectiveness of the UN?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Unquestionably it does.
That's what I said,
there are many issues.
There's just a commission
chaired by Kevin Rudd,
former Australian Prime Minister
that has a long agenda
for UN reform.
That's one.
There have been scandals
with peace-keepers.
You know, sexual scandals
with peace-keepers.
You know, I guess there's
bringing cholera to Haiti.
There are a whole
slew of issues.
My sense of things though is,
is you know we need an effective
UN in the world, right?
And, and we need it
frankly now more than ever.
And so.
You know, you know,
the only thing I deal
with in this book is, is the
role of Secretary-General.
Because I think a lot
of things should flow,
could flow from that.
Hammarskjold's notion
of the Secular Pope was
about the moral authority
that, you know,
that he exercised
and brought it there.
There are things that UN can
do that governments can't do.
I mean, Syria's, to me is a
really good example right now.
And there are a whole
host of others.
And many other reforms are
going to have to happen.
But sometimes we look at the UN.
And we say, "Here's
all its negatives."
And we look we look at American
foreign policy, and we say,
"Here's all its positives."
And so we've got to do a
two-column accounting of both.
And then figure out
how to change it.
Because we really do
need an effective UN.
And you know the
notion of blowing it up
or cutting off our funding.
Or telling countries that
don't vote the way we want them
to that we're not going to,
we're not going to give them,
you know, foreign aid.
It's just counterproductive,
right?
So you know, it's been a
little bit of tough love among,
directed at kind of
liberal internationalists,
people that do believe
in the UN.
It's not enough to say what's
wrong with the anti-UN.
You know, if you really
believe in the UN,
you've got to do a
little tough love on it.
And part of what I'm doing in
this book is along those lines.
>> Audience Question: Yes,
the three C's that you talked
about being the constraints
and the conduciveness
and the, the choices.
Reminded me a lot of
Machiavelli's kind
of [inaudible] type thing.
And I was wondering
what peacemaker
in your book you though faced
the most restrictive constraints
that they had to deal with?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: Oh,
that's a really good question.
>> John Haskell: Great question.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
That's a great question.
So I'm going to have
to think on my feet of.
I probably would
say, and it I thought
about it later tonight,
I'd need your email.
Might change my mind.
I would probably say Gorbachev.
You know, because the
system was so ossified.
And, and he was trying
to do this balancing
of domestic change with
international change.
And in the end of the day,
it caught up with him.
Right? I don't think it
had to, so US Ambassador,
Jack Matlock wrote
the very long memoirs.
He actually is a Duke grad.
He's been spending these
latter years at Duke.
And I've talked with
Ambassador Matlock.
And in spring and summer of
1991, President George H.W. Bush
and Ambassador Matlock
were warning Gorbachev
about what they were picking
up on what was being-- .
You know, they didn't
specifically say who's going
to be attempting on
such and such a day.
And the skill set that
Gorbachev had started
with that made him
so successful.
Kind of abandoned him.
Whether it was the
arrogance of power.
That, you know, the
longer you're in power.
And he just kind of dismissed
their, I don't need to worry.
It's really okay.
I'm in, I'm here.
So the combination
of the nationalism
that was unleashed among the
republics, the Baltics first.
The real difficulties
of economic change.
His commitment to Glasnost which
opened up the political process.
And, and not, one of
the expressions I take
out of the business leadership
literature that relates
to Gorbachev and to Rabin.
Is the need to control
the temperature
and keep the opposition close.
This is in some of
the leadership books
that are written in
the business community.
And neither one of
those did that.
And I think Gorbachev's
challenge,
I think Rabin could've, his
was a little more manageable.
But I, so that's one I'd
probably nominate is,
is the most difficult
to really consolidate.
So that he's disappeared,
you know?
I guarantee you,
and first or all,
you know, when he passes away.
There will be enormous
accolades all over the world,
except for inside
his own country.
>> Audience Question: So, so
as a scholar of leadership.
What are the leadership
challenges for the EU right now?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Sorry, in the end of the book,
I don't necessarily,
sometimes people ask
so who do you think are the
21st century peacemakers.
And I intentionally
don't point to people.
Because a lot of these
people, you want to point
to Rabin earlier in his career.
You want to point to the
Gorbachev who knew Lech Walesa.
I talk about strategies that
you can derive from this
in each of those five areas.
And there's similarities
and differences for it.
I actually have a chapter I
was working on, on the founding
of the EU but we have to again,
make it you know,
marketing a book.
You know, you have to, we
have to keep the length.
And it was going to be
about Monnet, Schuman,
and Adenauer together in
the founding of the EU
because you know, whatever
else the EU's done wrong,
the fact that you know there
has not been a major power war
in Europe after two world
wars start there is not,
not small potatoes.
So I think its challenges
are, are, are policy.
My own analysis is
they, you know,
they didn't keep symmetrical
the political change
and the policy and
economic change.
So they had this
enormous integration.
They went to a single currency.
There was a rule that you
couldn't run about more
than 2.7, two percent of your
GDP as your fiscal deficit.
Nobody enforced it, you know.
So Greece ran up its deficit.
And Germany then came
in which really had all
of the economic power
and imposed its own,
you know, views.
Which were coming
out of what it went
through in the [inaudible]
Republic.
So they're going to have to
find a greater, you know,
kind of equilibrium
between how far they want
to take the political change.
And how much they
coordinate policy.
I think they've actually
seen the worst of their days.
I just came back from Britain.
And in June 2016, I had been
invited to London, to the,
to Chatham House [inaudible]
International Affairs
to give a talk on how our
domestic policy was affecting
our foreign policy.
Turned out to be three
days after Brexit.
So I walked and said, "Why don't
you guys talk to me, you know?"
And so Brexit is a huge issue.
You know, Catalonia
may be an issue.
The right wing is a huge issue.
But I, I think that they're
going to have to manage those.
You know, my own sense is, is
I think the EU can survive it.
But at the same time, in the
nuts and bolts of policy.
It's going to have to figure
out, you know, how to, you know,
you know, if its wants
more political integration.
It's going to have
to you know impose,
make the governments comply.
Because it's still kind of
like the United Nations.
It's really a bunch
of governments coming
together under an umbrella.
>> John Haskell: We
got, yeah, Andrew?
>> Audience Question:
Thank you very much
for a most interesting
discussion.
I would appreciate your
inclusion of social movements
and non-governmental
organizations.
And I also appreciate
the fact that you point
out that there are
limitations to what they can do.
And eventually state
institutions
and governmental
authorities have to pick up.
In order to push
the process along.
You think about Martin
Luther King,
pushing up from the bottom.
And Lyndon Johnson
pushing down from the top
to achieve Civil
Rights legislation.
I'm wondering, based on
your historical research,
can you offer suggestions
for that process of
passing the baton?
From social movement to
government institutions?
How do we ease that along?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Let me give you an example.
In the, in the section on
your know advancing freedom
and human rights that
the Amnesty International
chapter's in.
And some of the others.
At the end I say that
you know, NGOs are going
to be extremely important
in the human rights area.
Because the reality, whether
it's the Human Rights Council
or US foreign policy.
There's a lot of inconsistency,
to say the least there.
And so what we're seeing
as, as NGOs, you know,
get the kind of technologies.
So for example with what
was happening with Rohingya,
the first reports came
from Human Rights Watch.
Who now had satellite technology
they could photograph.
The same way we were dependent
upon intelligence agencies
to do.
And intelligence agencies
of governments may
or may not share
that information.
So I actually think
they will continue
to be extremely important on
flagging human rights issues.
They've developed enormous
expertise over the years.
There's little market
competition among human right--
human rights NGOs because
they all need funding
from foundations and others.
But you're right.
At the end of the day, they
can't change the policy, right?
So I think that you know
that their role there
in calling attention.
You know, they're not
going to be as important
in major power geopolitics.
They can, there can
be some things.
Secondly is in this
philanthropy statesmanship.
If you watch the role of the
Gates Foundation has played.
You know, one of the
chapters in the book is
on Gro Harlem Brundtland who,
she was the Prime Minister
of Norway, but she's in there
for her international role.
First in chairing the
World Commission on,
on Sustainable Development
in the '80s.
That took the term
and the thinking
of sustainable development,
you know, into the mainstream.
And, and you could be
green in both ways, right?
Both for environment
and for money.
And then she took over the WHO
in '90s and really reformed it.
Got it paying more attention
to a variety of issues.
And then unfortunately,
other leaders let it go.
I think that's where
foundations come in.
I think in the case
of the [inaudible]
and others is the
WHO's spun its wheels,
the Gates Foundation and others.
You know, Doctors without
Borders and others got
in there and did things.
So those are two areas:
environment, three.
Environment and the
sustainability of global health
and environment and
human rights.
Where I think we need
you know again the notion
of what governments are
unable and willing to do.
And to push to get
governments to act.
>> John Haskell: The guy right
here in the back, [inaudible].
>> Audience Question: Has
the wired world made changes
in the ability to
have transformational
relationships here?
The quote from Kennedy earlier I
think was related to the media.
But it seems to me if time and
personal attention are needed.
There's also more
heat and light coming
from putting those
leadership relationships
under a microscope
or into blogs.
[Laughter] Almost immediately,
and has that changed the ability
to make them possible?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: I think,
I think it's added
the complication.
Particularly like
the time factor.
It's very hard to
control message.
Or sometimes, you know, I know
you make a policy decision,
you've got to get out quickly.
And sometimes, you know, any
of us know from any situation
that a quick decision
may not be, you know,
well thought through,
well researched.
I, I, I you know, but
again I go back to.
And I try to build up to
the U.S.-China opening.
And the Red China, and I go
back to the Soviet Union,
and I go back on
Rabin and others.
And who would have
thought Mandela, you know,
would get out of prison?
That the South African political
transformation would be peaceful
and democratic?
That he, after 27 years in
prison, plenty of reason to,
you know, be resentful.
So I, I don't think our
current situation precludes it.
I really don't at all.
I think people in
some ways are anxious
for vision and leadership.
I acknowledge that in some
respect social psychologists
will say that appealing
to people's fear
and anxiety psychologically
can always be easier.
Than to their hope
and aspirations.
And that's an inherent
psychological problem.
But I feel like with everything
we're going through now,
I think, I actually think
that, that, that the,
that the table's being set.
You know for that sort of thing.
And, and so I, I hold out.
And I don't think it's naive.
I think it's based on, on that.
You know, based on the
research I did and,
and the intractability of
many of these problems.
You know, I'm not betting my
next non-subprime mortgage
payment that it's going
to happen you know soon.
But I think there's, there's
an analytic and strategy path
to make those kinds
of things happen.
In a variety of areas.
Environment's a good
example where, you know,
you read a magazine from the
real estate industry now.
They sound like my
old boss, Al Gore.
Right? Because they have
all these, you know,
hotels on the shoreline of
Miami Beach and elsewhere.
And you know, and so the
business community has begun
to see that.
We have a political issue in
our country, you know, that,
that's been problematic there.
But you begin to see change.
And then you need leadership
that can tap that change.
That's that person and moment.
You know, with all
due respect to Al Gore
who I think was extraordinarily
insightful.
You know, the moment
in 1992 or even 2000
on the environment
it just wasn't there.
Right? And so it's where
these two intersect.
How and when they intersect
isn't always predictable.
But I think on some of these
issues, we're really at a moment
where people would
respond to leaders
that they believe have
this authenticity.
And a vision that you know
that is somewhat reassuring.
That, the, that you know,
that change can lead
to better futures.
>> John Haskell: We have time
for one more question,
if we have it?
This gentleman over
here, last question.
>> Audience Question: I wanted
to ask a little bit
about Irving Babbitt.
I want to see if you
think there's a connection
between a strong moral
character, both in the citizenry
and of the, these statesman.
That correlates to
good statesmanship?
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: What
was the first thing you wanted
to ask about who?
>> Audience Question:
Oh, Irving Babbitt.
I'm just channeling him.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Okay, so I use the term
in the book personal capital in
which moral capital is a subset.
So it's hard to talk
about Kissinger [inaudible]
having moral capital, right?
But they had personal capital.
Mandela had moral capital,
[inaudible] in that
role had moral capital.
Rabin had enormous
moral capital.
And so I sort of define it as
qualities that the person has
that are not just a function
of the position they occupy.
The two Northern
Irish women had it.
You know, Walesa
had it as a worker.
And that's enormously important.
There's an authenticity
thing that people, you know,
the average person wants
to know that you know,
you really are what
you say you are.
Having worked in quite a few
presidential campaigns and gone
through the consultant as
the perfect resume, you know.
I think that, that
these qualities--
and so when I talk
about leadership.
You know, I use this broad
sense of personal capital.
And it is really important
for transformational change.
And, and it's not necessarily.
You know, there are very
few leaders in the book
who were like, you
know, LeBron James,
you know coming out immediately.
Or Mozart as a young person.
They emerge through
their life experiences.
And they get to that point.
Mandela's probably the closest
because he you know came
out of this particular,
you know, upbringing.
But the others are you know
who would have thunk it
at an earlier point in
their, in their lives, okay?
>> John Haskell: Bruce,
thank you for coming back
to the Library to share your
thoughts in public scholarship
and the actual scholarship
you've done.
And we have a reception that
we would like to invite you to,
to enjoy as well as Bruce is
signing copies of his books.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson:
Happy to sign books.
Good, thanks very much.
>> John Haskell: Thank you.
>> Dr. Bruce Jentleson: Thanks!
[ Applause ]
>> This has been a presentation
of the Library of Congress.
Visit us at LOC.GOV.