>> John Haskell: I am
joined by Carla Freeman,
the Library of Congress' chair,
and U.S. China relations,
and director of the
Foreign Policy Institute
at Johns Hopkins
University School
for Advanced International
Studies.
Also, we have Hal Brands as
the incoming Kissinger chair
in Foreign Policy
and International Relations
at the Kluge Center.
Hal is distinguished
professor of global affairs
at Johns Hopkins and he's
also a senior scholar
at the American Enterprise
Institute.
Welcome to you both.
Let me start with
a question for --
for Carla and then it will
be the same question to kind
of give the overview
of how we're thinking
about public diplomacy
in the wake of COVID.
Where are U.S. China
relations going?
>> Carla Freeman: Well, I
don't think they're headed
in a very good direction.
We started the year with
some promising signs
in the relationship.
I mean we had concluded an --
an interim trade agreement,
and it looked like we were
putting the trade war on hiatus,
and we could move forward
in the relationship.
But the coronavirus
is certainly sent
that potential positive
movement in the relationship
in a tailspin and highlighted
some of the -- the --
the problems in the relationship
that had been ongoing.
And -- and now I
think pushing them --
has pushed them increasingly
to the forefront of --
of the dynamic between
the two countries.
We are -- we really are
facing a China that is --
is far more publicly
hostile to the United States,
it has used the coronavirus
as a -- as a public --
a relations opportunity to
push its message out about --
about China's superior system.
And -- and has -- has
also sent a strong message
that is designed to communicate
that the United States is --
is -- is a failing country.
And highlighting most recently,
the -- the social -- this --
the -- the unrest that the
marches against police brutality
in -- in the United
States as a -- as a --
as a feature or a sign
of -- of U.S. problems.
So, we're going to come out
of this having -- having a --
a much harder time of finding
-- finding footholds, toeholds
and -- with -- with China to
work on -- on issues together.
You know, I'm an eternal
optimist, so when --
when we first faced this crisis,
I thought that the coronavirus
has a global challenge where --
you know, we -- we all
need to work together,
would provide an opportunity
for the two countries
to come together, and the
moment just isn't right.
I think there's just so much
mistrust on the two sides.
And -- and we are -- we are
going to come out of this
with all of the same
geostrategic challenges
that we faced before
the coronavirus
but with many economic
burdens to --
to address and on both sides.
And I think for -- what
this means for China --
and you can see it already
playing it -- playing --
this already playing
out in the -- in --
in the high altitudes
on the -- on the --
the China India the
border is a --
a China that is going to be
much more defensive and focused
because -- on -- on -- on
asserting its -- its -- its --
its sovereignty, its interests
overseas, because it faces
such -- so many challenges
internally.
And Xi Jinping has to
be perfect and when --
when the Chinese government
doesn't perform well
under his leadership, then
there is -- there are problems.
And so, I think we're going
to see what you might describe
as diversionary efforts
by China overseas.
And all of that will
just bode ill
for the U.S. China relationship.
>> John Haskell: Where do
you think things are going
in the wake of the
pandemic, Hal?
>> Hal Brands: So, I think
Carla has it basically right
unfortunately, which is that --
you know, even in the
run up to the pandemic,
I think the assessment
of a lot of people
who watch the relationship
closely was
that whatever trade deal --
whatever phase one trade deal we
got was really going to be more
of a truce rather than
a lasting resolution
of the issues dividing
the two countries.
And -- and it had become
increasingly common to talk
about a -- a new -- new Cold War
between the United
States and China.
And you can -- you
can like that analogy,
you can not like
that analogy, but --
but what it captured was that
there was an increasing sense --
certainly, in the United
States, and as I understand it,
in certain Chinese decision
making circles as well,
that the relationship was headed
for deepening competition,
that the competition was
simultaneously strategic,
economic, and ideological
in nature in the way that --
that Carla pointed
out in the sense
that the competition
involved questions
of whether authoritarian
or democratic systems
were better suited
for success in the 21st century.
And so, the response to
coronavirus was viewed
through that lens, it was viewed
I think in a zero sum rather
than a positive sum
lens in both capitals.
And so, the initial response
in Washington was, hey, great,
this is going to accelerate
U.S. China economic decoupling.
Firms are going to
come home from China.
This is a big problem for
China, maybe not a big problem
for the world, that
obviously was a misjudgment.
But as the crisis deepened,
you saw a virtual absence
of U.S. China cooperation or
even the high level dialogue
at -- at certain point.
And so, the crisis has had
the effect of sharpening all
of the perceptions of
danger and competition
that were already moving
the relationship in a --
in a fairly challenging
direction.
And so, if you look
at the public polling
and how Americans view China,
coronavirus has accomplished
something that a decade plus
of assertive Chinese behavior
in the South China Sea couldn't,
it's convinced a
majority of Americans
that U.S. policy toward China
should be either tougher
than it is now or as
tough as it is now,
and that the Chinese Communist
Party represents a significant
challenge to their
prosperity and wellbeing.
I'm sure there are
similar dynamics
at work in -- in Beijing.
And so -- you know, Ronald
Reagan, when he was talking
to Soviet leaders back in
the 1980s, used to kind
of bemuse everybody by
saying, well, if aliens came
down from outer space,
the United States
and the Soviet Union would
resolve their differences very
quickly and cooperate
on the common threat.
We've had kind of the closest
approximation of that happening
in terms of this exogenous
shock to the system
over the past few months,
but it's actually pushed the
two countries farther apart
by highlighting all
the things they don't
like about each other.
>> John Haskell: You brought
up that Cold War analogy,
which you hear people
talk about on Capitol Hill
and other places, and -- you
know, the commentary on that.
Where does that analogy
fall short?
>> Hal Brands: So, it falls
short in a lot of places
and I think that it's
important to clarify that --
you know, people who use the new
Cold War analogy usually aren't
saying that the U.S. China
competition is exactly the same
or nearly the same as the
U.S. Soviet competition
because there are so
many obvious differences.
The level of economic
integration
between the United
States and China is --
orders of magnitude
greater than it was
for the U.S. and
the Soviet Union.
The -- the levels of
interconnectedness
between American allies and
China are -- are greater still.
And there are a variety
of other ways
in which the Chinese
Regime is different
than the Soviet regime,
in which the geography
of the competition is different,
and so on and so forth.
I think the best argument
you can make in favor
of the Cold War analogy
is basically twofold,
that there are challenges the
United States faced during the
Cold War that it will face
in a long term competition
with China.
These challenges might
be maintaining a diverse
and fractious coalition
over many years.
It might be using a
comp as an opportunity
to improve the functioning
of one system
and one's quality at home.
Those sorts of broad challenges
applied during the Cold War
and I think, to some
extent, they apply today.
The other good defense of the
Cold War analogy I think is
that the Cold War is simply the
only time in America's history
where the United States
has geared up over a period
of decades for explicit
self-conscious competition
with an authoritarian power.
And so, we are going to,
consciously or unconsciously,
be pillaging the Cold
War's history for lessons
in dealing with China.
And so, perhaps we ought
to do it more formally
and systematically rather
than less formally
and systematically.
>> John Haskell: Now
Hal brought up --
Carla, Hal brought up the
question of whether autocratic
or authoritarian regimes
handled crises better
than -- than democracies.
Do you have -- do you
have perspective on that?
>> Carla Freeman:
Well, I think --
I think if you compare
the U.S. and --
and Chinese responses you --
you probably come out giving the
Chinese higher marks in -- in --
before being able to manage
and control the disease.
But it -- it continues to flare
up in China, of course, and --
and it's not over there yet,
and we're not sure exactly
what they -- this is --
how the story will end.
But China has spent much
of the last decade rebuilding
its healthcare system and has --
has an -- a better ability to --
to deliver treatment to
large numbers of people,
partly because it can -- it
can throw up buildings quickly,
and -- and order people to move
from different regions, and --
and so forth, and all
of those things that --
that authoritarian
systems can do.
But, of course, the --
the disease never would have
progressed as rapidly as it did,
and possibly would not
have become the pandemic
that it has become had
China had a more open
and transparent political
system.
And now this is a lesson
that [inaudible] and --
during the SARS epi -- epidemic
of 2002, 2003 learned was --
was that -- you know,
when it's --
it's not unusual for
local governments
to suppress information.
I mean one of my colleagues
has likened the situation sort
of the drop Jaws movie, where --
you know, the local mayor
didn't want to let anybody know
that there was a -- a man
eating shark because he wanted
to keep the beaches open.
So, it's not -- that --
that, alone, is not a feature
of an authoritarian system.
But the problem in China
was that the desire
to control information,
suppress information,
and so even though there were
technical systems in place to --
to report up the chain,
the local government
suppressed information.
But the big -- but the big
key was that -- that --
that the flows of
information to --
to experts and so on
got stymied because --
because Xi Jinping wanted to
control -- control the message.
And -- and so, I
-- when -- when --
I'm going back to what
I was saying about --
[ Inaudible ]
Learned about -- about
managing epidemics in China is
that you need to have
more channels of --
for information and
-- and -- and flows.
And so, after -- after the SARS
epidemic, there was an effort
to relax controls over the media
so that media could report
more openly about problems
at the local level, recognizing
that local governments have --
there's this principle
aging problem
in between local governments
and the central government.
Xi -- Xi Jinping's
centralization and control
over information is -- and
it's strengthening of -- of --
of the authoritarian political
system in China is definitely --
has definitely been a huge
source of the -- of -- of --
of this rapid spread of
the disease because it --
there just wasn't enough
information getting
out to the local public,
and to the -- to the --
the international
community early enough.
>> John Haskell: Hal, do you
have a perspective on that?
>> Hal Brands: Yeah.
I -- I would add that -- you
know, while the Chinese seemed
to have implemented
some very harsh and --
and effective measures in
suppressing the disease aft --
after it had progressed
to a very dangerous point,
it's really hard for us
to tell how effective
that Chinese response has been
because the information
that's coming out of China is
so thoroughly distorted.
And so, my colleague
Derek Scissors at --
at AEI has done sort of some
basic math checking Chinese
numbers of reported cases
and deaths gone under --
from coronavirus, and basically,
they don't pass the laugh test
and so it's hard for us to know
whether those numbers are off
by a factor of two, or by a
factor of ten, or whatever.
But it testifies to some
of the problems that --
that Carla was highlighting
in dealing
with authoritarian regimes.
And I -- I would just add that
I think you can find examples
of authoritarian or
quasi-authoritarian systems
that have performed fairly well
in dealing with coronavirus.
I think Singapore probably
wins the prize in that respect.
You can also find
examples of democracies
that have actually performed
exceedingly well in dealing
with -- with COVID, Taiwan,
South Korea, New Zealand,
Germany, even the
[inaudible], a larger country.
And so, neither a political
system seems to have a monopoly
on success or failure
in grappling
with this -- this disease.
My -- I tend to think that
democracies, on balance,
will do better over the long run
because they probably have
higher levels of transparency,
better information
sharing, and more trust
in government authorities,
all of which public health
people will tell you are
critical to getting
on top of pandemics,
but you can find
exceptions to those rules
in the current case as well.
>> John Haskell: Let's get to
-- Carla, let's get to the --
to the -- something of
that people in Congress
and of course elsewhere
are very concerned,
about what's been going on in --
in Hong Kong and indeed, Taiwan.
How is -- how are recent events,
the -- the protests and the --
and the crackdown,
how are that --
how are they affecting U.S.
China relations, not --
what's your perspective on that?
>> Carla Freeman: I think
the Hong Kong crisis,
it is one that is -- is
emerging a sort of --
I don't know if it's ground
zero or Sino-American, tensions
but it is certainly
encapsulating the -- our --
the -- the -- many of
the issues that we --
we have working with
China, partly because we --
although we weren't
directly involved in the --
in the handover, we --
the United States has
been deeply concerned
about maintaining the one
country, two systems' commitment
that -- that China made when the
British completed the handover
in 1997 of Hong Kong
to the mainland.
And since the early 1990s, the
United -- the United States --
U.S. Congress has required
a review of this --
the status of Hong
Kong, ensuring that --
that the one country,
two systems' formula
has been maintained.
And that -- that
formula is supposed
to allow the Hong Kong Chinese
to continue the way of life
that existed under British rule,
and also to expand a democratic
process -- in -- in --
in choosing local leaders,
and that has not happened.
And now we've had a series
of efforts by China first
in extradition, an effort to
-- to -- through the China --
through the Hong Kong government
to [inaudible] extradition law
that would have allowed --
expanded China's ability to --
to extradite people from --
from Hong Kong to the mainland,
as well as this -- this
national security law, which --
which will enable
-- give -- it's --
it's very hard to know
exactly how China will use it
at the moment because it's
only in draft form, but it --
it would enable the Chinese
government to charge people
with treason and
that kind of thing.
It will definitely -- it will
definitely inhibit free speech,
and -- and -- and meanwhile,
the Chinese government has not
enabled the expansion of --
of -- of -- of direct
elections in Hong Kong,
as many people had -- in Hong
Kong -- had expect would happen.
And so, we have a situation
where Hong -- the --
you know, if you're
looking for -- I think --
you know, the U.S. had seen Hong
Kong as kind one step ahead,
a pot -- potential beacon for
the rest of China, and instead,
we're seeing China in -- --
increasingly centralized
an authoritarian China,
tightening its grip over
Hong Kong and -- and --
and rolling back its political
independence and -- and --
or autonomy, rather, and it's --
and the political
freedoms inside Hong Kong.
And so, that is -- that sends
-- it's sort of affirms concerns
about the direction of politics
in China, and not to mention,
deep concern about the
future of -- of a --
of a city and that
has plagued has --
has really been a beacon
for free trade and -- and --
and open society on
China's periphery.
And I -- I won't get into the
Taiwan issue now, maybe --
maybe I'll go back to you, we
can pick that up in a moment.
>> John Haskell: Yeah Hal, so --
so Carla is looking at a
large measure from the --
the Chinese perspective.
What's -- what's
our perspective?
What are we doing?
How are we responding.
What responsibilities
does Congress have?
Let me turn it to you.
>> Hal Brands: So,
I think the --
the Chinese gamble in
making this move now,
which I assume was being
prepared for some time,
was that the international
response would not be
particularly painful, either
because countries that might be
in a position to respond are --
are either economically
dependent on China,
or are distracted by
coronavirus and other things.
And so far, that gamble seems
to have paid off a little bit
in dealing with the
European Union, for instance,
which is decided to
go the route of kind
of strongly worded letter with
no substance attached to it
in its relationship with China.
But -- but there has
been a stronger response
from the United Kingdom so
far, which has basically said,
we're going to create a
path to citizenship for up
to 3 million residents
of -- of Hong Kong.
And we have at least the
makings of a stronger response
from the United States.
And so, shortly in the
aftermath of the introduction
of the national security
law, Secretary Pompeo said
that the United States
had determined
that Hong Kong no longer enjoys
a substantial degree of autonomy
from -- from China, and those
are kind of the magic words
in the way that -- that
Carla talked about because
that opens the door to
a variety of measures
to strip away the special
status that Hong Kong has
in U.S. policy and
-- and U.S. law.
What we don't know yet is how
aggressively the administration
will seek to strip back
that -- that status.
And so, we could see everything
up to basically a Hong Kong
special commercial status being
suspended, and so it would
then be subject to all
of the tariffs, and -- and
all of the trade frictions
that have afflicted U.S.
economic relations with the rest
of -- of mainland China.
And that would presumably have
a fairly significant impact
on Hong Kong's status as a
commercial and financial center,
although how exactly
it plays out,
I think we're all still
trying to figure out.
And so, that's --
that's kind of what's
to be watched at the moment.
How -- how far is the
administration going to go
in terms of levying sanctions
of one sort or another
in response to this episode?
And clearly, there's a
significant degree of latitude
for Congress here as well.
And so, there are a number of
congressional representatives
and senators who have
shown a strong interest
in Hong Kong issues over the
years, and so I would imagine
that those folks
are in communication
with the State Department
right now,
trying to shape the
administration's response,
and may be considering
responses of their own.
>> John Haskell: So, are
there red lines for China?
And if so, what are
they with respect
to the West taking actions --
or taking positions on
Hong Kong and Taiwan?
>> Carla Freeman: Any -- any
move by the United States
to encourage independence
is the big red line
and that particularly
applies to -- to Taiwan.
It hasn't been something the
United States has pressed for
but -- with respect
to Hong Kong.
We have -- we have
really just ask
that the Chinese uphold the
basic -- basic law and --
and that the -- the --
the -- the agreement --
the joint declaration
that the --
the Chinese and British signed.
So, we -- we have stuck
to that and rather
than pushing for independence.
There are -- there is
an independence movement
in Hong Kong and we're --
some of our political leaders,
for example, to stand next to
pro-independence Hong Kong --
Hong Kong citizens,
that would be a big --
that would be seen as a --
a major policy shift
by the United States
and the Chinese would --
would -- would take action.
They would take action not so
much against the United States
but against Hong Kong,
and I think that's something
we really have to be cautious
about in our policy, to
recognize that the -- that --
that -- that the Chinese
response to whether it is our --
our decision to decertify
Hong Kong as --
or any other actions that we
will take, we have to recognize
that they are going to be --
they're going to affect
the Hong Kong citizens --
Hong Kong citizens
first and foremost.
And that is the same -- a bigger
discussion on Taiwan policy,
the same with our Taiwan policy.
There aren't -- the --
the red line there is
for the United States
to champion full sovereignty
independence for Taiwan,
we would see all kinds
of repercussions.
>> John Haskell: Hal, where are
you on the red line question?
>> Hal Brands: So, I'll take the
Taiwan piece of it because one
of the really interesting
things about COVID is
that it has produced a stronger
outpouring of American support,
or at least admiration
for Taiwan, right,
which is the Democratic China
that handled the crisis very,
very well in an exemplary
fashion.
And I think it is leading to
advocacy, and in some corners,
for deepening the U.S.
relationship with Taiwan.
I -- I don't hear anyone saying
that the United States should
support a Taiwanese declaration
of independence because I think
that's generally recognized
that -- that would
be very destabilizing
within the relationship and
might actually get everybody
into a situation they
would prefer to avoid.
But you do hear proposals
to go as far even
as revisiting the
one China policy,
and perhaps extending diplomatic
recognition to Taiwan,
which I think in Beijing's eyes,
would be the functional
equivalent of a support for --
of U.S. support for a
declaration of independence,
or even just increasing military
and diplomatic ties with Taiwan,
which -- which are pretty
tightly circumscribed
at the moment by the Taiwan
Relations Act, and a variety
of policy guidelines
that have put
in place pursuant to -- to that.
What was interesting is
there was a statement
from the Chinese government
about two or three weeks ago
that reiterated kind of
the standard boilerplate
in China's approach to
Taiwan, which is that China --
China reserves the right to
use force to prevent Taiwan
from declaring independence
or seceding,
as the Chinese sometimes
refer to it.
But there was a twist on
this one, which is that it --
it was written in
a way that implied
that the Chinese might use force
to prevent the current situation
from going on forever, right?
And so, the current
situation is with --
one of which Taiwan does not
enjoy legal independence,
but does enjoy de
facto autonomy,
de facto independence,
in a sense.
And so, if -- what the
Chinese may be signaling is
that we're -- we're
not willing to live
with the status quo
forever, we do expect
that Taiwan will come
back to the mainland at --
at some point Xi Jinping
has sometimes sort
of vaguely referenced
2049 as the date
by which he hopes this
will be accomplished.
And so, what you
may be seeing is --
is posturing on the Chinese
side as well in an effort to try
to dissuade the United
States or other countries
from doing more to
support Taiwan.
From -- from my perspective,
the --
the really critical issue
in the U.S. Taiwan
relationship is enabling Taiwan
to defend its independence,
its de facto independence,
from a PRC assault, or
an attempt at coercion,
and there's -- there's a lot of
work to be done there as well.
I don't think that is a
fight that Beijing would go
into enthusiastically or
they were going to lightly
because it would be very
challenging and if Xi Jinping
or a successor started a
war over Taiwan and lost,
that could be an existential
threat to the regime,
but I think that the danger
of that is probably growing
in the coming years
because the Chinese think
that the military balance
in the Strait is becoming
more favorable to them.
At the same time, they worry
that the political balance
in Taiwan is becoming
less favorable to them,
as more of a distinctive
Taiwanese,
as opposed a Chinese
national identity emerges,
and as Beijing friendly
politicians get left farther
and farther in the dust,
at least over the
last decade or so.
And so, if you put
those things together,
you could have a scenario where
the Chinese believe 5, 10,
15 years from now, that the
political window is closing
while the military
window is opening,
and I think that would
be quite dangerous.
>> John Haskell: You know, we --
we titled this discussion about
the global PR battle and, Carla,
depending on -- on how
vaccine efforts develop,
what will the impact
be on the --
on the relations
between the countries?
Because this is, of
course, a global problem,
so it would have -- it
potentially could have a lot
of impact on how the
world sees both countries?
>> Carla Freeman:
Well, apparently,
there are about 90 different
efforts around the world
to develop a vaccine,
but when you have a --
President Trump is urging the
United States to produce one
on warp speed and we certainly
have the capacity to do that.
I think -- I think were
we to develop a -- a --
a vaccine before
China, for example,
that would be an
incredible PR win.
And I -- and -- and at
that point, we, ideally,
will not squander that
by actually producing
and sharing the vaccine
with other countries.
There are -- there are --
there are a lot of areas where
we could this to bolster our --
our flagging influence,
including in the
Western Hemisphere,
where we've seen the
coronavirus actually served
to push countries in our own
hemisphere, whether it's Mexico
or Brazil, more closely
into China's arms.
And similarly, I think tomorrow
China is meeting with --
with a group of African
nations, Xi Jinping, himself,
will host them to discuss a
range of different topics,
but will include health.
And if we are concerned about
China's growing influence
in that continent,
having -- playing a --
a role there in distributing
a vaccine would be an exciting
opportunity and etcetera.
We would have a real --
a real opportunity to --
to show that the United
States still leads and is a --
is a source of global
public goods.
>> John Haskell: And -- but
there's no sign of that coin,
right, Hal, potentially?
>> Hal Brands: Sure.
So, I mean I think that the --
the Chinese very much view it
in the -- the same light.
And so, you can think
of this as a space race
that actually matters, right?
And so, that the space race
of the 1960's was hugely
important symbolically, but --
but really had kind of limited
impact for the quality of life
of people on earth, this
one matters symbolically
because it has profound
implications for the quality
of life of people
around the world.
And so, I think --
you know, the --
the Chinese are certainly
hoping to be the first
to develop a vaccine, that --
that would go a long
way in erasing some
of the reputational
damage that China suffered
from being the source of --
of the virus, and
from mishandling the
initial response.
And it's been reported
certainly in --
in the open press
that there has been --
there have been hacking
attempts originating from China
against many of the institutions
in the United States
and elsewhere that are also
engaged in vaccine R&D.
And -- and so, I think that
the Chinese very much view this
as an aspect of the competition
with the United States,
one that is going to
have a significant impact
on how the legacy
of the crisis plays
out in this long
term competition.
>> John Haskell: Either
of you can start on this.
But how effective is China --
has China been, as we
go through the crisis,
and maybe even before that,
in exploiting the
challenges the U.S. has
in its relationship with Europe?
>> Carla Freeman: Sure, and I
think it's had mixed effects.
Some countries [inaudible]
I think it was news
in The New York Times, they
focused on -- on Serbia and --
and Serbia's reaction to --
to China's health diplomacy.
There been other countries
that like -- in Eastern Europe,
in particular, where China
has -- has used its -- its --
its distribution of masks and
other -- other [inaudible] to --
those countries to -- to
show its friendship building
on its -- its economic
relationships
with those countries.
But I think China's
strategy has backfired in --
in many countries
in the region in --
in Europe, who have seen --
been very concerned for a while
that -- that China was
having a corrosive influence
on the European Union's
integrity,
and that that might even be
a -- an objective of -- of --
of China's -- a strategic
objective associated
with China's Belton
Road strategy.
And -- and -- and so,
when you have part
of the region sending
messages of -- of --
of appreciation and thanks to
China, and part of the region,
part of Europe worrying
about -- about the --
the source of the
virus, about China's --
China's heavy handed propaganda,
promoting its -- its --
its superior system,
and so forth, it --
it actually has enhanced
tensions across Europe.
I'm -- I'm having trouble
sort of reconciling with that.
Some of the polling
data though that come --
is coming out of Europe that --
that also, shows that -- that --
that China's -- that
support for China on some
of the publics has
remained fair --
fairly strong throughout
this whole crisis,
relative to the United States.
And I think that's
something we really --
the United States
really needs to repair.
I think the -- the virus
-- the coronavirus --
this pandemic has -- has also
-- has also highlighted that,
although there are opportunities
for the United States to exploit
because of China's mixed impacts
on the European of response --
reaction to China's --
China's health diplomacy,
there also is -- is a problem
in that the United
States has also failed
to support its allies during the
-- this -- this pandemic, and --
and so there's a lot of
negative fallout from that.
>> John Haskell: Hal?
>> Hal Brands: So, I
think that, in general,
the balance of European
government opinion seems
to have become less enamored of
China since the crisis began,
for -- for reasons that
-- that Carla mentioned.
But it's -- it's useful
to draw the distinction
between European countries and
then Europe as an entity, and --
and precisely because
Beijing has been successful
in cultivating countries,
mostly in --
in eastern and southern
Europe, and in finding ways
of fracturing the unity of the
EU on China related issues.
The EU, as an entity, has
not moved dramatically,
as a result of this crisis.
And this -- this is a
challenge for the United States
because I think the United
States is accustomed to thinking
that Europe will be
on America's side
and whatever the great
geopolitical competition
of the age is, but the Chinese
have actually pursued a fairly
adept strategy for weakening
the cohesion of Europe,
and making it harder for Europe
to respond as an institute.
The United States, by the
way, has actually done some
of that itself, and so this
administration has pursued a
strategy that's relatively
hostile to the EU.
And moreover, I think,
that while a number of your
and governments are increasingly
skeptical of Chinese,
and tensions, and actions,
they're also just
frankly worried
about the reliability
of the United States.
And so, if -- if -- the --
the ask that the United
States is making is, okay,
now go get tough with China,
now go pick a fight with China.
Well, we have to be able
to deliver on this saying,
and we will be there with you
when the going gets tough.
What -- what happens
now, not just in --
in Europe, but frankly,
around the world is
that countries are a little
bit hesitant to walk out on
that limb for fear that it
might be sawed off behind them.
>> John Haskell: So,
I'll hit you both
with the same last question.
I can do a little, quick hitter.
What do you think is the most --
so, Hal, we'll start with you.
What is it -- what do you
think is the most important
opportunity we're missing
in this challenging time
with respect to our
relationship to China?
>> Hal Brands: So, I think
the most important opportunity
that we have missed on so
far is the idea that came
out of the UK basically
to expand --
and reform the G7 to make it a
group of ten leading democracies
that would work together
in developing alternatives
to reliance on Chinese 5G
technology, in particular,
this has been the big stumbling
block in the United States.
We go to our allies around the
world we say, don't use Huawei.
And they say, okay, what's
the alternative, right?
And so, I think if you actually
could get a partnership of --
you know, we'll call
it the free world
and developing democratic
5G alternatives,
that could potentially be a game
changer in a competitive sense.
But the problem is that we kind
of got in the way of that one
by proposing that Russia also
be included in an expanded G7,
which made it seem as though we
were missing the point a bit.
And so, I'd like to see us
pick up that idea and --
and put our weight
behind it because I think
that has a lot of promise.
>> John Haskell:
So, Carla, for you.
Hal just told us what he thought
the most important missing
opportunity to U.S. -- the most
important opportunity the U.S.
has missed in this
challenging time with respect
to its relationship to China.
What's yours?
>> Carla Freeman: I am going
to read -- reveal my -- my --
my support for multilateral
institutions here and say
that we have missed
an opportunity to --
to lead -- in -- in -- globally.
The United States has --
has -- for many decades --
been the leading provider
of global public goods.
We founded the -- the
WHO or were a key --
key founding member of the WHO.
We have exercised leadership
in many multilateral forums
and I think we -- we
could have used this --
this opportunity to
demonstrate our support for --
for a collective action
around a global challenge
and we have not done that for
philosophical reasons I think
more than anything else.
And I think that is a -- an --
a missed opportunity because
it's given enormous space for --
for China to pro -- promote
its idea of a shared future
or a common future for mankind.
And that may seem
clumsy to us in the West,
but it actually has a
fair amount of traction.
And we have to remember, China's
audience isn't just the United
States, and it's not
just Western democracies,
but it is the rest of the world,
and that's a big, big world,
and it's also the
Chinese people.
And so, I think we -- we
missed an opportunity to --
to show the world that we --
we can still lead effectively,
and the world still needs us.
>> John Haskell:
Carla, Hal, we're --
we're out of time but I
want to thank both for --
for joining us here at the
Library of Congress for our --
for our conversation
on the future
of democracy series
and we appreciate it.
Thank you both very much.
>> Hal Brands: Thanks
for having us.
>> Carla Freeman: Thank you.