>> Welcome to Conversations
on the Future of Democracy,
a series sponsored by the
John W. Clooney Center,
at the Library of Congress.
I'm Don Haskell, Director
of the Clooney Center.
Today, we are discussing a
new book edited by Hal Brands
and Francis Gavin,
COVID-19 and World Order,
the Future of Conflict,
Competition, and Cooperation.
We're doing by the two editors,
Hal Brands is the
current Kissinger Chair
in International
Relations and Foreign Policy
at the Clooney Center, and
distinguished Professor
of Global Affairs at the School
of Advanced International
Studies
at Johns Hopkins University.
He's a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute,
and the author of several
books on foreign policy.
Frank Gavin, this is the
Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished
Professor and the
Inaugural Director
of the Henry A. Kissinger
center for Global Affairs,
at the Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies.
His latest book,
Nuclear Weapons:
An American Grand Strategy,
was published in 2020.
We are also joined by
contributor Margaret MacMillan.
In addition to being on the
Scholar's Advisory Council
to the Librarian of Congress,
Margaret is the Distinguished
Visiting Historian
at the Council on
Foreign Relations.
She is the Emeritus Professor of
International History at Oxford,
and a Professor of History
at the University of Toronto.
Her latest book just
out this fall is War:
How Conflict Shaped Us.
Welcome to you all.
We are glad to have you here.
I'm going to start
with Frank and Hal.
You must have moved fast to
put together a book like this
with such a distinguished
group of contributors.
Tell us a little bit about that.
>> Sure, so I'll take a
first crack at that, John.
The idea for this volume
actually came from the President
of Johns Hopkins, Ronald
Daniels, who is a dynamo
in pretty much every way, and
called Frank and me at one point
and said he had a terrific idea
for how we should
spend our summer,
and that we should basically
pull together a conference
with stars like Margaret,
to discuss the implications
of COVID World Order,
and then do a book on it.
And so we basically had
our marching orders,
but it was easy and
fun to execute.
Well, easy may be
the wrong word.
It was fun to execute,
because I think Frank
and I had been talking for a
long time about what we saw
as a building crisis of World
Order, even before COVID.
There were a variety of strands
on the international order,
from the resurgence of
authoritarianism, to the return
of great power competition,
to the way that populism
was unsettling political
and economic bargains in
countries around the world,
and you put COVID
on top of all this,
and it made it pretty clear that
it was time to convene a group
of really interesting
people to start thinking
about the implications of COVID.
Not just what it would do in
the next month or next year,
but how we might look
back on it 20 years hence.
And so we decided to
put together a project
that would draw on
all of the strengths
of Johns Hopkins University,
and so we have people
from the School of
Public Health,
who contributed great essays on
that dimension of the crisis.
People who have thought about
international organizations,
as well as more traditional
geopolitics.
But then also bring in
wonderful contributors
from outside the university.
People like Corey Shockey, or
Thomas Wright, or Neil Ferguson,
or Margaret MacMillan.
And so, in that sense, the book
was really an opportunity for us
to bring together smart people,
almost to help us organize our
own thinking about the impacts
that this tremendous
crisis might have.
>> Frank, what would you add?
I mean, it's-- as Hal suggested,
it's an eclectic group,
people coming from a
lot of different angles,
from public service, from
academia, journalism, etc.
>> Yeah, well what was really
remarkable was when Hal
and I sat down and
came up with a list,
we expected pretty much half
the people we asked to say no.
It pretty much turned out
just about everybody said yes.
I think there might have
been one person who said no.
And given how much pressure
was on us to create the volume,
the amount of time that we gave
to the authors was
not particularly long.
It was really a record
turnaround.
And in addition to that,
there wasn't going
to be a lot of time.
We would provide feedback.
We would get commentators
to provide feedback
and there wasn't going
to be a lot of time
to turn this all around.
And I think what was really
striking was how eager people
were to share their
thoughts about everything
that was going on in the world.
As Hal pointed out,
the Kissinger center,
we'd been thinking a
lot about world order.
This is obviously something
that Henry Kissinger has thought
about more than any, and
it's one of the real themes
that drives our work
at the Center.
And this moment, I think served
as a real constellation point
for a lot of people
to say, okay,
there's this great uncertainty,
there is this global crisis.
As Hal said, we had a sense that
things were unsettled before,
this is accelerating it.
What does it all mean?
And what was, I think, really
fascinating for Hal and I,
Hal and I were having
arguments about it before,
we're having arguments and
discussions afterwards,
it's just really an
incredible opportunity
to get the smartest people
that we know together to talk
about these issues
and learn from them.
And I would add another point,
and to emphasize that something
that Hal said, there's a lot of
the traditional type of people
who think about grand
strategy and world order,
but we have essays in there
on the effects of world order,
COVID and climate, or the
food supply, and food chains,
which I'd never really
thought about.
It's a terrific essay about
from historians of medicine,
about how we know pandemics end.
And so the other thing that I
think was really extraordinary
about just wonderful for
us was to bring in scholars
from a variety of
different disciplines
to help make us a lot smarter,
which made it a lot of fun.
>> Margaret, what charge were
you given by these gentlemen?
>> Well, I was asked
to write a short essay
on what history might have to
say about the present crisis.
And it's an interesting
question.
And I think what I've noticed
in the past few months is
that historians have
been called in,
because we have some
perspective,
and we can sometimes
formulate useful questions.
And so I look back at
other previous crises,
and other pandemics, but also
spent quite a lot of time
on the first world war, because
it's something I know a lot
about, and I tried to figure
out, what I always have
to do is figure out what
is new, and what isn't.
But I tried to figure out
where there might be parallels
in the past with
our present crisis.
And I looked at things that
helped to create the outbreak
of the first world war,
a sense of complacency,
a danger of tunnel vision on
the priority leaders, and then,
at the end of the war,
and unwillingness,
perhaps to learn some of the
lessons from that catastrophe.
And it seems to me that
this, these are things
that we should be thinking
about with the current pandemic.
How did we get into
this situation?
Why in some countries
did it become so bad?
Why was there perhaps less
international cooperation
than there might have been?
What went wrong?
But also what went right?
Why did certain societies
tend to surmount
and survive such challenges?
And what did we learn from it?
You know, historians don't
like to predict the future,
but I think at the moment, we're
all thinking about the future,
and so I agree with
both Hal and Frank.
It was a very interesting
mix of people
which doesn't often happen.
You know, quite often, we're
in our own boxes out here.
I mean, historians, and
political scientists,
and this looked really good,
because we crossed all sorts
of disciplinary boundaries.
And I think we learned
a lot from each other.
And I found it really
fascinating, so thank you both.
>> It's a great book.
Now, Margaret, I wanted
to follow up on something
that you touched on in your
chapter, which is you know,
everybody-- a lot of people,
not just the contributors
to this volume, are talking
about how there being a great
impact, for better or worse
in the response to COVID
on the world order.
What was it like, you know, the
Spanish Flu was, if anything,
even maybe a more
mysterious health crisis,
did it have an impact
on the world order?
Of a similar magnitude
that people are expecting?
>> It doesn't seem to have done,
and I think there may
be two reasons for that.
And one is that people at
that time, when the pandemic,
the flu pandemic broke
out, and just at the end,
and the early days after
the first world war,
people were much more used to
uncertainty, and much more used
to the idea that there
wasn't an [inaudible].
I think we've lived in a
world, particularly since '45,
where we think there will
always be a technological fix
for something.
And we have a pandemic, we
get a vaccine immediately.
And so I think in a curious way,
people back then were more
prepared for uncertainty,
and of course, influenza
epidemic wasn't the only thing
that carried people off.
They were used to living in
a world in which all sorts
of illnesses and diseases,
which we have now pretty much
eliminated, did kill people.
And finally, I think
the first world war sort
of overshadowed what
else was happening,
that the influenza
epidemic, I mean,
if you look at the literature,
there are not that many mentions
to it, by then, and there
are not that many plays
about it, not poems about it.
Whereas, I think COVID has had a
profound impact on our society,
perhaps because we weren't
prepared for uncertainty,
and we kept on thinking there
must be a solution and quickly.
>> In different ways, when
you go through the book,
you notice that the contributors
highlight the paradox,
that the liberal world order is
largely responsible for the fact
that the pandemic
spread so fast,
just as rising illiberalism
is hampering the response.
Frank, or Hal, what's
your take on that,
that kind of paradox, there?
>> So I'll take a stab at that.
I think you lightly highlighted
I think one of the key tensions
that emerge from the volume.
It's funny.
When you bring together
a great group like this,
I think one of the
things you want,
rather than answers,
are great questions.
And there were four sort of big
questions that emerged for me,
after reading them, that
I'm still wrestling with,
which gets exactly
to your tension
that you're talking about.
The first is, as you point out,
with globalization, alright,
within a period of
intense globalization that,
for several decades, which
we recognize has generated
extraordinary benefits,
very much aided by all sorts
of new technologies, but we're
also seeing, at the same time,
that this globalization had
certain burdens and costs
that we certainly weren't
prepared to fully deal with,
and I think that is one of
the things that comes out,
like global public health, like
a lot of the sort of challenges
that we are going to deal with
are products of globalization,
but also can best be solved
through globalization.
There are all sorts of
tensions that go on this, there,
and that's the first one.
The second is that the
global public health crisis
highlighted, and this is an
interesting debate that Hal
and I have been having
ever since,
about what is actually shaping
the international system.
Crises of these types, which
are problems of the common
or transnational problems,
which tend to be not zero sum,
are different than
the sort of return
of great power politics problems
that also appeared
in the volume.
And this is the whole course,
if you read closely the debate
about how to think about
the U.S.-China relationship,
it comes through very
clearly in the volume.
Is the future of the
international system going
to be shaped more by these
transnational global problems?
Or is it going to be
returned to the sort
of great power political
dilemmas and issues
that marked earlier
periods, is there going
to be some kind of mix?
Which obviously leads
to the third question,
which I mentioned,
which is China.
And then the fourth issue is
what is the response to this?
Right? What are the
institutional responses?
The governance responses,
that deal with these?
The other thing I think that
comes through in the volume is
that in the institutions
we created to deal
with world order, some of
which are post-World War II,
some of them are post-World War
I, some of them are post 89-91,
but we're structured to
deal with the realities
of a different world, have
really not done especially well
to deal with this crisis,
and highlights, I think,
some of the inadequacies,
if we have to deal
with future transnational
crises, like climate change.
And one of the real robust
discussions in the volume was,
well, do we take the existing
institutional architecture
and reform it?
Do we create new institutions?
Janice Stein had a terrific
essay that talked about offsite.
Bringing it offsite,
where you had institutions
that were adaptable
and manageable
to very specific problems.
But all of that, I think,
highlights the dilemma you posed
in your question which is
the world that we live in,
which created all
sorts of benefits,
also created these problems.
And we haven't-- our
thinking about governance
and institutions conceptualizing
this world hasn't caught
up with, I think, the dilemmas
and problems we've all--
we've basked in all the good
things that it has produced
for 30 years, and I think
we're sort of coming
to terms right now with some of
the burdens and difficulties.
>> Hal or Margaret, would
you like to add anything?
>> I'll let Hal go.
>> Sure, I'll just add,
I think the central issue
that the pandemic revealed
was that we have the reality
of deep interdependence, without
the capacity or even the mindset
to manage the problems that can
flow from deep interdependence.
So a lot of reasons the pandemic
spread so quickly obviously is
that global travel has become
essentially commonplace in a way
that would have been
unimaginable in earlier eras.
But the earlier eras, there
were a variety of issues
that rendered the liberal
international order
that had facilitated that
globalization less capable
of dealing with the pandemic.
The everything from
international institutions,
as Frank mentioned, that
have become increasingly
dysfunctional to a
U.S.-China relationship
that encouraged countries
to take--
the United States and China
at least, to take a zero sum,
rather than a positive
sum view of the crisis,
to the emergence of,
in many countries,
a class of populist
leaders who were opposed,
at least rhetorically to
globalization, and thus,
less well prepared
to engage in the sort
of cooperative global
management of a crises
that one would hope would
emerge in a situation like this.
And so I think that has
been what is most striking
about the crisis,
from the perspective
of the liberal order.
Something that was facilitated,
in a way, by the liberal order,
but also revealed many
of the deep strains
that had emerged
within that order.
>> Margaret?
>> Yes, I think what
also has happened
in that there were a number
of problems and issues
and tensions developing
before the pandemic.
And I think we were all aware
of them, but perhaps not focused
on them enough, or not enough
people were focused on them,
and what the pandemic has done
is overlapped developed crises,
and that has possibly
made it worse.
I mean the reservations
about globalization,
we understand the good sides,
and now we're becoming much
more aware of the bad sides.
The growing inequalities
in society.
The loss of faith in
a number of countries,
and that people are having
in their own leaders.
The cynicism, about
those who lead you.
The lack of faith
in institutions.
And also institutions-- I
mean, Phil Bobbitt in his piece
in the book, argued that
some of the institutions,
such as the U.S. Constitution
are no longer adapted in dealing
with the sorts of crises
of the 21st Century.
And so let's just say
a beneficial impact
from the COVID-19 will be that
we're going to have to think
about a lot of these things,
because we recognize, I think,
the challenges to
our structures,
and the weaknesses in them.
And the international
organizations
which have served this
action very well since '45,
we perhaps are forgetting
why we needed them.
And what COVID-19 has
done again has reminded us
that we do need a degree of
international cooperation.
We do need institutional
arrangements
so that we can cooperate
internationally.
And I think this may be our
youthful moment when we reflect
on what needs to be fixed in
our societies, and what sort
of institutions we need.
I have to hope that something
good will come out of this.
Having said that, how or
listening to Margaret's take,
their hopeful take, you wrote
that the conventional wisdom
of the impact of COVID
on the world order is quite
pessimistic in general.
Why is that?
>> Well, I think much of
the conventional wisdom,
at least at the time we
were writing the book,
had emerged in the earliest
weeks of the pandemic.
Basically the period
between when this,
the period when this went
from being a problem for China
to a profound crisis for
the rest of the world,
and during those
first weeks, it was--
what was true in the market
was true in everything.
It wasn't clear where
the bottom was.
And so when people were writing
about the impact of COVID
in March and April, they
were looking at an America
that seemed to be in disarray.
There were concerns
about whether democracies
might prove less well suited
to handling the pandemic
than autocracies might.
And so you saw a lot of
writing in that vein,
that this might actually be the
end of the American World War,
the end of the war-- I think
obviously the crisis has
subjected the United
States and the system it led
to profound stress, and we don't
know exactly what the final
damage will be.
I think it depends a lot
on how quickly we emerge
from this, and in what way.
That said, I think one of the
things that was becoming clear
as we started putting together
the volume as the point
that Margaret just made, that
there might actually be a number
of opportunities to emerge
from this crisis, as well.
And so one of them clearly
has been a much greater global
skepticism toward the
idea of Chinese power
and Chinese leadership than
there had been even a year ago.
And the United States,
and also other countries,
COVID accomplished
what years of talking
about the Chinese challenge
and the South China Sea
couldn't accomplish,
which was to convince people in
America and around the world,
that the behavior of the Chinese
Communist Party might actually
be a threat to their
wellbeing and their livelihood.
So there is an opportunity
there.
I think there is an opportunity
to pursue what I could consider
to be a smarter or a
more strategic version
of globalization.
We often heard in the early days
of the crisis, "this is the end
of globalization," and
that's clearly not true.
And in fact, one of the
things that has emerged
from the crisis is how well
global food chains have
functioned under
pressure, for instance.
But I think what will
happen as a result of this,
or what I'd like to
see happen at least,
is that countries won't
pull back into autoarchy,
but they'll pay more
attention to, you know,
what goods they actually
have to produce themselves,
what goods they can rely even on
geopolitical rivals to produce,
and then what goods they
can't produce themselves,
but might be able to obtain
through deeper economic
integration with, say,
other democracies, or
like-minded countries.
And so I think what
may ultimately emerge
from all this is you will
see the United States
and other democracies
selectively decrease their
economic intertwining with
China, but try to offset
that by deepening their
integration and cooperation
with countries that see
the world the same way.
And I think that would be
a positive development.
>> Frank, what extend
is that dependent
on American leadership, going
forward, in terms of, you know,
the opportunities that both
Margaret and Hal talked about,
and on a much more
positive scenario in terms
of the impact on
the world order.
>> That's a great question.
I actually think it's a
pretty critical variable.
And I think even though we're
in the midst of a crisis,
I think that we will likely
look back decades from now,
and say that the absence of
American leadership this year,
or at least the erratic
nature of that leadership
on the pandemic, probably made
it worse than it had to be.
And I think that getting
to Hal's excellent point,
that's why this is such
an interesting moment.
One of the debates we had
throughout the conference
and the volume was just
this reordering moment.
Because typically, reordering
moments follow great power wars,
or geopolitical collapse.
We don't really have
one of those.
So where will the incentive be?
And I think as Margaret
pointed out, this is sort
of like a wake-up call
for a lot of people.
A lot of, and hopefully that
wake-up call has highlighted
that there does need to be more
appreciation and effort put
into global governance on
some of these key issues.
But of course the
key variable is going
to be the U.S. in many ways.
And the U.S. is, as we know
in the midst of this sort
of internal debate and
discussion about what its role
in the world should be.
I think a lot of us took for
granted that the commitment
to sort of internationalism that
was part of the U.S. profile
through most of the Cold War,
and certainly the post-Cold
War was something solid,
that would continue.
But I think we see, not just
in the success of Trump,
but also throughout
the political spectrum,
there's certainly over
the past decade or so,
certainly since the war, has
been an increasing skepticism
about that American role.
So I think there
is an opportunity,
a necessity for American
engagement,
but I also think there is little
appetite for American engagement
as it was conceived before this.
Meaning that there is an
opportunity for some creativity,
for engaging with
these new problems,
but not necessarily
returning to 2005, or 1995.
And I think that political,
that set of political questions
is going to be one we are going
to see played out in the
U.S. in the next few years,
with uncertainty as to
how it will turn out--
because there are
strong elements
of restraint-oriented
policies in both parties.
I think that's not a small part
of President Trump's popularity
was because of his rejection
of certain aspects
of traditional American
internationalism.
And so I think it's
an open question.
I think there is a real
opportunity but I think it has
to be cognizant of
the domestic concern,
and I think there is an
opportunity for leadership
to demonstrate how
American leadership
on the international
scene connects directly
to these domestic issues.
Meaning that if America had
shown greater leadership during
this pandemic, there would
be less people dead, right?
I mean, if the economy,
the global economy would
be in far better shape.
And you see, you know,
with certain aspects,
you look at how the Federal
Reserve has performed,
for example.
They've actually, for all
the talk of American decline,
American monetary power is
as critical as it ever was,
and it has actually been
for the most part, creative,
and important in keeping
this crisis from being worse.
So it is unclear what the future
holds for U.S. leadership.
I believe it's critical.
I think this volume
shows it's critical.
But I also think it's critical
that it not just be the same
sort of leadership to grab
from the past, but
sort of cognizant
of the new challenges we face,
and the domestic realities
of an American citizenry
that has some qualms
about how America
engages the world
since the end of the Cold War.
>> Margaret, what qualities
of leadership do you think
are crucial at this time?
>> Well, what seems to have
come out a lot, it seems to me,
is that we've perhaps reached
the end of a certain kind
of political rhetoric, I mean,
we still see a lot of it,
where leaders talk in slogans,
and they dumb down the message,
they kind of appeal to what
they think people want to hear.
I mean, that certainly
was the case in the U.K.,
where I've been for
the last three months.
The government came
up with three
or four very simple
commands, which in the end,
I think people got fed up with.
And what we may be
seeing is a return
to what I'd call a more
reasoning adult type
of political rhetoric
on the part of leaders,
where they actually talk to
their people and try to explain
to them what it is that they
are doing, and try to explain
that they don't know
all the answers.
And I think we expect too much
of our leaders, and expect them
to have a solution
for everything.
And that may be breaking down.
I mean, it seems to me the
leaders that have really stood
out and done well in managing
crises, are again people
like [inaudible] in New
Zealand, [inaudible] in Germany,
who have talked very directly
and have not pulled
their punches,
and not pretended everything
was going to be all right.
And the public seemed to
be responding to that.
And so we may be seeing a
shift espoused in leadership.
And I think we're seeing not
yet a decline in populism,
but certainly a challenge
to populism.
Because populist governments get
into power promising everything.
You know, they can
fix everything.
There won't be any price to pay.
And I think what's becoming
clear is they can't fix
everything, and there
is a price to pay.
And so we may be seeing, I
think, a very important shift
in a number of countries, and
possibly globally in the sort
of expectations we
have of our leaders,
and the expectations
they have of us.
And I think that could
actually be a very good thing.
>> Hal, what appointments
should be paying close attention
to for president elect Biden, in
terms of impact on the direction
and the role of America
in the post-COVID world?
>> I think foreign policy
types like myself often focus
on the three or four positions
that we're all familiar with.
Who is going to be the
National Security Adviser,
Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense,
and these are all
obviously crucial.
But I think we need
a broader view
of the appointments
in two respects.
And so one, if you think about
the issues that I think about,
so in particular, the
U.S.-China relationship,
the issues of who is running
the commerce department,
and who is running the
treasury department,
and who is the U.S.
Trade Representative?
Those are going to
be just as important
as who is leading the
Pentagon or at Foggy Bottom,
because so many of
the key issues
in the U.S.-China relationship
revolve around finance,
technology and trade right now.
And then the second
thing I would say is
that it is important not just
to think about the top level
of appointments, but one
or two levels below that.
The Assistant Secretary, Deputy
Assistant Secretary level,
in part, because that's
where a lot of day
to day policy gets made, and in
part because that is where a lot
of the day to day management
of key relationships happens,
but also because, you know,
just as Frank was saying,
that the type of American
leadership we're going
to need isn't necessarily the
type we had 10 or 20 years ago.
That's where you'll start to
see the generational turnover,
within the democratic party.
And so at the top level, we'll
probably have a number of folks
who play very distinguished
and very important roles during
the Obama administration.
A level or two below
them is when we'll start
to have a younger generation
of folks who may come
in with a different set of ideas
on the World Trade Organization
or in China, or on a
variety of different issues.
And so looking at how that
kind of two-level dynamic plays
out will be important as well.
>> I was going to, as kind of a
closing gambit, let's give each
of you an opportunity to tell
President Elect Biden what he
needs to do.
If you he were to call you,
what would you tell him now
with respect to COVID
and the world order.
We'll start with you, Frank.
>> I would say that there's
a real opportunity here
that again, with this crisis,
to rethink basically both how
America engages the world,
both in terms of its conceptual
principles, and its tools,
and to be bold about that.
I would also make it clear that
there is a real opportunity here
to connect these
concerns of world order
and foreign policy
to domestic politics.
And one of the things, you
know, Hal and I teach a course
on the history of American
foreign relations, and you look
at the beginning, since the
very beginning of the Republic,
foreign policy was at the
heart of all domestic debates.
The modern political party
system began with a debate
over the Jade treaty in our
relationship with Great Britain,
and in the post-Cold War world,
those two worlds
have become divided.
And increasingly,
foreign policy,
national security international
affairs has been see
as this sort of siloed off area,
separate from domestic politics.
Not really part and
parcel of elections.
And I think that
hasn't been healthy.
And I think one of the things
I would tell the President
to do is to say the reason--
because obviously his domestic
agenda is going to dominate
for the first part of
his administration,
as well it should, but
on any number of issues.
And I would say here, not just
pandemics and climate change,
the things like social justice,
inequality, all of those things,
in a globalized world,
the connection
between our relationship
with China, the connection
between outcomes
and people's day
to day lives are intimately
connected to how America engages
and navigates the world, and
a smart, effective, creative,
forward-leaning foreign
policy and engagement
with the world will lead
to much better outcomes
for American citizens.
And that case hasn't been
made in a very long time.
And I think this is a
real opportunity to do so.
>> Margaret?
>> I think possibly
three things.
One is recognizing the
importance of diplomacy,
you know, that it's, I think,
being elected in a number
of countries in the
past two decades or so,
and we need diplomats.
We need experts.
We need people who have made
their careers studying other
places, and studying issues,
and they can give us advice,
and give advice to our leaders.
And I suppose the second thing I
would say, and I would say this
as a Canadian, because we
believe in multilateralism,
is fix and build your alliances.
Work for those who are like
you, don't push them away.
Work with them, because even
great powers, even a superpower
in the end needs friends, and
needs people to work with.
And the third thing I think I'd
say is take advantage of some
of the blunders China has
made in the past year or so.
You know, we tend
to think of China
as dealing very successfully
with the COVID crisis,
but if you look at its foreign
policy, and if you look indeed
at its repression in China,
we're now becoming much more
aware of what's happened
to the leader, that appalling
story, but also the ways
in which China has
alienated neighbors,
I think roughly pushed people
away and are now in a dispute
with Australia, which I think
is completely unnecessary.
They've been threatening
Canada, in a number of ways.
And I think the Chinese
have actually lost a lot
of authority in the world.
And they've been trying very
hard to build up so far,
and it seems in the
last year, they've sort
of thrown a lot of that away.
And I think this
is an opportunity
for the United States
and like-minded states.
>> Hal?
>> So, I'll say two things.
The first is the Biden
administration should keep
in mind that it's going to get
a huge soft power bounce simply
by dent of its own
existence on January 21st,
but that soft power
bounce is going
to buy it about six months.
And this is what we saw under
the Obama administration,
huge soft power bounce
in Europe, and elsewhere.
But then you have to start
delivering at some point.
And so the Biden administration
will have a lot of opportunity.
There will be a tremendous
amount
of Global goodwill
toward it from day one,
but that is a temporary
condition rather
than a permanent condition
if you don't get
the policies right.
The second thing I would say is
that the United States
should be thinking
about a creative ambitious
and generous program
for global vaccine distribution.
So we've had big breakthroughs,
it appears we have
big breakthroughs
on the vaccine development
front, vaccines that are likely
to be far more effective
than the versions
that the Chinese
are putting out.
For instance, the Trump
administration has distinguished
itself by taking a,
you distinctively
nationalistic approach
to vaccine development, right?
We're doing it for
us, it's for us.
And for no one else.
I think there is a big
opportunity out there
to think boldly about what
a truly global vaccine
distribution program
would look like.
That would be very costly.
The United States would
want to do it in cooperation
with like-minded
countries, but I would see
that as a wise investment in the
future of American leadership.
>> Well, Frank, Hal,
and Margaret,
thank you for joining us for
the Conversations on the Future
of Democracy Series, this fall.
All of us at the Library
wish you the best.