>> Gustavo Guerra: And now we
will begin this presentation.
Welcome to the Law Library
of Congress's Foreign
and Comparative Law
webinar series.
I'm Gustavo Guerra,
foreign law specialist
with the Law Library's Global
Legal Research Directory.
Today, my colleague Sayuri Umeda
and I will be presenting a
brief overview of four reports
that we prepared
in collaboration
with other specialists
and analysts in 2021.
Before we review our recent
reports, a word on our products.
The mission of the Law
Library of Congress is
to provide authoritative
legal research,
reference instruction services,
and access to an unrivaled
collection of US, foreign,
comparative, and
international law.
To accomplish this mission,
the law library has a staff
of foreign and US-trained legal
specialists and law librarians
who work on a wide variety
of resources for researchers
and these slide shows.
These resources include
multinational reports
such as the reports that
we will discuss today.
We will also prepare
reports for--
we also prepare reports
for federal agencies,
country law studies, guides,
and the Global Legal Monitor
which covers legal news
and developments worldwide.
This slide provides a list of
recent statistics on our work.
As you can see, in fiscal year
2021 we created 391 in-depth
research reports for Congress
covering far-ranging questions
on privacy protection, AI
regulation, COVID-19 response,
immigration, taxation,
constitutional law, et cetera.
We also answered more than
9,000 legal reference questions
and received more than 7,000,000
visits to our website, law.gov,
and published hundreds
of articles
in the Global Legal Monitor
which generated close
to half-a-million pages.
We also published 254 posts on
our blog, In Custodia Legis,
which generated more than
a million page views.
For more information
about our services,
please visit our
website at law.gov.
Now we will start the review
of our recent reports.
This is a list of
multinational reports
that we will be discussing.
As stated before, we prepared
these reports earlier this year
in collaboration with other
specialists and analysts.
Please note that these
reports are provided
for reference purposes only, and
that the information provided
by these studies reflects
research undertaken
as of the date of writing,
so it has not been updated.
The first report that we
will discuss is entitled,
"Net Zero Emissions
Legislation Around the World."
The report is available online
at the link displayed
on this slide.
This was a very timely
problem considering
that the United Nations' Climate
Change Conference just took
place in the United
Kingdom from October 31st
through November
12th, and negotiations
by stakeholders continued
through last weekend.
We published this
report in September.
This table-- a table that
we prepared includes 39
jurisdictions around the
world, and the Law Library
of Congress identified as
having a net zero emissions
or climate neutrality goal
enshrined in legislation.
Five of those jurisdictions
are shown on this slide.
Net zero emissions means
that countries release
no more greenhouse gases
into the atmosphere than
they remove from it.
This slide shows in the form
of a chart a few jurisdictions
we covered including the
European Union, where a June
2021 regulation sets 2050
as a target date for
climate neutrality.
Eight EU member states have
passed their own legislation
in addition to directly
applicable regulation,
including two that have
set an earlier target date.
To date, 11 countries outside
the EU have passed legislation
containing a net
zero emissions goal,
with two setting a target
date earlier than 2050.
At least three other countries--
Chile, Asia, and Taiwan,
have introduced or are
expressly developing legislation
that includes such a goal.
We have provided links for
primary source materials
and also included a brief note
as to the current
established EU legislation.
Several other countries
as well as cities
and companies have made net zero
pledges through policy documents
or other official statements.
These are not included
in the table.
The law library has published
various articles related
to climate change and
the global legal matter,
including some specifically
related to net zero targets.
We will continue to monitor
legal developments in this area.
So, if you are interested in
this topic, please subscribe
to receive relevant
updates at law.gov.
The next report that we
will review covers the "Belt
and Road Initiative," or BRI,
pursued by China since 2015.
We published this
report in August.
Our colleague Tariq Ahmad,
who coordinated this report,
summarized BRI
as a transcontinental
investment strategy and program
with the aim of promoting
economic connectivity
and integration in more than
100 countries in Asia, Europe,
and Africa through a
large set of rail, road,
and sea infrastructure
projects, energy pipelines,
special economic zones, and
other areas of cooperation meant
to expand China's economic
and political influence.
As background, we
know that in 2015,
the Chinese government
issued an official outline
of the principles, framework,
and cooperation mechanisms
of the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st-Century
Maritime Silk Road,
which together now are
referred to as BRI.
The outline states that the BRI
aims to promote the connectivity
of Asian, European,
and African continents
and their adjacent
seas and establish
and strengthen partnerships
among the countries along
the BRI.
According to the
official BRI portal,
China has signed 206 BRI
cooperation documents
with 140 countries and 32
international organizations
as of September 2021, when
we published this report.
Most of the agreements signed
with China take the form
of bilateral cooperation
agreements or Memoranda
of Understanding,
MOUs for short.
BRI-related MOUs cover
government-to-government
agreements involving
the Chinese government
and the host country government,
state entities including
state-owned corporations,
or regional organizations.
This is a map prepared by
my colleague Sayuri Umeda
that shows the countries
that are participating
in the Belt and Road Initiative.
We cover a number
of these countries,
as we will explain
during the presentation.
This slide shows the
jurisdictions reviewed
in our report.
The report covers the
legal and policy frameworks
that govern the Belt
and Road Initiative
in these countries and regions.
As explained in our report,
some of these countries have
several bilateral agreements
and other arrangements.
For example, Pakistan's
heavily involved
in BRI's flagship
project called,
"A China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor," or CPEC,
and has signed 51
agreements, MOUs,
and financing contracts
with China.
My colleague, Sayuri,
will explain
in more detail Pakistan's level
of involvement in BRI projects.
Malaysia also has signed various
MOUs and agreements related
to a number of infrastructure
products involving Chinese
funding including eight
government-to-government MOUs
signed in 2015, and 14 MOUs
signed in November 2016.
The report looks at the nature
and types of agreements made
by these countries, the
debt implication of some
of the major projects,
the extent of involvement
of local companies, and
the amount of job creation,
and whether projects have any
military or strategic purpose
in addition to commercial uses.
This is a very comprehensive
report, almost 200 pages long.
So, my colleague, Sayuri,
and I will provide some
highlights about it.
While preparing the report,
we realized that the
international legal framework
for the participation of host
countries in BRI is difficult
to review, as the text
of most agreements
and their precise contents
and terms are not
publicly available.
For example, the report
on the Russian Federation
and Central Asian
Countries describes the lack
of transparency in BRI-related
high-level meetings and resulted
in number of new agreements
in several instances.
However, the public
was informed only
of the titles of the agreements.
In Kenya, loan agreements
for certain products had
non-disclosure clauses
which state that the borrower
must keep all the terms
and conditions of an agreement
strictly confidential.
Furthermore, China does not
appear to have enacted any laws
or regulations governing the
implementation of BRI products.
Due to a lack of public
availability of most
of the MOUs, we relied
on government statements,
secondary sources, and
media reports in order
to obtain details of
most of these agreements.
Most of these agreements
signed with China take the form
of bilateral cooperation
agreements.
Despite some differences in
design, the basic structures
of these MOUs are similar,
as explained in the report.
Generally, these
agreements have sections
where parties affirm
common objectives and areas
of cooperation such as policy
coordination, free trade,
and financial integration
as well as methods
for resolving differences
in applicable law.
Cooperation in the agreements
can cover a wide range of areas
such as transportation
infrastructure development,
energy projects,
investment promotion,
and financial cooperation.
The BRI MOUs that we located
are not generally binding.
For example, the MOU with
the Philippines includes the
following paragraph on
applicable law: "This Memorandum
of Understanding does not create
legally binding obligations
for the participants.
It is an expression of their
common aspiration to cooperate
on the Belt and Road Initiative
for their mutual benefit."
It also states that any
disputes that may arise
from interpretation
or implementation
of the MOU should be
settled in an amicable manner
through diplomatic channels.
This MOU does not provide
specific information
on implementing projects
derived from it.
It is important to mention that,
in the Philippines for example,
the main BRI agreement
is not binding,
as you can see in this slide.
However, the Philippines
and China signed 28 additional
agreements on the same date
that the BRI MOU was entered.
These agreements cover several
topics including the development
of a number of infrastructure
projects,
and some of these projects were
financed by Chinese entities
through agreements
that are binding.
Those contracts provide that
these financial agreements
and the rights and duties of the
parties are to be governed by
and construed under Chinese
law, and disputes arising
from them must be
subject to arbitration
in Beijing and Hong Kong.
One loan agreement in the
Philippines includes a clause
in which the Philippines
waives its sovereign immunity
for itself or its
property related
to any arbitration proceeding
derived from disputes pertaining
to the loan agreement.
This waiver has caused some
controversy in the Philippines,
as some commentators
believe that China could take
over strategic Philippine
assets such as a gas-rich area
in Philippine waters
if the Philippines fails
to pay back the loan.
Other commentators believe
that China could not seize
such property in the
event of a loan default.
So, this is an example as
to how certain sections
of BRI contracts can
be controversial.
As discussed, many of the BRI
projects are financed by loans
from Chinese financial
institutions
such as the China Development
Bank and Exim Bank of China.
Generally, these loans are
guaranteed by the countries
that borrow from China
to fund the BRI projects,
and as explained in our
report, debt problems
and risks have been associated
with BRI projects in a number
of host countries such
as Djibouti, Kenya,
Pakistan, and Malaysia.
Kenya, for example, has 43
loans worth $9.2 billion,
and interest payments to Chinese
lenders represent 87% of money
that Kenya used to
service its debts in 2019.
Kenya is struggling to
generate enough revenue for one
of its flagship projects,
the standard-gauge railway,
to service its debt.
Djibouti's risk of external
distress and overall risk
of debt distress is also
high, with China holding
at least 70% of Djibouti's debt.
In Central Asia, the poorest
countries of the region,
Turkestan and Tajikistan, may
be vulnerable to debt shocks
as they borrow under
unfavorable conditions
to finance their
respective BRI-related
infrastructure projects.
Some commentators argue
that China is involved
in a debt trap diplomacy
which is burdening countries
with unsustainable levels of
debt in order to gain control
of strategic infrastructure
or political influence
when borrowing countries
can't repay their loans.
One often-cited example of this
practice is a port in Sri Lanka,
the Hambantota Port, which
is now controlled by China
after Sri Lanka did not
pay the debt in order
to finance this project.
My colleague Tariq Ahmad
included an explanation
on this port in his
report on Pakistan.
Also, our report
on Kenya indicates
that some analysts are concerned
that Kenya waived its sovereign
immunity in the loan agreement,
potentially exposing some of
its key public assets to seizure
by China in the event
of a default,
including Kenya's standard-gauge
railway in Mombasa
that connects this
Kenyan port to Nairobi.
There is a counter-argument
made on the debt trap issue.
Specifically, some commentators
note that, with the focus
on debt, not enough
attention is devoted to some
of the economic benefits
that BRI projects bring
to host countries,
and their ability
to handle their debt
obligations.
For example, with respect to
Kenya, our report explains
that the Mombasa
project connecting it
to Nairobi has benefitted
Kenya in many ways,
as it cut travel time between
these cities by more than half.
Also, the construction of
the project created thousands
of temporary local jobs, and
improved trade and connectivity,
boosted local enterprises,
brought benefits in technology
and skill transfer, and is
expected to bolster tourism.
Another country that is
mentioned in debates under pros
and cons of BRI loans
is Djibouti.
Many observers are concerned
that Djibouti has taken
on more debt than it can handle.
However, some commentators
dispute that it has fallen
into a debt trap because a
number of factors may mitigate
against that possibility
including positive economic
prospects, significant
reputational cost to China
if that happens, and the
Djiboutian government long
experience in leveraging
its strategic position
to protect its interests.
Some observers also note that
China is willing to renegotiate
or restructure loans
in some cases.
For example, Pakistan is
negotiating with China in order
to restructure the terms
of energy projects,
seeking to curb interest rates
on current power
sector-related loans in a 10-
to 12-year extension
on the debt repayment.
In response to criticism,
China recognized the need
to [inaudible] forum
held in 2019,
President Xi Jinping emphasized
that China would make the BRI
more financially sustainable
through the BRI Debt
Sustainability Framework.
Accordingly, China's ministry
of finance issued BRI Debt
Sustainability Framework
for participating countries of
the Belt and Road Initiative
in 2019 with the goal of
promoting sustainable economic
and social development
of BRI countries while
ensuring debt sustainability.
The framework is a
non-mandatory [inaudible]
to conduct debt sustainability
analysis and manage debt risk
to support lending positions.
It was based on the debt
sustainability framework
for low-income countries used
by the IMF and the World Bank,
which is positive according
to analysts from the Center
for Global Development
which is a research center
for development matters,
as it would seem
that this effort is
a step taken by China
to address debt problems
associated with BRI.
These analysts believe that
the framework to change
by Chinese policymakers
from denying any problems
with BRI lending to
acknowledging the debt risks
of large-scale lending,
and pointing to the need
for more disciplined lending.
However, these commentators
have some doubts
as to how the framework
will work in practice.
So, it remains to be seen
whether these mechanisms will
significantly improve
the problems associated
with debt incurred by
countries with BRI projects.
Commentators have written about
the potential and actual use
of certain BRI-linked ports
and other maritime assets
for strategic and
military purposes.
But this is usually
downplayed or rejected
by the host country and China.
For example, Cambodia
and China are suspected
of having signed a confidential
agreement granting China
exclusive rights over a
certain part of a naval base,
although both governments
deny this.
Similarly, the Gwadar seaport
in Pakistan is often highlighted
as an example of
a potential site
for a China overseas naval base.
However, according
to available reports,
it is not currently being used
as a People's Liberation
Army military base,
and both governments have not
made any military use for it.
Some experts note, however,
that the port may still serve
China's broader strategic
and other objective
policy objectives.
According to a China Maritime
Studies Institute case study,
objectives for Gwadar
are, number one,
to enable direct
transport between China
and the Indian Ocean and,
number two, to anchor an effort
to stabilize western
China by shoring
up insecurity on its periphery.
In addition, Djibouti hosts
China's only foreign military
base, a naval facility adjacent
to the Doraleh multipurpose port
from which it can participate
in antipiracy operations
and generally safeguard
its access
to the Strategic Maritime
Group along the coast
of the Horn of Africa.
Lastly, in Greece,
COSCO shipping,
a Chinese-owned enterprise,
has a majority stake in
and operates the Piraeus Port
Authority, making the port
of Piraeus the first major
seaport in the European Union
that is wholly managed
by a Chinese company,
raising strategic concerns
among U.S. and European allies.
This concludes my presentation.
Now my colleague, Sayuri Umeda,
will cover additional
sections of our report on BRI.
>> Sayuri Umeda: Hi,
this is Sayuri Umeda.
I talk about the data
highlight of some BRI countries.
The first: Djibouti.
Actually, Gustavo already
talked most of the things,
I think, that in this slide.
As he mentioned,
Djibouti is a crucial part
of its Maritime Silk Road due
to its strategic location.
And one of the major projects
is Doraleh Multipurpose Port.
The Exim Bank of China
financed 85% of US $580 million.
Exim Bank of China is
export/import bank of China,
one of three institutional
banks in China chartered
to implement the state policies
in industry, foreign trade,
economy, and foreign aid to
other developing countries
and to provide financial
support.
So, you will note that export of
Chinese products and services.
As Gustavo said, Djibouti
have serious debt problem.
China is holding at least
70% of Djibouti's debt.
Second, Russia and Central Asia.
Russia and China, the dominant
area of cooperation is energy.
Two BRI flagship
projects are the Power
of Siberia natural
gas pipeline project
and the Yamal liquefied
natural gas project.
The Power of Siberia project is
the biggest BRI project of all.
It is in US dollar
$55 billion project.
Last December, I mean 2019
December, the first phase
of the Power of Siberia
was brought into operation
under the first ever pipeline
supplied last year December
with China.
And more development is coming.
Among Central Asian countries,
Kazakhstan is the
center of BRI project.
Eighty-percent of
Central Asia investment
by China go to Kazakhstan.
It's more than $70 billion.
Chinese investors own 24%
of Kazakhstan's oil
production assets and 13%
of its gas production assets.
There has been considerable
criticism over corruption
and the lack of transparency,
due diligence,
and competitive bidding/fair
procurement practices involved
in BRI projects across
Central Asian host countries.
And next is Pakistan.
As Gustavo said, Pakistan is one
of the key countries with China.
China-Pakistan economic Corridor
is a BRI flagship project.
CPEC-- that's China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor--
infrastructure projects
are being developed mostly
through low-interest
government concessional loans.
Every CPEC project has
different terms and conditions.
They are also financed using a
variety of different structures
that may involve
Pakistani state entities,
Chinese state-owned enterprises,
Pakistani private firms,
and other third parties.
Project financing often includes
a mix of Chinese grants,
government concessional
low-interest loans,
zero-interest loans,
and investments
through public-private
partnerships.
And also, Gustavo mentioned
Gwadar Port is a deep-sea
commercial and multipurpose
port.
It's located at the Arabian
Sea, situated at the mouth
of the Persian Gulf, just
outside the Strait of Hormuz
where the key shipping good in
and out of the Persian Gulf.
Since February 2013,
construction and operations
of the port have been conducted
by state-run Chinese-applied
China overseas port
holding company.
It look like China gained more
for profit by the agreement.
Ninety-one percent
of the revenue
and port-generated profit
will go to Chinese company,
and nine percent goes to
Gwadar Port Authority.
And over 700,000 jobs is created
in the Pakistani labor market,
but the Pakistani laborers,
many unskilled laborers
and skilled workers--
so high-earning jobs
Chinese skilled workers take.
The last I talk about
Greece's Port of Piraeus.
In 2008, the Chinese state-owned
enterprise C-O-S-C-O Shipping's
subsidiary won a
35-year concession
to operate the Piraeus
Container Terminal.
So, this is actually
pre-date BRI,
because BRI started in 2013.
Actually, many other countries'
BRI projects also, in fact,
pre-date BRI, starting
point of BRI,
and they are rebranded
and they are BRI.
In 2016, C-O-S-C-O
acquired a majority stake
in the Piraeus Port Authority,
which manages all
other operations
in the Port of Piraeus.
In 2019, Piraeus Container
Terminal grew rapidly
and became Europe's fourth
busiest container terminal.
The success of a Chinese company
in Piraeus attracted the
interest of Chinese enterprises
in other FDI opportunities
in various sectors in Greece.
This concession agreement
was subject
to proceedings before the
European Commission which found
that certain provisions
constitute unlawful state aid
under European Union law.
For example, like tax treatment.
Stamp tax were exempted
or those things.
And in 2017, an appeal
was filed but dismissed.
Next is a report about the
"Regulation Crash
Avoidance Systems"
that was published
August this year.
So, jurisdictions covered
were Australia, Canada, China,
European Union, France, Israel,
Japan, Russia, South Africa,
this is a typo, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, UAE, and the UK.
So, topic covered was
the legal requirements
for car crash avoidance
systems aimed at detecting
and classifying pedestrians
and cyclists.
So, there is international
framework
for the Crash avoidance
system regulation.
That is UN regulation
number 152,
Uniform Provisions Concerning
the Approval of Motor Vehicles
with Regard to the Advanced
Emergency Braking System,
and it was agreed on
last year, October,
and entered into force
this year, January 3rd.
These UN regulations formed
under the 1958 agreement
that is officially titled,
"Agreement Concerning
the Adoption
of Uniform Technical Regulations
for Wheeled Vehicles, Equipment,
and Parts which can be
Fitted and/or be Used
on Wheeled Vehicles
and the Conditions
for Reciprocal Recognition of
Approvals Granted on the Basis
of these Regulations."
Very long title.
And these regulations are
formulated under the UNECE--
UNECE that I explain
that in the next slide.
Okay, this is that.
UN Regulation 152 was
led by EU and Japan.
So, the UNECE, Economic
Commission for Europe, is,
that's the body to
make UN regulations
under the 1958 agreement.
And under the UNECE, the
World Forum for Harmonization
of Vehicle Regulations
is a UNECE working group.
So, a lot of discussions are
made in these working groups.
Any UN member may
participate in the activities
and become a contracting
party to the agreements.
And the parties are
not obligated
to adopt a specific
UN regulation.
They can, yeah, only
even participants
to the agreement don't have
to adopt UN regulations.
Not that they can't but
doesn't have to-- any of them.
And I added a 1998 agreement
here-- just a related agreement.
It is concerning
the establishing
of global technical regulations
for wheeled vehicles.
And there are many
countries covered
in this report-the participants.
Yeah, participants.
And under this 1998 agreement,
global technical regulations,
called GTR, it failed.
And so, it's separate,
different from UN regulation,
like UN Regulation 152.
But those GTR and
regulations are supposed
to be more integrated
in the future.
This GTR now has 21 rules,
regulations and the last two,
number 20 and 21, is
about electric vehicles.
Next slide please.
Thank you.
So, currently the crash
avoidance system is mandatory
only in Japan.
Just a formal beginning
this year.
The UN Regulation
122 is incorporated
in Japan's notification
or regulation titled,
"Regarding Partial Amendment
of Notification Stipulating
the Details of Safety Standards
for Road Transport Vehicles."
So, this regulation was
amended January 31, 2020.
So, the requirement
of Regulation 152 is the system
shall automatically detect a
potential forward
collision, provide the driver
with an appropriate warning,
and activate the vehicle braking
system to decelerate the vehicle
with the purpose of avoiding
or mitigating the severity
of a collision in the event
that the driver does not
respond to the warning.
So, so these functions
were all incorporated
in the Japan's regulation.
And here it say that regulations
state that new titled cars go
to market after November 1st
should follow the standard
adopted, new standard.
And this new type car means
a significant model change;
it's not a minor model change.
And EU already try to
make this regulation,
they already made this
regulation in force,
but not yet mandatory.
EU Regulation 2019/2144 on
type-approval requirements
for motor vehicles
and their trailers,
as regards their general
safety and the protection
of vehicle occupants
and vulnerable road users
was adopted in November 27,
2019 and coming in
force January 5, 2020.
And in EU, will be mandatory
July 6, 2022, next year.
And all EU members and the
UK and Turkey will follow--
in these countries,
that regulation will
be mandatory next year.
Next slide please.
There are various kinds
of automatic emergency
braking systems.
And so, the Regulation 152
that I read just a few minutes
before, that the definition.
But, like, for example,
in Japan in 2003,
many ally states had
these automatic emergency
braking systems.
But it didn't stop the car,
but it shortened the
response time significant.
And always this technology is
advancing, and most new cars
in Australia, EU,
Japan, South Korea,
the US have some kind of AEBS.
AEBS has been mandatory
for heavy trucks
since 2014 Japan and 2015 EU.
Again, this AEBS system is
different from Regulation 120.
152. It's about the
collision to the car in front.
So, like, the highway, the truck
can't stop quickly and collide
with the car in front.
The AEBS mitigated the
damage from such collisions.
And so other countries,
it's not still--
the regulation--
it's not mandatory.
But many countries like China
or the UAE are developing
autonomous vehicles.
And autonomous vehicles include,
necessarily include AEBS.
So, in other countries,
soon, I think that this kind
of regulation will be adopted.
Okay. I should hurry up
on the next regulation.
Next slide, please.
And next is "Taxation of
Cryptocurrency Block Rewards
in Selected Jurisdictions,"
published January 22, 2021.
Next slide, please.
And many jurisdictions
are covered.
Okay, next slide, please.
And now, so, the general, like,
the profit from trading
cryptocurrency is generally,
in many countries it's taxed
typically as a capital gain.
But so now, cryptocurrency
has more development
and many opportunity to get
the new tokens happened.
And at first, cryptocurrency
mining, the new tokens obtained
by cryptocurrency mining, if
we [inaudible] or more like,
if there is any new
regulation for this.
And crytomining is a
process in which transactions
for various forms of
cryptocurrency are verified
and added to the
blockchain digital ledger.
For this effort, successful
miners obtain new cryptocurrency
as a reward.
Large-scale or commercial mining
activities are generally taxed
like a business tax
or corporation tax.
And small-scale cryptocurrency
mining by individuals,
then there are a
different approach.
Income. Denmark and
Finland and Norway,
tax by income from hobby.
Denmark and Finland
tax these new tokens,
but Norway doesn't tax
something you gain from hobby.
And in Sweden, it is
income from employment.
Next slide, please.
And in Japan and the UK,
it's miscellaneous income.
And in Italy, VAT applied.
And other countries-- Australia,
Canada, France, Jersey, Norway,
and Singapore-- no tax.
New Zealand, in New Zealand
it is taxed depending
on the purpose of the activity.
Okay, next slide, please.
Next, "New Tokens Obtained
by Cryptocurrency Staking."
Staking is the process
of delegating or locking
up crypto holdings
to earn rewards.
And some countries
had definitions.
Australia said Proof of Stake
is a form of consensus mechanism
that requires a holder to
hold units of a cryptocurrency
so they can validate
transactions
and create new blocks.
Forgers participate in consensus
by staking their
existing tokens.
A forger who is selected to
forge a new block is rewarded
with additional tokens when
the new block has been created.
The additional tokens
are received
from holding the
original tokens.
The money value of those
additional tokens is ordinary
income of the forger at
the time they are derived.
So, it's really difficult,
some definitions
of cryptocurrency technology.
Tax authorities of Australia,
Finland, New Zealand,
and Switzerland have
addressed the tax treatment
of tokens received
through staking.
Australia treats it as
ordinary income received.
Finland, capital gains.
New Zealand, depending on
the purpose of the activity.
Switzerland, it's VAT.
Next slide, please.
Next is "Tokens Acquired
Through Airdrops."
Airdrops are distributions
of small portions
of new cryptocurrency token
or coin, usually for free,
to numerous wallet addresses
for marketing purposes.
And only two countries
have some provision.
In Singapore, it's
not taxable as long
as the tokens are not received
in return for any goods
or services performed.
In Australia, it's
ordinary income on receipt.
Next slide, please.
And last is "Tokens
Acquired through Hard Forks."
A hard fork or a
chain split occurs
when a cryptocurrency's
existing code is changed,
resulting in both an
old and a new version.
The two versions of the software
are meant to be incompatible.
In comparison, with a
soft fork the two versions
of the software are
meant to be compatible.
Japan, Finland, Australia has
a clear vision about, I mean,
had some tax authority
mentioned or regulation
and the tokens acquired through
hard fork are not taxed in any
of these three countries.
Okay, this is end
of my presentation.
Oh, okay. I forgot
one last slide.
Crypto taxation is always, now,
all countries' tax
authorities are catching
up to the cryptocurrency
development.
And that always change.
For example, Kazakhstan
government enacted a law
that will tax cryptocurrency
mining
from next year, January first.
So, we often, law library here,
regularly check those
crypto taxation.
So, hopefully, we will
update the report sometime.
Okay, thank you.
This is end of my presentation.
>> Gustavo Guerra: Okay, so
I guess my colleague, Sayuri,
has just concluded
her presentation.
We are-- it's almost, it's three
o'clock now, so I'm afraid we.
Unfortunately, we don't have
time to respond to questions.
But please note that since we
couldn't answer your questions
today, you can send
those to us using our
"Ask A Librarian" service.
The link to do so is
shown on this slide.
And please also note that
on December 2nd, at 11 a.m.,
our colleague Elizabeth Osborne
who is a CM legal reference
librarian will host an
orientation to legal
research webinar focusing
on tracing federal regulations.
The entry in the series provides
participants with information
about [inaudible] and
common rule-making process,
including the publication and
citation of federal regulations
as well as exploring how to
trace a federal regulation.
And on December 9th,
the Law Library
of Congress will
celebrate Human Rights Day
to commemorate the adoption
of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights by the United
Nations with an event designed
to promote understanding
and recognition
of human rights around
the globe.
This year's event focuses on
the intercession of health
and human rights with a panel
that will bring together leading
health and legal scholars
and practitioners who will
discuss the interactions
between health, human rights,
and how human rights can help
to strengthen public health
systems across the globe
and improve the response
to health challenges.
To sign up for this webinar,
this is the website
shown on this slide.
And as we near the end of
the webinar, we thank you
for attending today's
presentation.
We would like to note that you
will see an evaluation survey
as you leave this webinar.
We ask you to complete
this survey for us.
We appreciate your feedback.
Thank you very much for joining
us today, and happy holidays.